People v. Ayala CA2/3

CourtListener 10046376Calctapp20 août 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 8/20/24 P. v. Ayala CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B330104

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
v. LA090973, LA092117)

VALENTINE AYALA et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Valentine Ayala.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Pedro Alvarez.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
A jury convicted Pedro Alvarez and Valentine Ayala of
assaulting Alex Ibarra and Jasper Cendejas with a firearm and
attempting to murder them. On appeal, Alvarez and Ayala
contend that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
gang evidence; (2) substantial evidence did not support the
convictions in which Cendejas was the victim; and (3) the trial
court prejudicially erred in failing sua sponte to modify
CALCRIM No. 875, the jury instruction providing the elements
for assault with a firearm, to clarify that each victim must have
been subject to the application of force. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The First Amended Information
The first amended information charged Alvarez and Ayala
with the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a))1 of Ibarra
(count 1) and Cendejas (count 2); and assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) on Ibarra (count 3) and Cendejas (count 4). It
alleged for all counts against Alvarez and Ayala that a principal
had been armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) As to
Alvarez only, the first amended information alleged that he
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d)), personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon Ibarra (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)),
and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury to Ibarra (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2
II. The People’s Evidence at Trial
A. The July 2019 shooting
At trial, the People presented the testimony of over
15 witnesses over the course of several days in March 2023.
Robinson Bueno Olivares (Bueno) testified that, on July 21, 2019,
at 4:50 p.m., he was in the front yard of his home on Baird
Avenue when he saw “two guys walking on the sidewalk” and
“another two guys chasing these two guys.” Bueno explained that
the two in the front were walking a little faster than normal, and
the two in the back appeared to try to “catch[ ] these two guys.”
The shorter of the two in the back, who was wearing a white
shirt, screamed, “Hey,” not in a friendly tone, as well as other
words and something to the effect of “Homies” in a very loud
voice, to the two in the front.
According to Bueno, “[a]s soon as these guys stopped say
that words,” the taller of the two in the back, who was wearing a
dark shirt, “opened fire on the two guys in the front” from a
distance of about 35 to 45 feet. As the taller man moved forward
shooting, the shorter man with him also moved forward. When
the taller man stopped shooting, he and the shorter man turned
at the same time. The taller man looked at Bueno and started to
run. He and the shorter man ran back the way they came. As for
the two in the front, one ran straight ahead and the other turned
to the right when the shooting began.
At trial, Bueno initially was unable to identify anyone in
the courtroom, including Alvarez and Ayala, as either the shooter
or the shorter man in the back. But Bueno acknowledged that he
had identified Alvarez as the shooter at preliminary hearings in
January and March 2020. On cross-examination, Bueno testified
that the shorter man (who he had said wore a white shirt) had no

3
gun, but admitted that, a day after the shooting, he told a
detective it was the man in the white shirt who fired the gun. On
redirect, he explained he had noticed the two men in the back
more by their height than by what they were wearing. He also
testified he now recognized Alvarez. He explained he previously
had difficulty identifying anyone in the courtroom because
everyone had been wearing a mask. Although Alvarez at one
point had pulled his mask down, Bueno had not identified
Alvarez right away because it had taken some time for Bueno to
recognize him.
The court asked Ayala to remove his mask. Bueno
recognized Ayala as well, but identified Alvarez as the taller man
with the gun.
Ibarra testified that on July 21, 2019, he was walking on
Baird Avenue with Cendejas when he got shot in the arm. After
he got shot, he ran to Reseda Boulevard with Cendejas and sat
behind a van. Ibarra claimed not to remember what happened
before he was shot. He denied hearing anyone say anything to
him when he was walking with Cendejas. He denied talking to a
detective named Guillermo about what happened that day.
Ibarra did not recall testifying at the January 2020
preliminary hearing that he heard the men behind him yelling,
“What’s up?” He did not recall testifying that he was a member
of the West Side Reseda gang; that the West Valley Crazys was
his gang’s rival and “enemy”; and that if a West Valley Crazys
member were to come up to him and say, “What’s up?” he would
take that to be a threat. He did not recall previously testifying
that, during the shooting, he turned and saw that the taller man
had a revolver. At trial, he could not say whether the individual
who shot him was in the courtroom.

