Zhu v. Meng CA4/1

CourtListener 10100000Calctapp30 août 2024

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Filed 8/30/24 Zhu v. Meng CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ZHU ZHU, D083785

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2200778)
XIANXI MENG,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Callahan & Blaine, Edward Susolik, Brian J. McCormack, and Brett E.
Bitzer for Plaintiff and Appellant.
MacDonald & Cody and Edye A. Hill for Defendant and Respondent.
In the early morning hours of March 7, 2021, Zhu Zhu was awakened
by screaming in a home in which she was staying as an overnight guest. Her
close friend and host Jia Jia and Jia Jia’s eight-year-old daughter, Ruby,
were being attacked by an intruder who had entered the home through an
unlocked door. Within moments of being roused from her sleep, Zhu herself
was grievously injured by the intruder, and Jia Jia and Ruby lay dead.
Zhu filed suit, alleging negligence against the last occupant of the home
to go to bed on the night of the attacks—Jia Jia’s husband and Ruby’s father,
Xianxi Meng. In a first amended complaint (the complaint), Zhu alleged that
“Meng, as the owner of the . . . residence, had a duty to his invited guest,
[Zhu], to . . . take reasonable safety precautions and make sure . . . all of the
doors to the Meng residence were locked and . . . the security
alarm . . . turned on prior to going to bed.” The trial court concluded Meng
owned no duty on the facts alleged and, on this basis, sustained Meng’s
demurrer and entered a judgment of dismissal. Zhu appeals the judgment,
contending the court erred in finding no duty. We disagree. Hence we affirm
the judgment.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background1
In 2021, Rancho Cucamonga—the community in which Jia Jia, Ruby,
and Meng resided—had a large and growing Asian population and a property
crime rate that exceeded the national average. In this same timeframe,
“California had the highest percentage in the country of Asian hate crimes,
including, but not limited to, . . . physical assault,” and law enforcement
authorities, a think tank, and media outlets were reporting a substantial rise

1 Because this appeal arises in the context of a demurrer, we proceed as
though all allegations of material fact pleaded in the complaint have been
admitted by the defendants. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318;
Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 160, fn. 4; see also Del E. Webb
Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [in
considering merits of a demurrer, “the facts alleged in the pleading are
deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Thus our
descriptions of events preceding Zhu’s filing of the complaint should be
understood as having been drawn from the complaint. We make no findings
as to such descriptions’ truth or falsity.

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in crimes directed against individuals perceived to be Asian. Among the
conditions to which such sources attributed these trends was “anti-Asian
rhetoric . . . blam[ing] Asian communities for the spread of COVID-19 in the
United States” and “the fact that Asian families generally store a lot of cash
and jewelry in their residences.”
According to data revealed in one published report, the area of Rancho
Cucamonga in which Jia Jia, Ruby, and Meng’s home (the residence) was
located was “a moderately dangerous location of the city.” During the two-
and-one-half year period that preceded the March 7 attacks, several violent
crimes had occurred or been narrowly averted within various distances from
the residence. Among them: (i) a homicide 1.8 miles from the residence, (ii) a
would-be looting 2.3 miles from the residence, (iii) a pair of home-invasion
armed robberies 2.8 miles from the residence, and (iv) a homicide and home
arson an unspecified distance from the residence.
The residence itself had attributes that rendered it more vulnerable to
a burglary or other type of home invasion crime than would otherwise be the
case: it was located on a corner near a major thoroughfare, it lacked exterior
lighting, it could be entered on the ground floor, and visibility and light from
the street were obscured by trees and the fence. In addition, Jia Jia, Ruby,
and Meng did not have a dog.
The complaint does not allege whether or to what extent Meng may
have been aware of crime statistics or of security implications associated with
the attributes of the residence just discussed. But it does allege that he was
mindful of the importance of home security. Thus, for example, at lunchtime
on March 6, 2021 (the day before the attacks), Jia Jia mentioned to Zhu: that
she [Jia Jia] and Meng “did not feel safe as a result of the increase in anti-
Asian hate crimes . . . in Rancho Cucamonga since the COVID-19 pandemic;”

