CourtListener 10046380•Katz v. Ramsey CA2/7
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Filed 8/20/24 Katz v. Ramsey CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
BARRY STEVIN KATZ, B317296
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STRO02368)
v.
JANE RAMSEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Amy M. Pellman, Judge. Affirmed.
Jane Ramsey, in propria persona, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Frank D. Rubin and Iris Shelub for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Barry Stevin Katz obtained a five-year civil harassment
restraining order against Jane Ramsey. Ramsey appeals,
arguing that the order is not supported by substantial evidence,
violates her right to free speech, and is barred by claim and issue
preclusion. She also contends the trial court failed to consider a
2019 agreement between the parties that allegedly allowed her to
contact Katz, prevented her from presenting hearsay testimony,
and applied the incorrect burden of proof. We conclude the trial
court did not err and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties’ Prior Relationship and Katz’s 2019 Petition for
Domestic Violence Restraining Order
Katz and Ramsey had a brief dating relationship, and went
out at least four times around 2016. Ramsey thereafter contacted
Katz repeatedly and followed him. There is also evidence in the
record that Ramsey paid for various items and travel for Katz
and his sons, and wired him substantial amounts of money in
2018 and 2019.
In February 2019, Katz filed a petition for a domestic
violence restraining order (DVRO) against Ramsey, alleging a
physical assault and continuous harassment and unwanted
electronic and in-person contacts over the preceding three years.
The trial court denied Katz’s petition for a DVRO on March 12,
2019.
Ramsey contends that, in November 2019, the parties
entered into a written agreement under which she agreed to have
no further contact with Katz except by way of prearranged
2
meetings for which he would receive compensation for his time
spent with her in the form of a credit against the amounts she
had given him.1
B. Katz’s 2021 Petition for a Civil Harassment Restraining
Order
On May 17, 2021, Katz filed a petition for a civil
harassment restraining order against Ramsey that is the subject
of this appeal. This time Katz sought a restraining order under
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 seeking protection for
himself, his two minor sons, and two adult friends (Elisabeth
1 Ramsey attached a photograph of the purported agreement
to her response to Katz’s petition. The agreement states that for
prearranged meetings of two hours, Ramsey “will be credited an
amount of $2,000 (two thousand dollars) per meeting towards
[Ramsey]’s financial gifts to [Katz] that were deposited in [Katz]’s
bank account. ¶ [Ramsey] will credit [Katz] an extra $500 (five
hundred dollars) for every additional 30 minutes (or less) extra
period of time. [Ramsey] will credit [Katz] an extra $50 (fifty
dollars) for every email (excluding the first one responding to
each week’s email which is the only one that will be read), text,
social media post/comment, or phone call to his cell or business
that is sent/made to [Katz] after the signed date of this
agreement (11/1/19).” Ramsey also purportedly agreed, among
other things, not to enter Katz’s property, “verbally or physically
accost” him during or after their meetings, “approach” or
“confront” him in public, otherwise Katz would “discontinue all
meetings and electronic contact, and [Ramsey] would
automatically agree to forfeit the remaining monies as a gift to
[Katz], as she has already originally agreed to do.”
3
Avila and Steven Gorey).2 The petition attached declarations
from his sons and his employee Kyle Kimber, describing incidents
of Ramsey trespassing on Katz’s residential property at night in
October 2020 and January 2021.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on
May 17, 2021 as to Katz and his sons.
On June 28, 2021, Ramsey in propria persona filed a
response to Katz’s petition in which she admitted “attending (sic)
at the petitioner’s home” for the purpose of attempting to obtain
the return of funds she lent him. Ramsey denied assaulting Katz
or harassing him at other locations, disputed his characterization
of their relationship (which she described as “an intimate
relationship over a lengthy period”), and argued that Katz’s
petition merely repeated the same allegations from his 2019
petition for a DVRO. Ramsey attached the trial court’s minute
order dismissing Katz’s 2019 petition, as well as emails and bank
records from 2018 and 2019 reflecting her payment of certain
expenses for Katz’s sons and wire transfers to Katz’s bank
account.