4
Detective Zoraya Guillermo testified she investigated gang
crimes for the Los Angeles Police Department and was the lead
investigator on the case. She interviewed Ibarra at the hospital
on July 22, 2019. Ibarra told her he did not know or remember
who he was with or where he was when he had been shot. The
detective was not surprised by Ibarra’s claimed lack of memory
because, in her experience as a gang detective, gang members
“won’t tell you who did anything to them because . . . snitches get
stitches.” Ibarra eventually told the detective that he was with
Cendejas; Ibarra heard a male voice yell, “What’s up?”; Ibarra
heard gun shots and ran; and Ibarra was shot in the arm.
At trial, Cendejas denied knowing Ibarra and spending
time with him. He said he was not with Ibarra when Ibarra was
shot. Asked if he had testified in January 2020, he first denied
having done so and then said he did not remember. He denied
coming to court in January 2020 and testifying that he “got shot
at.”
Cendejas further denied that, on August 2, 2019, he had
talked with an officer (Officer Steven Bakewell) about the
shooting. Cendejas denied telling Officer Bakewell details about
the day of the shooting. He denied telling the officer that he
thought the suspects were from the West Valley Crazys or “CYS.”
He testified at trial that he did not know what the West Valley
Crazys were or what “CYS” was.
B. The August 2019 Cendejas interview
The jury was shown a video of Cendejas’s August 2, 2019
interview with Officer Bakewell. The trial court admitted that
video and a transcript of the interview into evidence, as
Exhibits 9 and 10, with no objection from the defense.

5
During the interview, Officer Bakewell asked Cendejas
about the incident that had taken place when Cendejas was
walking down Baird Avenue with his “homeboy, Alex,” about a
week before the interview. Cendejas explained that he and Alex
were walking when “we just started gettin’—gettin’ shot at.”
Cendejas heard several “pops.” He and Alex ran to Reseda
Boulevard. Alex had been shot in the arm. Cendejas stayed with
Alex until the police and ambulance came, and then Cendejas left
without talking to the police. Cendejas said the shooting was
“most likely” by “CYS” because “we’re going at it right now.” Alex
and Cendejas were “beefing” with “the Crazys.”
C. The surveillance videos and the shirt with
Alvarez’s DNA
Los Angeles Police Officer Hector Banuelos responded to
the crime scene and recovered video surveillance of an area on
Baird Avenue immediately south of where the shooting
happened. The court admitted three surveillance videos into
evidence without objection. One video, which was played before
the jury, showed Ibarra and Cendejas walking northbound next
to each other on the sidewalk along Baird Avenue. They were
followed by Alvarez and Ayala, who appear in the video less than
30 seconds after the victims appeared. At two minutes and
17 seconds, when the four individuals were no longer in the
video’s field of view, five gun shots could be heard on the video.
By no later than two minutes and 37 seconds, Alvarez and Ayala
run back into view going southbound on Baird Avenue.
Another witness heard loud gun shots in his neighborhood
on July 21, 2019. He came out of his house and saw two men
running away. One of them had just closed the lid on the
witness’s trash can. The witness found a shirt in the trash can.

6
The shirt contained a mixture of four people’s DNA, and Alvarez
was included as one of the DNA contributors. Alvarez was one
quintillion times more likely to be a contributor than a random
person.
D. Gang-related evidence
The West Valley Crazys is a prominent gang whose rivals
included the West Side Reseda and South Side Reseda gangs.
West Side Reseda and South Side Reseda merged and became
“Reseda Trece,” or Reseda 13. Reseda 13 members also refer to
themselves as West Side Reseda or South Side Reseda. The
shooting was in territory claimed by Reseda 13. It was a
disputed area that overlapped with territory claimed by the West
Valley Crazys. Officer Banuelos described it as a “spill-over area”
where “Crazys come into Reseda’s territory.”
Ayala was a West Valley Crazys member. He had “CYS,”
which stands for “Crazys,” and “WV,” which stands for “West
Valley,” tattooed on his head. Ayala had been seen with known
West Valley Crazys members Nicholas Rubalcaba and Aaron
Lopez at least as far back as 2015. As of 2018, he had been a
member for 10 years.
In 2019, Jorge Soto, a West Valley Crazys member, was
shot and killed. Rubalcaba, Lopez, Ayala, and Alvarez attended
Soto’s funeral.
In February 2019, Detective Jason Haggis interviewed
Alvarez as a potential witness in the Soto case because Alvarez
had been at the location of Soto’s shooting. Alvarez told the
detective he and Soto were very close. Alvarez was upset and, at
times, despondent during the interview.
Franklin Hernandez, a member of Reseda 13, was charged
with Soto’s murder. On June 12, 2019—three weeks after the

