CourtListener 10050944•Rosson v. Carr CA2/6
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Filed 8/21/24 Rosson v. Carr CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
SCOTT ROSSON, 2d Crim. No. B331979
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2023-
Plaintiff and Appellant, 00575394-CU-BC-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
KIMBERLY CARR,
Defendant and Respondent.
Scott Rosson appeals from the judgment of dismissal after
the trial court sustained the demurrer to his first amended
complaint (FAC) without leave to amend. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rosson filed a complaint in propria persona against
Kimberly Carr seeking compensation for remodeling her
residence. He attached an invoice seeking $388,283 for labor
performed for the remodel and alleged: “Ms. Carr, knowing she
had no way to pay for my labor, promised the house would be left
to me as beneficiary in her Trust.” Carr demurred on the ground
that the lawsuit was barred because Rosson was not a licensed
contractor. (Bus. & Prof. Code,1 § 7031.) The court sustained the
demurrer with leave to amend.
Rosson then obtained counsel and filed an FAC for breach
of contract, fraud, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. It
alleged: Rosson had been a general contractor but his license
became inactive in 2016. He met Carr in 2018 and they “entered
into a romantic dating relationship.” In 2019 Rosson moved into
her house and they resided there together. In exchange for
Rosson remodeling the house, Carr “agreed to add Plaintiff as a
co-beneficiary with her to the Trust” to make him “a co-owner of
the Home so as to allow him to protect his interest in his labor.”
Rosson alleged that Carr added him as a co-beneficiary on the
Trust. If Carr predeceased Rosson, he could live in the house for
one year.
The FAC alleged that Rosson worked on Carr’s house
between 2019 and 2022. When their dating relationship ended in
September 2022, Carr removed him as a beneficiary and did not
compensate him for his labor.
The FAC sought monetary damages and restitution for the
value of the labor provided. Attached to the FAC was an invoice
for $401,146.40 itemizing numerous services Rosson provided,
including installing new pipes, a HVAC system, a new roof,
siding, flooring, electrical system, and windows, among other
work.
Carr demurred to the FAC on various grounds, including
that Rosson was barred from bringing an action for compensation
because he was an unlicensed contractor (§ 7031). Rosson
responded that he was not seeking compensation for his labor,
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Business
and Professions Code.
2
but sought “to enforce a property right granted to him as part of a
nonmarital cohabitation agreement” pursuant to Marvin v.
Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 (Marvin).
The court sustained the demurrer to the FAC without leave
to amend. It concluded that Marvin did not apply and section
7031 barred recovery because Rosson was not a licensed
contractor. Rosson appeals from the judgment of dismissal.
DISCUSSION
Standard of review
“ ‘When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the
complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’ ”
(Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
“[T]he trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the
complaint and those arising by reasonable implication therefrom;
it may not consider contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact
or law.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.) We review an order sustaining a
demurrer de novo (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 412, 415) and review the denial of leave to amend for
abuse of discretion (McKell, at p. 1469).
Contractor’s license law
Rosson contends the court erred in concluding that his
lawsuit was barred because he was not a licensed contractor. We
disagree.
Contractors require a license. (§§ 7028, subd. (a)(1), 7065.)
A “contractor” is synonymous with a “builder” and includes any
person who “does . . . construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract
from, [or] improve . . . any building.” (§ 7026.) Rosson maintains
that he provided approximately $400,000 worth of labor and
materials to improve Carr’s home, thus conceding that he acted
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as a contractor.
Rosson also admitted that his license had lapsed at the
time of performing services for Carr. Consequently, he is barred
from suing Carr for compensation for his work. “[N]o person . . .
acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any
action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court of
this state for the collection of compensation for the performance
of any act or contract where a license is required by this chapter
without alleging that they were a duly licensed contractor at all
times during the performance of that act or contract regardless of
the merits of the cause of action brought by the person.” (§7031,
subd. (a).)
“The purpose of the licensing law is to protect the public
from incompetence and dishonesty in those who provide building
and construction services.” (Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis
Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 995 (Hydrotech).) “Because of
the strength and clarity of this policy, it is well settled that
section 7031 applies despite injustice to the unlicensed
contractor.” (Ibid.) “The statutory prohibition operates even
where the person for whom the work was performed knew the
contractor was unlicensed.” (Id. at p. 997.)
“Thus, an unlicensed contractor cannot recover either for
the agreed contract price or for the reasonable value of labor and
materials.” (Hydrotech, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 997.) “[T]he
statute bars an unlicensed contractor’s claim for fraud when the
primary deceit alleged is a false promise to pay, and the damages
primarily consist of, or are measured by, the price or value of the
work and materials furnished.” (Id. at p. 992.) Nor may an
unlicensed contractor recover on the theories of quantum meruit,
reasonable value of goods and services, or unjust enrichment.
4
(Pacific Custom Pools, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co. (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 1254, 1266.)
Because Rosson seeks compensation for his labor and
materials provided in remodeling Carr’s home, section 7031 bars
recovery. “ ‘The term “compensation” as used in the statute
“denotes sums claimed as an agreed price, fee or percentage
earned by performance, and also sums claimed as the reasonable
value of work done under implied contract.” ’ ” (UDC-Universal
Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 10, 26.)
