People v. Yancy CA4/1

CourtListener 10099886Calctapp30 août 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 8/30/24 P. v. Yancy CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081382

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE403243)

JAMEL YANCY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Laura G.
Baggett and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

Jamel Yancy and another man entered the apartment of a woman
Yancy knew and robbed her at gunpoint, taking an Xbox video-gaming
system. Sometime after the robbery, Yancy was spotted by police while he
was driving and officers initiated a traffic stop. Yancy, however, evaded the
officers after leading them on a high-speed chase. When Yancy was
eventually arrested, police discovered photographs and videos on his phone
showing him in possession of various guns. Yancy was brought to trial, and a
jury convicted him of robbery, evading law enforcement while driving
recklessly, and 15 counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury
acquitted Yancy of two additional counts of being a felon in possession of a
firearm.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Yancy argues the trial
court erred by (1) consolidating the robbery case with the separate felon in
possession case related to the images on his phone and (2) by admitting
evidence concerning his involvement with a gang, child protective services,
human trafficking, and illicit drug sales. In addition, he asserts insufficient
evidence supports several of the felon in possession of a firearm convictions.
As we shall explain, we reject the majority of Yancy’s appellate contentions,
with the exception of his assertion that insufficient evidence supported one of
the felon in possession of a firearm charges. Accordingly, that conviction,
count 14, is reversed and the judgment is otherwise affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Case
The victim of the robbery, P.R., testified that she met Yancy about a

month before the robbery as she was walking near her home.1 She and
Yancy hung out a couple of times and had a sexual relationship. On the

1 P.R. was in custody when she testified at Yancy’s trial. The court
informed the jury of this fact and instructed that it was not to consider or
speculate about. In addition, she was compelled to testify, and did so
pursuant to a grant of immunity by the court.
2
night of the robbery, October 9, 2020, P.R. was on the phone with her
boyfriend when she heard banging on her door. She went to see who it was
and opened the door, but not the outer screen door. She heard Yancy, who
was with codefendant Jeandor Dormevil, say “open up the door.” P.R. was
surprised to see them.
When P.R. opened the door, Yancy and Dormevil barged in, and Yancy
began looking around the apartment. Yancy asked if anyone was there and
appeared to be in a rush. Both men were armed with guns. Yancy looked in
P.R.’s living room, bathroom, and bedroom. P.R. angrily asked Yancy what
he was doing, and Yancy said that “if you’re not going to be my bitch, it’s
going to be bad for you.” Yancy then grabbed P.R.’s Xbox and unhooked it
from her television over P.R.’s demands not to touch her things.
After the men left P.R.’s apartment with her Xbox, P.R. used her phone
to film them driving away and called 911. She told the 911 operator the men
were armed with guns and one had tried to hit her with his weapon. She also
said she knew Yancy and the two men seemed like they were high on cocaine.
Police arrived while P.R. was still on the phone with the 911 operator.
A body-worn camera of one of the responding police officers recorded
his interview of P.R. She told the officers that she knew Yancy, but at first
downplayed their relationship. She then showed officers a video of Yancy on
her phone suggesting she and Yancy had a sexual relationship and that she
had known him for months. P.R. explained to the officers that she had let the
two men into her apartment, that they were both armed, and that they had
threatened her with their guns when she tried to stop them from taking her
television by picking up a knife from her kitchen.
After the police left, P.R. Facetimed Yancy and told him to return the
Xbox. P.R. recorded the Facetime call, and in the video Yancy is seen with

3
two firearms. At the time of trial, P.R. testified that she could not remember
if the guns in the video were the same ones that Yancy and Dormevil used in
the robbery.
After the robbery, P.R. texted Yancy and asked him when he was going
to return her Xbox. In the weeks after the robbery, P.R. continued to have
contact with Yancy. She told the jury that she was talking to him because
she wanted him to return the gaming system. At one point, P.R. offered
Yancy $2,000 and marijuana in exchange for the Xbox. She also testified she
had sex with Yancy after the robbery because she thought he was going to
return the Xbox and she “felt … some type of way about him.” Sometime
thereafter, a woman that P.R. believed was Yancy’s sister, called P.R. and
told her that if P.R. dropped the charges, the Xbox would be returned to her.
P.R. told the woman she would drop the charges, but testified that she only
made that statement to get her Xbox back. On November 24, 2020, after
Yancy had been taken into police custody, three men P.R. did not know
returned the Xbox to her.
On October 29, 2020, a San Diego police officer was on patrol when he
observed a black SUV driven by Yancy. The officer identified Yancy; the
window of the SUV was down and the officer testified that Yancy stared
directly at him with an “angry face.” The officer knew Yancy was wanted for
a home-invasion robbery, so he made a U-turn to get behind Yancy to initiate
a stop. Yancy pulled into a nearby parking lot, made eye contact with the
officer through his rear view mirror, and began rummaging through his
center console.
The officer then turned on his lights and siren. Yancy slowed down,
but then “aggressively” sped through the parking lot and back onto the street.
Yancy then ran a red light, swerved, and fishtailed as he increased his speed

4
to about 50 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone, and drove through a
four-way stop at more than 70 miles per hour. Law enforcement officers lost
sight of him.
Yancy was eventually arrested on November 17, 2020 when law
enforcement officers were investigating illicit fentanyl activity at a home
where Yancy’s girlfriend was living. At the time of his arrest, Yancy was
holding a cellphone that he admitted was his. The phone contained
numerous photographs and videos of guns and of Yancy holding guns. In
addition, three guns were seized from the home where Yancy was arrested
after officers served a search warrant there. Testing of the DNA collected
from the three guns showed that Yancy handled the weapons.
B. Defense Case
Dormevil testified in his own defense. On the stand he claimed that
P.R. let him and Yancy inside of her apartment, they asked P.R. if they could
borrow the Xbox, and she gave them permission to take it. Dormevil also
testified that he and Yancy were unarmed and had no intention to rob P.R.
Yancy did not present any affirmative evidence in his defense. During
closing argument, his trial counsel did not dispute the firearm charges that
were proven by DNA evidence. His counsel, however, questioned the
authenticity of the guns depicted in the photographs that supported some of
the felon in possession charges. Yancy’s counsel also argued that P.R. was
not a credible witness based on the inconsistencies in her testimony and her
statements to law enforcement.
C. Verdict and Sentencing
Yancy and Dormevil were charged together in one information. Both
were charged with home-invasion robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5,

