Franceschi v. Baldwin CA2/8

CourtListener 10099819Calctapp30 août 2024

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Filed 8/30/24 Franceschi v. Baldwin CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ERNEST J. FRANCESCHI, JR., B323870

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV35596
v.

GLORIA BALDWIN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed.

Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Davis Wright Tremaine, Mary H. Haas, Daniel H. Leigh
and Mark C. Burnside for Defendant and Respondent.

_____________________________
SUMMARY
Plaintiff Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr. appeals from an order
granting defendant Gloria Baldwin’s motion to quash service of
the summons and first amended complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. We affirm the order.
FACTS
Plaintiff sued Christopher Baldwin and his mother, Gloria
Baldwin, alleging several causes of action including extortion.
Plaintiff, who is an attorney, alleged he had represented
Christopher Baldwin in two lawsuits in which Mr. Baldwin’s
father funded the upfront payments. Plaintiff alleged
Mr. Baldwin, with Ms. Baldwin’s encouragement, refused to
settle or mediate the lawsuits, and plaintiff withdrew as counsel.
After that, Christopher Baldwin sent an e-mail to plaintiff
stating plaintiff failed to provide receipts for the monies paid to
him and demanding return of the funds under threat of reporting
plaintiff to the IRS and the State Bar. Plaintiff alleged
Ms. Baldwin “conspired with, aided and abetted, provided
material encouragement to Christopher, and was a driving force
behind the extortionate email.”
Ms. Baldwin filed a motion to quash service, contending the
court lacked both general and specific jurisdiction over her. The
motion was accompanied by Ms. Baldwin’s declaration stating,
among other things, that her permanent residence is in New
Mexico, where she was born and lived her entire life; she is
registered to vote in New Mexico; she has never resided in
California, does not own or lease property in California, has no
bank accounts or mailing address in California, and does not
conduct business or have any employees or representatives in
California. Ms. Baldwin also stated that she signed a guarantor

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application as part of her son Christopher’s initial leasing
agreement in 2015 for an apartment in Marina del Rey, but was
not listed as an occupant on the lease agreement, never resided
there, and did not pay for her son’s rent.
The trial court granted plaintiff leave to take Ms. Baldwin’s
deposition on the limited issue of jurisdiction, after which
plaintiff filed his supplemental opposition. Plaintiff contended
that Ms. Baldwin “has engaged in ‘substantial, continuous, and
systematic’ contacts with California so as to subject her to
general jurisdiction.” His evidence concerned only Ms. Baldwin’s
involvement in her son’s lease of the apartment in Marina del
Rey: her guaranties of payment in the event of her son’s default
on his one-year leases from 2015 to 2022 (for “as long as he’s
there”) and a 2015 “onsite transfer application” that stated
Ms. Baldwin would also be living in the new apartment to which
her son wished to transfer and that her monthly income was
$50,000. Plaintiff said nothing in his supplemental opposition
about specific jurisdiction, but cited several authorities that
involved only specific jurisdiction (and the heading of his
argument stated that “executing a contract in the forum state
constitutes purposeful availment”).
The trial court granted Ms. Baldwin’s motion to quash,
finding that plaintiff “failed to meet his burden to establish
specific jurisdiction” and failed to demonstrate the court could
exercise general jurisdiction over Ms. Baldwin.
As to specific jurisdiction, the court observed the only
evidence provided related to Ms. Baldwin’s involvement in her
son’s leases, and plaintiff’s lawsuit “does not involve the lease
agreement, Christopher Baldwin’s tenancy, or Gloria Baldwin’s
contractual obligations.” Thus plaintiff failed to show his lawsuit

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was related to or arose out of Ms. Baldwin’s contacts with the
forum, as required for specific jurisdiction.
As for general jurisdiction, the court observed that
substantial, continuous and systematic contacts in the forum
state will support jurisdiction even where the plaintiff’s cause of
action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,
but here the only evidence related to the leases. The court
recited facts from Ms. Baldwin’s declaration about her lifelong
residence in New Mexico and lack of any connections or business
activities in California (see p. 2, ante); that she was not listed as
an occupant on the lease agreement, never resided at the
apartment, and did not pay her son’s rent. The court also cited
Ms. Baldwin’s deposition testimony that the representation in the
“onsite transfer application” that she would live in the apartment
“was not authorized and she was not a co-tenant.” Further, the
court cited legal authorities for the proposition that a guaranty
relationship by itself is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
After citing several other authorities, the court concluded that
plaintiff’s evidence “does not establish Gloria Baldwin is
essentially at home in California, such that the Court can
exercise general jurisdiction over her.”
Plaintiff filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
We find no flaw in the trial court’s analysis, which is fully
supported by the law and the evidence.
1. The Legal Principles
The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
comports with constitutional principles “if the defendant has such
minimum contacts with California that the assertion of
jurisdiction does not violate traditional notions of fair play and

