CourtListener 10045049•People v. Epps CA6
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Filed 8/16/24 P. v. Epps CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H050447
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2008065)
v.
MICHAEL RAY EPPS, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A man shot defendant Michael Ray Epps, Jr.’s daughter during a drug deal. Epps
was a marijuana producer/dealer and had supplied the drug to his daughter for sale. After
learning of the shooting from his daughter, Epps set out to find the assailant with the help
of confederates. The manhunt resulted in the shooting death of a person who had nothing
to do with the failed drug deal.
At trial, Epps did not contest his involvement in the killing. Rather, he urged the
jury to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. The jury
rejected this contention and convicted Epps of first degree murder for a willful,
premeditated, and deliberate killing or a drive-by killing (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),
189, subd. (a)1).
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Epps contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that passion
based on revenge does not reduce a killing to manslaughter. Epps further maintains that
the district attorney violated a written pretrial agreement (hereafter proffer agreement) by
using information derived from Epps’s proffer interview against him at trial.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an amended information charging
Epps with the murder of Arturo C.2 (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1.)
The jury found Epps guilty of first degree murder based on a willful, premeditated,
and deliberate killing with express malice or a murder perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle intentionally at another person outside of the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death.
At a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Epps’s motion for a new trial and
sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison.
B. Evidence Presented at Trial
1. Prosecution Evidence
Epps is the biological father of Kaila M., although she had not met him during
most of her childhood. Kaila first became acquainted with Epps through his son Andre
when she was 16 years old (in 2017–2018). Kaila later lived with Epps and his family in
Yuba City from June 2019 to August 2019, immediately after she graduated from high
school.
Kaila began selling marijuana while she was in high school, separate from her
relationship with Epps. When Kaila lived with Epps in the summer of 2019, she did not
2
We refer to the victim and other individuals by their first name and the first letter
of their last name (and at times thereafter by their first names only) to protect their
privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10).)
2
sell marijuana, but she learned that Epps grew and sold marijuana and had a lot of cash,
nice cars, and several houses. In August 2019, Kaila moved back to Santa Clara to live
with her mother and stepfather. Kaila continued to see Epps about twice a month, and
they had a good relationship.
In September or October 2019, Kaila resumed selling marijuana. Epps provided
Kaila marijuana to sell, and they split the profit. Epps introduced Kaila to several people
and she delivered marijuana to some of them. Kaila knew Epps’s friend Venitia Hyatt.
When Kaila lived with Epps, she got to know him and believed he was a nonviolent
person. Kaila testified that she did not know Epps to have a reputation as a person who
would commit violence “if someone messed with his [marijuana] business.”
Around January 21, 2020,3 Kaila found out that Epps had had sex with her best
friend. Kaila was upset by this, and she and Epps argued about it via text messages.
After January 24, Kaila did not have text communications with Epps until January 29,
when she was the victim of an attempted robbery during a drug deal in which she was
selling Epps’s marijuana.
On the night of January 29, Arturo (the murder victim) attended a San Jose Sharks
game with some coworkers. Coincidentally, Kaila set up a marijuana deal that night with
a different man through her social media account. The marijuana buyer provided an
address in San Jose (on De Rose Way, near Southwest Expressway and Leigh Avenue)
and a photo of his identification (ID) card. Kaila requested this information from the
buyer to protect herself. She knew that selling marijuana was dangerous, and she risked
being robbed or hurt.
When Kaila and her girlfriend Ariana M. arrived at the De Rose Way address, the
buyer attempted to rob Kaila and shot her. Kaila drove off. Kaila had “a lot” of
marijuana supplied by Epps in her car. She posted about the shooting on social media
3
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2020.
3
(including the man’s photo ID and his social media account) and messaged people for
help in finding the man.
Around 8:35 p.m. on January 29, Kaila called Epps using FaceTime. The dash
cam in Kaila’s car captured the audio of the call as Kaila drove toward a hospital.4 Kaila
used the video feature of FaceTime to show Epps her injury and to confirm that she had
in fact been shot. Epps told Kaila to go to the hospital as soon as possible. Kaila sent
Epps the buyer’s address and ID card. In Kaila’s opinion, Epps sounded calm and
remained calm after learning she had been shot.5
Epps’s friend Richard M. and Epps’s cousin Antione S. visited Kaila at the
hospital. Kaila was treated and released around 12:05 a.m. on January 30.
Between around 8:35 p.m. on January 29 (when Epps learned that Kaila had been
shot) and approximately 1:15 a.m. on January 30 (when Arturo was shot), Epps had
contact with several people, some of whom lived in the San Jose area. The people
contacted included Epps’s friend Jovaune Zermeno, Venitia Hyatt, Hyatt’s daughter Sade
M., Kaila’s girlfriend Ariana M., Richard, and Antione. In addition, Epps used Google
Maps to locate the address Kaila provided to him as the buyer’s address.