5
subd. (a)2; count 1) and first-degree burglary (§§ 459, 460; count 2). As to
each of those offenses, the information also alleged both men personally used
a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b); 12022.5, subd. (a)). Yancy was also charged
with three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); counts 3–5) and evading an officer while driving recklessly (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 6).
The district attorney filed an amended consolidated information before
trial containing the same charges as the original information, and adding 15
additional counts against Yancy for felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); counts 5-21). The amended consolidated information also
included counts against Yancy for animal cruelty and animal abuse and
neglect; the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion to try these two

charges with the others.3
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Yancy not guilty of residential
burglary as alleged in count 2 and being a felon in possession of a firearm as

alleged in counts 5 and 9, but otherwise convicted him as charged.4
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Yancy to 14 years and four months in
state prison.
Yancy filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.

2 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 The amended consolidated information also charged Dormevil with
three additional charges of unlawful weapon and ammunitions possession
(§§ 30305, subd. (a)(1), 29800, subd. (a); counts 22–24).

4 Dormevil was tried jointly with Yancy. The jury found Dormevil not
guilty of robbery and burglary, but guilty of the firearms and ammunition
charges.
6
DISCUSSION
I
Yancy first asserts that the court committed prejudicial error by joining
the robbery and burglary charges with the charges for felon in possession of a
firearm. The Attorney General responds that there was no error because the
crimes at issue “were of the same class, and the potential prejudice from
consolidation was substantially outweighed by the practical benefits.”
A
Additional Background
In his trial brief, the prosecutor requested to consolidate the
defendants’ robbery and burglary case, which also included three charges for
felon in possession against Yancy and the charge for evading arrest (Case No.
SCE403243/MBV510), with two additional cases. The second case charged
Yancy with 15 additional counts of felon in possession of a firearm, animal
abuse and animal cruelty (Case No. SCE404491/MBV593), and the third
charged Dormevil with two additional counts of felon in possession of a
firearm and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition (Case No.
SCE406974/MBW850). Dormevil’s counsel filed a written opposition
requesting the cases be severed, and the trial court presumed that Yancy
joined that motion.
At the hearing on the consolidation request, the prosecutor argued that
evidence would be cross-admissible between the robbery/burglary and felon in
possession cases because evidence seized from Yancy’s phone was important
in both cases. Additionally, the prosecutor anticipated that the defendants
would argue in the robbery case that there was no proof the firearms used
were real. Thus, he contended, the photo and video evidence from the cell
phone depicting Yancy with firearms clearly loaded with ammunition was

7
relevant to prove that he used a real weapon in the robbery. The prosecutor
further asserted the crimes alleged in both cases were of the same class, and
there was nothing unduly prejudicial about either case warranting severance.
Dormevil’s counsel argued the crime of being a felon in possession of a
firearm was not in the same class of assaultive crimes as robbery and
residential burglary, and that evidence of the robbery and residential
burglary would not be admissible in a separate trial on the felon in
possession charges. Yancy’s counsel asserted that prejudice would result
from consolidation, particularly in light of P.R.’s inconsistent statements
about the robbery. Yancy’s counsel also argued the prosecution should not be
permitted to bolster its weak robbery evidence with the relatively stronger
case that he unlawfully possessed firearms.
In response to the defense arguments, the prosecutor reiterated that
the charges were all of the same class. He also explained that all of the
charges arose out of the same investigation, but they were not filed in a
single complaint due to a “procedural hiccup” caused by the pandemic. In
terms of the probative value and cross-admissibility of the evidence, the
prosecutor stated that the defendants’ relationship to each other was a
critical part of the theory of the case. He stated that the evidence from
Yancy’s cell phone suggested they were involved in trafficking weapons
together and suggested that they were robbing P.R. “because she’s selling
drugs for them and she didn’t cover whatever she owed, or she’s not working
the blade as a human trafficking victim, or she’s taking something and
they’re holding the Xbox hostage.”
The court granted the prosecutor’s motion to consolidate the weapons
cases with the robbery/burglary case. The court found all of the crimes were
within the same class of crimes, and that the evidence could be presented in a

8
manner that was not unduly prejudicial to the defendants. The court noted it
was “hopeful that [the parties could] tailor presentation of evidence as to the
felon in possession counts in such a way that the jury will be simply called
upon to determine whether or not these are, in fact, real guns.”
B
Legal Standards
“ ‘The law prefers consolidation of charges.’ ” (People v. Manriquez
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 574.) “[J]oint trial has long been prescribed—and
broadly allowed—by the Legislature’s enactment of section 954. The purpose
underlying this statute is clear: joint trial ‘ordinarily avoids the increased
expenditure of funds and judicial resources which may result if the charges
were to be tried in two or more separate trials.’ [Citation.] ‘A unitary trial
requires a single courtroom, judge, and court attach[és]. Only one group of
jurors need serve, and the expenditure of time for jury voir dire and trial is
greatly reduced over that required were the cases separately tried. In
addition, the public is served by the reduced delay on disposition of criminal
charges both in trial and through the appellate process.’ ” (People v. Soper
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771–772 (Soper).)
Charges may be consolidated under two circumstances: (1) when they
are connected together in their commission; or (2) when they are of the same
class of crimes. (§ 954.) Offenses are of the same class of crimes or offenses if
they “possess common characteristics or attributes.” (People v. Moore (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1012.) Offenses are connected in their commission if
there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission,
including the intent or motivation with which different acts are committed.
(Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1219.) Whether the charges