C. Hearing and Testimony on Katz’s Petition for Civil
Harassment Restraining Order
The court held an evidentiary hearing on June 29, 2021, at
which Katz and Ramsey testified, as did Kimber. Katz and
Ramsey were both sworn in at the beginning of the hearing, and
responded to questions from the court throughout the course of
each other’s testimony.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
4
Katz testified that in the six months preceding the hearing
Ramsey’s harassment had “escalated exponentially.” For
example, Ramsey had entered Katz’s residential property (the
area surrounding his home) through his front gate over one
hundred times. Katz testified that in the six months preceding
the hearing he had also received over a thousand different
messages from Ramsey via email and text, from over one
hundred different email addresses she had created, and over a
thousand different phone numbers. Katz testified that he knew
it was Ramsey because of the nature of the messages, containing
derogatory messages such as calling him “the devil” or stating
“F off,” followed by “I need to see you. I can’t wait to see you.
Please, please see me.” Katz further testified that in the past
12 months, he had received more than 6,500 such emails from
her.
Katz testified that the most recent emails he had received
from Ramsey were from early 2021. Katz also submitted, and the
court reviewed, a video containing images of his email history
and surveillance footage of Ramsey repeatedly entering Katz’s
property by opening and entering through a closed gate, despite a
“no trespassing” sign. The court asked Ramsey if she recognized
the footage, and she stated, “I already admitted to it.” Katz
testified that the most recent videos he had of Ramsey entering
his property were from May 24 and 25, 2021, after the temporary
restraining order had issued.
Katz testified the harassment caused him “major distress”
because “you don’t know what’s going to happen. You don’t know
what they [i.e., Ramsey] have. They can hurt you, hurt your
family.” He testified it was stressful for him to have to call the
police or look out the window and see “somebody walking
5
around.” Katz testified the harassment caused him to feel
“[s]tress for me, my business, and my sons.” He further testified
it was “major distress because all we have in our lives is [to be]
safe in our homes, safe in our property” and Ramsey repeatedly
coming in and out of his property was “emotionally disturbing.”
In response to questions from the court, Ramsey admitted
she had sent Katz multiple emails, including “many [that] were
sent to e-mails that he doesn’t have access to anymore.” Ramsey
also conceded that she expected many of the emails in Katz’s
video were her emails to him from the past year (i.e., 2020 to
2021). The trial court noted her admission, and stated: “The
record should reflect that there are what appears to be hundreds
and hundreds of e-mails [from Ramsey’s alias] Georgia or Georgia
Day, up until the present time, back from 2019.”
Katz further testified Ramsey had sent letters to him from
false addresses (using the address of female friends of his) and
had “left several different envelopes underneath [his] door with
checks” made out in amounts from $1,000 to $200,000 with the
messages “please see me” and “I’m sorry.” He also testified
Ramsey had contacted and harassed his friends at other
addresses. The court reviewed and admitted into evidence
several checks, including one from September 2020 with the
memo “Jane Katz.” Ramsey admitted the checks were from her,
“from about a year ago,” and testified she sent them because she
was “emotionally distraught.”
The trial court stated at the close of Katz’s direct
testimony: “[T]he court has read and reviewed the documents
which include hundreds of e-mails from respondent. Respondent
has admitted those are, in fact, her e-mails . . . . The other
evidence, at least to this point, has been presented including
6
respondent coming into petitioner’s home uninvited even though
the gate does indicate there is [a] ‘do not trespass’ sign. The
court also is in receipt of multiple, multiple checks, probably
about six which respondent has also admitted to sending
petitioner for amounts such as a $1,000, $500, with the memos
that say things like meet up, with a note from her.”
Kimber testified that on January 14, 2021, around 9:00 to
9:30 p.m., he saw Ramsey looking in Katz’s kitchen window and
then running away from the house as Kimber arrived in his car
to drop off some food at Katz’s residence. He could see her
despite the darkness because there was a motion activated
spotlight at the property. The court found Kimber was credible.