4
The dash cam recording was played for the jury, and a transcript (which was not
admitted into evidence) is included in the appellate record. The transcript includes the
substance of five conversations that Kaila and Epps had prior to her arrival at the
hospital. Both parties cite to the transcript in their appellate briefing.
5
The transcript of the dash camera recording indicates that during the first
FaceTime call, Epps looked at Kaila’s injury and said it “look[s] like a graze wound.”
Epps asked Kaila who she was “dealing with” and Kaila promised to send Epps the
man’s information. Epps also said he was in “the middle of something” and would call
Kaila back in five minutes. When they spoke again a short time later, Epps urged Kaila
to send him the man’s information “right now.” In addition, Epps asked Kaila “how did
everything go down?” Kaila said, among other things, “I pulled up, I told him I was here
and [] he came out.” Epps told Kaila to falsely state that someone had tried to carjack her
and shot her, and not to say that she was selling marijuana. When Kaila asked what she
should do with the marijuana that she had in her car, Epps told her to put it in the trunk.
4
Ariana and Epps spoke after Kaila was released from the hospital. They discussed
the failed drug deal. Epps asked Ariana whether she had seen the buyer come out of an
apartment. According to Ariana, Epps’s tone of voice sounded normal, and he was
curious about what had happened.
Epps sent the buyer’s photo to Sade (Hyatt’s daughter) and asked if she knew him.
Sade did not know the man but told Epps she would ask around to see if anyone did.
When Sade asked Epps if Kaila was okay, he said she was fine. Sade provided the
buyer’s photo to Hyatt and others. Epps told Sade that he was on his way to San Jose.
According to Sade, during a call that occurred as Epps drove to San Jose, Epps sounded
upset, anxious, and worried about Kaila, but he calmed down by the end of the call. Sade
testified that she did not know Epps to have a reputation for violence with respect to his
marijuana business. Sade further testified that Hyatt spoke with Epps after Kaila was
shot and Hyatt told Sade “ ‘they were going to take care of it.’ ” Hyatt also sent
messages to multiple people seeking information about the man who shot Kaila.
Cell phone records and data from Epps’s Cadillac SUV suggested that Epps and
his friend Zermeno drove together in the SUV from Yuba City to San Jose (leaving Yuba
City after 10:00 p.m. on January 29).6 At 12:50 a.m., Epps’s cell phone arrived in the
vicinity of Southwest Expressway and Leigh Avenue in San Jose. At 12:51 a.m.,
Zermeno did an internet search to find out who lived at the De Rose Way address.
Epps’s phone remained in that area until around 1:20 a.m. (before returning to Yuba
City).
Around the same time on January 30, Arturo (the murder victim) happened to be
meeting with a woman near Southwest Expressway and Leigh Avenue. Surveillance
cameras captured Arturo’s vehicle in a store parking lot. A vehicle associated with Hyatt
entered the parking lot around 1:00 a.m. Phone records showed that Epps and Hyatt
6
Yuba City is about a “30, 40-minute drive north of Sacramento.”
5
exchanged phone calls between 1:09 a.m. and 1:14 a.m. In addition, a Buick LeSabre
sedan associated with Epps’s friend Richard and a Range Rover associated with Hyatt’s
friend Mark R. appeared in the parking lot.
Around 1:13 a.m., Arturo began driving out of the store parking lot. Epps’s SUV
followed Arturo’s vehicle. After Arturo exited the parking lot, he drove north on
Southwest Expressway and turned onto Leigh Avenue. Arturo’s vehicle and Epps’s SUV
proceeded toward a strip mall on Leigh Avenue and pulled into adjacent parking spaces.
Arturo then backed up and began driving away. Epps’s SUV tried to cut off Arturo’s
vehicle to prevent it from leaving. Arturo drove out of the parking lot and accelerated.
Epps’s SUV accelerated after him and pulled alongside the driver’s side of Arturo’s
vehicle for one or two seconds.
An eyewitness heard gunshots as he sat outside his apartment on Leigh Avenue.
He also heard car engines “racing” and a loud car crash. He saw an SUV and a sedan
speeding away from the scene. The eyewitness approached the crashed vehicle and
found Arturo in the driver’s seat. Arturo was unresponsive and bleeding badly from the
back of his head.7
The police arrived and removed Arturo from his vehicle. An ambulance
transported Arturo to the hospital. His vehicle’s rear window was shattered, but no other
bullet strikes were located. The police found seven 9mm bullet casings at the scene. A
forensic analysis revealed that all seven bullet casings seemingly were fired by a single
firearm. The police never recovered the firearm.