7
prosecutor presented evidence at Hernandez’s preliminary
hearing—Jose Espinoza, a Reseda 13 member who went by the
moniker Mousie, was shot and killed. Three West Valley Crazys
members, including Rubalcaba and Lopez, were identified as
suspects in Espinoza’s shooting. When Detective Haggis
interviewed Alvarez again on July 1, 2019, Alvarez was even
more emotional than when interviewed in February. Although
Alvarez previously associated with West Side Reseda members,
Alvarez stopped associating with them after Soto was killed.
Ibarra was a Reseda 13 member. He had a tattoo on his
hand that said, “RIP Mousie.” Cendejas was also a Reseda gang
member. He had “R13,” which stands for Reseda 13, tattooed on
his right arm and “Reseda” tattooed on his jaw.
Sometime after the July 2019 Baird Avenue shooting
involving Ibarra and Cendejas, an officer saw Alvarez with
Lopez, who had “West Valley” tattooed on his collarbone and
“CYS” tattooed on his abdomen. Later, on January 30, 2020,
Officer Daniel Hughes arrested Alvarez, who was with
Rubalcaba. Both had spray paint on their hands, and spray paint
cans were in their car. The officer found “CYS” freshly spray
painted on a fence and the sidewalk. A Cowboy’s beanie and a
Chicago Cubs baseball cap, which were items associated with the
West Valley Crazys, were recovered from the car.
Officer Bakewell testified as a gang expert. He monitored
the West Valley Crazys. Officer Bakewell testified about the
West Valley Crazys’ rivalries, particularly with West Side Reseda
and South Side Reseda. He testified about the kind of retaliation
that occurs for disrespecting a rival gang, explaining that
“[t]ypically it’s acts of violence.” He opined that the Soto and
Espinoza homicides were specific acts of violence as a result of

8
the rivalry between the West Valley Crazys and West Side
Reseda.
Officer Bakewell also testified that West Valley Crazys
members typically gain status within their gang by committing
acts of violence. They commit crimes in groups for two reasons:
“One is strength in numbers. If you have more than one person,
you’re more inclined to commit acts of violence. Another reason
is, is to have witnesses. Especially if you’re a newer member in
the gang. You’re going to want more senior or more established
gang members to observe you doing those acts of violence so that
way you can gain credibility within that gang.”
III. The Jury’s Verdict
After the People rested, Alvarez and Ayala chose not to
testify. They did not call any witnesses.
The jury convicted Alvarez and Ayala of the attempted
murder of Ibarra and Cendejas and found true the allegations the
attempted murders were committed willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation. It also convicted them of assault with a
firearm on Ibarra and Cendejas. As to all counts against Ayala,
the jury found true the special allegation that a principal had
been armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). However, the
trial court struck that allegation. It had been erroneously
omitted from the verdict forms for the counts against Alvarez.2

2 The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that Alvarez was
the shooter and that Ayala was the aider and abettor. The trial
court struck the section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), allegation
because there was “no allegation that Mr. Ayala used a weapon
or provided it,” while “the person [Alvarez] that under the
prosecution’s theory was the actual shooter is facing a sentence
that doesn’t have any firearms allegations at all.”

9
The jury found not true that Alvarez personally used a firearm,
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Ibarra, or personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury to Ibarra.
DISCUSSION
Alvarez and Ayala contend their convictions should be
reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting gang evidence. They also assert their convictions for
attempted murder and assault with a firearm as to Cendejas
(counts 2 and 4) were not supported by substantial evidence.
They further contend the trial court committed prejudicial error
by failing on its own motion to modify CALCRIM No. 875 to make
clear that, when there are multiple victims, the application of
force element applies to each victim. We reject those contentions.
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Admitting Gang Evidence
A. Additional background
The prior informations alleged the crimes had been
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1).) The People moved to introduce, and Alvarez filed a
motion to exclude or limit, gang evidence. Ayala joined in
Alvarez’s motion.
At the hearing on the motions, the People moved to strike
the section 186.22 gang enhancement allegation in part because
of “the change in requirements for a pattern of criminal activity,”
but still sought to introduce gang evidence as relevant. The trial
court granted the People’s motion to strike.
The court also found that gang evidence was relevant for
motive and intent. Evidence about the intensity of gang rivalry,
not merely its existence, would help the jury. Drawing a