Katz testified that he installed security cameras after that
incident.
Ramsey testified she went up to the house and contacted
Katz because he had “wrongly taken $280,000” from her. The
court stated that, in Ramsey’s response to Katz’s petition, she
admitted to contacting him and stated in the response that it was
because of a money dispute; Ramsey replied, “Exactly.” She
testified she “went up there lots of times” in 2021 and would “just
keep going up there and leave” because she could not tell if he
was home. Ramsey denied seeing a “no trespassing” sign. She
stated she went there “peaceably” and “in peace and with a calm
nature,” but admitted “my going on his property is unacceptable.”
Ramsey testified that she sent messages to Katz in
February and March 2021. She further testified that her last
emails to Katz were more than six months before the hearing,
that she “stopped calling him months ago,” and that she most
recently texted him one year before the hearing. Ramsey stated
she “was doing it as a way to vent emotionally” and characterized
7
her own conduct as her “breaking down.” Ramsey testified she
had not physically approached Katz for over a year. Ramsey
offered to show her phone as proof she had not sent emails, texts,
or calls to him in over six months, except for a “couple days in
February and a couple days in March,” but the court stated, “I
believe your testimony.”
After considering the evidence before it, the trial court
stated: “The course [of] conduct must be to cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress. This course of
conduct absolutely qualifies for a civil harassment restraining
order. There is no question in the court’s mind based on the
evidence as well as based on respondent’s [own] admissions
throughout the hearing as well as in her response that she has
continuously harassed and willfully and knowingly tried to
contact the petitioner through thousands of e-mails, thousands of
phone calls, appearing at his home multiple, multiple times even
after the temporary restraining order was issued and in violation
of the temporary restraining order.” The court also found that
“[t]he respondent has admitted to essentially all of the conduct.”
The trial court issued a five-year civil harassment order
requiring Ramsey not to contact Katz or his two sons, and to stay
150 yards away from them at all times. The court noted that
Katz’s adult friends would need to file their own petition. The
court admonished Ramsey that its order meant she could not be
within 150 yards of Katz’s entire property line, not just his house.
Ramsey filed a motion for new trial on July 19, 2021, and
filed an amended motion for new trial on September 8, 2021. She
admitted “incidents of technical trespass” but denied that all the
messages were sent by her, alleged that new evidence (a
restaurant receipt) showed she could not have been at Katz’s
8
property when Kimber testified she was there, and argued that a
five-year order was excessive and that Katz “welcomed keenly”
her contacts because under their 2019 agreement “he profited
from them” by “charg[ing] [her] for each call, text, and email.”
She reattached the parties’ 2019 agreement to her amended
motion for new trial, along with a declaration stating that her
referenced attachments had been previously submitted to the
trial court in conjunction with her response.
On October 7, 2021, the trial court denied Ramsey’s motion
for new trial, stating it did “not find that anything that is stated
changes the court’s conclusion that the evidence overwhelmingly
showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the restraining
order was necessary in this case.”
Ramsey timely appealed.3
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
A civil harassment restraining order under section 527.6 is
an injunction that requires a person “to refrain from a particular
act.” (§ 525.) “The Legislature enacted section 527.6 in 1978 in
order ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness
and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’”
3 At oral argument, Katz’s counsel represented the financial
dispute between the parties resulted in a confidential settlement
agreement and that Katz is repaying Ramsey over an unspecified
period of time. We deny Ramsey’s and Katz’s requests, in their
appellate briefs, that we take judicial notice of the civil collection
action that precipitated the settlement agreement. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.252.)
9
(Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 677 (Olson).) “‘“It does so by
providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.”’”
(Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 103 (Hansen);
accord, Olson, at p. 677.) A trial court may issue a civil
harassment restraining order upon a finding, by clear and
convincing evidence, of one of three qualifying types of
harassment: “[1.] unlawful violence, [2.] a credible threat of
violence, or [3.] a knowing and willful course of conduct directed
at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose,” that is reasonably
likely to recur (§ 527.6, subds. (a)(1), (b)(3) & (i)).
