CourtListener 10098161•In re F.S. CA2/7
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Filed 8/28/24 In re F.S. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re F.S., a Person Coming Under B330246
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 22CCJP02443A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ELIZABETH S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
_________________________________
ELIZABETH S., B334677
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
Petitioner, 22CCJP02443B)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY
Respondent,
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
APPEAL (B330246) from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS (B334677); writ petition to
review order setting hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee. Petition
denied.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant, Appellant, and Petitioner.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County
Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly
Roura, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services.
Children’s Law Center and Sarah Liebowitz for Real Party
in Interest K.S.
No appearance by Respondent The Superior Court of Los
Angeles County.
_________________________
2
INTRODUCTION
Elizabeth S. (Mother) appeals (B330246) from a juvenile
court order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 388 seeking reunification services for her daughter,
F.S.1 The court had previously denied Mother the services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), after determining F.S. came
within the court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e),
as a child under age five who was the victim of severe physical
abuse. In denying Mother’s section 388 petition, the court
concluded Mother had shown neither a change of circumstances
nor that providing her with reunification services would be in
F.S.’s best interest. We affirm.
In a separate original proceeding (B334677), Mother seeks
extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s order denying
her reunification services for her second daughter, K.S., who was
born during the proceedings regarding F.S. Because Mother was
not receiving services for F.S., the court concluded services need
not be provided for K.S. under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7).
The court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Thus,
we deny Mother’s writ petition.2
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 On our own motion, we consolidate Mother’s separate
proceedings for purposes of this opinion only.
3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Dependency Jurisdiction Over F.S. Under Section 300,
Subdivisions (a), (b), and (e)
F.S. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) on
June 17, 2022, when Mother brought F.S. to a medical clinic.
Mother informed the health care provider that she had
accidentally dropped seven-month-old F.S. on June 4, and that
F.S. had since stopped using her right arm or crawling and had
developed a lump on her right clavicle. Mother explained she did
not seek medical attention earlier because the family had
recently moved to California.
Finding the injuries were more indicative of abuse than an
accident, the clinic transferred F.S. to an emergency room for
further medical evaluation. At the hospital, doctors discovered
F.S. had a dislocated hip and fractures in her skull, ribs, clavicle,
femur, tibia, and humerus. These fractures were in different
stages of healing. F.S. also had bruising on her body. She
required intravenous fluid because she was not eating. A doctor
opined that the injuries to F.S.’s femur could have significant
effects on her gait in the future.
At the hospital, the Department and law enforcement
interviewed Mother and F.S.’s father, Edgar S. (Father).
Mother repeated that she dropped F.S. while carrying her
from her crib to the changing table. According to Mother, F.S.
landed on her right side, and Mother later noticed some bruising
on the child’s elbow and hairline but no bleeding. After she
informed Father, together they decided not to seek medical
attention because they saw no sign of other injuries. Later that
day, Mother noticed F.S. was unable to crawl, and a few days
4
later, Mother noticed she was not moving much at all. Despite
this behavior, Mother waited until Father’s new medical
insurance card arrived in the mail before making an appointment
at the clinic.
In his separate interview, Father stated that in early May
he was playing with F.S. while Mother was showering. According
to Father, he was swinging F.S. up and down when she fell out of
his hands and flew five feet before landing on the floor and
hitting her head on the crib. F.S. cried for 10 to 20 minutes.
Father gave her pain medication but did not see any injuries or
bleeding. After Mother finished showering, Father told her that
F.S. had fallen out of his hands while he was playing with her. A
week later, Mother informed Father that F.S. had bruising all
over her head. Even so, they did not seek medical attention
because F.S. had only shown discomfort for the first few days
after the incident. But when Father noticed a bump on F.S.’s
clavicle, they finally sought medical attention.
Father was arrested for child endangerment. Before the
arrest, Father told Mother, “It is okay you do not have to protect
me just tell the truth.” Thereafter, Mother told law enforcement
that Father had dropped F.S., and that Mother had not taken
F.S. to the hospital sooner because Father did not let her and she
“obeyed him.”