9
are properly consolidated under section 954 is a question of law subject to
independent review on appeal. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188.)
If the charges are properly joined, “[t]o demonstrate that a denial of
severance was reversible error, defendant must ‘ “clearly establish that there
[was] a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be
separately tried.” ’ [Citations.] [¶] Refusal to sever charges on a defendant’s
motion may be an abuse of discretion where: ‘ “(1) evidence on the crimes to
be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of
the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant;
(3) a ‘weak’ case has been joined with a ‘strong’ case, or with another ‘weak’
case, so that the ‘spillover’ effect of aggregate evidence on several charges
might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of
the charges carries the death penalty.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th
483, 510–511.)
“Unlike what occurs in situations involving the admissibility of
uncharged misconduct—in which the People bear the burden of establishing
that the evidence has substantial probative value that clearly outweighs its
inherent prejudicial effect—[] in the context of properly joined offenses, ‘[t]he
burden is reversed.’ [Citations.] In the latter setting, ‘[t]he … burden is on
the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial
danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.
[Citations.] When the offenses are [properly] joined for trial the defendant’s
guilt of all the offenses is at issue and the problem of confusing the jury with
collateral matters does not arise. … That the evidence would otherwise be
inadmissible [under Evidence Code section 352] may be considered as a factor
suggesting possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations [of efficiency
and judicial economy] that are not present when evidence of uncharged

10
offenses is offered must be weighed in ruling on a ... motion [to sever properly
joined charges]. The burden is on the defendant therefore to persuade the
court that these countervailing considerations are outweighed by a
substantial danger of undue prejudice.’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 773,
italics omitted.)
Additionally, section 954.1 “provides that when, as here, properly
joined charges are of the same class, the circumstance that evidence
underlying those charges would not be cross-admissible at hypothetical
separate trials is, standing alone, insufficient to establish that a trial court
abused its discretion in failing to sever those charges. Accordingly, the
assumed absence of cross-admissibility … in the present case is simply one
factor to be weighed against the benefits of joinder.” (Soper, supra, 45
Cal.4th at pp. 779–780.)
“A trial court’s denial of a motion to sever properly joined charged
offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion only if that ruling
‘ “ ‘ “ ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 774.)
C
Analysis
Yancy agrees the charges at issue against him were of the same class
and thus properly joined under section 954. He argues, however, that the
court abused its discretion by consolidating the 15 additional firearm charges
with the initial charges brought against him. Specifically, he contends that
evidence from the second case would not be admissible in the trial of the first
case, except with respect to that case’s felon in possession of a firearm charge,

11
because it would be excluded as improper propensity evidence under

Evidence Code section 1101.5
Yancy also argues that the evidence concerning the later weapons
charges would have been excluded in a separate trial of the robbery charges
because there would be “a ‘substantial likelihood the jury’ ... would use the
evidence from the possession of so many guns for the ‘illegitimate purpose’ of
finding [him] guilty of the robbery.” Yancy asserts the charges contained in
the second-filed case were particularly inflammatory because of the large
number of charges. Finally, he contends the two cases alone were both
relatively weak, and thus joining them together likely altered the outcome to
his detriment in both cases. We reject these arguments and agree with the
Attorney General that Yancy has not shown the trial court abused its
discretion by finding the significant benefits of trying the cases together
outweighed the potential prejudice of one proceeding.
“When a trial court considering a defendant’s motion for severance of
unrelated counts has determined that the evidence of the joined offenses is
not ‘cross-admissible,’ it must then assess the relative strength of the
evidence as to each group of severable counts and weigh the potential impact

5 Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) requires the exclusion of
evidence of a “person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in
the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his or her conduct) … to prove his or her conduct on a specified
occasion.” Subdivision (b), however, permits “the admission of evidence that
a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove
some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident ... ) other than his or her disposition
to commit such an act.” Evidence of an uncharged crime, therefore, is
admissible as long as it is relevant to prove a fact such as motive,
opportunity, intent, plan, or knowledge. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People
v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602.)
12
of the jury’s consideration of ‘other crimes’ evidence. I.e., the court must
assess the likelihood that a jury not otherwise convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant’s guilt of one or more of the charged offenses might
permit the knowledge of the defendant’s other criminal activity to tip the
balance and convict him. [Citation.] If the court finds a likelihood that this
may occur, severance should be granted.” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d
919, 936.)
In this case, with respect to the cross-admissibility of the evidence, it is
true the evidence relating to Yancy’s possession of 18 guns at various times
was probative of his character to own weapons generally, and thus
potentially prejudicial. However, the evidence was not so inflammatory that
it prevented the jury from assessing Yancy’s guilt on the robbery charge.
Specifically, the possession evidence consisted of photos and videos from
Yancy’s phone showing various weapons and their sale prices, as well as the
DNA linking Yancy to the three weapons found at the house that was
searched after his arrest. This evidence was simple and distinct from the
evidence supporting the armed robbery conviction (and a relatively small part
of the trial evidence), neutralizing any prejudicial effect. (See Soper, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 784 [“Appellate courts have found ‘ “no prejudicial effect from
joinder when the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct, even though
such evidence might not have been admissible in separate trials.” ’ ”].)
With respect to the other factors—whether certain charges were
unusually likely to inflame the jury and whether two weak cases were joined,
or one weak case joined with a much stronger one—we also do not agree with
Yancy that they show the court’s decision to try the two cases together was
an abuse of discretion. As the Attorney General points out, neither set of
charges was particularly more inflammatory than the other. P.R. testified