A “‘course of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a
continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an
individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or
sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means,
including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails,
interoffice mail, facsimile, or email.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)
“Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the
meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (Ibid.) “The course of conduct
must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(3).) At the hearing on a petition for a civil harassment
restraining order, the court “shall receive any testimony that is
relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (Id., subd. (i).)
If the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
unlawful harassment exists and is reasonably likely to recur, it
may issue a civil harassment protective order of up to five years.
(See id., subds. (i) & (j).)
10
We review the trial court’s grant of a civil harassment
protective order under section 527.6 for substantial evidence.
(See R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 (R.D.) [“The
appropriate test on appeal is whether the findings (express and
implied) that support the trial court’s entry of the restraining
order are justified by substantial evidence in the record.”].)
“When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear
and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court
is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.) “In assessing whether substantial
evidence supports the requisite elements of willful harassment,
as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, we review the
evidence before the trial court in accordance with the customary
rules of appellate review. We resolve all factual conflicts and
questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and
indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the
finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence
which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Schild v. Rubin
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762 (Schild).)
“We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence ‘for abuse of discretion, and [the ruling] will not be
disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial court acted in
an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a
miscarriage of justice.’” (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921,
951 (Powell); accord, Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476; Austin B. v. Escondido Union School
Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 885.) We may reverse a
judgment for the erroneous exclusion of evidence only upon a
11
showing the error prejudiced the appellant. (See Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th
1041, 1078-1079; People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211, 1223.)
We review de novo questions of law. (See Hansen, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 104 [constitutionality of civil harassment
restraining order is question of law subject to de novo review];
Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497,
1507 [application of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a
question of law subject to de novo review].)
B. The Civil Harassment Restraining Order Is Supported by
Substantial Evidence
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s restraining
order. Katz testified that Ramsey sent him thousands of
harassing email and text messages throughout 2020 and 2021,
which escalated “exponentially” in the six months preceding the
June 2021 hearing. Katz further testified that Ramsey
trespassed on his property hundreds of times in the six months
preceding the hearing (including May 2021 after the temporary
restraining order issued), and that she left several envelopes
under his door with checks and notes to him. Katz testified this
conduct by Ramsey was “emotionally disturbing” to him and
caused Katz “major distress.” Kimber, whose testimony the trial
court found credible, testified that he observed Ramsey looking in
Katz’s kitchen window and running away at night in January
2021. And Ramsey admitted during the hearing that she
repeatedly entered Katz’s property in 2021, and emailed him as
recently as February and March 2021.
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court expressly
found that Ramsey engaged in a knowing and willful course of
12
conduct directed at Katz. And by issuing the restraining order,
the court impliedly found that this course of conduct seriously
alarmed, annoyed, and harassed Katz, that such conduct served
no legitimate purpose, and that it was reasonably likely to recur.
The court also impliedly found that Ramsey’s conduct would
cause a reasonable person in Katz’s position to suffer emotional
distress, and that Katz actually suffered from such distress. On
matters in which the record is silent we presume the trial court
made the factual findings necessary to support its order. (See
Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham);
In re Marriage of Condon (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 533, 549-550,
fn. 11.)
The level of repeated, ongoing unwanted contact by Ramsey
and her entering Katz’s property constitutes a “course of conduct”
that “seriously alarm[ed], annoy[ed], or harasse[d] [him], and
that serve[d] no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) The
repeated nature of Ramsey’s attention on Katz, including
entering his property in May 2021 after the temporary
restraining order had issued, was sufficient to support a finding
that her course of conduct was reasonably likely to recur.
