CourtListener 10045123•Springfield v. Mendi Co II, LLC CA2/7
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Filed 8/19/24 Springfield v. Mendi Co II, LLC CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
LATONYA DAWSON- B326857
SPRINGFIELD,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 20AVCV00600)
v.
MENDI CO II, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Affirmed.
The Milner Firm and Timothy Vance Milner for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, Ernest
Slome, Lillian C. Harwell and Tracy D. Forbath for Defendant
and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, Latonya Dawson-Springfield tripped and fell on
loose gravel in a landscaped planter bed located in a parking lot
in Palmdale. She sued the owner of the parking lot, Mendi Co II,
LLC (Mendi Co), for negligence and premises liability. She
alleged Mendi Co failed to remedy or warn of a dangerous
condition on its property.
After discovery, including Dawson-Springfield’s deposition,
Mendi Co moved for summary judgment. As relevant here, it
argued Dawson-Springfield failed to establish Mendi Co owed her
a duty of care because the planter was not a dangerous condition
or alternatively the dangerous condition was open and obvious.
Dawson-Springfield opposed and, among other things, presented
evidence she argued raised a triable issue of fact that the planter
was dangerous and that the danger was not open and obvious.
Her summary judgment papers conceded she saw the loose gravel
in the planter but chose to walk through the planter because it
was “the shortest route” back to her vehicle.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Mendi Co.
The court ruled Dawson-Springfield had not met her burden to
show a triable issue of material fact because “any danger posed
by the planter” was “open and obvious,” and “it appears that the
planter was not a dangerous condition.”
Dawson-Springfield argues the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment. We conclude the trial court did not err and
affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As we must on summary judgment, we “view and recite the
facts in the light most favorable to . . . the party opposing
summary judgment.” (Knapp v. Ginsberg (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
504, 509.)
A. The Complaint
In August 2020, Dawson-Springfield sued Mendi Co for
negligence and premises liability. She filed a form complaint,
which alleged that on March 11, 2019, Dawson-Springfield
“attempt[ed] to enter her vehicle which was parked in
Defendant’s parking lot, [and] tripped on an uneven surface
covered in loose gravel, that was adjacent/next to the parking
space resulting in Plaintiff falling and sustaining serious and
debilitating injuries.” The complaint sought compensatory
damages of an unspecified amount.
Mendi Co answered the complaint with a general denial.
The case proceeded to discovery.
B. Dawson-Springfield’s Deposition and Discovery Responses
Dawson-Springfield was deposed on February 15, 2022.
Dawson-Springfield testified she drove to Mendi Co’s parking lot
on the day of the incident to visit her credit union’s ATM. She
was a regular visitor to the credit union, but had never observed
any dangerous conditions on the premises before. She testified
she was wearing “regular walking shoes.”
Dawson-Springfield parked her car in the parking spot
closest to the ATM. Immediately next to the driver’s side of the
parking space was a large, in-ground landscaped planter covered
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in “small, loose rocks” and containing “larger rocks, shrubs, and a
tree.” The planter extended into the asphalt parking lot and, on
the opposite side, it adjoined the sidewalk. Next to Dawson-
Springfield’s car, a concrete strip “one foot in width and
approximately four and one-half feet in length” separated the
planter from the asphalt parking surface. There were no
warning or caution signs at the site.
Dawson-Springfield exited her car from the driver’s side,
walked through the planter without incident, and withdrew cash
from the ATM. When she returned to her car, Dawson-
Springfield again walked through the planter. But this time, she
fell. She testified she “tripped” or “slid” in the planter and landed
on her right shoulder and the right side of her face. Dawson-
Springfield testified, “I don’t know if I tripped or slid on the
rocks. I just know that it had something to do with that. I didn’t
even have my foot off the curb yet.” Dawson-Springfield required
surgery for the resulting injury to her right shoulder.
C. The Trial Court Grants Mendi Co’s Motion for Summary
Judgment
Mendi Co moved for summary judgment on August 2, 2022,
arguing Dawson-Springfield could not establish it had a duty to
warn or remedy the alleged dangerous condition. Mendi Co
contended the planter was not a dangerous condition but an
“open and obvious condition” of which it had no duty to warn, and
that Dawson-Springfield “assumed the risks inherent in leaving
the paved sidewalk and choosing to instead walk through a
planter containing visible trees, shrubs, and landscaping rocks.”
