CourtListener 10045019•People v. Obermueller
Texte intégral
Filed 8/16/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF B327891
CALIFORNIA,
Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. YA104659-01
v.
KURT BRADY OBERMUELLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Nicole C. Bershon, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren N. Gruber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________________
Kurt Brady Obermueller appeals his second stalking
conviction on the ground the court should have instructed the
jury on a lesser included offense: attempted stalking. His logic is
that, after his first conviction, he refrained from emailing directly
to the victim herself. Rather, he emailed threatening messages
only to her family, who forwarded the messages to the victim.
We affirm because stalkers who recklessly intend to threaten a
victim incur full liability under the stalking statute, no matter
how they do it. The statute requires the defendant to “make a
credible threat.” (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a).) Left open is how
the defendant conveys this threat. Stalkers can be imaginative.
Obermueller used intermediaries to make credible threats
against his victim, and that was completed stalking, not
attempted stalking. The trial court thus properly declined to
instruct on attempted stalking because no substantial evidence
supported the lesser included offense. (See People v. Williams
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1263 (Williams).) All code citations are to
the Penal Code.
I
Obermueller’s girlfriend rejected him in ninth grade.
Thirty years later, he began stalking her. His goal was to get his
high school prom kiss.
A
Obermueller grew up in a small town near Sacramento. He
was in a brief relationship with schoolmate Kathy K. in junior
high school. Kathy K. lived with her father Bill and her older
sister Jennifer. Kathy K. later married Matthew B. and went by
Kathy B., which is how we refer to her.
Kathy B. ended her relationship with Obermueller when
she was 15. The relationship had not been happy for Kathy B.;
2
“it has always been a difficult memory and something I always
wished had not happened.” Once in high school, “I wasn’t
interested in him at all.”
She attended her high school prom with someone else. She
had ended her relationship with Obermueller years earlier.
Kathy B. went to college, moved with her family to
Southern California, and married Matthew B. The couple had
children and lived in Manhattan Beach.
Obermueller remained six hours away in the Sacramento
area. Obermueller and Kathy B. had no contact during the next
30 years.
Kathy B. and her husband raised their children in
Manhattan Beach. She pursued her interest in art, selling her oil
paintings at the annual art fair in Manhattan Beach.
Kathy B. also created her own website to display and
market her art. On this website, Kathy B. used “my first name,
my maiden name, and my last name which was a big mistake.” It
was a “big mistake,” she concluded, because it made her “too easy
to find.”
B
In the summer of 2018, when he was in his 40s,
Obermueller contacted Kathy B. through her website. He
emailed her, claiming he wanted to buy a painting. She
responded in an open and innocent way, believing they were just
friends becoming reacquainted.
“It didn’t take very many emails back and forth before he
started bringing up our relationship from the past. . . . I told him
I wasn’t interested in talking about that. But then the emails
would start to get inappropriate and sexual and I told him to stop
contacting me at that point.”
3
Obermueller briefly stopped emailing Kathy B.
C
In late 2018 or early 2019, Obermueller resumed and
intensified his contact with Kathy B. Over the next two years,
Obermueller sent her an avalanche of sexually-charged and
threatening emails, texts, and online communications. He also
sent messages to her father and sister, who forwarded the
messages to her.
Obermueller posted publicly about Kathy B. on a website
he created. Kathy B. described Obermueller’s website: “It was
all about me and all the reasons I should be his wife.”
Obermueller discovered Kathy B.’s home address. He sent
flowers and a spa certificate to her house.
Obermueller’s prolonged and relentless persistence greatly
distressed Kathy B. Her hair began to fall out, and she gained
weight. She experienced panic attacks. She and her husband
installed cameras around their home.
On October 1, 2019, Obermueller emailed Kathy B. “I need
you Kathy. Cum in you . . . Tell me to stop.” This message was
“especially scary” to Kathy B. “That was the week I went to the
police.”
A few days later, Obermueller traveled some 400 miles to
see Kathy B., in person and by surprise. He went to the
Manhattan Beach art fair where Kathy B. sold art. Obermueller
walked up and said, “Hi, Kathy.” Kathy B. panicked and ran for
police, but Obermueller disappeared before they could respond.
Later that day, Obermueller sent Kathy B. a message
saying, “You think a restraining order is going to stop me from
hugging my princess bride baby.” Another message said, “When
are you going to understand that nothing can stop true love.
4
Manhattan Beach Police Department step aside …. I just want to
hug her one last time.”
Kathy B. got a restraining order against Obermueller that
issued on October 24, 2019. Kathy B. had applied for coverage
for her father and sister as well as her immediate family, “but the
judge crossed their names out” because “they don’t live with you
so they can’t -- they have to come get their own.” As issued, then,
and as served on Obermueller, the 2019 restraining order showed
the court had crossed out the names of Kathy B.’s father and
sister. This fact will assume significance.