On the morning of January 30, Kaila and Epps spoke. Epps asked Kaila how she
was doing and told her to look at the news about a shooting in San Jose. In addition,
7
In closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that Epps and Zermeno were inside
Epps’s SUV but conceded that “we do not know for certain if Michael Epps is the driver
who is accelerating, chasing down [Arturo] so that Zermeno can fire those shots, or if it’s
Zermeno driving Michael Epps’[s] car and Michael Epps himself is the one pulling the
trigger again and again until they kill [Arturo].”
6
Epps sent Kaila a lawyer’s phone number in case she might need it. At trial, Kaila denied
that Epps had told her that others were involved and that he saw the man, followed him,
stopped next to him, asked him “ ‘What’s up?’ ” and shot him as he tried to drive away.
Kaila also testified that she previously lied to the police about Epps’s statements to her.
A detective testified that Kaila had admitted during a police interview that Epps said he
saw the man and asked him what was up. Further, during the interview, the detective
asked Kaila whether Epps made it “ ‘pretty clear’ ” that he was responsible for the news
story and Kaila replied, “ ‘I guess so.’ ”
Arturo died on February 12 due to complications from the gunshot wound to the
back of his head.
2. Defense Evidence
The defense called five relatives and the mother of one of Epps’s children to
testify about Epps’s character. The defense witnesses variously described Epps as a
loving and devoted father who wanted the best for his children. The witnesses further
testified that they did not know Epps to be a violent person or hear him speak about
wanting to inflict violence on anyone.
The prosecutor cross-examined the defense witnesses about their lack of
awareness of Epps’s illegal marijuana business (including that he had supplied marijuana
to Kaila) and their minimal contact with Kaila. In addition, the prosecutor elicited from
Epps’s aunt that she had not heard that after Epps was arrested, the police stopped his son
Andre leaving home with a firearm that had a fake serial number. The prosecutor also
elicited from Epps’s uncle that Epps had two prior misdemeanor convictions for criminal
threats.8
8
The parties stipulated that on June 3, 2021, police officers saw Andre leaving the
family’s home in Yuba City. After stopping Andre’s car, the police found a gun with an
altered serial number. The parties also stipulated that Epps had two misdemeanor
convictions from 2001 for criminal threats (§ 422).
7
II. DISCUSSION
Epps raises two claims on appeal. He contends the trial court erred when
instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter. He further alleges a violation of a pretrial
proffer agreement by the district attorney. We address his claims in turn.
A. Instruction on Revenge
The trial court instructed the jury that “[p]assion will not reduce a killing to
manslaughter if based on revenge” (hereafter revenge instruction).
Epps contends the trial court erred in adding this revenge instruction to the pattern
jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter for heat of passion (CALCRIM No. 570). He
argues that “the traditional exclusion of revenge as a permissible basis for heat of passion
is inapplicable when the provocation involves an assault with a deadly weapon upon a
family member.” He further maintains that by excluding “ ‘revenge,’ which included all
retaliation, the court here improperly removed heat of passion from the jury’s
consideration in this case under the facts of this case.”
The Attorney General responds that Epps forfeited his instructional error claim by
failing to object to or request a modification of the revenge instruction. The Attorney
General argues further that the instruction was legally correct, and, in any event, the
alleged instructional error was harmless under the standard set forth in People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).
1. Additional Background
Pretrial, Epps, through his defense counsel, filed a “brief on the legal standards of
voluntary manslaughter” and requested an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based
on heat of passion.
During trial, at a conference on the jury instructions, the trial court stated its intent
to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion using CALCRIM No. 570.
The court further stated: “The [c]ourt is going to add some additional language to this
instruction, primarily based on People v. Fenenbock [(1996)] 46 Cal.App.4th [1688].
8
And the addition the [c]ourt is going to include will be right above the last paragraph on
this instruction [and] will state, ‘Passion will not reduce a killing to manslaughter if based
on revenge.’ And we had some discussions about that language informally. I’m not sure
if either counsel wishes to comment additionally, but with that modification, I am
inclined to give this instruction.” Defense counsel did not object to the court’s proposed
addition or request any modification to it.
The trial court provided the following written instruction to the jury regarding
voluntary manslaughter:
“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if
the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.
“The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of
passion if: [¶] 1. The defendant was provoked; [¶] 2. As a result of the provocation,
the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his
reasoning or judgment; [¶] [and] [¶] 3. The provocation would have caused a person
of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion
rather than from judgment.
“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It can be
any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation and
reflection.
“In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, the
defendant must have acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I
have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote
provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long
period of time.
“It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not
allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant
was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the
9
provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same
situation and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from
judgment.
“If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a person of
average disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her clear reasoning and judgment, then
the killing is not reduced to voluntary manslaughter on this basis.