In support, it attached Dawson-Springfield’s deposition transcript
and discovery responses.
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Dawson-Springfield opposed summary judgment. She
argued the planter constituted a dangerous condition due to
unstable rocks, a slope “as steep as 15.6%,” and the concrete strip
which “invites pedestrians returning to their car to cut through
the planter” but “does not extend far enough along the edge of the
planter to provide an adequate walking surface.” Dawson-
Springfield asserted these dangerous conditions were “not open
or obvious to someone, like plaintiff, who parks in the space next
to the planter.”
In support of her opposition, Dawson-Springfield attached a
declaration from a licensed professional engineer, Philip Rosescu,
who opined that the planter did not comply with national best
practices for safe walking surfaces and Palmdale Municipal Code
provisions for the layout of parking lots. Rosescu declared:
“Based off the parking stall Ms. Dawson[-Springfield] selected to
park in, it is reasonable to expect that upon returning to her
vehicle, she would need to traverse through the planter to access
her driver door.”
Dawson-Springfield further argued Mendi Co owed a duty
of care to pedestrians who walk through the planter because “[i]t
is foreseeable that people will walk through planters and
landscaped areas when that is the shortest route to their
destination.” In her opposition, she stated that “she might bear
some comparative fault” for walking through the planter but
argued that the assumption of the risk doctrine did not apply.
After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment
to Mendi Co. The court ruled that even if “it is generally
foreseeable that people will walk through the planter,” “any
danger posed by the planter was so open and obvious such that
Defendant had no duty to further warn or remedy the curb.
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[Citation.] Additionally, based on the evidence provided, it
appears that the planter was not a dangerous condition.” The
court further determined Rosescu’s declaration lacked an
“evidentiary basis” to conclude the planter did not comply with
the Palmdale Municipal Code because the court could not “find
the alleged business code that has been violated.”1
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Mendi Co.
Dawson-Springfield timely appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Dawson-Springfield argues the trial court erred in ruling
the planter did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter
of law. She further challenges the court’s ruling that any danger
posed by the planter was “open and obvious,” because she asserts
the “landscaping rocks [we]re deceptively dangerous.”
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
“The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are
the same as those for negligence. A plaintiff must prove a legal
duty to use care, breach of that legal duty, and a breach that is a
proximate cause of injury.” (Kaney v. Custance (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 201, 214 (Kaney).) Whether the defendant owed a
duty to the plaintiff depends primarily on the foreseeability of the
harm suffered. (See id. at p. 215; Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix
1 Dawson-Springfield does not challenge the evidentiary
rulings sustaining Mendi Co’s objections to Rosescu’s declaration,
and these rulings are not germane to the issues Dawson-
Springfield raises on appeal.
6
(1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 121-122 (Osborn).) “Foreseeability is
a question of law, and it is ‘typically absent when a dangerous
condition is open and obvious.’ [Citations.] ‘“Generally, if a
danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected
to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the
landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the
condition.”’” (Kaney, at p. 215; accord, Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447
(Jacobs).)
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion,
“[a]ppellate courts determine de novo whether an issue of
material fact exists and whether the moving party was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. . . . In conducting its
review, the appellate court must[] ‘view the evidence in a light
favorable to plaintiff as the losing party.’” (Jones v. Awad (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1206-1207 (Jones).) “As in the trial court,
we first determine whether the moving party has met its initial
burden to establish facts justifying judgment in its favor; if so, we
then decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the
existence of a triable, material issue of fact” that defeats
summary judgment. (Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1166.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Concluding the Dangerous
Condition Presented by the Planter Was Open and Obvious
Dawson-Springfield does not argue that Mendi Co failed to
shift the summary judgment burden. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar); Jones, supra,
39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1207.) The burden thus shifted to Dawson-
Springfield to demonstrate “the existence of a triable issue of
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material fact.” (Aguilar, at p. 850.) The trial court correctly
determined Dawson-Springfield did not meet this burden.
“‘[A] property owner ordinarily is required to use due care
to eliminate dangerous conditions on his or her property.’”
(American Golf Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 30,
36.) A dangerous condition is “‘one which creates a hazard to
persons who foreseeably would use the property with due care.’”