13
that Yancy was armed when he entered her home and he used the gun to
threaten her after she tried to get Yancy and Dormevil to leave her
apartment. The fact that Yancy faced separate charges for firearm
possession was consistent with his use of a firearm in the robbery. Neither
case was more likely to inflame the jury than the other.
Likewise, the evidence supporting each case was not comparatively
weak in relation to the other. The robbery was supported by P.R.’s direct
accounts of the events at trial, and her statements to police and the 911
dispatch operator. Although those statements contained some
inconsistencies about her relationship with Yancy, P.R. was consistent in her
account of the robbery. Further, the defense effectively pointed out the
problems with P.R.’s consistency and credibility. The felon in possession of
firearm charges also faced weakness since not all of the photographic
evidence showed Yancy with the firearms. Neither case was so
overwhelmingly strong that it could influence the jury’s perception of the

other.6
On the other side of the balancing test, the benefits of joining the cases
were significant. Instead of separate trials, Yancy’s case required a single
courtroom, judge, jury panel, and appeal. These benefits outweigh any
potential prejudice that resulted from trying the cases together. (See Soper,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 771–772.) Accordingly, we reject Yancy’s assertion
that the court abused its discretion by allowing a joint trial of the charges
against him.
Although we find the trial court’s decision to allow a joint trial was
proper at the time it was made, “[b]ecause the issue is raised on appeal

6 The fourth factor, whether one of the charges is a capital offense, is not
relevant here.
14
following trial” and Yancy asserts he was denied a fair trial by the denial of
his severance motion “we must also consider whether ‘despite the correctness
of the trial court’s ruling, a gross unfairness has occurred from joinder such
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law.’ ” (People v.
Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 174.) In this regard, Yancy has not
demonstrated any actual prejudice from any “spillover” effect of the joinder of
the charges for trial. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315
(Bradford).)
As noted, the evidence regarding the robbery was distinct from that
regarding the 15 additional charges of felon in possession of a firearm. In
addition, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3515 that “[e]ach
of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime. You must consider
each count separately and return a separate verdict for each count.” Further,
the jury’s acquittal on the burglary charge and two of the firearm offenses
shows it independently evaluated the evidence on each count and was not
unduly inflamed. Yancy has not demonstrated that prejudice actually
resulted from joinder of the charges at trial. (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at
p. 1318.) Thus, we conclude that Yancy has not met the “high burden of
establishing that the trial was grossly unfair and that he was denied due
process of law.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783.)
II
Yancy next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing witness testimony that he “was selling drugs, was a gang member,
was pimping women out, and had his child taken by [Child Protective
Services] for endangerment.” He argues the evidence was highly
inflammatory and more prejudicial than probative, and thus should have
been excluded under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101. The Attorney

15
General responds that all of the evidence that Yancy identifies was properly
admitted, that Yancy forfeited his challenge to some of the evidence by failing
to object at trial, and that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, any
error was harmless.
A
Legal Standards
“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” (Evid. Code,
§ 350.) “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, … having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.) Evidence Code section 1101
provides: “(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103,
1108, and 1109, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her
character ... is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion. [¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of
evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when
relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or
her disposition to commit such an act. [¶] (c) Nothing in this section affects
the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a
witness.”
Under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court “may exclude evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” Reviewing courts will not disturb a trial court’s
admission of evidence “ ‘over an Evidence Code section 352 objection ... unless

16
the trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason.’ ” (People v. Montes
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 859 (Montes).)
B
Gang Evidence
Yancy argues that certain statements made by P.R. and the
prosecution’s gang expert, San Diego Sheriff’s Department Detective Troy
Conrad, about Yancy’s gang affiliation were improperly admitted.
Specifically, he challenges: (1) Conrad’s testimony that Yancy was a member
of the Emerald Hills street gang and was known by the moniker “Baby Joe
90Z”; (2) Conrad’s statement about, and images from, Yancy’s phone showing
his gang moniker; (3) Conrad’s explanation of the meaning of gang lingo
Yancy used in several jail calls to Dormevil; (4) Conrad’s statement that no
gang offense was alleged against Yancy in this case; and (4) P.R.’s statement
to the officers responding to her 911 call, introduced through an officer’s
body-worn camera footage, that Yancy was a “gang banger.”
1. Additional Background
During a pretrial conference, in which the parties were discussing the
admissibility of phone calls between Yancy, who was in jail at the time, and
Dormevil, Dormevil’s counsel noted that he anticipated the prosecutor would
call a gang expert to explain the slang words used in the calls. Dormevil’s
counsel objected that no one should explain what the defendants were saying;
rather, the calls should stand for themselves. The prosecutor responded that
he did plan to call a gang expert to interpret the words used on the jail calls
because it was necessary for the jury’s understanding of those conversations,
but the prosecutor assured the court that it was not his intention to “parade”
gang evidence in front of the jury. The parties then agreed to conduct an

17
Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the gang expert’s experience and
qualifications to explain the language used in the jail calls.
The parties also discussed the fact that P.R. would likely testify that
she knew Yancy was a gang member and that she had seen his gang tattoos,
which are visible in the pictures of Yancy from his social media account, and
that this information formed part of the basis for her identification of Yancy
as one of the two men who robbed her. Yancy’s counsel wanted to ensure that
the testimony was limited, and alternatively offered to stipulate to the fact
that Yancy was a gang member. At that juncture, the court stated that it did
not think a stipulation was necessary, and that it might “cause greater harm
than it would be intended to achieve.” The court ruled that the evidence
could “come in for a very limited purpose” of explaining to the jury the
meaning of the jail calls and the tattoos in the photos.
Following the Evidence Code section 402 hearing at which Conrad
testified, defense counsel stated, “I just want to be sure that, based on the
filings of the People that I understand those purposes, which are to explain
the jail calls and that he identified himself as Emerald Hills to [P.R.]. And
outside that, there’s not going to be a discussion of any gang stuff.” The
prosecutor clarified that he would also use the detective for “laying the
foundation for all [of Yancy’s] social media,” including that he labeled himself
by his gang moniker on social media posts and the victim used his gang
moniker as his contact information in her phone, as well as to explain his
gang tattoos.
The prosecutor argued that some basic explanation was necessary to
provide the jury with context for things discussed between the victim and the
responding officers, which the jury would see and hear through body-worn
camera footage. Defense counsel responded that the way Yancy was labeled