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substantial justice.” (Brue v. Al Shabaab (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
578, 589 (citing cases) (Brue).) “Under the minimum contacts
test personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.”
(Ibid.)
“General jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state are so ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to make it consistent with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice to subject the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the forum even when the cause of action is
unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” (Brue,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.)
“Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires some
nexus between the cause of action and the defendant’s activities
in the forum state. Under well-established case law specific
jurisdiction exists when (1) the defendant has ‘purposefully
availed’ himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is
related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with
the forum; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would
comport with ‘ “fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Brue, supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 589-590.)
“The plaintiff bears the burden of showing the defendant
has sufficient minimum contacts with the state to justify
jurisdiction. [Citation.] When the evidence of jurisdictional facts
is in conflict, we resolve that conflict in favor of the trial court’s
order, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.] If that evidence is not disputed, the question of
jurisdiction is one of law; and we independently review the trial
court’s decision.” (Brue, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.)

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2. Contentions and Conclusions
We begin by observing that plaintiff repeatedly invokes the
term “purposeful availment,” a concept most frequently used in
connection with specific jurisdiction (see above), which also
requires the controversy to relate to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum. Plaintiff does not contend the controversy related to
Ms. Baldwin’s contacts with California. Instead, plaintiff
contends the requirement for general jurisdiction—that
Ms. Baldwin has engaged in “substantial, continuous, and
systematic” contacts with California, subjecting her to California
jurisdiction over any cause of action—“is satisfied by Gloria
having repeatedly (on a yearly basis) incurred contractual
liability for the Marina del Rey apartment and made substantial
monthly rental payments for the apartment over the course of
several years.” This is wrong for multiple reasons.
Ms. Baldwin’s only alleged “contractual liability” is her
yearly guaranty of her son’s obligations under his one-year
leases. Plaintiff ignores entirely the principle that “our Supreme
Court has long recognized a guaranty relationship by itself is
insufficient to establish jurisdiction.” (Pennsylvania Health &
Life Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th
477, 487.) The Pennsylvania Health court cited Sibley v. Superior
Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442 and explained: “Sibley held a
California court could not constitutionally assert jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant who had guaranteed the performance of
a Georgia corporation, even though the defendant knew the
Georgia corporation’s breach of the agreement would have an
effect in California and that its issuance of the guaranty would
influence the plaintiff California corporation to enter into the
underlying agreement. Sibley stressed that by guaranteeing the

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obligation, the defendant did not ‘anticipate[] that he would
derive any economic benefit’ nor ‘intend[] to conduct business or
in any other way directly or indirectly gain from dealings in this
state.’ ” (Pennsylvania Health, at p. 487, quoting Sibley, at
pp. 447-448.) The same is true here: there is no evidence
Ms. Baldwin anticipated any economic benefit or intended to
conduct business or otherwise gain from dealings in this state by
guaranteeing her son’s lease payments.
Ignoring the pertinent authorities, plaintiff cites Van
Buskirk v. Van Buskirk (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 523, 533, claiming
it stands for the proposition that “entering into ‘transactions
about land’ governed by California law is purposeful availment.”
The court made no such statement. Van Buskirk involved
specific jurisdiction, where (unlike here) the controversy related
to the defendants’ contacts with the forum. (Id. at p. 531.) The
Van Buskirk court found specific jurisdiction over four defendants
who were “deeply involved” with a trust that “originated and was
administered in California,” was governed by California law, and
held interests in California real estate. (Id. at pp. 531-532.)
Among other things, the court concluded the defendant mother
(who had moved to Idaho) “has been a longtime California
resident, a California property owner, a California trust creator
and participant, and a California plaintiff. The mother
purposefully availed herself of this state’s benefits, beyond
question.” (Id. at p. 533.) Van Buskirk is nothing like this case
and is of no precedential value to this case.
Plaintiff’s assertion that Ms. Baldwin “made substantial
monthly rental payments for the apartment over the course of
several years” is unsupported by any evidence. Plaintiff points to
records from the landlord which he says show various