F.S. was detained and placed with her maternal
grandparents, with monitored visitation for Mother and Father.
In another interview with the Department, Mother
reported she was “shocked” when she learned of F.S.’s injuries at
the hospital. Since his arrest, Father had told her he was
“responsible for those injuries,” noting “that he lost his temper
during those times; that he shouldn’t have done that to her and
5
that he’s going to take full responsibility for what he has done.”
Mother explained she and Father had physically separated on the
advice of legal counsel but they still talked and checked in on
each other. Despite her separation from Father, Mother intended
to remain unemployed and planned to be a stay-at-home wife.
In his interview, Father confirmed Mother’s account that
the incident occurred on June 4, 2022, and not early May as he
had originally reported. Father shared his desire for Mother to
have custody of F.S., explaining that he was the problem and
Mother was innocent, and that he was controlling of Mother and
kept her from seeking treatment for F.S. because he did not want
his actions to be discovered. He also explained that he and
Mother had separated on the advice of church elders. He
indicated Mother had forgiven him and that they still loved each
other and wanted to be together.
In a search of Mother’s phone, law enforcement discovered
notes Mother had written questioning whether F.S.’s neck was
injured based on her limited movement and documenting that
F.S. was “bruised everywhere” and crying when Mother sat her
up, moved her back, or extended her hands and feet. Law
enforcement also found photos on Mother’s phone that appeared
to show F.S. with her arm in a homemade sling, as well as a
video showing F.S. crawling using only one arm while Mother
commented that it was amazing she was doing so without crying.
Mother and Father were each charged with one count of
misdemeanor child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)).
Criminal protective orders prevented the parents from having
contact with F.S. except during their monitored visitation.
After a September 20, 2022 jurisdiction hearing, the court
took jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (e),
6
sustaining the following allegations: Both parents committed
“deliberate, unreasonable and neglectful acts” that caused serious
injuries to F.S., and both knew or should have known F.S. was
being physically abused but did not take action to protect her;
both parents failed to obtain timely medical treatment for her;
and Father’s mental health condition (i.e., schizophrenia)
endangered F.S. and Mother knew of that danger and failed to
protect F.S.
2. F.S.’s Disposition Hearing and Denial of
Reunification Services for Mother
The Department recommended the dependency court deny
both parents reunification services under the so-called “bypass
provision” of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(5), which provides that “[r]eunification services
need not be provided to a parent . . . when the court finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, . . . [t]hat the child was brought
within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of
Section 300 [for severe physical abuse of a child under age five]
because of the conduct of that parent . . . .” Because reunification
services may only be provided in this situation where the court
finds the services are “likely to prevent reabuse or continued
neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification would be
detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively
attached” to the parent (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (c)(3)),
the court appointed an expert under Evidence Code section 730 to
examine Mother and Father and their relationships with F.S. and
provide an opinion on these subjects.
Following evaluations of the parents and observations of
their interactions with F.S., the expert found Mother exhibited
poor insight and impaired judgment that “decrease[d] her ability
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to keep [F.S.] safe.” The expert noted Mother took no
accountability for her role in F.S.’s injuries and continually
changed her story. The expert observed Mother “displayed a
pattern of making conflicting statements about the incidents
making it difficult to gauge the credibility of her statements.”
The expert determined Father had an underlying mental illness
that may have been affecting his ability to appreciate the gravity
of the situation, and Mother minimized his mental health history
by stating Father “pretended to have mental illness to get out of
the [Navy].” The expert opined there was a “high” likelihood that
F.S. would suffer physical or emotional abuse if returned to her
parents, and that if reunification services were provided, the
expert’s prognosis that the parents would benefit from such
services was “guarded” based on the case history.
The expert assessed that F.S.’s attachment to both Mother
and Father was “not strong.” The expert observed that F.S.