10
distinction between recent shootings as opposed to those from the
distant past, it observed that the People sought to introduce
evidence of “shootings between these two gangs within months of
the shooting at issue in this case.” The court also found relevant
the intensity of Alvarez’s and Ayala’s involvement within the
gang, drawing a distinction between active members and
peripheral members. It stated, “Attempted murder requires an
intent to kill. So if there had been a murder or attempted murder
of a member of the gang to which the defendants allegedly
belong, . . . the theory that this shooting was payback for another
. . . would tend to show that there was an intent to kill, not just
an intent to hurt somebody.” It further explained Alvarez and
Ayala’s status as active members of the same gang would tend to
show that one intended to aid and abet the other. The court
found the prejudicial effect of the gang evidence did not
substantially outweigh its probative value, which, “in this case, is
particularly high.”
The prosecutor in her closing argument stated, “Rivalry
and revenge were the motivation in this case.” She argued that
the shooting in this case and the shooting of Espinoza were
“payback” for the Soto killing. She also argued that, before Soto’s
death, Alvarez “kind of straddled the line between the two rival
gangs.” But after Soto’s shooting, Alvarez was seen multiple
times with West Valley Crazy members and was even tagging
with West Valley Crazy graffiti. Soto’s murder thus was the
turning point that motivated Alvarez to become a “full-fledged
West Valley Crazy gang member” and required him to “put in
work to prove himself to his gang and his fellow gang members,
including Ayala.” That work included carrying out the crimes in
allegiance to his gang.

11
B. Applicable law and standard of review
“The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense. [Citation.] ‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang
affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory,
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal
enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity,
motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force
or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.’ ”
(People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31.) “Such evidence is
admissible even when a gang enhancement is not charged,
provided the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” (People v. Ramirez (2022)
13 Cal.5th 997, 1095 (Ramirez).)
“A court’s admissibility ruling is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1095; accord,
People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 540.) “The abuse of discretion
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for
varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under
review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,
and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if
arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008)
43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712; accord, People v. Thai (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433 [quoting Haraguchi and stating that a
trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls “outside
the bounds of reasons, i.e., was arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd”]); see People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 756
[abuse of discretion may include applying an erroneous legal
standard].)

12
C. The trial court did not err or otherwise abuse its
discretion and, in any event, there was no
prejudice
Alvarez and Ayala argue the trial court erred by admitting
gang evidence without considering Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), which, effective January 1,
2022, added Penal Code section 1109, among other changes.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.) Section 1109 provides “that, if
requested by the defense, a trial court must try a [section 186.22]
gang enhancement charge separately from the underlying
offense.” (People v. Burgos 16 Cal.5th 1, 7; People v. Tran (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 [section 1109 “requires, if requested by the
defendant, a gang enhancement charge to be tried separately
from all other counts that do not otherwise require gang evidence
as an element of the crime”].) To the extent Alvarez and Ayala
argue that Assembly Bill 333 places additional limits on the
introduction of gang evidence, beyond those already contemplated
by Evidence Code section 352, where no violations of Penal Code
section 186.22 are alleged, we reject their argument.
Here, the trial court struck the section 186.22 gang
enhancement allegation. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court
has held, “gang evidence, even if not admitted to prove a gang
enhancement, may still be relevant and admissible to prove other
facts related to a crime.” (People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1208; see People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1132,
disapproved on other grounds as stated in People v. Burgos,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 31 [“nothing in Assembly Bill 333 limits
the introduction of gang evidence in a bifurcated proceeding
where the gang evidence is relevant to the underlying charges”].)
Gang evidence may thus be admissible in the absence of any gang

13
enhancement allegation. (See Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p.
1095.)
Alvarez and Ayala next argue the gang evidence was more
prejudicial than probative. But, as the trial court found, evidence
of gang membership, rivalry between their and the victims’
gangs, the intensity of the rivalry, their level of involvement in
their gang, and other gang-related evidence was highly relevant
to prove their motives for the shooting. (See, e.g., People v.
Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167–1168 [“[g]ang
evidence is relevant and admissible when the very reason for the
underlying crime, that is the motive, is gang related”;
“ ‘ “[b]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive for criminal
behavior, its probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial
effect, and wide latitude is permitted in admitting evidence of its
existence” ’ ”].) Indeed, in People v. Martinez (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 400, the Court of Appeal determined that the
jury could reasonably infer from gang evidence that the motive
for the shooting involved gang rivalry. The Court of Appeal
concluded that motive was relevant to support the jury’s
attempted premeditated murder findings. The gang evidence in
Martinez included the attempted murder victim’s
acknowledgement that he was a member of the Jeffrey Street
gang, evidence that defendant was a member of the rival
Compton Vario 132nd Street gang and one of defendant’s former
fellow gang members had been killed in an incident involving
Jeffrey Street, and the gang expert’s testimony about the concept
of payback in gang culture as being a retaliatory act for a wrong
committed by a rival gang. (Id. at pp. 412–413.)
Ayala argues that the bare fact of Alvarez and Soto’s
friendship was sufficient to establish that retribution for Soto’s

