CourtListener 10098134•People v. Sahibi CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 8/28/24 P. v. Sahibi CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B333568
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA220851)
v.
OUSSAMA SAHIBI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Deborah L. Hawkins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Defendant and appellant Oussama Sahibi challenges the
trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 In his petition, Sahibi alleged that he was
eligible for resentencing because the jury was instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, a doctrine abolished
as a basis of murder liability by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). The trial court denied the petition,
finding Sahibi had failed to make a prima facie case that he was
entitled to relief because the jury did not receive the instructions
Sahibi claimed. Sahibi contends this was error, arguing that the
jury instructions on implied malice, coupled with the prosecutor’s
closing argument, allowed him to be convicted under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.
We disagree. The jury instructions and closing argument
correctly described the doctrine of implied malice, which remains
valid following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437. (See People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850.) The trial court did not err in
determining that Sahibi is ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law and denying the petition on that basis.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Cognizant that neither we nor the trial court may engage
in factfinding at the prima facie stage (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
1 At the time Sahibi filed his petition, the applicable
statute was found at Penal Code section 1170.95. Assembly Bill
No. 200 (Reg. Sess. 2021-2022) has since renumbered section
1170.95 as section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we refer to the current citation at section 1172.6
throughout. Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
Cal.5th 952, 972), we recount the facts set forth in our prior
opinion in Sahibi’s direct appeal of his convictions solely to
provide procedural context for the issues in the resentencing
proceeding. On February 11, 2001, Sahibi and two fellow gang
members went to a rival’s house. (People v. Sahibi (Nov. 21,
2003, B161149) [nonpub. opn.].) “Shots were fired, and a
neighbor, Roger Paez, went outside to see if someone needed help.
More shots were fired and Paez was killed (he was shot in the
face).” (Ibid.) The following month, Sahibi was in an argument
“with a rival gang member, Josue Montes, who expected a
fistfight and went into an alleyway to fight; Sahibi had a
different plan, drew a revolver, and shot Montes four or five
times. Montes survived . . . .” (Ibid.)
A jury convicted Sahibi of one count of second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), one count of attempted murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664), and one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)).2 As to the murder charge, the jury found true an
allegation that he personally used a firearm in the commission of
the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) but found not true allegations
that he personally discharged the firearm (id., subd. (c)) and
personally caused great bodily injury or death to Paez (id.,
subd. (d)). The jury found true, however, an allegation that
Sahibi committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused Paez’s
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). On the attempted murder charge,
the jury found true another gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
2 The trial court stayed the sentence for assault with a
firearm under section 654, and it is not at issue in this appeal.
3
(b)(1)), as well as an allegation that Sahibi personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great
bodily injury to Montes (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court
sentenced Sahibi to 65 years to life in prison.
In November 2021, Sahibi filed a petition under section
1172.6 seeking resentencing on both the murder and attempted
murder convictions.3 After appointing counsel and obtaining
briefing from both sides, the trial court denied the petition,
finding that Sahibi had failed to make a prima facie case for relief
because the jury was not instructed on any theory of guilt by
imputed malice.
DISCUSSION
A. Background on Resentencing under Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6 allows certain defendants convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter to petition the trial
court for their convictions to be vacated and to be resentenced.
To be eligible for relief under the statute, it must be the case that
“[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) These
changes to the law, enacted as part of Senate Bill 1437, amended
section 188 to provide that, “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of
[s]ection 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
3 For unknown reasons, the petition is not part of the
appellate record. We therefore augment the record on our own
motion to include it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155(a)(1)(A),
8.340(c).)
4
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The effect of this amendment was to
abolish the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis
of liability for murder. (People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp.
847-848.) Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, a defendant
could be convicted of murder under this doctrine simply by acting
as an accomplice in an offense that foreseeably resulted in the
commission of a murder, even if the defendant did not share the
mens rea of the killer. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
449; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-165.)
In addition to abolishing the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 also amended section
189 to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine,
requiring greater proof of the defendant’s personal culpability for
the killing. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708.)
To convict a defendant of felony murder under the new law, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant either was the actual
killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); acted with the intent to kill in aiding,
abetting, encouraging, or soliciting the actual killer (id., subd.
(e)(2)); or “was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life” (id., subd. (e)(3)).