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that, due to these fears, they “were increasing security protections” at the
residence;” and, more specifically, that they “were in the process of hiring a
contractor to update and increase the security protections of the [residence],
including, but not limited to, rebuilding the back fence . . . and installing
security cameras.”
Similarly, the complaint alleges that, at dinner that evening, Jia Jia,
Meng, and Zhu discussed their concerns: “that the local community was not
as safe as it [had been] prior to the COVID-19 pandemic;” that this was due
in part to “increasing home invasions and violent assaults against Asians;”
“that . . . crime in general . . . and anti-Asian hate crimes in particular
. . . had been escalating in . . . the neighborhood;” “that, as Chinese
immigrants, [Jia Jia, Meng, and Zhu] were constantly concerned about their
personal safety;” and that Jia Jia and Meng “were afraid of being burglarized
as a result of . . . storing valuables inside the [residence and because of] the
stereotype that Asians in general store cash, jewelry, and other valuables in
their house.” In addition, “Meng spoke about his prior purchase of a gun in
order to protect the . . . residence in response to the increasing crime rates
and increasing anti-Asian hate crimes being committed in Rancho
Cucamonga.”
The afore-mentioned concerns notwithstanding, the residence was not
altogether defenseless. In addition to Meng having purchased a gun to
protect the premises and its occupants, the residence was equipped with locks
on the doors and a security system, a doorbell camera, and a camera (that
Meng himself had installed) with a view of the living room.
Zhu’s presence during lunch and dinner at the residence on March 6,
2021, was not unusual. She and Jia Jia “had been very close friends for
many years,” and she “would regularly come to visit . . . Jia Jia, Ruby,

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and . . . Meng at the . . . residence.” “During these visits, it was common for
[her] to spend the night as an invited guest.” And on occasions when she did
so, “she observed . . . Meng locking the doors and arming the security system
before going to bed.” In fact, “it was . . . Meng’s standard practice to check
and make sure all of the doors were locked, including, but not limited to, the
sliding glass door to the back patio[,] . . . and [to] arm the security system
before going to bed . . . because he knew [it would be] dangerous to the
residents and guests of the [residence] . . . if he [were to leave] a door
unlocked and/or . . . not arm the security system” inasmuch as that would
“greatly increase[] the odds of an intruder breaking into the residence and
causing harm to the residents and guests.”
Following dinner, Jia Jia and Meng invited Zhu to stay the night
“because it would be too dangerous for [Zhu] to drive back to her home.” Zhu
accepted the invitation. In addition, she followed Jia Jia and Meng’s advice
“to get all of her valuables out of her car and store them inside the
[residence].” Thereafter, Jia Jia, Ruby, and Zhu went to bed and Meng left
the residence to go to a poker game.
When Meng left the residence, the security system was activated.
When he returned at about 12:30 a.m. the next morning (March 7), Zhu was
awakened by the sound of the garage door opening. Then, at about 3:00 a.m.,
she was awakened again—this time by Jia Jia and Ruby’s screams in the
next room. Upon hearing the screams, Zhu exited the room in which she had
been sleeping and stepped into the hallway, whereupon she was attacked,
too, and stabbed four times.
The assailant was an intruder who had gained “unrestricted,
undeterred, and undetected access into the [residence]” through a sliding
glass door to the backyard. Although the intruder “did not have any

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professional tools to break into the [residence]” that evening, he had been
able to gain access because the “sliding glass door was unlocked and the
security system was not armed, making it so he could easily and silently
enter.” “[I]f the . . . sliding glass door [had been] locked and/or the security
alarm [had been] armed, [the assailant] would have been deterred from
breaking into the [residence] and/or . . . the noise from . . . breaking into the
[residence] and/or the security alarm would have caused [Meng] to wake up
and prevent the attack and injuries.”
II.
Discussion
The existence of a legal duty to act reasonably under the circumstances
is an essential element of a negligence theory of action that we review de
novo. (See Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 657, 669.)
Ordinarily one who has not created a peril has no duty to protect
another from that peril. (See Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks Inc. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 993, 1016 (Kuciemba).) But in some instances one does have such
a duty. (See, e.g., Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 215
(Brown).) Thus, for example, an owner or possessor of real property owes “ ‘a
duty to take reasonable steps to protect persons on the property from
physical harm caused by the foreseeable conduct of third parties,’ including
foreseeable criminal acts.” (Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99,
107 (Hanouchian).)
Recognition of a legal duty to protect another from the foreseeable
criminal acts of a third party is governed by a two-step inquiry: First, the
court must inquire into the existence of either a special relationship between
the parties or of a negligent undertaking of aid, giving rise to an affirmative
duty to protect. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 211, 213, 221-222.) Second,

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if such a relationship or such circumstances exist, then the court must
consider a set of factors articulated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d
108 (Rowland, and the Rowland factors) to decide whether policy
considerations nonetheless militate in favor of limiting or not recognizing
that affirmative duty. (Brown, at pp. 211, 213, 221-222.)
Turning to step one of this analysis, i.e., the existence of a special
relationship giving rise to a duty to protect, we note that Zhu was an
overnight guest in Meng’s home, Meng perceived the threat of a violent home
invasion to be very real, and it is plausible (albeit not specifically alleged in
the complaint) that Zhu took comfort in the security protocols she had
observed Meng engaging in, that she relied on him engaging in those
protocols, and that Meng was aware of her reliance.
On these allegations and inferences, we assume but do not decide that
there may have been a special relationship that gave rise to an affirmative
duty on the part of Meng to protect Zhu. (Allen v. Liberman (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 46, 50 [hosts “had . . . special relationship with [overnight guest]