14
death was a motive for the charged crimes. That fact alone,
however, fails to establish why Alvarez, let alone Ayala who did
not share the same closeness with Soto, would want to shoot
Ibarra and Cendejas as retaliation for Soto’s death. Evidence of
the intense rivalry and enmity between the two gangs and Ibarra
and Cendejas’s membership in the rival gang that killed Soto was
necessary to establish both Alvarez and Ayala’s motive for
shooting the victims. Ayala further ignores that gang evidence
was relevant to assess the credibility of the victims’ claims at
trial as to their professed lack of knowledge regarding the
incident, in the face of prior inconsistent evidence to the contrary.
(People v. Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168 [gang
evidence is relevant to a witness’s credibility].)3
Alvarez and Ayala argue that having multiple officers
testify regarding their connection to the West Valley Crazys was
excessive. However, as the trial court found, the intensity of
Alvarez’s and Ayala’s involvement in the gang was relevant to
motive. The testimony of several officers was required to prove
different aspects of that involvement.4 For example, Detective

3 In its motion to introduce gang evidence, the People had
argued such evidence was relevant to explain “why victims of a
gang shooting may not tell the truth or admit to observations
made.” The jury was instructed it could consider gang evidence
for, among other limited, specified purposes, “the credibility or
believability of a witness.”
4 Although Alvarez and Ayala assert that four officers
testified about Ayala’s moniker, their record citations only show
that Officer Manuel Vargas testified that Ayala’s moniker was
“Quieto” and Detective Bryce Kirk testified it was “Silent.” The
testimony of each provided information not supplied by the other.

15
Bryce Kirk’s testimony established Ayala’s membership in the
West Valley Crazys stretched back to approximately 2008.
Detective Haggis’s testimony showed Alvarez’s closeness to Soto,
whose death served as the catalyst for Alvarez’s greater
commitment to the West Valley Crazys. Another officer’s
testimony established Alvarez and Ayala attended Soto’s funeral.
The trial court’s determination that the prejudicial effect of the
gang evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value
was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor was it patently absurd.
To the contrary, the trial court’s conclusion was well within the
bounds of reason. (See People v. Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 433.)
Alvarez and Ayala contend that the trial court’s “wholesale
admission” of gang evidence resulted in a “fundamentally unfair”
trial and denied them due process of law. We disagree. The
evidence, while extensive, was relevant to showing why Alvarez
and Ayala would shoot at those particular victims in that
particular area. Per the People’s theory, the shooting occurred in
the context of a gang rivalry. The admission of gang evidence
was not unfettered. The court carefully considered and limited
the admission of certain types of gang evidence. For example, in
discussing the admissibility of Officer Bakewell’s expert
testimony, the court stated, “[C]ertain stuff about gang members
in general is of somewhat limited relevance. [¶] [I]t’s relevant if
it’s specific. Let’s not talk about gang members generally. Let’s
talk about: Does this gang have this sign? Does this gang use
this graffiti?” It instructed the prosecutor to “get as specific as

Alvarez and Ayala also do not demonstrate that the remaining
two witnesses testified regarding Ayala’s moniker.

16
we can to these two gangs” when examining Bakewell. We reject
Alvarez and Ayala’s contention that they were deprived of a fair
trial and due process of law.
Finally, Alvarez and Ayala contend the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing Officer Hughes to testify about the
Mexican Mafia. They assert that the evidence regarding the
Mexican Mafia has little bearing on the issues and was
inflammatory. During trial, Officer Hughes was shown photos of
the gang graffiti that he had observed when Alvarez was arrested
in January 2020. When the officer testified that photo A showed
“the letter[s] ‘CYS’ and ‘X3,’ which stands for 13,” the prosecutor
asked what the significance of 13 was to the gang. Officer
Hughes replied, “It’s—they are associated with the Mexican
Mafia.” There was no defense objection to that first reference to
the Mexican Mafia or request that the testimony be stricken. It
was not until the prosecutor asked, “What are we looking at in
photo B,” that Alvarez’s counsel stated, “Objection. 352.” After
the court overruled the Evidence Code section 352 objection,
Officer Hughes responded, “That’s the letter ‘CYS’ with a
kanpol.” Asked what that was, Hughes replied, “It’s . . . called a
kanpol. It’s the three dots with the two lines. It’s a Mayan
symbol representing—again associated with the Mexican Mafia.”
There was no further objection or request to specifically strike
any reference to the Mexican Mafia.
As the People point out, however, Alvarez and Ayala
forfeited the issue by failing to timely and specifically object to
Officer Hughes’s testimony about the Mexican Mafia in the trial
court. (See People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 366 [“ ‘the
“defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection” on
the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not