(Biscotti v. Yuba City Unified School Dist. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th
554, 559.) As the party with the ultimate burden of proof at trial,
Dawson-Springfield bears the burden to demonstrate a triable
fact issue on the existence of a dangerous condition.
Dawson-Springfield contends that the gravel in the planter
constituted a dangerous condition, and it was foreseeable that a
reasonable person would encounter that hazard by “tak[ing] the
shortest path” through the planter to reach her vehicle. She
argues that the existence of a dangerous condition is typically a
question of fact reserved for the jury. (See Wellsfry v. Ocean
Colony Partners, LLC (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1090
[“‘“Whether a given set of facts and circumstances creates a
dangerous condition is usually a question of fact. [Citation.] The
issue of a dangerous condition becomes a question of law only
where reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.”’”];
accord, Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003)
30 Cal.4th 139, 148.) Mendi Co responds that the planter did not
constitute a dangerous condition because it is not foreseeable that
a “reasonable person exercising due care would walk through a
planter with large and small rocks.”
Regardless of what we may think about Mendi Co’s
foreseeability argument, we need not decide whether the planter
in which Dawson-Springfield tripped constituted a dangerous
8
condition. Even assuming Dawson-Springfield raised a triable
issue of material fact that the planter constituted a dangerous
condition, the trial court correctly concluded that any such
danger was open and obvious as a matter of law, and thus Mendi
Co lacked a duty to remedy or warn.
Dawson-Springfield’s opening brief concedes “the
unsecured rocks” in the planter “[we]re obviously visible.” This is
consistent with her deposition testimony, responses to
interrogatories, and opposition to summary judgment. But she
argues that “while the rocks were clearly visible, the danger that
they may slide and cause a fall was not.” While an individual
plaintiff may not appreciate the danger of a visible hazard,
however, the danger may nevertheless be “so obvious that a
person could reasonably be expected to see it.” (Krongos v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 393
(Krongos); see, e.g., Nicoletti v. Kest (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 140,
145-146 (Nicoletti) [affirming summary judgment because
running water on driveway was “open and obvious” condition;
plaintiff “was aware” of the wet surface but “did not know that
the current of rainwater posed a danger to her safety”];
Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1461,
1470-1471 [affirming summary judgment on similar grounds,
where “the presence of standing water . . . would have been
obvious and apparent to any reasonably observant person, as
would the danger that the water might create slippery surfaces
and cause one to slip and fall”].)
The trial court correctly determined the gravel was an open
and obvious danger because a reasonably observant person would
recognize the gravel came with an associated danger of slipping.
In Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, our Supreme Court
9
reviewed a grant of summary judgment under similar
circumstances. In that case, a window washer fell on a “slippery”
path “covered in loose sand, gravel, and rocks.” (Id. at p. 54.)
Because the worker “knew of these conditions,” the Court held
the pathway was an “open and obvious” danger and affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant who owned the premises.
(Id. at pp. 40, 50; cf. Osborn, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 111,
123 [on review of a jury verdict, where plaintiff testified he saw
“the dirt and . . . rubble” on the ground before he tripped, the
evidence was “uncontradicted” there existed an “open and
obvious” danger].)
Dawson-Springfield relies on Chance v. Lawry’s, Inc. (1962)
58 Cal.2d 368 (Chance) to argue the planter did not constitute an
open and obvious hazard. But in Chance, the plaintiff fell into a
planter box that she did not see in a crowded restaurant lobby.
(See id. at p. 373.) These circumstances created a jury question
regarding whether “the danger created by the open planter box
was sufficiently obvious.” (Id. at p. 374.) By contrast, here
Dawson-Springfield expressly acknowledged that “she knew she
was walking through a planter” containing loose gravel. Unlike
the plaintiff in Chance, she did not identify a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the planter was an open and obvious
hazard.