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delinquencies and defaults by Christopher Baldwin (one in 2017
and the rest during the pandemic in 2020 and 2021) and asks us
to infer that his mother paid the lease obligations “whenever
Christopher comes up short whenever rent is due.” The trial
court, however, credited Ms. Baldwin’s declaration that she never
resided at the apartment and did not pay for her son’s rent.
Where there are conflicts in the facts, they are resolved in favor
of the trial court’s order if supported by substantial evidence, as
they are here. (Brue, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.)
Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Ms. Baldwin “pays for
apartment expenses,” “leases an apartment in the State of
California” and has made representations to the landlord “that
she lives there” or intended to live there. But the evidence is that
the only lessee is her son Christopher and that Ms. Baldwin
guarantees payment if Christopher defaults. (Indeed, the
guaranty agreement states that the guarantor “acknowledges
that he/she has no right to access the premises without the
consent of the resident.”) Further, Ms. Baldwin testified at her
deposition that the representation she would live in the
apartment (which appeared on a 2015 application to transfer
from one apartment to another) was unauthorized. In any event,
the pertinent point is that, whether or not the 2015 statement
was authorized, and whatever she may have intended to do in
2015, in fact Ms. Baldwin never lived there and there is no
evidence to the contrary.
In the statement of facts in his opening brief, plaintiff tells
us (without any citations to the record) that Mr. Baldwin’s
parents each own 50 percent of Enterprise Builders, a large New
Mexico construction company. Plaintiff then tells us—again
without citation to the record—that Mr. Baldwin’s parents “have

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been supporting Christopher through the artifice of having him
on the Enterprise Builders payroll as an officer even though
Enterprise Builders does no business in California.” Then
plaintiff says that “[a]s a 50% controlling owner of Enterprise
Builders, [Ms. Baldwin] made the decision to maintain a
purported executive level employee (the Vice President of
Marketing) in the State of California, Christopher Baldwin, who
according to her testimony, was and continues to be on the
company payroll.” Again, no record citations. Plaintiff concludes
that Ms. Baldwin and Enterprise Builders are required to comply
with various California employment taxes and regulations, and
this “is evidence of a significant contact with the forum state.”
And in plaintiff’s legal argument, plaintiff tells us Mr. Baldwin’s
parents “put him on the Enterprise Builders payroll and he
draws a salary, which is obviously done to obtain a tax deduction
for what would otherwise be non deductible support payments.”
And again, no references to the record.
We fail to see what any of this has to do with Ms. Baldwin’s
contacts with California for purposes of establishing personal
jurisdiction over her. The evidence is that she has never worked
at Enterprise Builders Corporation. In any event, plaintiff has
forfeited the argument, such as it is. (Audish v. Macias (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 740, 751 (Audish) [“ ‘ “Rather than scour the
record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a
point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate
citations to the record.” ’ ”]; see ibid. [“ ‘ “Any statement in a brief
concerning matters in the appellate record—whether factual or
procedural and no matter where in the brief the reference to the
record occurs—must be supported by a citation to the record.” ’ ”].)

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Plaintiff contends Ms. Baldwin’s declaration “should have
been disregarded as a sham.” Plaintiff tells us that the evidence
before the trial court on the motion to quash was “replete with
documents that establish that Gloria Baldwin as [sic] a
controlling owner of Enterprise Builders and maintained a
management level employee (Christopher) in California for more
than ten years.” For this, plaintiff cites without explanation to
almost 200 pages of the record. Then plaintiff states that despite
these (unidentified) documents, Ms. Baldwin’s declaration states
she has never been employed by Enterprise Builders. Plaintiff
then once again cites the “onsite transfer application” where
Ms. Baldwin is shown as “owner” of Enterprise Builders.
Plaintiff cites authorities (without explaining them) that apply
(or refuse to apply) “ ‘the D’Amico rule [which] permits a trial
court to disregard declarations by a party which contradict his or
her own discovery responses (absent a reasonable explanation for
the discrepancy).’ ” (Ahn v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc. (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 133, 145, italics omitted, citing D’Amico v. Board
of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)
Even if plaintiff had not forfeited the point by requiring us
to “scour the record unguided” (Audish, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
p. 751), the authorities cited do not support disregarding
Ms. Baldwin’s declaration. The declaration was executed before
Ms. Baldwin’s deposition, at which plaintiff had a full
opportunity to explore the issue, if there was one. We see no
contradiction in being an owner of, and never having been
employed by, a company.

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DISPOSITION
The order granting respondent’s motion to quash for lack of
personal jurisdiction is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on
appeal.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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