18
in P.R.’s phone and whether that label was a gang moniker was irrelevant
and unduly prejudicial. The court ultimately ruled that it would allow the
expert testimony about Yancy’s gang moniker.
At trial, Conrad testified that P.R. knew Yancy was affiliated with the
Emerald Hills criminal street gang, and that Yancy was known by the gang
moniker “Baby Joe 90Z.” Conrad also testified that some of the photos on
Yancy’s social media postings contained that moniker. Conrad explained the
meaning of words used during the jail calls between Yancy and Dormevil,
including that “blood” referred to a blood set of the Emerald Hills gang,
explained that members of a blood set gang would typically replace the letter
“c” at the start of words with the letter “b,” and explained some of the other
slang words used in the calls. Conrad also stated during cross-examination
that no gang offense was alleged in the case. Finally, the jury was shown
video recorded on an officer’s body-worn camera of P.R. stating that Yancy
was a “gang banger” with the Emerald Hills gang.
2. Analysis
As an initial matter, Yancy’s trial counsel agreed that Conrad’s
testimony explaining the jail calls and P.R.’s identification of Yancy as an
Emerald Hills gang member on the body-worn camera footage was relevant
and admissible. Accordingly, Yancy’s challenge to this evidence as
improperly admitted under Evidence Code section 352 is forfeited. (See Evid.
Code, § 353; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 125‒126 [“In the absence of a
timely and specific objection on the ground sought to be urged on appeal, the
trial court’s rulings on admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed.”].)
Thus, the only portion of Yancy’s claim that is reviewable is his challenge to
Conrad’s testimony explaining Yancy’s gang moniker and its presence on his
social media posts.

19
But even if Yancy had preserved the entirety of his claim, it
nevertheless fails because the trial court’s admissibility rulings were not an
abuse of discretion. First, any prejudice stemming from the minimal gang
evidence was not so substantial as to outweigh its probative value. The
testimony was relevant because it explained the photographic and video
evidence that supported the charges for felon in possession of a firearm,
specifically the images showing Yancy holding the guns that formed the basis
for those charges, and the testimony explained the incriminating jail phone
calls between Yancy and Dormevil about the Xbox. The testimony also
helped explain P.R.’s inconsistent testimony, which the prosecution asserted
was colored by her fear of gang retaliation.
Moreover, and as Yancy’s trial counsel agreed, the minimal testimony
was admissible because it was part and parcel of P.R.’s identification of
Yancy as the person who robbed her. In addition, and importantly, Conrad’s
testimony on the subject of Yancy’s gang affiliation was relatively brief and
did not suggest the crimes in the case were gang related. Under the
circumstances, the trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason or
otherwise abuse its discretion in admitting the minimal gang evidence Yancy

now challenges.7

7 Yancy contends that his case is similar to People v. Avitia (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 185 (Avitia), which reversed a conviction for grossly negligent
discharge of a firearm based on the admission of evidence suggesting the
defendant was a gang member. Unlike Avitia, in which the prosecution’s
case was far weaker without the evidence of the defendant’s gang
involvement that carried no probative value, the case against Yancy was not
notably strengthened by the fact that he was a gang member. (Id. at pp. 193‒
195.) Further, the challenged evidence was relevant to the prosecution’s
case. For these reasons, we do not agree with Yancy that Avitia supports
reversal of his convictions.
20
However, even if the evidence was improperly admitted, we agree with
the Attorney General that it was not prejudicial. “The erroneous admission
of gang or other evidence requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable
that appellant would have obtained a more favorable result had the evidence
been excluded.” (Avitia, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 194.) Here, the
evidence connecting Yancy to the crimes at issue was overwhelming. P.R. did
not waiver in her identification of Yancy as one of the men who robbed her.
In addition, the photographic and video evidence taken from Yancy’s phone
and the DNA found on the confiscated firearms was not called into question
by any defense evidence. Even if Yancy’s gang affiliation had been obscured,
it is not reasonably probably that he would have obtained a more favorable
result. Accordingly, any error with respect to the gang evidence was
harmless.
C
Child Protective Services Evidence
Yancy next contends that the court erred by admitting statements
between Yancy and his child’s mother, R.R., concerning Child Protective
Services (CPS). During a motion in limine conference, Yancy’s counsel
objected to admitting portions of a jail call made by Yancy to Dormevil in
which Yancy mentioned R.R. was trying to get their child out of protective
custody. Yancy’s counsel argued the statements were irrelevant and highly
prejudicial. The prosecutor stated that the information was relevant to give
context to Yancy’s arrest, explaining that the arrest occurred after a traffic
stop the day before, unrelated to Yancy, led the police to the home where he
was arrested. According to the prosecutor, when officers arrived at the home,
they believed there was a child inside, causing them to conduct a protective