“Passion will not reduce a killing to manslaughter if based on revenge.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.”9
(CALCRIM No. 570, modified; italics added.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that Epps murdered Arturo C. “for
revenge, to retaliate for the attempted robbery and the shooting of Kaila [M.] that had
happened four hours and 40 minutes earlier.” When arguing more specifically against
voluntary manslaughter, the prosecutor told the jurors that “revenge is not a passion. A
desire for revenge is not a passion for voluntary manslaughter.” The prosecutor further
asserted that there was “enough time for a person of average disposition to cool off” and
Epps did not have “some violent reaction focused on his concern for” Kaila. Instead, he
had “his own motivations, coming down [from Yuba City] to retaliate to kill, using
reasoning and judgment.”
9
The reporter’s transcript indicates that when reading this instruction to the jury,
the trial court said passion will not reduce “the killing” (italics added) to manslaughter if
based on revenge (rather than “a killing”). Neither party notes this discrepancy nor
makes any argument based on it. Further, the trial court stated that it would provide
copies of the written instructions to the jurors for their deliberation. We therefore infer
that the jury received the written instructions. When a “discrepancy exists between the
written and oral versions of jury instructions, the written instructions provided to the jury
will control.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.)
10
In response, Epps’s defense counsel characterized the prosecutor’s theory as one
in which the offense was “[a] calculated, cold-blooded act of revenge and retaliation to
protect Michael Epps’[s] business” along with “ ‘something to do with his daughter who
was shot.’ ” Counsel countered that theory arguing, “Our theory, and what you [the
jurors] should have a reasonable doubt about, is that Mr. Epps did act rashly, under the
influence of intense emotion. It obscured his reasoning for judgment, which is exactly
what the definition of voluntary manslaughter is.” Counsel asserted that Epps was not
motivated to protect his business or by revenge. Rather, “he didn’t have a motive. There
was no message to be sent by finding this San Jose guy that tried to rob and shoot Kaila.
No business purpose for that whatsoever. [¶] And we also know that Mr. Epps had too
much to lose. Mr. Epps had, what sounds like, a very successful, illegal marijuana
business.” Additionally, counsel argued that Epps was not the shooter and “never
intended to kill.”
In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor asserted that Epps committed the offense “for
a reason. He does it to retaliate, he does it for revenge, and it’s tied to the marijuana, that
he has his daughter in this dangerous situation, and what they both know could happen
does. He has to show he’ll protect her, and it goes to their complicated relationship.
He’s earning back that trust, and in his way, this is how [he] thinks he earns back that
trust, by killing the man who shot her.” The prosecutor argued further that voluntary
manslaughter was “not applicable” under the evidence and that the killing “was done in
retaliation, and retaliation is murder.”
2. Legal Principles
a. Voluntary Manslaughter – Heat of Passion
“California law separates criminal homicide into two classes: the greater offense
of murder and the lesser offense of manslaughter. [Citation.] Murder is defined as ‘the
unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought’ [citation], while
manslaughter is defined as ‘the unlawful killing of a human being without malice’
11
[citation]. Thus, the ‘distinguishing feature [between the two offenses] is that murder
includes, but manslaughter lacks, the element of malice.’ [Citation.] Malice exists when
‘an unlawful homicide was committed with the “intention unlawfully to take away the
life of a fellow creature” [citation], or with awareness of the danger and a conscious
disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 252 (Schuller).)
“A person who kills without malice does not commit murder. Heat of passion is a
mental state that precludes the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from
murder to manslaughter. Heat of passion arises if, ‘ “at the time of the killing, the reason
of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the
ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation
and reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.” ’ [Citation.] Heat of
passion, then, is a state of mind caused by legally sufficient provocation that causes a
person to act, not out of rational thought but out of unconsidered reaction to the
provocation. While some measure of thought is required to form either an intent to kill or
a conscious disregard for human life, a person who acts without reflection in response to
adequate provocation does not act with malice.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th
935, 942, fn. omitted (Beltran); see also People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 828 [“A
heat of passion killing . . . is one caused by an unconsidered reaction to provocation
rather than the result of rational thought.”].)
In other words, “[h]eat of passion has both objective and subjective components.
Objectively, the victim’s conduct must have been sufficiently provocative to cause an
ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection.” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 759, citing People v. Moye (2009)
47 Cal.4th 537, 549–550.) “Subjectively, ‘the accused must be shown to have killed
while under “the actual influence of a strong passion” induced by such provocation.’ ”
(Enraca, at p. 759.) “No specific type of provocation is required, and ‘the passion
aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any “ ‘ “[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or
12
enthusiastic emotion” ’ ” [citations] other than revenge.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23
Cal.4th 101, 108 (Lasko), italics added.) Further, “ ‘[i]f sufficient time has elapsed
between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return,
the killing is not voluntary manslaughter—“the assailant must act under the smart of that
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” ’ ” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 951; see also
Moye, at p. 550.)