“responded to [Father’s] presence with tears and appeared to be
[in] distress throughout the session.” F.S. also “cried and
appeared to be in distress when alone with mother,” and she
“struggled in responding in a playful manner to mother and only
became more comfortable and playful when [the maternal]
grandmother joined in the session and held her.” To that end,
the expert assessed that F.S. had “a strong and nurturing bond
with maternal grandmother.”
At the disposition hearing held on November 16 and 17,
2022, Mother submitted evidence of her petition for legal
separation from Father filed on October 5, 2022, as well as
evidence of her participation in individual psychotherapy,
parenting classes, and church-affiliated counseling since August
2022.
8
Mother also testified, explaining she was “in shock” to learn
that Father may have injured F.S. at times other than when he
dropped her on June 4, 2022. When asked about the photos
showing a homemade sling, Mother stated she had wrapped
F.S.’s arm “to prevent further injury.” Mother then said she did
not know if F.S. was injured at the time, and later said that she
was not aware of any injuries before she took F.S. to the clinic on
June 17, 2022. Mother explained that reuniting with Father was
“not an option right now,” but that she was still in
communication with him.
The juvenile court ordered F.S. removed from Father and
Mother and ordered monitored visitation for both parents. The
court denied both Father and Mother reunification services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), finding by clear and convincing
evidence that F.S. was brought within the jurisdiction of the
court under section 300, subdivision (e), because of the conduct of
both parents. Further, although the court recognized both
parents presented evidence that they had enrolled in programs
and were beginning to address their issues, the court indicated it
was unable to find pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3),
that reunification services for either parent were in F.S.’s best
interest or likely to prevent further abuse, or that the failure to
try reunification would be detrimental to F.S. because she was
closely and positively attached to either parent.
3. K.S.’s Birth and Detention
Mother gave birth to K.S. in February 2023. The
Department learned of K.S.’s birth two weeks later during a
home visit with the maternal grandparents. Mother reported the
child was Father’s and that Father was helping her financially, in
communication with her, and present when K.S. was born.
9
Although Mother claimed Father’s only contact with K.S. was at
the hospital when Mother gave birth, the Department obtained
records showing K.S. was not born at the hospital as well as
reports from Mother’s neighbors that Father had recently been
seen on multiple occasions at her apartment Thereafter, Mother
admitted K.S. was born at home with Father present, and that he
had visited the home and K.S. since her birth. K.S. was detained
and placed with her maternal grandparents along with F.S.
4. Section 388 Petition
In March 2023, Mother filed a petition under section 388
seeking modification of the order at disposition denying her
reunification services for F.S. Mother sought reunification
services on the basis of her completion of 25 parenting classes
and participation in therapy and counseling, her continued
separation from Father, and her visitation and bond with F.S.3
In its response, the Department reported that neither the
instructor for Mother’s parenting classes nor her counselor
responded to the Department’s attempts to contact them. The
Department also reported that Mother’s former psychotherapist
had “concerns about [Mother]” but could not elaborate as Mother
had not consented to her speaking with the Department. The
letter submitted from Mother’s current therapist did not
reference the underlying issues and said only that Mother was
being treated for stress management due to court involvement
and the removal of her children.
3 Mother also requested that the maternal grandparents be
permitted to monitor her visits with F.S., but Mother does not
now seek reversal of the denial of that request.
10
The Department also explained that Father was reporting
he lived at an address that corresponded to a vacant apartment
where work was being done, and that Mother’s neighbors recently
witnessed Father coming to her apartment.
The Department reported difficulties in coordinating
visitation for the parents with F.S. because the parents did not
want to use Department-provided monitors and even rejected
volunteers from their church. The Department assessed that
Mother’s visits with F.S. mostly went well. However, one church-
affiliated monitor observed F.S. run from Mother, further
describing F.S. as “very stand-offish with her mother. She did
not go to her mom, but her mom reached out and the kid turned
away. She seemed a little more secure with the [maternal]
grandpa.”