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because she was an invited guest in their home” 2]; Margaret W. v. Kelley R.
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 141, 155 fn. 17 [a “special relationship . . . [may be]
based on a . . . residential host-guest relationship”]; Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 620–621 (Regents)
[“Generally, [a special] relationship has an aspect of dependency in which one
party relies to some degree on the other for protection.”].) Instead, we focus
our analysis on step two of the analysis. We begin by reciting the Rowland
factors.
“In the passage of Rowland that has now become a
touchstone of our negligence jurisprudence, we summarized
the policy considerations that guide the inquiry. To depart
from the general principle that all persons owe a duty of
care to avoid injuring others, we explained, ‘involves the
balancing of a number of considerations’: ‘the foreseeability

2 Notably, the duty that a host owed to social guests in his home was
much narrower at common law than it is now.
“[Under common law], landowners owed a duty of
reasonable care only to ‘invitee[s],’ which [the California
Supreme Court] described in Rowland as meaning
‘business visitor[s].’ [Citation.] Licensees, by contrast—
including social guests—were owed only a duty to refrain
from ‘wanton or willful injury.’ [Citation.] The general idea
was that invitees whose entrance benefited the landowner
in some way—patrons at a grocery store, for example—
could reasonably expect that the landowner would take
precautions to protect them from dangerous conditions of
the premises. But not so for social guests.”
(Hoffmann v. Young (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1257, 1280 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.).)
Then, “in Rowland, [the California Supreme Court] . . . discard[ed] [this
rule] in favor of the modern approach . . . appl[ied] today.” (Hoffmann, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1280; cf. Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108 [recognizing duty of
host to eliminate or warn social guest of latent defect on premises].) As a
consequence, following Rowland, “a victim’s status as a . . . licensee, or
invitee cannot be determinative of a landowner’s duties.” (Brown, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 217.)

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of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.’ ”
(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217, quoting in part Rowland, supra, 69

Cal.2d at pp. 112-113.)3
In assessing the Rowland factors, we focus “ ‘not . . . on the facts of the
particular case before us,’ ” but rather, “ ‘at a relatively broad level of
generality,’ ” on “ ‘whether carving out an entire category of cases from [the]
general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.’ ” (Kuciemba,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1021.)4 “In other words, the duty analysis is
categorical, not case specific.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
Our Supreme Court has explained a four-step analysis for courts to
apply in considering the Rowland factors:
1. First, the court identifies the specific actions that the
plaintiff claims the defendant had a duty to undertake
to prevent harm;

3 The first three Rowland factors are sometimes referred to as
foreseeability factors, and the last four as policy factors. (See, e.g., Regents,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. at 629-632.)

4 The “general duty rule” is codified at Civil Code section 1714,
subdivision (a) which provides in relevant part that “[e]veryone is
responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his or her property or person.” But the same duty is not
imposed when the plaintiff’s injuries were inflicted by a third party.
(Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1017.)

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2. Next, the court analyzes how financially and socially
burdensome these measures would be;
3. Then, the court identifies the nature of the third-party
conduct that could have been prevented by these
measures and assess how foreseeable it was that the
conduct would occur;
4. Finally, the court balances the burden with the
foreseeability. “The more certain the likelihood of harm,
the higher the burden the court will impose; the less
foreseeable the harm, the lower the burden the court
will [impose].”
(Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213–1214 (Castaneda).)
Applying Castaneda’s analytical framework to the case presented here,
we begin by identifying the duty, and then we separately assess and then
balance foreseeability and burden.
Zhu contends that Meng had the duty “to use the safety precautions
that were already in place” and “to ensure that all doors of the residence are
properly locked and secured and that the security alarm is turned on prior to
going to bed.” Zhu argues that these measures are minimal and posed “zero
burden” to Meng. The third-party conduct on the night in question, i.e.,
deadly violence by a late-night intruder, may well have been prevented by a
locked patio door or a sounding alarm.
But as to foreseeability, “ ‘with hindsight, everything is foreseeable.’ ”
(Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 487, 502 (Colonial Van).)
Because “rarely is anything completely unforeseeable,” courts use “a
subjective reasonableness standard in determining whether the degree of
foreseeability is high enough to impose a duty on the defendant to act on it.”
(Tucker v. CBS Radio Stations, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1253; see
also Sturgeon v. Curnutt (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 301, 306–307.)