The prosecution must disprove heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt to
establish the element of malice. (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 253; see also People v.
Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462.)
b. Jury Instruction Requirements and Appellate Review
“ ‘In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on
general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for
the jury’s understanding of the case.’ [Citation.] That duty extends to instructions on the
defendant’s theory of the case, ‘including instructions “as to defenses ‘ “that the
defendant is relying on . . ., or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a
defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” ’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 58.) “[O]nce a trial court undertakes to instruct
on a legal point, it must do so correctly.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law
and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has
requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’ [Citation.] But that rule does
not apply when . . . the trial court gives an instruction that is an incorrect statement of the
law.” (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012; see also People v.
Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 499.)
“ ‘A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An appellate
court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the
instruction accurately states the law.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175,
13
218.) “ ‘ “When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must
assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with
other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury
applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible manner.” ’ ” (People v. Gomez
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 313 (Gomez).)
3. Analysis
Epps acknowledges that his defense counsel did not object to the revenge
instruction. Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s assertion of forfeiture, we reach the
merits of Epps’s claim of error because he contends the instruction “was legally incorrect
under the facts of this case” and affected his substantial rights. (See People v. Morales
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 995, fn. 4 [reviewing defendant’s argument “that the
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law if the instruction affected his substantial
rights, meaning it was reversible error under” Watson]; People v. Grandberry (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 599, 604; Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 312; § 1259.)
Regarding the merits of Epps’s claim, we are not persuaded that the revenge
instruction amounts to an incorrect statement of the law. The California Supreme Court
has “long recognized that ‘the fundamental of the inquiry [into whether provocation has
negated malice] is whether or not the defendant’s reason was, at the time of his act, so
disturbed or obscured by some passion—not necessarily fear and never, of course, the
passion for revenge—to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average
disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this
passion rather than from judgment.’ ” (People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1112,
quoting People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49, italics omitted & added; accord, Beltran,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 947–949 & fn. 9.)
The trial court’s revenge instruction accords with the principle that “a desire for
revenge cannot objectively satisfy the provocation requirement.” (People v. Souza
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 117; see also People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254,
14
301; People v. Burnett (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 469, 478 [“Heat of passion may not be
based upon revenge.”].) Because revenge is insufficient as a matter of law to support a
finding of heat of passion, the court’s direction to the jury that passion “based on
revenge” will not reduce a killing to manslaughter accurately stated the law.
Epps does not cite any authority that demonstrably supports his assertion that “the
traditional exclusion of revenge . . . is inapplicable when the provocation involves an
assault with a deadly weapon upon a family member.” Although an assault on a family
member could possibly be sufficient provocation to support heat of passion (see People v.
Brooks (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 687, 694 (Brooks); People v. Elmore (1914) 167 Cal. 205,
211), revenge even for an attack on a family member necessarily implicates some degree
of deliberation and reflection and is not the type of unconsidered reaction required for
voluntary manslaughter. (See Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 108.)
Epps’s reliance on Brooks for his assertion that the revenge exclusion does not
apply when a family member is involved is misplaced. In Brooks, the defendant’s
brother was stabbed to death at on a city street at 2:00 p.m. (Brooks, supra, 185
Cal.App.3d at p. 690.) At the crime scene, defendant, “in a very excited, upset state, was
running around talking to people, and trying to find out who killed his brother.” (Id. at
p. 691.) At 4:00 p.m., in the same location where his brother had been stabbed, after
having heard about the identity of his brother’s killer, defendant confronted the purported
killer, yelled “ ‘Where is your knife?’ ” and shot him five times. (Id. at p. 690; see also
id. at pp. 691–692.) The Brooks court decided that the murder of a family member is
legally adequate provocation for voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at p. 694.) The court
further concluded there was substantial evidence—namely the eyewitness accounts of the
defendant’s behavior at the crime scene—that the defendant had acted in the heat of
passion when confronting his brother’s killer. (Id. at p. 696.) In reaching the latter
conclusion, the Brooks court mentioned the longstanding principle that “ ‘passion for
revenge’ ” cannot serve as the predicate for heat of passion. (Id. at p. 694.) The court did
15
not suggest anywhere in its analysis that heat of passion sufficient for voluntary
manslaughter could be based on revenge when a family member is assaulted. (See id. at
pp. 694–696.)
In adding the revenge instruction to CALCRIM No. 570, the trial court aptly
clarified that revenge, even if passionately felt, is not the type of passion encompassed by
voluntary manslaughter. We conclude the trial court’s instruction was proper and did not
remove heat of passion from the jury’s consideration in determining Epps’s guilt of the
murder charge.