Following another interview with Mother, the Department
expressed concern that Mother was recanting and contradicting
some of her prior statements as well as minimizing F.S.’s
injuries, Father’s actions in causing those injuries, and her role in
failing to seek timely medical attention for them. For instance,
Mother said F.S. “had an accident” on June 4, 2022, the day
Father had admitted he injured F.S. The Department
determined Mother was “even more protective” of Father than
she had been initially. The Department assessed Mother as not
credible.
Thereafter, against his counsel’s advice, Father further
disclosed to the Department how F.S. sustained her injuries.
Father explained that, starting in March 2022, he would handle
the child roughly in an attempt to stop her from crying. He
stated, “I would hurt her, take her from her crib by squeezing
her. I would change her (diaper) and was squeezing with my
11
hands, bending and twisting her arms and legs so she would stay
still and not cry. I did the same thing while swaddling her. I
would squeeze her upper torso into my chest.” On June 4, 2022,
after F.S. started crying when she saw him, he started spinning
her in a circle while holding onto her ankles with his arms out
straight. After a few spins, Father continued, “My hands gave
out and she launched from my hands and hit the crib.” F.S.
“started crying hard,” and Father gave her pain medication and
told Mother he dropped the child. Father stated he should have
listened to Mother and sought immediate medical attention, but
he also said he and Mother checked the baby and determined she
was not injured.
After Father’s disclosure, the district attorney upgraded
Mother’s and Father’s criminal charges to felonies.
On May 10 and 25, and June 14, 2023, the court held a
hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition, during which the
parents testified and presented witnesses.4 The Department and
F.S.’s counsel opposed Mother’s petition.
Dr. Shelbi Cullen testified she provided Mother lay biblical
counseling through the parents’ church for several months and
also monitored some of Mother’s visits with F.S. Dr. Cullen said
she only observed positive interactions between Mother and F.S.
She testified Mother and Father continued to be together in
church.
John Ford, who met Father and Mother through their
church, testified that he monitored five to seven visits for Mother.
4 Father also filed a section 388 petition seeking
reunification services for F.S. The court considered (and denied)
Father’s petition at the same hearing as Mother’s. Father
voluntarily dismissed his appeal from the denial of his petition.
12
F.S. was happy during the visits, and Ford had no concerns about
Mother’s care of F.S.
The Department stipulated that another visitation monitor,
Laurinda Keys, also had positive reports about the visits between
Mother and F.S.
The maternal grandfather testified that he monitored
Mother’s daily video calls to F.S. that usually lasted 10 to 15
minutes. He stated F.S. would ask for Mother four to five times a
day and called her “Mom.”
Department caseworker Genesis Haddad, who had been
assigned to the case since June 2022, testified that Mother
visited with F.S. at least once a week, and Mother had attended
all of F.S.’s medical appointments. Haddad testified that three
different visitation monitors had reported that during the visits
F.S. would walk back to the maternal grandparents rather than
stay with Mother.
Matthew Heller, Father’s biblical counselor, testified that
he had a meeting with Mother and Father to discuss their
relationship. Mother had indicated she was interested in
reconciling with Father.
In Mother’s testimony, she stated she generally visited with
F.S. a few times a week at a playground inside a mall, and that
F.S. would come to her for comfort during the visits. Mother
played games with her and offered her snacks. During Mother’s
nightly video chats with F.S. before bedtime, Mother would sing
songs or dance with F.S.
Mother testified she had attended about 30 parenting
classes. Her insurance for therapy sessions had run out but she
hoped to attend more sessions to help her cope with stress and
anxiety from her dependency case.
13
Mother stated that, although she did not believe in divorce,
she was legally separated from Father and had not resided with
him since July 2022. She still met up with Father to attend
church with him, and she also saw him during weekly Bible
studies. She stated Father had found a new place to live, and the
only time he had come to Mother’s apartment was for her labor
with K.S. and K.S.’s birth.