C. Dawson-Springfield Cannot Obtain Reversal of the
Summary Judgment Based on a New Argument Not Raised
Before the Trial Court That She Encountered the Alleged
Dangerous Condition Out of Necessity
For the first time on appeal, Dawson-Springfield argues she
was “necessarily . . . forced to walk on loose rocks” to access her
10
car in the parking space by the planter. Citing Krongos, supra,
7 Cal.App.4th 387, and Osborn, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 104, she
argues that although the gravel may be an open and obvious
condition, it was foreseeable that she “might choose to encounter
the danger” because of “practical necessity.” (See Krongos, at
p. 393; Osborn, at p. 121.) Although there is generally no duty to
remedy or warn of an obvious danger, “‘[a]n exception to this
general rule exists when “it is foreseeable that the danger may
cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when
necessity requires persons to encounter it).”’” (Kaney, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at p. 215.) For example, in Osborn, supra,
224 Cal.App.3d 104, the plaintiff construction worker crossed a
demolition site containing “dirt mixed with broken pieces of
concrete” to deliver cement into the defendant’s cement silo. (Id.
at pp. 109-110.) The court held that although the danger
presented by the path was open and obvious, the plaintiff
sufficiently demonstrated the necessity of encountering the
danger because his “employment required him to pass across this
area in order to complete his work.” (Id. at p. 123.)
“In a summary judgment appeal, a party is ordinarily not
permitted to change her position and adopt a new and different
theory.” (Olson v. La Jolla Neurological Associates (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 723, 739 [theory not raised in appellant’s
opposition to summary judgment forfeited].) Dawson-Springfield
has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in her opposition
to Mendi Co’s motion for summary judgment. (See Nicoletti,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 147 [applying forfeiture where
appellant “did not argue this exception to the open and obvious
rule . . . in the summary judgment proceedings below”].) In her
opposition brief in the trial court, Dawson-Springfield did argue
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it was “foreseeable that people will walk through planters and
landscaped areas when that is the shortest route to their
destination” and also stated “she might bear some comparative
fault” for taking this route. But these arguments did not present
or develop Dawson-Springfield’s appellate argument that she
walked through the planter by necessity. (See Insurance Co. of
State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 898, 922 [declining to consider new theory on
review of summary judgment, as it was “not ‘“factually presented,
fully developed and argued to the trial court”’”].)2
Further, an appellant forfeits a new theory on appeal when
she “fails to include the underlying facts in [her] separate
statement of facts in opposing summary judgment.” (City of San
Diego v. Rider (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1493; see Parkview
Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1213 [stating, the “‘golden rule’ of
summary judgment”: “‘[A]ll material facts must be set forth in
the separate statement. . . . “[I]f it is not set forth in the separate
statement, it does not exist.”’” [Italics omitted.].) In her response
to Mendi Co’s separate statement, Dawson-Springfield stated it
was undisputed that when “she returned to her car after
2 Although Mendi Co raised forfeiture in its respondent’s
brief, Dawson-Springfield did not argue that any of the
exceptions to forfeiture apply to this case. (See, e.g., Fisher v.
City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654, fn. 3 [“parties may
advance new theories on appeal when the issue posed is purely a
question of law based on undisputed facts, and involves
important questions of public policy”]; see also Guardianship of
Stephen G. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1422 [forfeiture does not
apply to recently announced rule of law].)
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withdrawing cash, . . . she walked through the planter instead of
on the sidewalk or asphalt.” And her own statement of additional
material facts included no facts that she was unable to access her
car by the sidewalk or the asphalt or otherwise walked through
the planter out of necessity.
Dawson-Springfield argues that Rosescu’s expert
declaration attested that “pedestrians would be forced to walk on
the loose rocks within the planter” and that her interrogatory
responses to Mendi Co stated “[v]isitors were forced to walk on
the lo[o]se rocks in order to access their vehicles.” But “where
evidence is not referenced, is hidden in voluminous papers, and is
not called to the attention of the court at all, a summary
judgment should not be reversed on grounds the court should
have considered such evidence.” (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v.
Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316; accord, Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 [if material fact “‘is not mentioned in the
separate statement, it is irrelevant that such fact might be buried
in the mound of paperwork filed with the court’”]; North Coast
Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
22, 31.)
In sum, Dawson-Springfield has not raised a material
factual issue that Mendi Co owed her a duty to protect her from
the planter’s open and obvious danger. (See Montes v. Young
Men’s Christian Assn. of Glendale, California (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1142 [affirming summary judgment where
“there was no necessity nor any other circumstance that made it
foreseeable [plaintiff] would ‘choose to encounter’” the dangerous
condition]; Jacobs, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 446 [same].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Mendi Co is entitled to its costs
on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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