17
cognizable’ ”; “ ‘[a] general objection to the admission or exclusion
of evidence, or one based on a different ground from that
advanced at trial, does not preserve the claim for appeal’ ”]; see
also Evid. Code, § 353.) Although Alvarez and Ayala contend
they specifically objected to Officer Hughes’s testimony regarding
the Mexican Mafia, the record shows defense counsel merely
objected to the question asking, “What are we looking at in
photo B.” He did not object to the questions that elicited Officer
Hughes’s testimony referring to the Mexican Mafia, nor did he
move to exclude or strike that testimony.
In any event, it is not reasonably probable that Alvarez and
Ayala would have obtained a more favorable outcome in the
absence of Officer Hughes’s two brief references to the Mexican
Mafia. (See People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 280
[Evidence Code section 352 claim is reviewed under reasonable
probability standard for prejudice]; People v. McCurdy (2014)
59 Cal.4th 1063, 1103 [same].) The jury was not presented with
any further evidence regarding the brief reference to, let alone
any separate violence associated with, the Mexican Mafia.5 The

5 The cases cited by Alvarez—People v. Albarran (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 214 and People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225—
are thus distinguishable.

In Albarran, the prosecution presented “a panoply” of
“extremely inflammatory” “gang evidence, which might have been
tangentially relevant to the gang allegations, but had no bearing
on the underlying charges,” including “graffiti . . . attributed to
Albarran’s gang which contained a specific threat to murder
police officers. . . .” (People v. Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 220, 227.) Moreover, during opening statements, “[t]he
prosecutor . . . showed a picture of Albarran’s gang tattoos,

18
jury was also instructed that it “may not conclude from [the gang
evidence] that the defendant is a person of bad character or that
he has a disposition to commit crime,” and we presume it
followed the instruction. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th
834, 852 [jurors are presumed to understand and correlate
instructions and to have followed court’s instructions].)
Moreover, although Hughes’s testimony indicated that Alvarez
had painted the graffiti referring to the Mexican Mafia, the jury
nevertheless found not true the firearm allegations against
Alvarez, which would seem to indicate the jury’s passions were
not inflamed by the Mexican Mafia references. (See, e.g., People
v. Rogers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1368 [jury’s finding the

describing one of the tattoos as a ‘reference to the Mexican Mafia,
which is a violent prison street gang that controls the Hispanic
street gangs.’ The prosecutor noted that when a person has such
a tattoo it shows allegiance to the Mexican Mafia.” (Id. at p. 220.)

In Ayala, the court held that defense counsel was not
ineffective in electing not to present testimony from a potential
defense witness. The prosecutor had threatened to challenge the
veracity of the witness with claims that the witness had lied
about being “in trouble with the Mexican Mafia” in order to
secure a transfer to another prison. Given defense counsel’s
concerns that such testimony would inject the subject of “prison
gangs” into a case where no other gang-related evidence was
admitted, and might “cause the jury to believe that [defendant]
belonged to the gang” the court reasoned “we cannot say that
counsel[’s] [decision] was unreasonable . . . .” (People v. Ayala,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 272, 274–275.)

19
deadly weapon use enhancement not true indicates it was not
prejudicially influenced by evidence related to machete]; People v.
Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 612–613 [finding “no
reasonable likelihood the ‘jury’s passions were inflamed’ ” by
evidence of uncharged offenses where the jury acquitted the
defendant of one charge and found not true an enhancement
allegation].)
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Convictions on
the Counts with Cendejas as the Victim
Alvarez, with Ayala joining, contends substantial evidence
did not support the convictions for attempted murder and assault
with a firearm as to the counts with Cendejas (as opposed to
Ibarra) as the victim. Specifically, Alvarez and Ayala assert that
“there was virtually no evidence to support a reasonable
conclusion that the shooter had fired any bullets in such
proximity to Cendejas that he was put in reasonable jeopardy of
being struck by any of the fired bullets.”
“To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution
must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) “Direct
evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the intent to kill
must be inferred from the statements and actions of the
defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (Ibid.)
Although the lack of a motive for the shooting is not dispositive,
“where motive is shown, such evidence will usually be probative
of proof of intent to kill.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733,
742.) Moreover, “ ‘[t]he act of purposefully firing a lethal weapon
at another human being at close range, without legal excuse,
generally gives rise to an inference that the shooter acted with

20
express malice.’ ” (People v. Foster (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 430,
440; accord, Smith, at pp. 741–742 [purposefully firing a lethal
weapon at another at close range gives rise to an inference of an
intent to kill that is not dependent on any further showing of
motive to kill the victim].)
Further, the crime of assault with a firearm requires proof
the “defendant did an act with a firearm that by its nature would
directly and probably result in the application of force to a
person.” (CALCRIM No. 875; see People v. Delacerda (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 282, 291; People v. Velasquez (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1176 (Velasquez).)
Alvarez and Ayala contend there was insufficient evidence
to establish (1) the specific intent to kill Cendejas and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing
the intended killing; and (2) an act with a firearm that by its
nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to Cendejas. Pointing out that the jury found not true the
personal-use-of-a-gun allegations against Alvarez, he and Ayala
assert that the jury found them both guilty on aider and abettor
theories. They contend, because there was insufficient evidence
of Cendejas’s proximity to the line of fire, the shooter is not liable
for attempted murder and assault with a firearm. Accordingly,
they argue, the aider and abettor cannot be liable for those
crimes.6 (See People v. Silva (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640

6 Since, as discussed below, we reject their argument
regarding the lack of proximity of Cendejas to the line of fire, it is
not material to the disposition of this opinion who the jury
identified as the actual shooter.