Moreover, such conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and did actually cause substantial
emotional distress to Katz. (See ibid.) Although Ramsey argues
she had a “legitimate purpose” of seeking the return of money she
apparently provided to Katz, the thousands of texts and email
messages went far beyond any legitimate communication seeking
repayment. The record before us reflects that Ramsey sent Katz
derogatory messages apologizing or pleading to see him, or
attempting to press additional funds on him through checks left
13
under his door. We cannot say such conduct served a legitimate
purpose.
Ramsey further argues that: Katz’s “allegations” at the
time of the hearing on the restraining order were outdated and
had been “completely resolved”; her contacts with him were
always peaceful; and any contact in 2020 to 2021 was justified by
their 2019 written agreement. She further contends the trial
court found credible her testimony that her contacts with Katz
had subsided and that her conduct was for the purpose of
obtaining repayment of a debt. Ramsey also argues Katz could
not have had any fear or distress from her course of conduct
because their 2019 agreement permitted contact if she paid Katz
for meeting with her.4
On substantial evidence review, “‘[i]t is not our role to
reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of the
witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will not
disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support it.’”
(Williamson v. Brooks (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1300; accord,
Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41,
54 [“It is not our role to reweigh the evidence or substitute our
factual determinations for that of the trial court.”].) Instead, we
4 Ramsey also argues there was no “credible threat of
violence” in her conduct. But the restraining order here was not
issued on the basis of violence or threat of violence, but on “a
knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific
person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and
that serves no legitimate purpose,” and “which would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and
must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
14
must resolve any factual conflicts and credibility questions in
favor of Katz and the challenged order. (See Schild, supra,
232 Cal.App.3d at p. 762; R.D., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 188,
193.) Although Ramsey admitted sending multiple messages and
checks to Katz, as well as entering his property, she disputed
Katz’s account of her behavior and the volume of messages, and
asserted that her intentions were “in peace.” Thus here, “[t]he
trial court was faced with conflicting accounts of the parties’
actions and intentions, as is often the case. One party saw a
clear pattern of intentional harassment, reasonably leading [him]
to fear for [his] safety; the other party interpreted the events
differently, claiming that her conduct showed nothing of the sort.
The court chose to credit the evidence showing an intentional
pattern of harassment, as it was entitled to do.” (R.D., at
p. 193.)5
Ramsey also argues the trial court improperly applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the clear and
convincing evidence standard mandated by section 527.6. But
her only support for this contention is a statement from the court
when it denied her motion for a new trial as follows: “the
evidence overwhelmingly showed by a preponderance of the
evidence that the restraining order was necessary.” Ramsey’s
argument is not persuasive. First, nothing in the reporter’s
transcript during the hearing on the restraining order, and
nothing in the court’s restraining order (which incorporates
section 527.6 by reference) indicates the court applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Second, Ramsey’s only
5 Ramsey’s arguments relating to the 2019 agreement are
addressed in Part E.
15
support is a statement the court made, not at the hearing on the
restraining order, but at the subsequent hearing on her new trial
motion. But when examined in context, it is evident that the
court misspoke. Indeed, immediately before the statement on
which Ramsey relies, the trial court accurately, if somewhat
inartfully, stated, “[t]he question in whether or not to grant a
new trial is whether or not the evidence showed enough for the
verdict to be made.” (See § 657, subd. (1) [new trial may be
granted on “[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision.”].)
As noted, the evidence before the trial court of Ramsey’s
harassment was ample and there was substantial evidence
supporting a finding of each of the requisite elements for
harassment under the clear and convincing evidence standard.6
(See Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1411-1415
[affirming restraining order under § 527.6 for substantial
evidence of “knowing and willful course of conduct” harassment,
by clear and convincing evidence]; cf. Harris v. Stampolis (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 484, 498-502 [affirming § 527.6 restraining order
for substantial evidence of “credible threat of violence”
harassment, by clear and convincing evidence].)
6 Ramsey argues it was inappropriate for the trial court to
apply the procedures of section 527.6 because the facts did not
qualify as “true ‘harassment’” as defined by that statute. Ramsey
contends a “normal civil lawsuit” with full discovery would have
been more appropriate. Because the Legislature has authorized
the section 527.6 procedure to provide expedited injunctive relief
to victims of harassment, and we conclude the facts are legally
sufficient to constitute civil harassment as defined by section
527.6, this argument is unmeritorious.