Mother testified she was angry with Father, and she was
“in shock” when she read his recent confession. She said she
wanted to take F.S. to the hospital the day she was injured but
did not do so.
The court denied Mother’s petition, concluding Mother had
shown neither a change of circumstances nor that providing her
with reunification services was in F.S.’s best interest. The court
found Mother extremely passive and subservient, with
questionable protective capacities. It further noted that the
witnesses called by Mother and Father were all fellow church
members who would be expected to “speak positively” about
Mother and Father. The court indicated these witnesses had
focused on the parents instead of F.S., and they provided no
clinical evidence to assist the court in deciding what was in F.S.’s
best interest.
Mother timely appealed from the order denying her
petition.
5. Proceedings Regarding K.S.
In March 2023, the Department filed a petition alleging
under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), that K.S. was at
serious risk of harm based on Mother’s and Father’s abuse of and
failure to protect F.S. The Department recommended that
reunification services be denied to Mother and Father under
14
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7), which provides in part that the
court need not provide reunification services if “the parent is not
receiving reunification services for a sibling of the child”
pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5). The Department
cited Mother’s coverup of Father’s abuse of F.S., the parents’
knowledge of F.S.’s injuries and refusal to pursue medical
attention promptly, and Father’s continuing and controlling
relationship about which Mother was deceitful. The Department
reported that Mother’s service providers either had not responded
to the Department’s contact attempts or did not have Mother’s
consent to communicate with the Department.
In August 2023, Father pleaded no contest in criminal
court to one count of felony child endangerment causing great
bodily injury. The court sentenced him to 364 days in county jail
and five years of formal probation, and it issued a 10-year
criminal protective order that prohibited Father from having any
contact with F.S. Mother pleaded no contest to one count of
misdemeanor child endangerment. She was placed on summary
probation and ordered to complete 52 weeks of parenting and
domestic violence classes. The court also issued a 10-year
criminal protective order that prevented Mother from having any
contact with F.S. except for visitation ordered by the juvenile
court. The district attorney expressed concern to the Department
that Mother was “still adamant that she did not know anything”
about Father’s abuse and did not “fully understand that she was
wrong in this situation.”
On January 11, 2024, at a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the court sustained the allegations against
Mother and Father and ordered that neither receive reunification
services for K.S. under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7).
15
After the court set a permanency hearing under section
366.26, Mother timely filed a petition for extraordinary writ. We
issued an order to show cause, stating our intention to decide the
matter on the merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h).)
DISCUSSION
1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition Seeking
Reunification Services With F.S.
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 388 allows a parent to request modification of a
prior order based on changed circumstances or new evidence.
(§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) When the juvenile court has previously
denied a parent reunification services under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(5), however, the parent’s burden in bringing a
section 388 petition requesting reunification services is
heightened.
First, the parent must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed modification is in the best interests of
the child. (§ 388, subd. (a)(2) [“When any party . . . petitions the
court . . . to modify the order that reunification services were not
needed pursuant to paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subdivision (b)
of Section 361.5 . . . , and the court orders a hearing . . . , the
court shall modify the order that reunification services were not
needed . . . only if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed change is in the best interests of the
child.”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(C).)
Second, the juvenile court may not grant a section 388
petition requesting reunification services when services were
bypassed under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), unless the
16
requirements of section 361.5, subdivision (c), are met. (In re
A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1075-1076 & fn. 2; see § 361.5,
subd. (c).) Thus, reunification services may be granted only
where the court “finds that, based on competent evidence, those
services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the
child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the
child because the child is closely and positively attached to that
parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c); In re A.M., at p. 1076 & fn. 2 [a
parent cannot “evade the requirements of section 361.5,
subdivision (c), merely by waiting a few months and then seeking
relief under section 388”]; see In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1147, 1158 [once the bypass provision of § 361.5, subd. (b)(5), has
been found to apply, “a juvenile court may modify an order
denying reunification services only if there is clear and
convincing evidence that the services would be in the child’s best
interests, and only if it makes the same findings that would have
been required to offer services at the disposition hearing instead
of bypassing services”].)