21
[“ ‘[a]iding and abetting is not a separate offense but a form of
derivative liability for the underlying crime’ ”].)
In response, the People assert there was substantial
evidence to show the shooter fired at Ibarra and Cendejas. The
People point out the surveillance video and Bueno’s testimony
establish that Ibarra, who had been shot, and Cendejas were
walking together on the sidewalk on Baird Avenue before the
shooting, as Alvarez and Ayala acknowledge on appeal. Bueno
testified that the shooter “opened fire on the two guys in front,”
and there was evidence of five gun shots. Cendejas testified at
the January 2020 preliminary hearing that he “got shot at.”
Alvarez and Ayala, however, urge this court not to consider
that preliminary hearing testimony on the ground an attorney’s
questions are not evidence. At trial, the prosecutor, referring to
Cendejas’s January 2020 preliminary hearing testimony, asked:
“Mr. Cendejas, did you testify as follows: ‘Question: In your
words, what happened on Baird Avenue? Answer: Um, you
know what happened. I got shot at.’ Was that your testimony
that day?” Cendejas, in response, testified, “No. I don’t
remember.”
We do not need to determine whether Cendejas’s
preliminary hearing testimony was properly admitted as a prior
inconsistent statement (see, e.g., Evid. Code, §§ 770, 1235)
because other evidence established that Cendejas had been “shot
at.” Cendejas’s statement during his August 2019 interview that
he and Ibarra “just started . . . gettin’ shot at” shows Cendejas’s
proximity to the line of fire. The video and transcript containing
that August 2019 statement were admitted in evidence without
objection by defense counsel. Moreover, Bueno testified that the
shooter fired at Cendejas and Ibarra from a distance of about 35

22
to 45 feet. Point blank range is not required for an inference of
intent to kill to arise. (See People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222,
230 [firing a bullet into a group from a distance of 60 feet may be
sufficient to establish intent to kill someone in the group]; People
v. Foster, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 440 [affirming convictions
on multiple counts of attempted murder where, among other
factors, shooter fired weapon at a distance of 40 to 50 feet at a
group of six people standing close to one another].) There was
thus substantial evidence that Cendejas was in close enough
range to the shooter and in the line of fire to support the findings
that the shooter specifically intended to kill Cendejas and
committed a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the
intended killing.7 There was also substantial evidence of such

7 In closing argument, the People argued the shooter
intended to kill both Ibarra and Cendejas. The People did not
argue that Ibarra had been the shooter’s primary target, nor was
the jury instructed on a “kill zone” theory of liability. (See People
v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 209 [existence of a primary
target is important to liability under a kill zone theory because it
helps define the extent of the kill zone]; People v. Canizales,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 602–603 [under the kill zone theory of
liability, “ ‘ “[w]here the means employed to commit the crime
against a primary victim create a zone of harm around that
victim, the factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant
intended that harm to all who are in the anticipated zone” ’ ”].)
The parties on appeal do not argue the kill zone theory applies to
this case.

Rather, Alvarez and Ayala contend there was insufficient
evidence that the shooter targeted Cendejas because there was no
evidence of Cendejas’s proximity to the line of fire. We thus focus
only on the proximity evidence, given the nature of Alvarez and

23
proximity to establish the perpetrator committed an act with a
firearm that by its nature would directly and probably result in
the application of force to Cendejas. (See, e.g., People v. Williams
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [Court of Appeal should not have
reversed conviction for assault with a firearm where
circumstances included defendant firing a warning shot at King’s
truck knowing that King was “in the near vicinity”].)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error in
Failing To Modify CALCRIM No. 875
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 875.
That instruction provided as follows: “To prove that the
defendant is guilty of [the crime of assault with a firearm], the
People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant did an act with a
firearm that by its nature would directly and probably result in
the application of force to a person; [¶] 2. The defendant did that
act willfully; [¶] 3. When the defendant acted, he was aware of
facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act
by its nature would directly and probably result in the
application of force to someone; [¶] AND [¶] 4. When the

Ayala’s argument. Nevertheless, we observe that there was
evidence of motive and other factors probative of specific intent to
kill Cendejas, including the evidence that Cendejas belonged to a
rival gang. Such additional evidence augments the other
evidence of Cendejas’s proximity to the line of fire supporting the
convictions for the attempted murder of Cendejas. This same
evidence also supported Alvarez’s and Ayala’s specific intent to
kill Ibarra, the sufficiency of which they do not challenge on
appeal, the only additional evidence being that a bullet actually
struck Ibarra.