16
C. The Civil Harassment Restraining Order Is Not Barred by
Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel
Ramsey argues that the trial court’s order is barred by res
judicata or collateral estoppel because her conduct was the
subject of Katz’s 2019 DVRO petition, which was denied by the
trial court.
The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion bars a party
from relitigating an issue previously decided by a court. (See
Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73,
91.) “‘Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the
same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final
judgment on the merits in the first suit.’” (Id. at p. 91.) But that
doctrine “does not bar a later claim if new facts or changed
circumstances have occurred since the prior decision.” (Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 134, 179.)
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is “the relitigation
of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the
second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings
LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 825.) “[I]ssue preclusion
applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue
(3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and
(4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in
privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.)
Here, the trial court noted there had been a 2019 petition
and expressly directed Katz to focus his testimony on Ramsey’s
conduct during the six months preceding the June 2021 hearing.
Katz complied with the court’s directive and limited his
testimony accordingly, focusing on events in 2020 and early 2021.
The trial court also limited the factual basis for its order to
17
events occurring after the March 2019 denial of Katz’s petition
for a DVRO. The court considered pre-2020 messages and
conduct only as evidence of the overall context and time span of
Ramsey’s harassment of Katz.
In short, because the civil harassment restraining order
was based on facts occurring after the denial of the DVRO
petition, the restraining order was not barred by res judicata or
collateral estoppel.
D. The Order Does Not Impair Ramsey’s Right to Free Speech
Ramsey also argues that the restraining order infringes on
her free speech related to the “legitimate purpose” of obtaining
payment for a debt from Katz. But neither the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution nor article I, section 2 of the
California Constitution prohibits courts from incidentally
enjoining speech in order to protect an individual’s right to
privacy or the right to exclude others from private property that
is not a public forum. (See DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v.
Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 881 (DVD Copy Control); Donahue
Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178 (Donahue).) The “Legislature
created § 527.6 to protect individuals’ constitutional rights to
pursue safety, happiness and privacy.” (R.D., supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 191.) “In California, speech that
constitutes ‘harassment’ within the meaning of section 527.6 is
not constitutionally protected, and the victim of the harassment
may obtain injunctive relief.” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v.
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1250.)
18
Here, the challenged order restrains Ramsey from
contacting Katz or his sons, and it requires her to stay at least
150 yards away from Katz, his sons, and his property. “‘As a
general rule, landowners and tenants have a right to exclude
persons from trespassing on private property; the right to exclude
persons is a fundamental aspect of private property ownership.’”
(Donahue, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178.) Ramsey makes no
argument that Katz’s property is a “public forum,” and she has no
First Amendment right to enter his property for speech purposes.
To the extent the order limits Ramsey’s speech by restraining her
from contacting Katz, it does so without reference to the content
of her speech. The order thus is not a content-based prohibition
on speech and is subject to rational basis review. (See Madsen v.
Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 763-764
(Madsen); DVD Copy Control, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 877-879,
[injunction that is justified without reference to content of
restricted communications is content neutral].)
“Because the incidental restraint on [Ramsey’s] speech that
is a result of the restraining order is content neutral, the
standard that governs whether it can pass muster under the
federal and state Constitutions’ free speech guarantees is the
same as that governing the examination of any injunctive
restriction: whether it imposes no more burden than is necessary
to serve its legitimate governmental interests and whether it is
thus a reasonable ‘time, place, and manner’ restriction in light of
the importance of those interests.” (R.D., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 191-192, see Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 765-766
[content-neutral restriction on speech should be no more
burdensome than necessary to provide relief to plaintiffs]; see
also DVD Copy Control, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 882-883 [speech
19
on matters of private concern is entitled to less protection than
speech concerning public issues].)