B. Alleged Violation of Proffer Agreement
Epps contends the district attorney violated a pretrial proffer agreement in which
the district attorney had promised not to use Epps’s postarrest police interview statements
against him at trial. Epps claims the trial prosecutor improperly questioned Ariana M.
based on the police interview and exploited that testimony when arguing that Epps
committed the offense with reasoning and judgment, not in the heat of passion. Epps
further contends the trial court erred in finding the alleged error harmless, arguing that
the error contributed to the jury’s murder verdict and rejection of his heat of passion
defense.
The Attorney General responds that Epps forfeited his claim of error by failing to
object during Ariana’s testimony and the prosecutor’s closing arguments. The Attorney
General further asserts that even if Epps’s claim were not forfeited, it fails because Epps
has not shown that the prosecutor’s questions and arguments violated the proffer
agreement. Lastly, the Attorney General contends that even if a violation of the
agreement occurred, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury’s
verdict was not attributable to the error.
1. Additional Background
In June 2020, the police arrested Epps for murdering Arturo.
16
In October 2020, Epps entered into a written proffer agreement with the district
attorney in which he agreed to be interviewed. The proffer agreement states that if the
district attorney chose not to “make an offer to enter into a negotiated plea” with Epps,
the district attorney could “not use any statement given pursuant to th[e] agreement
against [Epps] in the case-in-chief in any criminal prosecution” (with certain immaterial
exceptions). The district attorney, however, was permitted to use Epps’s statements “for
any investigatory purpose” but could not use any additional information developed by
further investigation against Epps (again, with immaterial exceptions).
On October 7, San Jose Police Department detectives interviewed Epps for over
an hour. During the interview, Epps admitted that he had talked to Kaila’s girlfriend
Ariana and “asked her, ‘Are you sure you’ve seen this guy come out of that house?’ and
asked her a couple of time[s,] ‘Is that the – did you see that guy come out of the
house?’ ”10
At Epps’s trial, Ariana testified for the prosecution under subpoena. On direct
examination, the prosecutor questioned Ariana about the phone conversation she had with
Epps after midnight on January 30. Ariana testified that she had missed Epps’s initial
call to her that night and called him back.11 The prosecutor asked to “tell us about that
call.” Ariana responded, “I told him what happened. And when he asked what
happened, I told him what happened.” The prosecutor asked further, “When you say he
asked what happened, what do you mean?” Ariana explained that Epps had asked
“[w]hat happened [] with the drug deal.” The prosecutor followed up by asking “what
did you tell him about what had happened?” Ariana responded, “[Kaila] got shot while
10
As mentioned ante (pt. I.B.1.), while Kaila was driving to the hospital after
being shot, she told Epps (in response to his questioning) that the shooter “came out”
after she had informed him of her arrival at the De Rose Way address.
11
Phone records indicated that Epps had called Ariana at 12:11 a.m. (for four
seconds), and Ariana called Epps back at 12:35 a.m. The latter call lasted for 149
seconds.
17
she was making a drug deal, basically. Just like the gist of what happened. He kind of
already knew.” The prosecutor continued:
“Q. Did he ask you questions about it?
“A. Not really.
“Q. So after you told him the general gist of what happened, what was next on the
call?
“A. Um, nothing. That was it.”
Next, the prosecutor asked Ariana about “Epps’[s] tone on the call” and how his
“voice sound[ed]” Ariana responded, “Um, normal. Like, he was just curious as to what
happened.” The prosecutor continued:
“Q. Was he asking you questions about where the man had come out of -- if you
had seen him come out of an apartment?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And was he asking you if you had been at [] De Rose in front of an
apartment?
“A. What?
“Q. Was he asking about the address that you were at with Kaila when she was
robbed?
“A. Um, I don’t know.
“Q. But you remember him asking about where the man had come from?
“A. Um-hum.
“Q. Is that a ‘Yes’?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Did Michael Epps say anything about why he wanted to know that?
“A. No.
“Q. Did you ask?
“A. No.
18
“Q. And did you ask him why he wanted to know this information? Why he was
calling you after midnight?
“A. No.
“Q. Did he say anything about where he was?
“A. No.
“Q. Where he was going or not?
“A. I don’t think so. I don’t know.
“Q. Did he ask you if you had any more information or pictures about the man?
“A. I don’t know.
“Q. Did you tell him you don’t know any more about who it is?
“A. I probably did.
“Q. And if you said that, it would have been because he was asking?
“A. Hmm?
“Q. If you had said it, it would have been because he was asking about it?
“A. Well, yeah. Part of what happened, I don’t know who it was.”