Thus, section 7031 bars an action to recover a stock interest in a
business in exchange for contractor services. (Johnson v. Mattox
(1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 714, 718; see K & K Services, Inc. v. City of
Irwindale (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 818, 823-824 [§ 7031 barred
right to run “fill” operation and collect dumping fees as
compensation for work performed].) The same principle bars an
action seeking money damages or an ownership interest in
exchange for unlicensed contractor services. We conclude Rosson
is barred from seeking compensation because he was an
unlicensed contractor when he improved Carr’s house.
Ownership
Under certain conditions, a building owner or homeowner
who improves their property or principal place of residence need
not maintain a license. (§§ 7026, 7044, subd. (a)(1), (2), (3).)
Here, Rosson alleged a verbal agreement “to add Plaintiff
as a co-beneficiary with her to the Trust” to make him “a
co-owner of the Home.” He alleged that Carr added him as a
trust beneficiary in “partial fulfillment” of this agreement. Even
if these allegations are true, we conclude they are insufficient to
elevate Rosson to the status of a building owner or homeowner.
“ ‘[P]roperty transferred to, or held in, a revocable inter
5
vivos trust is deemed . . . the property of the settlor,’ ” who
“ ‘effectively retains full ownership and control over any property
transferred to that trust.’ ” (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1319.) “Any interest that beneficiaries of
a revocable trust have in trust property is ‘merely potential’ and
can ‘evaporate in a moment at the whim of the [settlor].’ ” (Ibid.,
fn. omitted.) In Steinhart, the trustor was also the sole trustee
and beneficiary during her lifetime, and there was no “change in
ownership” to her siblings or their issue for purposes of property
tax reappraisal until she died and the trust became irrevocable.
(Id. at pp. 1303, 1320.)
“A transfer of ownership occurs when a revocable trust
including an interest in real property that vests in persons other
than the trustor or their spouse becomes irrevocable.” (Bohnett v.
County of Santa Barbara (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1132.)
Because the FAC did not allege that Rosson was the beneficiary
of an irrevocable trust, and he has not shown that he could
amend the complaint to so allege, Rosson cannot show he is
exempt from section 7031.
Joint venture
Rosson also contends he is entitled to compensation
because he participated in a joint venture with Carr. We are not
persuaded.
“A joint venture is ‘an undertaking by two or more persons
jointly to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.’ ”
(Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 482.) For example,
in Epstein v. Stahl (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 53, 57, an unlicensed
contractor converted the property owner’s four buildings into
apartments, and contributed two parcels to be used for parking,
with an agreement to split the rents and profits. The trial court
6
concluded these facts were sufficient to show a joint venture. (Id.
at p. 59.) But here, Rosson and Carr were not running a
“business enterprise.” Instead, Carr sought improvements to her
own home for the purpose of living in it. The allegation that
Rosson was to receive an equity interest in the property rather
than cash did not convert the agreement into a joint venture.
(See Johnson v. Mattox, supra, 257 Cal.App.2d at pp. 718-719
[§ 7031 barred recovery to unlicensed contractor who built
baseball facilities in exchange for a promise of stock in the
completed baseball school because there was no joint venture].)
Marvin
Nor does Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d 660, exempt Rosson
from the unlicensed contractor prohibition of section 7031. In
Marvin, our Supreme Court held that unmarried cohabiting
adults are “as competent as any other persons to contract
respecting their earnings and property rights,” including to
“agree to compensate one party for services which benefit the
other[,] . . . to form a partnership or joint venture, or to hold
property acquired as joint tenants or tenants in common, or agree
to any other such arrangement.” (Marvin, at p. 674 & fn. 10.) In
Marvin, the plaintiff performed domestic homemaking services,
such as cooking and housekeeping, in exchange for the defendant
providing financial support. (Id. at p. 666.)
But a party to a Marvin cohabitation agreement is properly
denied compensation for services provided to another when the
nature of the work performed requires a license to receive
compensation. (Chiba v. Greenwald (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 71
[demurrer sustained against cohabiting partner for services he
provided without required Talent Agencies license].) Just
because Rosson and Carr had the capacity to contract did not
7
make Rosson an “owner” exempt from the requirement that he
possess a contractor’s license while rendering services in the
“capacity of a contractor.” (§7031, subd. (a).) “We . . . treat
nonmarital partners . . . only as we do any other unmarried
persons.” (Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 682.)
“Nothing in section 7031 either limits its application to a
particular class of homeowners or excludes protection of
‘sophisticated’ persons.” (Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc. v.
Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 842,
849, fn. omitted.) By the same token, section 7031 does not
exempt persons in “romantic” relationships or nonowners who
reside on the improved property. Rosson has not shown how the
complaint can be amended to evade the prohibition in section
7031 against bringing an action for compensation for unlicensed
contractor services. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.2
2 We deny Carr’s request for judicial notice of documents
regarding a mechanic’s lien on this property because it was not
considered by the trial court when it sustained the demurrer.
(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
434, 444, fn. 3.) And we decline to consider whether the alleged
agreement was barred by the statute of frauds because it was
raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief. (In re
Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, 693.)
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Carr shall recover her costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
9
Henry J. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Renay Grace Rodriguez for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, John A. Hribar, Joseph L.
Strohman, Jr. and Jessica A. Barajas for Defendant and
Respondent.
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