24
defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force with a
firearm to a person.”
Alvarez, again joined by Ayala, contends the trial court
prejudicially erred by failing sua sponte to modify CALCRIM
No. 875. Although acknowledging the instruction is a correct
statement of the law when there is a single victim, Alvarez and
Ayala assert that, when there are multiple counts, each with a
different victim, the instruction’s references to “a person” or
“someone” may mislead the jurors to conclude that the
application of force to any one victim satisfies the element for the
assault counts involving the other victims.
In support of their argument, Alvarez and Ayala cite
Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 1170. In that case, the
defendant fired a gun at a residence occupied at the time by five
people: four in the house and one (Maria) in the garage. (Id. at
pp. 1171–1173.) The prosecution’s theory was that the defendant
shot at the garage 10 times. Defendant was charged with and
convicted of five counts of assault with a firearm, one for each
resident. (Id. at p. 1175.) The Court of Appeal reversed the
convictions for the four counts in which Maria was not the victim.
The trial court had instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 875,
but because the instruction referred to application of force “to a
person” or “to someone,” the jury may have found the defendant
guilty of assaulting the other four residents based only on a
finding of a direct and probable application of force to Maria.
(Velasquez, at pp. 1176–1177.)
In response, the People contend Alvarez and Ayala forfeited
their argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. As the
People point out, “ ‘[a] party may not complain on appeal that an
instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too

25
general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate
clarifying or amplifying language.’ ” (People v. Jennings (2010)
50 Cal.4th 616, 671.) However, a failure to object “does not
prevent a defendant from challenging an instruction on appeal if
the asserted error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”
(People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382; see § 1259.)
“Instructions regarding the elements of the crime affect the
substantial rights of the defendant, thus requiring no objection
for appellate review.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469,
503.) Alvarez and Ayala’s claim of instructional error pertains to
the elements of the crime of assault with a firearm and thus
affects their substantial rights. It has not been forfeited. (See,
e.g., Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1177, fn. 5
[challenge to CALCRIM No. 875 on the ground it refers
ambiguously to application of force “to a person” or “to someone”
was not forfeited because it “affected Velasquez’s substantial
rights”].)
Nevertheless, we observe that, in Velasquez, supra,
211 Cal.App.4th 1170, there was evidence that the shooter
focused on a specific part of the house where only Maria was
located. There was no similar evidence here, where the victims
were standing in close proximity to each other.
In any event, any error by the trial court in not modifying
CALCRIM No. 875 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(See Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1177 [“[b]ecause the
error violated Velasquez’s constitutional rights, we must review
the record to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt”].) In addition to CALCRIM No. 875, the jury
was instructed, “Each of the counts charged in this case is a
separate crime. You must consider each count separately and

26
return a separate verdict for each one.” We presume the jury
followed that instruction and considered count 4, the assault
count involving Cendejas, separately from count 3, the one
involving Ibarra, and vice versa. (See People v. Sanchez, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 852; see also People v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 382 [“[d]efendant’s claim requires an evaluation of ‘ “ ‘the
entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an
instruction or from a particular instruction’ ” ’ ”].) Moreover, in
its count 4 verdict forms, the jury stated it found Alvarez and
Ayala “did will fully [sic] and unlawfully commit an assault on
Jasper Cendejas with a firearm,” with Cendejas’s name in all
capital letters. Similarly, in its count 3 verdict forms, the jury
stated it found Alvarez and Ayala “did willfully and unlawfully
commit an assault on Alex Ibarra with a firearm,” with Ibarra’s
name in all capital letters. This also shows the jury based its
verdicts for each of counts 3 and 4 on an application of force to
the proper victim. (See In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216,
1226–1227 [instructional error may be harmless when “ ‘other
aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave no reasonable doubt’ ”
that the jury made the necessary findings].)
Alvarez and Ayala contend the trial court’s error was not
harmless because there was no evidence of Cendejas’s proximity
to the line of fire and thus the jury necessarily relied on an
assault on Ibarra to convict on the assault count with Cendejas
as the victim. For the reasons we have already discussed, we
reject that contention.

27
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BERSHON, J.
We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.


Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

28

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.