Defense counsel did not object to any of the questions posed by the prosecutor
concerning Ariana’s conversation with Epps.
In closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned Ariana’s testimony about the phone
call when arguing to the jury that Epps’s actions after learning Kaila had been shot
reflected “reasoning and judgment,” not heat of passion. The prosecutor said, “You
heard that from Ariana M[.] as well. I asked her about the tone, and she didn’t say, ‘Oh,
he was’ -- ‘I don’t know. He was really hard to understand. He was disjointed in his
thinking. He sounded just off the wall.’ No. She described him as curious. What was
he curious about? Where the man had come out from. And that also is reasoning and
judgment, because he’s thinking, why would this man at [] De Rose [Way] give his own
address? Where did he come out from? Did you see him come out from an apartment,
right? He’s thinking, using reasoning and judgment, that would this guy really set up a
19
robbery in front of his own house? And so he’s questioning Ariana M[.], which is why
she thinks he sounds curious. Reasoning and judgment.”
In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor mentioned Ariana’s testimony when asserting
that defense counsel had not provided “an alternative reasonable explanation” for Epps’s
various acts including “calling Ariana M[.] to ask where did the guy actually come out
from.” The prosecutor also reiterated that Epps had “call[ed] Ariana to ask her about that
man, where he came out. This is all evidence of [Epps’s] reasoning and judgment that
night.”
After the jury found Epps guilty of first degree murder, Epps (through different
defense counsel) filed a motion for new trial (§ 1181) (motion). Epps requested that the
trial court grant him either a new trial or reduce his conviction to voluntary manslaughter.
Epps alleged that the prosecutor had violated the proffer agreement and, in turn, his due
process rights by using his police interview to question Ariana about whether he had
inquired about the shooter and by arguing based on that testimony that he had acted with
reasoning and judgment. Epps claimed that “[d]uring the proffer interview, [he] stated
that Kaila and Ariana told him that, on the night the man shot Kaila, they never actually
saw the man exit the residence at De Rose Way.” Epps argued: “The prosecutor only
knew to ask these questions of Ariana due to Mr. Epps’s proffer statement regarding the
girls telling him they did not see the man exit the residence. [Citation.] There was no
evidence that Kaila or Ariana told law enforcement that Mr. Epps had asked questions
regarding where the man came from. Indeed, Ariana specifically testified that Mr. Epps
had not asked any questions.”
The district attorney opposed Epps’s motion. The district attorney argued Epps
had forfeited any challenge to the questioning of Ariana by failing to object during the
examination. The district attorney further argued that no violation of the proffer
agreement occurred because the prosecutor’s questions about whether Epps had inquired
about the apartment from which the man may have exited were based on reasonable
20
inferences from the trial evidence. The district attorney maintained the prosecutor’s
inquiry “was a logical question to ask a reluctant witness [who was] providing only vague
and inconsistent answers to more general questions and not further investigation using
Mr. Epps’s statements.” Additionally, the district attorney asserted that any violation of
the proffer agreement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the prosecutor’s
reference to Ariana’s testimony during closing argument was brief and there was
abundant evidence and argument that Epps had not acted in the heat of passion.
At a hearing on Epps’s motion, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that forfeiture
should not apply because the alleged error affected Epps’s fundamental right to due
process.
In denying Epps’s motion, the trial court found that “the [d]efense forfeited its
challenge” to the prosecutor’s conduct by failing to object. In the alternative, the court
assumed arguendo that Epps’s challenge was not forfeited.12 The court further assumed
arguendo that a violation of the proffer agreement had occurred, saying: “Based on the
[c]ourt’s review, it appears if there was a violation of the proffer agreement, it was based
on essentially one question asked two or three times. Ariana was asked, ‘Was he asking
questions about where the man had come out of if you had seen him come out of an
apartment?’ Answer: ‘Yes.’ Three questions later, Question: ‘Do you remember him
asking about where the man had come from?’ Answer: ‘Uh-huh.’ ‘Is that a “Yes”?’
Answer: ‘Yes.’ Followed by, ‘Did Michael Epps say anything about why he wanted to
know that?’ Answer: ‘No.’ ” (Italics added.) The court noted that other evidence had
been presented at trial regarding Epps’s “calm tone and reaction to the shooting of
12
In doing so, the trial court said, “However, assuming the [d]efense is correct --
and their position is well-taken -- that the failure to object cannot be forfeited because the
questions resulted in a due process violation. The [c]ourt is going to address the
[d]efense’s motion for new trial.”
21
Kaila.” In addition, the court described the prosecutor’s manifold arguments to the jury
“regarding reasoning, judgment, and heat of passion.”