To obtain relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner must first
make a prima facie case for eligibility. (See id., subd. (c).) “[T]he
prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,] subdivision (c) is
limited,” and the trial court must “ ‘ “take[ ] [the] petitioner’s
factual allegations as true” ’ ” and “should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 971, 972.) The court may deny a defendant’s petition if the
record refutes the defendant’s allegation that he is eligible for
resentencing (id. at p. 971), but this does not occur “unless the
5
record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.”
(People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
If the petition survives the prima facie stage, the court
must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the People bear the
burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as
amended by” Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the
People cannot carry this burden, the court must vacate the
murder conviction and then resentence the defendant on any
remaining charges. (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
B. Sahibi Has Failed to Make a Prima Facie Case
Because the Record Shows Unequivocally that He
Was Convicted on a Still-valid Theory
In their opposition to Sahibi’s petition before the trial court,
the People submitted a copy of the jury instructions at Sahibi’s
original trial, showing that the jury was not instructed on felony
murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In
cases where the jury did not receive instructions on murder
under one of those doctrines, the trial court may conclude that
the conviction remains valid, and may deny the petition at the
prima facie stage because “the petitioner is ineligible for relief as
a matter of law.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52;
accord, People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945-946;
People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677.)
Sahibi nevertheless argues the trial court erred by denying
his petition at the prima facie stage because although the jury
was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, the instructions the jury did receive on implied malice,
when combined with the prosecutor’s closing argument, provided
“the equivalent of the natural and probable consequences
6
doctrine because it told the jury that [Sahibi] could be guilty of
murder without personally harboring the intent to kill.” We
disagree. Both the jury instructions and the closing argument
accurately described the law on implied malice, and did not allow
for a conviction under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.4
The trial court instructed the jury on implied malice
pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.11 as follows: “Malice is implied
when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶]
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human
life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life.” This language remains unchanged in the current
version of CALJIC No. 8.11 and comports with our Supreme
Court’s description of implied malice: “Implied malice does not
require an intent to kill. Malice is implied when a person
willfully does an act, the natural and probable consequences of
which are dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly
acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that the act
poses. [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643,
653.)
Both the pattern jury instruction and the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Gonzalez use variations of the term “natural and
4 Sahibi claims he also stated a prima facie case for
resentencing on his attempted murder conviction, but he offers no
argument on this point other than that “it is . . . highly likely that
the prosecution’s argument affected [the attempted murder]
verdict as well.” Because we find nothing improper in the
prosecution’s argument, we affirm the trial court’s denial on the
attempted murder count as well.
7
probable consequences,” but implied malice is a completely
separate doctrine. “[U]nder the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the
offense he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target
offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct
perpetrator that was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of
the crime the accomplice aided and abetted . . . . [Citation.]”
(People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) The doctrine
imposed a form of vicarious liability, under which a defendant
who aided and abetted a lesser, target offense could be convicted
of murder “ ‘although his culpability regarding its commission
may be no greater than that of negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 844.) The Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 to eliminate
this possibility and ensure “that a person should be punished for
his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual
culpability.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(d).)
Implied malice imposes no such vicarious liability, but
rather defines murder based on the defendant’s own willful
“conduct that endangers the life of another.” (People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.) For this reason, every court that has
considered the matter has concluded that Senate Bill 1437
“maintained the viability of murder convictions based on implied
malice, and the definition of implied malice remains unchanged.”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298; accord,
People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1004; see also People
v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850.)
Nothing in the excerpt of the prosecutor’s closing
arguments that Sahibi submitted in support of his petition is
inconsistent with the principles described above. The prosecutor
asked, “Did [Sahibi] do an intentional act by pulling the trigger of
8
a gun, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
human life? . . . Basically, go out, shoot up a corner, shoot
somebody with complete disregard for human life. The answer to
that question [is] yes. You saw what happened. He didn’t care.
Intent to kill is not necessary when you do an act that is
inherently dangerous to human life with conscious disregard for
human life.”
Thus, the prosecutor did not argue, as Sahibi alleges, that
he could be guilty of murder for “the mere act of pulling the
trigger,” but rather for willfully pulling the trigger while knowing
that doing so was dangerous to human life. This was an accurate
statement of the law, both at the time and following the
enactment of Senate Bill 1437. Because the record demonstrates
Sahibi was not prosecuted or convicted based on a natural and
probable consequences theory, he is not entitled to relief under
section 1172.6.
9
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
10
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.