In assessing the best interests of the child for purposes of a
section 388 petition, the juvenile court must focus on the needs of
the child rather than the parent’s interests in reunification. (In
re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163; see also In re Marilyn
H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) “[T]he petitioner must show
changed, not changing, circumstances. [Citation.] The change of
circumstances or new evidence ‘must be of such significant nature
that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged
prior order.’ ” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.)
We review the denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of
discretion. (In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194.)
17
B. Mother did not show changed circumstances
Mother failed to support her section 388 petition with
evidence showing circumstances had meaningfully changed since
the juvenile court denied her reunification services at F.S.’s
disposition hearing.
At the time of the disposition hearing, Mother was enrolled
in parenting classes, therapy with a licensed psychotherapist,
and church counseling. She was visiting F.S., with some
monitors observing positive interactions and others—notably, the
court-appointed expert—observing the absence of a strong bond.
Mother asserted she had physically and legally separated from
Father, and that she intended to remain separated from him.
Five months later, Mother based her section 388 petition on
evidence showing the following: She had continued attending
parenting classes, therapy with a licensed therapist, and church
counseling. She had continued visiting F.S., with some monitors
observing positive interactions and others observing the absence
of a strong bond. And she had continued her legal separation
from Father.
Even if Mother made progress in her case plan, Mother did
not explain how these circumstances were materially different
from those that existed when the juvenile court denied her
reunification services only five months earlier. (See In re Ernesto
R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [“To support a section 388
petition, the change in circumstances must be substantial.”]; In re
Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 615 [change must be
“significant”].)
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C. Mother did not prove that reunification
services would be in F.S.’s best interest
Even assuming Mother based her petition on changed
circumstances, Mother did not show by clear and convincing
evidence that providing her with reunification services would be
in F.S.’s best interest. While she continued to attend parenting
classes, therapy, and counseling, none of her service providers
opined that Mother had learned to accept responsibility for her
role in F.S.’s abuse or establish boundaries that would ensure the
child’s safety in the future. The court observed Mother still had a
passive and subservient mindset.
In addition, it was far from clear that Mother and Father
had in fact separated. Since the disposition hearing, Mother and
Father attended church and weekly Bible studies together. They
participated in joint counseling sessions with discussions of their
relationship and plans for and efforts toward reconciliation.
Father came to Mother’s apartment and medical appointments
while she was pregnant with her second child. He was present at
Mother’s apartment when she gave birth to K.S., as well as the
hospital where Mother and K.S. were later taken. Father visited
Mother’s apartment after K.S. was born. He continued to visit
her apartment after K.S. was detained. And Mother had
admitted she was interested in reconciling with Father and
acknowledged her separation from him was solely a product of
legal advice. Evidence of Mother’s ongoing relationship with
Father strongly supported a finding that reunification services
would be unlikely to prevent F.S.’s reabuse and that failing to try
reunification would not be detrimental to F.S. (See In re A.A.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612 [modification of a prior order is
justified only where “the problem that initially brought the child
19
within the dependency system [is] removed or ameliorated”]; see
also In re A.M., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1075-1076 [§ 361.5,
subd. (c)(3), requirements still apply when reunification services
are sought through a section 388 petition].)
Furthermore, so long as Mother remained with Father, her
reunification with F.S. would not be possible. As a result of his
felony conviction, Father was subject to a 10-year criminal
protective order that prohibited all contact with F.S. Under those
circumstances, providing Mother with reunification services
would result in a needless delay of permanence and stability for
F.S. (See In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1275
[finite social services are to be reserved “for those cases where
reunification is likely rather than ‘fruitless’ ”].)