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“Unfortunately, random, violent crime is endemic in today’s society.”
(Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 678). On the
other hand, “it is difficult if not impossible . . . to predict when a criminal
might strike.” (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1138, 1150 (Wiener).) The prevalence of crime “does not make a particular
criminal act foreseeable for purposes of a duty analysis” under California law.
(Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 538 [“[M]ore than a general
prospect of danger is required ‘before we can hold a defendant liable for the
criminal acts of third parties’ ”]; see Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at
p. 111, quoting in part Wiener, at p. 1150.)
The foreseeability of the acts of a third party has been found to be
greater when the defendant is aware of the danger posed by a specific person.
(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th 607 [university could foresee that a specific,
potentially violent student might harm other students]; Pamela L. v. Farmer
(1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 206 [defendant knew her husband had molested
children in the past].) Foreseeability is also greater when a specific location
has a particular susceptibility to crime (Vasquez v. Residential Investments,
Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269 [murder was a foreseeable result of a missing
pane of front door glass where at least one prior incident had occurred
involving an aborted entry by an intruder, and assaultive crimes had been
reported in other apartments in the building]); or where the criminal act
occurs in real time in the defendant’s presence (see, e.g., Delgado v. Trax Bar
& Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 245 [duty to respond reasonably to criminal
conduct that is occurring in the defendant’s presence]; Morris v. De La Torre
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 260, 264 [proprietor’s duty to respond reasonably to
criminal conduct that is imminent or ongoing in her presence]).

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Here, there were no allegations of prior threats or actions by the
intruder that would have alerted Meng to a specific and imminent danger;
nor were there prior incidents to put Meng on notice that the early morning
hours of March 7, 2021, would be the time when an intruder would attempt
to gain entry to his home. It is not alleged that Meng failed to act
appropriately while the attack was underway.
There is an additional layer to the foreseeability analysis here, namely
the foreseeability that an unlocked door would lead to violent murder, as
opposed to burglary, theft or vandalism. (See, e.g., Colonial Van, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 504 [attacker’s “deranged and motiveless attack” was
sufficiently unlikely that the court found no causal nexus between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered].)
In short, Meng’s failure to check the patio door and set the alarm was
not “sufficiently likely” to result in the attack on Zhu and the deaths of
Meng’s wife and daughter. (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
As to the financial and social burden that would result from a finding of
duty owed to overnight guests in a private home, we are not persuaded that
the burden is as minimal as Zhu argues. Because of the generalized nature
of the risk, the true burden would be that every night of the year, in private
residences in which people are sleeping (or otherwise vulnerable), at least one
adult in the home would bear a legal duty to check all doors and windows to
ensure they were locked, and to arm an alarm if the house had an alarm
system. We question whether such a duty would be “workable” (Castaneda,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1216), particularly in light of the many questions such
a requirement would pose: e.g., which adult(s) in the home bears the duty?
What is the correct time for the lock check? Would this duty only apply to
homes in neighborhoods known for crime? If so, what would be the standard

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for determining which neighborhoods fall within that category? Would people
living in more secure, affluent communities bear a lower duty to their guests
than those living in neighborhoods afflicted by crime?
Although Zhu is correct that the financial cost of using existing locks
and alarms would be low, the social costs may well be much higher. A person
living in a private residence would have to think twice before inviting a guest
to spend the night, lest she incurs a legal duty beyond her ordinary routine.
Something as benign as falling asleep in front of the television or leaving a
door unlocked for a late-arriving family member might result in liability to
others in the home. “A finding of duty may be inappropriate if its recognition
would deter socially beneficial behavior.” (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 1028.)
Further, as to “the policy of preventing future harm” (Rowland, supra,
69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113), “[p]lacing the cost of negligence on responsible
parties is generally thought to induce behavioral changes that will make the
activity in question safer.” (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1026.) But
here, it is hard to see how imposing such a cost on an overnight social host
would induce any change in behavior. A host such as Meng is already highly
motivated to act to avoid harm to his loved ones (and himself) and thus to act
with prudence and caution, particularly as to non-specific risks created by
unknown third parties.
Finally, as to the “availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved” (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113), although homeowners
policies may cover the damage caused by criminals to non-family members in
the home, there may be serious unintended consequences to the availability

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of insurance and its cost in California if a homeowner’s legal duty is extended

as Zhu suggests.5
In sum, when we “balance[] the burden with the foreseeability”,
Castaneda, supra, and consider all the Rowland factors, we conclude that
“clear considerations of policy” justify “carving out an entire category of cases
from the general duty rule.” Accordingly, Meng did not owe a legal duty to
Zhu.
III.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Meng is entitled to costs on appeal.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

5 Two Rowland factors are sufficiently clear that lengthy discussion is
unnecessary. As to certainty of injury, there is no doubt that Zhu suffered
serious injuries from the attack. As to moral blame for Meng’s failure to
check the patio door, while Zhu asserts Meng is morally culpable because he
knew his failure created the potential for a “dangerous burglary,” we do not
consider his one-time oversight to be a moral failure. “[M]oral blame is
typically found when the defendant reaps a financial benefit from the risks it
has created,” (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1025), which is not alleged to
be the case here.

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