21
search of the home that revealed some of the firearms giving rise to charges
in the instant case.
The court questioned the relevance of the statements about CPS, since
the defense raised no issue as to why there had been a search of the home.
The prosecutor responded that might be the case if the defense were willing
to stipulate to the lawfulness of the search, and asserted there was nothing
unduly prejudicial about the evidence. Yancy’s counsel argued the statement
was highly inflammatory since Yancy was not charged with child
endangerment, and stated he would stipulate to the fact that the home was
searched. The court initially ruled that the transcripts of the jail calls should
be redacted to remove reference to CPS and child endangerment because they
were prejudicial and not probative, and instructed Yancy’s counsel to identify
statements in the transcript that required redaction.
The next day, however, the court reconsidered and denied Yancy’s
request to redact the jail calls. The following day, Yancy’s counsel asked for
clarification as to the ruling. Defense counsel noted that the court had
initially ruled in her favor and agreed that the jail calls should be redacted.
The court responded that it was denying the request to redact the jail call,
and that it found the statements were relevant because Yancy and R.R. were
discussing what to do with the stolen Xbox, which had not been collected
during the search of the home.
At trial, the jury was played a jail call between Yancy and Dormevil. In
that call, Yancy stated that CPS took his child when law enforcement served
a search warrant at a home based on events that had nothing to do with him.
He stated that “they” were trying to figure out who was going to get the child
out of CPS custody, and that law enforcement was trying to use the CPS
proceeding as a means to increase his bail.

22
The jury was also played a recording of a call between Yancy and R.R.
During that call, Yancy and R.R. discuss child custody issues and Yancy’s
stress over removal of the child from R.R. They also discuss the return of the
Xbox to P.R. Specifically, R.R. mentions the idea of contacting P.R, but
decides they would be accused of intimidating P.R. and that a third party,
possibly R.R.’s son, should check in on P.R. instead. In a third jail call
recording played for the jury between Yancy, R.R and another man, R.R.
discusses missing her child, states that CPS was being “super strict” and that
they thought she was a “brandishing kingpin operating [a] drug house,” and
that her child had been drug tested. In the call, Yancy and R.R. also briefly
discuss returning the Xbox to P.R.
We agree with the Attorney General that the content of these three
calls was probative to show Yancy’s consciousness of guilt because he was
attempting to orchestrate a way to return P.R.’s Xbox. The statements
suggest Yancy thought he could avoid criminal liability by returning the
stolen item. The conversations also suggest that because R.R. was being
closely monitored by CPS, she and Yancy orchestrated a plan to have her
sons return the Xbox, which was consistent with P.R.’s testimony that three
men eventually returned it to her.
On the other side of the balancing test, the evidence was not so
prejudicial that the trial court’s decision to allow it constituted an abuse of
discretion. The fact that Yancy had a child, who was living where weapons
and drugs were found, leading to removal and involvement by child protective
services—a logical outcome of the events leading to Yancy’s arrest—is not so
inflammatory that allowing the evidence exceeded the bounds of reason. (See
Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 859.)

23
Further, as with the gang evidence, the limited evidence admitted in
the trial concerning CPS involvement with Yancy’s child was not highly
prejudicial. As discussed, the evidence connecting Yancy to the crimes with
which he was charged was overwhelming. Even if the statements concerning
CPS had been excluded from the trial, it is not reasonably probable that
Yancy would have obtained a more favorable result. Accordingly, any error
with respect to this evidence was harmless. (See Avitia, supra, 127
Cal.App.4th at p. 194)
D
Human Trafficking Evidence
1. Additional Background
The next category of evidence Yancy challenges are statements by P.R.
and Detective Conrad suggesting that Yancy was a pimp. Specifically, during
her direct examination, the prosecutor asked P.R. if she knew if Yancy “was
pimping girls out?” P.R. responded that she did not know, Yancy’s counsel
objected to the question as leading, and the court overruled the objection. At
a subsequent break outside the jury’s presence, Yancy’s counsel elaborated on
her objection, asserting the question also assumed facts not in evidence. The
court responded that its ruling allowing the question would stand.
After questioning of P.R. resumed, the prosecutor asked P.R. if she was
working for Yancy; P.R. responded she was not. Yancy’s counsel did not
object and the court immediately recessed for its lunch break. Once the jury
exited the courtroom, defense counsel complained that the question also
assumed facts not in evidence. The prosecutor responded that he would be
presenting additional evidence that suggested P.R. was working as a
prostitute for Yancy in the form of text messages between them and also
P.R.’s statements to a detective that investigated the robbery. The court

24
overruled the objection. Then, during cross-examination, P.R. testified she
never prostituted, sold drugs, or sold guns for Yancy. She also clarified that
she thought he was a pimp, but she was not sure.
During his direct examination, Conrad testified P.R. told him that
during the robbery, Yancy said, “If you’re not going to be my bitch, it’s going
to be bad for you.” Conrad told the jury this statement was consistent with
human trafficking behavior. Conrad further testified that P.R. denied being
pimped, but told him she believed Yancy was “pimping out” other women. In
addition, while explaining the slang language used in text messages and
images between Dormevil and Yancy in which they were communicating
about drug and gun sales, Conrad explained that some of the texts suggested
that the men were also engaging in human trafficking behavior.
During his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the evidence
suggesting Yancy was engaging in human trafficking activity, including
trafficking, or attempting to traffic P.R., explained the inconsistencies in
P.R.’s statements to police and during trial, and also explained Yancy’s
motive to take her Xbox. The prosecutor asserted that Yancy and Dormevil’s
robbery was an exertion of power over her, not because they needed the Xbox,
but because they wanted to control her.
2. Analysis
As an initial matter, as the Attorney General contends, Yancy’s
challenge to this evidence on appeal as improperly admitted under Evidence
Code section 352 is forfeited by his counsel’s failure to object on this basis
during trial. (See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 416 [“failure to