Moreover, after the disposition hearing, Mother continued
to hinder the Department’s investigation by withholding
information and providing inconsistent statements. She failed to
disclose the birth of her second child, and when questioned by the
Department, falsely stated that K.S. was born in a hospital when
in fact Mother gave birth to K.S. at home. She lied and withheld
information regarding Father’s visits to her home around the
time K.S. was born. And she minimized F.S.’s injuries and
denied facts she had previously admitted, including that she had
seen signs of F.S.’s injuries. Mother’s lack of candor supported
the court’s determination that she failed to carry her burden to
show by clear and convincing evidence that reunification services
were in F.S.’s best interest.
Finally, notwithstanding some evidence of Mother’s
positive interactions with F.S., other evidence showed F.S. was
not bonded with Mother and preferred to be with her maternal
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grandparents with whom she was strongly bonded and who were
willing to adopt her.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mother’s section 388 petition.
2. The Juvenile Court Properly Denied Mother
Reunification Services for K.S.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7), provides that reunification
services need not be provided to a parent where “the parent is not
receiving reunification services for a sibling or half sibling of the
child pursuant to paragraph (3), (5), or (6).” In that instance, the
juvenile court may still order reunification services if the parent
proves by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in
the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2); see In re T.R.
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1148.)
In making this determination regarding the child’s best
interest, “the court shall consider any information it deems
relevant, including the following factors: [¶] (1) The specific act
or omission comprising the severe sexual abuse or the severe
physical harm inflicted on the child or the child’s sibling or half
sibling. [¶] (2) The circumstances under which the abuse or
harm was inflicted on the child or the child’s sibling or half
sibling. [¶] (3) The severity of the emotional trauma suffered by
the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. [¶] (4) Any history
of abuse of other children by the offending parent or guardian.
[¶] (5) The likelihood that the child may be safely returned to the
care of the offending parent or guardian within 12 months with
no continuing supervision. [¶] (6) Whether or not the child
desires to be reunified with the offending parent or guardian.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (i).)
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We review for substantial evidence a determination that
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7), applies. (In re A.G. (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 276, 283; Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) We review the determination that
reunification would not be in the child’s best interest for an abuse
of discretion. (In re A.G., at p. 283.)
It is undisputed Mother was not receiving reunification
services for F.S. pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5),
such that the bypass provision of subdivision (b)(7) is applicable
to K.S.
In weighing whether reunification services were
nevertheless in K.S.’s best interest, the juvenile court considered
the Department’s reports from the earlier proceedings regarding
F.S., which documented Father’s severe physical abuse of F.S.,
both parents’ failure to pursue prompt medical attention for her
injuries, and both parents’ continued failure to fully cooperate in
an investigation of that abuse and accept responsibility for their
actions. The reports also indicated that, despite telling the
Department otherwise, Mother was continuing her relationship
with Father and providing him with access to her home and K.S.
before K.S. was detained. Since those reports were filed, Mother
and Father were convicted of child endangerment charges, and
Father was ordered to have no contact with F.S. for 10 years.
The prosecutor expressed concern that Mother still did not
recognize her role in F.S.’s abuse.
While Mother asserts she should receive services because
K.S. was not subject to physical abuse like F.S., a court “need not
wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In
re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) The evidence regarding F.S.’s
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abuse and Mother’s unwillingness to fully appreciate her role in
that abuse supports the juvenile court’s finding that reunification
would not be in K.S.’s best interest. (§ 361, subd. (i)(1)-(5).)
Moreover, despite presenting evidence showing she
attended parenting classes and counseling, Mother did not
establish how these services would ensure K.S.’s safety upon
reunification. Mother also did not allow her therapists to share
any information with the Department.
Finally, having spent almost her entire life outside of
Mother’s care, K.S. has bonded with her maternal grandmother.
Continued placement with her maternal grandparents would
likewise keep K.S. with her sister.
In sum, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
determination that reunification services need not be provided
under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7), and the court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that Mother failed to prove
that providing those services would be in K.S.’s best interest.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Mother’s section 388 petition is affirmed.
Mother’s writ petition is denied.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J.
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