In this case, the speech that Ramsey claims the restraining
order infringes upon is Ramsey’s speech to Katz having to do
with money allegedly owed by him to her, with no apparent
relationship to any issue of public interest. It thus implicates a
“less[er] First Amendment concern.” (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 749, 759; accord, R.D.,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.) “The restraining order, on the
other hand, serves an important governmental and public
purpose—the prevention of violence and harassment, and the
protection of [Katz]’s and [his] family’s right to safety and
privacy—that section 527.6 was enacted to serve.” (R.D., at
p. 192.)
Further, the restraining order’s incidental infringement of
Ramsey’s speech is no broader or more restrictive than necessary
to prevent Ramsey’s harassment of Katz. Ramsey remains free
to pursue other legal avenues to recoup amounts she claims are
owed to her by Katz. The restraining order does not unlawfully
infringe on Ramsey’s free speech rights.
E. Ramsey’s Claims of Evidentiary Error Are Forfeited and
Would Not Support Reversal
Ramsey argues for the first time on appeal that the trial
court failed to admit the parties’ 2019 agreement, which she
states authorized her to contact Katz if she compensated him.
She also contends the court erroneously prevented her from
presenting hearsay testimony, even though hearsay evidence is
admissible under the civil harassment statute. (See § 527.6,
subd. (i) [court shall receive any testimony that is relevant]);
20
Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 729.) In her
view, such evidence could have proved she made no threats, had
no recent contact with Katz, and was merely attempting to collect
a debt.
Ramsey did not raise these objections before the trial court
and has forfeited her claims of error. (See Evid. Code, § 354,
subd. (a) [no reversal for erroneous exclusion of evidence without
record that “[t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the
excluded evidence was made known to the court.”]; Johnson v.
Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 [“issues not raised in the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”]; In re
Marriage of Turkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 353
[same].) The record does not reflect a request from Ramsey that
specific hearsay testimony or the 2019 agreement be admitted or
considered at the hearing, and her motion for new trial
referenced the 2019 agreement without any complaint that the
trial court failed to admit it at the hearing (rather, her
declaration confirms she submitted it to the court in conjunction
with her response to Katz’s petition).
But even if her evidentiary arguments were preserved,
Ramsey fails to demonstrate any prejudice. (See Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354 [reversal only for erroneous
exclusion of evidence that results in a “miscarriage of justice”];
Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 951 [trial court’s discretionary
decision to admit or exclude evidence “‘will not be disturbed
unless there is a showing that the trial court acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a
miscarriage of justice’”].)
Ramsey concedes the trial court had the parties’ 2019
agreement before it at the time of the hearing. Even though the
21
trial court did not specifically identify it at the hearing, the court
did allow testimony about the agreement. That the court did not
embrace Ramsey’s view of what occurred, or independently
conclude that the purported 2019 agreement should preclude an
injunction against her, does not demonstrate that the court did
not consider what Ramsey had presented. Instead, the court
determined that other evidence met the statutory standard for
harassment. On substantial evidence review, we presume the
judgment is correct and resolve all fact disputes and questions of
credibility in favor of the prevailing party. (See Denham, supra,
2 Cal.3d at p. 564; Schild, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 762
[reviewing courts make all legitimate and reasonable inferences
to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by
substantial evidence].)
But even if the trial did not consider the 2019 agreement,
any error in failing to consider it was not prejudicial. That the
parties may have agreed in 2019 that Ramsey would compensate
Katz for future meetings and contacts does not mean that her
course of conduct, communications, and trespass in 2020 and
2021 were justified or could not independently constitute
harassment under section 527.6. By its own terms, the purported
agreement also provided, among other things, that if Ramsey
went onto Katz’s property, he could discontinue his agreement to
meetings and electronic contact. The court also credited
Ramsey’s testimony that her contacts with Katz had subsided in
recent months, she had not threatened him, and that she was
trying to collect on a debt, but it nevertheless concluded her
conduct constituted harassment under the statute.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Katz is entitled to recover his costs
on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
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