25
make a timely and specific objection on the ground [raised on appeal] forfeits
the claim on appeal”].)
However, even if we reach the merits of the arguments, we agree with
the Attorney General that this limited evidence about Yancy engaging in
pimping activity was relevant to the prosecution’s case and not unduly
prejudicial. It provided context to the communications that evidenced both
the robbery and Yancy’s possession of various firearms, and explained the
motive for the robbery. On the other side of the Evidence Code section 352
analysis, while the evidence was prejudicial—certainly the jury would be
more inclined to think a pimp could commit robbery—given its relevance to
the case, it was not so inflammatory that the trial court’s decision to allow it
exceeded the bounds of reason.
Further, like Yancy’s other evidentiary challenges on appeal, even if
the decision to allow the human trafficking evidence was error, the error was
harmless. As stated, the evidence against him with respect to each charge
was strong. Had P.R.’s statements indicating she thought Yancy was a pimp
been excluded, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a
more favorable result on any of the charges levied against Yancy.
E
Drug Sales Evidence
Yancy also argues that the court’s admission of evidence showing his
involvement in drug sales was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code
section 352 and, thus, improperly admitted. Specifically, Yancy asserts the
court improperly admitted: (1) a video of someone holding nuggets of
marijuana that was taken from Dormevil’s cell phone; (2) a video taken from
Dormevil’s phone showing 3.114 grams of cocaine on a scale, with plastic bags
and other indicia of illegal narcotics also taken from Dormevil’s phone; and

26
(3) various text messages and photos between Dormevil and Yancy
suggesting drug sales and drug use.
Before trial, Dormevil’s counsel moved in limine to exclude any drug
sale evidence as irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative.
In response, the prosecutor asserted the evidence was relevant to show the
general criminal enterprise Yancy and Dormevil were engaged in at the time,
and also argued that P.R. may have stolen drugs from the defendants and
that the Xbox was taken in retribution. The trial court ruled the evidence
was admissible, explaining that “the People are allowed to present the larger
picture to support their theory as to what was taking place between the
alleged victim and these two gentlemen.” At the conclusion of the discussion,
the court stated that for purposes of appellate review, despite Yancy’s
counsel’s silence, the court was joining Yancy in all objections to evidence
that concerned him.
We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court did not err in
admitting this evidence. As both the prosecutor and the court observed, the
evidence was relevant to show that Yancy and Dormevil were involved in a
criminal enterprise at the time of the robbery. Further, even if the evidence
was improperly admitted, the majority concerned Dormevil, not Yancy,
making it unlikely the jury drew adverse inferences about Yancy with respect
to the evidence. Finally, the evidence at issue was minimal, especially in
relation to the significant evidence presented concerning the charges against
Yancy. It is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a more

27
favorable conclusion absent the evidence connecting him to drug sales.8
(People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203; People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836.)
III
Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Felon in Possession Convictions
Yancy’s final contention on appeal is that there was not sufficient
evidence to convict him of several of the felon in possession of a firearm
charges (counts 6 through 8 and 10 through 21) and that the trial court
improperly denied his motion under section 1181.1 for acquittal of the
charges. He argues that evidence of the same guns was improperly used to
support multiple convictions, and also contends the convictions must be
reversed because there was no proof the guns at issue were real. The
Attorney General responds that the photographs and videos entered into
evidence establish that Yancy was liable for 15 counts of violating section
29800, and expert testimony and other evidence sufficiently established that
the firearms were real. We agree with Yancy that insufficient evidence
supports one of the convictions (count 14) because the same weapon was
improperly used by the prosecution to support two separate charges. We

8 We also reject Yancy’s assertion that even if the evidentiary errors he
asserts alone do no warrant reversal, their cumulative effect does. “Under
the cumulative error doctrine, the reviewing court must ‘review each
allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if it is
reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to
defendant in their absence.’ ” (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th
587, 646.) “The ‘litmus test’ for cumulative error ‘is whether defendant
received due process and a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 785, 795.) Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings, we conclude Yancy’s claim of cumulative error also fails.
28
reject Yancy’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence to support the 14
other convictions for felon in possession of a firearm.
A
No one who has been convicted of a felony may lawfully own, purchase,
receive, possess, or have custody or control of any firearm. (§ 29800.) The
possession, custody, or control of the firearm must be with the defendant’s
knowledge. (People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [analyzing former
§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), the predecessor statute to § 29800].) “Possession may
be physical or constructive, and more than one person may possess the same
contraband. [Citation.] Possession may be imputed when the contraband is
found in a place which is immediately accessible to the joint dominion and
control of the accused and another.” (People v. Miranda (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 398, 410 (Miranda).)
In assessing whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a criminal
conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212.) Under that standard, “ ‘ “we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.
Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144.) We “ ‘presume[] in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence[,]’ ” and we “ ‘may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the
jury.’ ” (Ibid.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the
testimony when determining its legal sufficiency. [Citation.] Rather, before
we can set aside a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, ‘it

29
must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
evidence to support [the jury’s finding].’ ” (Id. at p. 145.)
“Given this deferential standard of review, a ‘defendant bears an
enormous burden in claiming there is insufficient evidence’ to support a
conviction. [Citation.] Nevertheless, ‘substantial evidence,’ that is, evidence
that is ‘ “ ‘reasonable ..., credible, and of solid value’ ” ’ is required, not just
any evidence. [Citation.] In particular, a reasonable inference from the
evidence ‘ “ ‘may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination,
speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] ... A finding
of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than ... a mere
speculation as to probabilities without evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sanford
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 84, 91–92; see also People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th
353, 360 [“ ‘An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and
reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise
established in the action.’ (Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b).)”].) “An appellate
court reviews the denial of a section 1118.1 motion [for a judgment of
acquittal for insufficient evidence] under the standard employed in reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.” (People v. Houston
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.)
B
Yancy asserts that two of his convictions for felon in possession of a
firearm must be reversed because the sole evidence supporting them is
photographs of the same firearms used to support other counts of the same
charge. Specifically, he argues that the evidence of counts 4 and 16 consisted
of photographs of the same firearm such that only one of the two convictions
should stand. Likewise, he argues that the photograph of the firearm giving
rise to count 10 appeared to depict one of the same firearms that the

