CourtListener 10045319•People v. Boyd CA2/4
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Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Boyd CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B328685
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA007943)
v.
HARRY JACKSON BOYD JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In 1997, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Harry
Jackson Boyd Jr. of two special circumstance murders (Pen.
Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subds. (a)(3) & (a)(17)),1 committed
less than a month before defendant’s 26th birthday. The trial
court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
In 2022, defendant filed a motion requesting a hearing to
make a record of mitigating evidence for a future youth offender
parole hearing. (See §§ 1203.01, 3051.)2 The court denied the
motion, finding the relevant statute excluded individuals, such as
defendant, serving LWOP sentences for murders they committed
between the ages of 18 and 26.3 The court also rejected
defendant’s equal protection claim based on the separate
treatment of juvenile and non-juvenile, youthful offenders
sentenced to LWOP. Defendant timely appealed.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion to make a youth offender parole hearing
record. He argues section 3051 as amended violates his
constitutional rights to equal protection and freedom from cruel
or unusual punishment. We affirm.
1 Subsequent references to statutes are to the Penal Code.
2 “A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of
Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of
any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger, or was under 18
years of age as specified in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b), at the time
of the controlling offense.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1).)
3 “This section shall not apply to cases in which . . . an individual
is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained
18 years of age.” (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
2
DISCUSSION
A. Equal Protection Claim
As the parties acknowledge in their appellate briefs, at the
time defendant filed this appeal (and submitted an opening
brief), all but one appellate decision rejected defendant’s equal
protection challenge. (See People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
116, 125–127; People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069,
1079, review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; People v. Sands
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204–205 (Sands); In re Murray (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463–465; People v. Morales (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 326, 347–349 (Morales); People v. Jackson (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 189, 196–197, 199-200; People v. Acosta (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 769, 777–781 (Acosta).)
Defendant contends these opinions were wrongly decided
and requests that we rely on People v. Hardin (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 273, review granted January 11, 2023, S277487.
There, the appellate court agreed with defendant’s premise that
no rational basis existed for section 3051’s disparate treatment of
(1) young adults sentenced to LWOP; and (2) young adults
sentenced to parole-eligible life terms. (Id. at pp. 286–288, 290.)
Our Supreme Court recently disapproved of this lone
decision, instead adopting the majority position. (People v.
Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin). In Hardin, the Supreme
Court held section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders
sentenced to LWOP from a youth offender parole hearing did not
violate principles of equal protection. (Id. at pp. 838–839.) In so
ruling, the Supreme Court found a rational basis to disparately
treat young adults sentenced to LWOP for committing special
circumstances murder. (See id. at p. 859 [“special
circumstance[s] murder is sufficiently serious and morally
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culpable as to justify imposing the most severe sanctions
available under the law, up to and including death”].)
Defendant does not dispute we are bound to follow Hardin
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455), and he concedes all but one of his arguments is barred by
that decision. Nevertheless, defendant avers he may pursue an
equal protection claim questioning the Legislature’s “rational
basis to distinguish between young adults sentenced to LWOP
and juveniles sentenced to LWOP, because the Supreme
Court, . . . did not consider that issue.” (Italics added.) He
argues the Supreme Court limited its analysis to the distinction
in sentences imposed on young adults, not the distinction in age
between juvenile and young adults sentenced to LWOP.
We agree the Supreme Court did not expressly address the
separate treatment of juveniles and young adults sentenced to
LWOP. The Court declined to address that issue because
“Hardin [did] not challenge the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on
this point.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 841.) In so noting,
the Supreme Court summarized the appellate court’s decision
“explain[ing] that the Legislature had a rational basis for
distinguishing between juvenile offenders and young adult
offenders, since a unique set of constitutional rules restricts
sentencing children to life without parole.” (Id. at pp. 840–841,
citing Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460.)