The trial court ruled as follows: “Based on the [c]ourt’s independent review of all
of the evidence, the [c]ourt finds that any violation by the People of the proffer agreement
or error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the [c]ourt finds the
guilty verdict rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to any violation of the
proffer agreement or error. The People provided extensive evidence regarding the issue
of heat of passion, and Mr. Epps responding, after learning that Kaila had been shot,
calmly, and not in the heat of passion. [¶] Therefore, the motion for a new trial pursuant
to Penal Code [s]ection 1181[, subdivision 5] is denied. Furthermore, based on the
[c]ourt’s independent review, the request that the [c]ourt reduce the murder conviction to
voluntary manslaughter pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 1181[, subdivision 6] is denied.
The [c]ourt find[s] that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient beyond a reasonable
doubt to sustain the verdict of murder.”
2. Legal Principles
“Proffer agreements are a type of contract. As such, they ‘ “may be analyzed in
terms of contract standards,” ’ although ‘courts will not “follow blindly the law of
contracts” where that body of law does “not provide a sufficient analogy and mode of
analysis.” ’ [Citation.] Although we independently review the plain text of agreements
[citation], we review for substantial evidence whether ‘the parties entered into an
agreement,’ whether the plain text of the agreement was modified or defined by
conflicting extrinsic evidence, and ‘whether a party carried through with its part of the
agreement.’ ” (People v. Palacios (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 184, 190.)
A prosecutor cannot use a defendant’s statement in violation of a promise not to
do so. (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 616–623 (Quartermain).)
Because a prosecutor’s promise induces a defendant to waive his constitutional right to
22
remain silent, fundamental fairness and constitutional due process require a prosecutor to
adhere to the promise. (Id. at p. 620.)
When a prosecutor violates a proffer agreement by improperly using the
defendant’s statement at trial, the court “must decide whether the error was harmless . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt—that is, whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
use of the statement did not contribute to the verdict.” (Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th
at p. 621, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) “Under this test, the
appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered
in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” (Quartermain, at p. 621.)
“ ‘We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.’ [Citations.] ‘ “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for new
trial is so completely within that court’s discretion that a reviewing court will not disturb
the ruling absent a manifest and unmistakable abuse of that discretion.” ’ ” (People v.
Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 140; see also People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718,
792–793 [“We review the trial court’s rulings on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of
discretion.”].)
3. Analysis
At trial, Epps’s defense counsel did not object to or request an admonition
regarding the allegedly improper questioning of Ariana or the prosecutor’s closing
arguments. Thus, Epps’s claim of error is forfeited. (People v. Amezcua and Flores
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 919; People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 450.) Although Epps
raised his proffer agreement claim in his motion for new trial, that is insufficient to
preserve the claim for appeal. (See People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 577
[prosecutorial misconduct challenge forfeited for lack of timely objection when raised for
first time in postverdict motion for new trial].)
23
Forfeiture notwithstanding, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that
any violation of the proffer agreement based on the prosecutor’s questioning and closing
arguments was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching its decision, the court
identified the allegedly improper questions and noted that the prosecution had presented
other evidence “relating to [Epps’s] calm tone and reaction to the shooting of Kaila.”
Epps makes no persuasive argument that the court’s finding in this regard is unsupported.
Furthermore, the trial court catalogued the evidence and argument that, apart from
the questioning of Ariana, demonstrated Epps had not acted in the heat of passion. The
information included that “four hours and 40 minutes” elapsed between the time Kaila
told Epps she had been shot and the shooting of Arturo, Epps knew Kaila’s gunshot
wound was not serious and she was able to drive herself to the hospital, Epps saw fit to
end his first FaceTime call with Kaila because he was “in the middle of something,” Epps
provided directions to Kaila about concealing the marijuana she possessed and the true
nature of the shooting, Epps asked for the shooter’s identifying information, Epps did not
speak with Kaila after she arrived at the hospital, Epps made “over 42 telephone calls to
14 different people, and over 40 text messages with 12 different people” before Arturo
was shot, and Epps had “a number of people in San Jose helping him figure out what
happened and where the suspect shooter is located.”
Based on the totality of the evidence and the prosecutor’s closing arguments, the
trial court’s finding of harmlessness was not a manifest abuse of discretion. Although the
prosecutor mentioned Ariana’s testimony about Epps’s inquiries regarding the shooter’s
potential connection to the address he had provided, there was copious other evidence
(which the prosecutor also discussed) proving that Epps had tried to obtain information
about and locate the man who shot Kaila. Ariana’s testimony was a small piece in a large
puzzle comprising a plethora of proof that Epps, with deliberation and reflection,
systematically engaged in a manhunt that resulted in the killing of an innocent man. For
these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Epps’s
24
new trial motion and reasonably decided that “ ‘the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” (Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 621,
italics omitted.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
25
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Grover, J.
H050447
People v. Epps
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