30
prosecutor used to support counts 20 and 21, such that either the conviction
for count 10 should be reversed or his convictions for counts 20 and 21 should
be reversed. The Attorney General responds that because nothing in the
record suggests Yancy’s possession of these different firearms was
continuous, the convictions should stand.
To support his argument, Yancy relies on this court’s decision in People
v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355 (Mason). In Mason, the defendant was
convicted of four counts of possession of a firearm by a felon under former
section 12021, subdivision (a)(1). (Mason, at p. 364.) Each possession count
corresponded to the date of a different shooting or the date a police chase led
to the recovery of the firearm used in the shootings. (Ibid.) The prosecution’s
theory was that the defendant possessed the firearm on each of these
occasions such that each occasion gave rise to a separate offense. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, this court reversed all but one of the convictions. (Id. at p. 367.)
In Mason, we stated “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that
possession of a firearm by a felon is a continuing offense.” (Mason, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 365.) “ ‘ “Ordinarily, a continuing offense is marked by a
continuing duty in the defendant to do an act which he [or she] fails to do.
The offense continues as long as the duty persists, and there is a failure to
perform that duty.” [Citations.] Thus, when the law imposes an affirmative
obligation to act, the violation is complete at the first instance the elements
are met. It is nevertheless not completed as long as the obligation remains
unfulfilled. “The crime achieves no finality until such time.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In
other words, “ ‘only one violation occurs even though the proscribed conduct
may extend over [an] indefinite period.’ ” (Ibid.)
Applying this concept, we reasoned in Mason that, “[a]lthough the
evidence showed that Mason possessed the firearm on each of the dates, there

31
was no evidence that Mason’s possession of the firearm was anything but
continuous over the period encompassing the four dates. The prosecution did
not present evidence, for example, showing that Mason had relinquished
possession of the gun for a period between the specified dates. Mason’s crime
was complete at the time he first possessed the gun because he violated the
duty imposed by the statute not to do so. [Citation.] But the crime
continued—as a single offense—for as long as the same possession continued,
i.e., so long as Mason continued to violate his duty under the statute.”
(Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.)
Like Mason, in which the evidence showed the defendant possessed the
same firearm without interruption at the time of each charged offense (a
series of four separate shootings), there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury’s finding that possession of one of these weapons underlying the
felon in possession charges was not continuous. Specifically, in support of the
charge set forth in count 6, the prosecutor offered a photograph from
March 11, 2020, and to support count 14, the prosecutor offered a video from
October 21, 2020. However, the weapon in both of these depictions appears
to be the same, and very distinctive, black and pink gun. As the Attorney
General acknowledges, it was the prosecution’s burden to prove that the
weapons were different, or that Yancy’s possession of the weapon was not
continuous over the entire time period. Here, the prosecutor did not
distinguish the guns in these photos at all. Accordingly, we agree with Yancy
that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for both counts 6
and 14 and, thus, we conclude that count 14 must be reversed for lack of
evidence.
The guns at issue in count 10 and counts 21 and 22 (two of the three
guns seized from the home where Yancy was arrested), however, do not

32
appear to be the same weapon. The photos identifying the weapon
corresponding to count 10, and those corresponding to counts 21 and 22 do
not appear to depict the same gun (though the style of weapons is similar, the
handgrip is different). It is not this court’s role to reassess the evidence
presented to the jury and, as the Attorney General asserts, Yancy did not
raise this issue in the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude the evidence
supporting counts 10, 21, and 22, establishing different weapons underlying
each charge, was sufficient to support the jury’s corresponding convictions.
Yancy next contends insufficient evidence supports counts 6 through 8
and 10 through 19 because no gun was found to support the charges, and
instead they were based solely on photographic evidence, some of which did
not depict Yancy with the weapons. We disagree with Yancy’s argument and
conclude substantial evidence also supported the jury’s conviction on each of
these counts.
Each count was supported by photographic evidence of weapons taken
directly from Yancy’s cell phone. All of the photographs were in Yancy’s
camera roll on his phone, and not images sent to him via text message or
otherwise. Further, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting Yancy
was selling these firearms. This evidence included photographs of the
various weapons with sales prices listed, text message exchanges between
Yancy and Dormevil discussing the price of firearms, photographs of Yancy
with the weapons, and expert testimony opining that the images showed
Yancy was in possession of these guns and was selling them. Finally, the
prosecution presented evidence of three actual firearms seized on November
17, 2020, which had DNA connecting the weapons to Yancy. From this
evidence, a trier of fact could reasonably infer that Yancy possessed all of the
firearms at issue, including those depicted in photographs and videos on his

33
phone, regardless of whether he was in the picture with the weapons or not.
(See Miranda, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 410 [“Possession may be physical
or constructive, and more than one person may possess the same
contraband.”].)
Finally, Yancy argues that there was insufficient evidence showing that
the guns were real. This assertion is also not well-taken. Rather, ample
evidence in the trial court showed the firearms were real. The photographs
found on Yancy’s phone of the firearms and their sale prices strongly
suggested he was selling the guns. Text messages exchanged between Yancy
and Dormevil discussing the price of firearms also showed the guns were for
sale. Importantly, Detective Conrad opined that the firearms in the
photographs and videos were real because real firearms and ammunition
were found at the home where Yancy was arrested and because the guns’
prices were consistent with those of actual firearms, not prices of replicas or
fake weapons.
Accordingly, substantial evidence showed that the guns at issue, as
depicted in the photographs and videos, were real firearms. Reversal on this
basis, therefore, is not warranted. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297,
331 [a conviction can be reversed only where there is “ ‘no hypothesis
whatever’ ” upon which the evidence can be deemed sufficient to support it].)

34
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to count 14 and otherwise affirmed in its
entirety.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

RUBIN, J.

35

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.