Defendant furnishes no argument in response to the
Supreme Court’s statement or to the principles upon which courts
rely to rationally distinguish between children and adults subject
to the same sentence (LWOP). (See, e.g., Morales, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) We agree with the weight of authority
finding a rational basis for treating juveniles and adults
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differently. (Ibid.; accord, Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 204; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 779–780 [“The
Legislature declined to include young adult LWOP offenders in
this amendment, presumably because Montgomery [v. Louisiana
(2016) 577 U.S. __] did not compel such treatment for young
adults”].) We reject defendant’s equal protection challenge.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
Defendant next contends that section 3051 violates the
state constitutional proscription against cruel or unusual
punishment by rendering him ineligible for a youth offender
parole hearing. The Attorney General contends defendant
forfeited this argument.
We agree defendant forfeited this claim for the failure to
raise or discuss it below. (See People v. Baker (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 711, 720 (Baker) [“claim that a sentence is cruel or
unusual requires a ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if not
raised below”]; accord, People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1247; People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993.)
We nevertheless exercise our discretion to resolve it. (See Baker,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 720; People v. Em (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 [appellate court may reach forfeited
issue on record presented or in interest of judicial economy];
People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27.)
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which applies to the states (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th
262, 265, fn. 1), prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) Our state analogue,
Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, prohibits
infliction of “[c]ruel or unusual” punishment. (Italics added.)
5
This distinction in wording makes no analytical difference.
(People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fn. 7.) The
touchstone in each is whether a defendant’s sentence “‘is grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing
v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 21 (Ewing); accord, People v.
Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479.)
“‘[O]utside the context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have
been exceedingly rare.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at
p. 21.) “There is no question that ‘the fixing of prison terms for
specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that,
as a general matter, is “properly within the province of
legislatures, not courts.”’ [Citation.] It is for this reason that
when faced with an allegation that a particular sentence amounts
to cruel and unusual punishment, ‘[r]eviewing courts . . . should
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and
limits of punishments for crimes . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 83.) “‘Only in the rarest of
cases could a court declare that the length of a sentence
mandated by the Legislature is unconstitutionally excessive.’”
(Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.)
Here, defendant concedes his sentences “may not meet the
three-part test” for evaluating a cruel or unusual punishment
claim. (See In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424–427 [courts
consider (1) the degree of danger which the offense and offender
present to society; (2) punishments prescribed in the same
jurisdiction for more serious offenses; and (3) punishments
imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions].) Perhaps
that is why defendant declines to address any factor(s) bearing on
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his claim. No discussion is provided on the degree of danger
defendant’s convictions present to society. (See Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 859 [section 190.2 “lists special circumstances that,
under California law, mark a first degree murder particularly
egregious and thus render the perpetrator eligible for the death
penalty, consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements”].)
Nor has defendant compared his sentence to the penalties in this
state for more serious crimes or those imposed in other states for
the same crime.
Defendant further acknowledges this court’s previous
decision rejecting the same claim for a defendant who committed
murder shortly after his 18th birthday. (People v. Argeta (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.) The court reasoned, ““[W]hile
‘[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject . . . to the
objections always raised against categorical rules . . . [, it] is the
point where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood.’” (Ibid., quoting Roper v. Simmons
(2005) 543 U.S. 551, 554.) Defendant does not explain why this
distinction is inapplicable to section 3051’s inclusion of juveniles
sentenced to LWOP, and its exclusion of defendants sentenced to
the same term for committing special circumstance murder
between the ages of 18 and 26. (See also Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 854 [“the structure and history of the expansion [of
section 3051] make clear that the Legislature sought to balance
[comparable opportunities to obtain release] with other,
sometimes competing, concerns, including concerns about
culpability and the appropriate level of punishment for certain
very serious crimes”].) Absent any reasoned analysis of his claim,
we conclude section 3051 did not violate the constitutional
limitations on cruel or unusual punishment.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion for a future youth
offender parole hearing is affirmed.
MORI, J
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
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