D
In early 2021, prosecutors charged Obermueller with
stalking Kathy B. She testified as part of that prosecution.
When she was on the witness stand, with Obermueller in the
room, Kathy B. said her father and sister had forwarded to her
all of the emails Obermueller had sent to them.
Obermueller concluded that case by pleading no contest to
a charge of stalking Kathy B. Part of the case resolution was a
criminal protective order dated January 6, 2021 against
contacting Kathy B. “directly or indirectly.” Obermueller was
served with this order in open court.
E
After his January 2021 conviction, despite the criminal
protective order, and in violation of his probation, Obermueller
continued harassing Kathy B. Now, however, he emailed only
her father and sister, who had their own law firm. Her father
and sister forwarded Obermueller’s emails to Kathy B. We
describe some of these emails.
In April 2021, Obermueller sent a long and rambling email
to Kathy B.’s father and sister. The jury saw this email as
5
Exhibit 20, which consisted of 40 pages of comments about Kathy
B., disconnected musings, opaque remarks about taser darts, and
disturbing imagery. We excerpt portions of this stream of
consciousness without correcting spelling, punctuation, or
grammar.
Obermueller wrote that Kathy B. “still owes me my prom
kiss and [her husband] can keep her. She totally lead me on and
now my boy cat is gone now. . . . [⁋] Anyway long story sorry I
have to declare war on you all and I will seriously take you all
down one by one. . . .”
This sentence made Kathy B. frightened for the safety of
herself and her family. “That was really scary.”
Obermueller’s email continued. “My payback to her for
killing my boy cat will be the way I kiss her and leave. My kiss
will weaken her knees and she’ll get lost in it. Then I’ll look deep
in her brown eyes and then.......wait......then I’ll go. [⁋] She will
learn what she missed out on with one kiss. She think about that
kiss for the rest of her life. [⁋] And her husband will know and
he can’t do a dam thing about it.”
“I got an RO [restraining order] from her but her father and
sister opted out. . . .”
“Thanks folks I’m taking no prisoners.”
“Those scissors are used for removing clothing from
patients ‘suffering TRAUMA.’ [⁋] Chunks of flesh missing.
Large gashes severe blood loss ...etc etc... ‘trauma.’ . . . You’re
jealous of my custom made hand stitched (it’s a weapon) sheath. .
. . Your talking to a guy that makes his own sheath for this
fabric scissors. . . . Not even with my (the best you can get)
forged emorders [sic] scissors. Those scissors cut clean, Made in
Germany.”
6
This email also described Obermueller’s method for
sharpening scissors and knives. “All my knifes are wicked
sharp.”
Kathy B. testified that, in this email from Obermueller,
“anything with some sort of weapon or violence was really
terrifying.”
Another Obermueller email was Exhibit 21 at trial. This
exhibit was 34 pages long. Again we excerpt.
This email repeatedly refers to “Kathy,” her paintings, and
her art website. It also refers to Kathy B.’s husband as “the
hackers spouse.” Obermueller wrote that his last email “is on an
indirect online communication relationship thing with the girl
from my past -- the hackers spouse.”
“Kurt Brady Obermueller it’s LIVE FREE OR DIE! . . .
AK-47 w/2000 rounds of 7.62x39 COME GET SOME!”
In other portions of this lengthy email, Obermueller
repeated his reference to an AK-47 and to the 2000 rounds of
ammunition. Obermueller also mentioned “a German WW2
Lugger.” Presumably this refers to a Luger pistol. Obermueller
included a picture of a gun in this email.
“The point is RO [restraining orders] don’t really protect
women. . . . It’s Live Free or Die.”
Kathy B. testified this email “terrified” her. It made her
consider uprooting her family and moving far away.
In May 2021, Obermueller again emailed Kathy B.’s father
and sister. This email was Exhibit 22. Obermueller wrote, “Hi
Jennifer, [⁋] So you and your father get the luxury of opting out
of her RO . . . .”
In this email, Obermueller refers to “Kathy” and then
mentions “Sampson,” “Rocky,” and “Andy.”
7
Kathy B. testified her childhood pets had these names.
“Sampson was the cat and Rocky and Andy were the dogs.”
Obermueller wrote “ ‘Snap!’ [⁋] I break Andy’s neck and
drop his dead body on the ground like dropping the mic and walk
out. . . . On my way out I step on Rocky’s back leg and break it.”
A woman renting a room in Obermueller’s Northern
California house around this time said Obermueller claimed he
was sewing a duffel bag “to bring his girlfriend back and her
belongings.” “Like if she wanted to come or not, you know, he’s
going to bring her here because he’s in love with her.” The
woman remembered this conversation because it made her
uncomfortable.
Police searched Obermueller’s home on April 13, 2021 and
seized several journals. Obermueller’s handwritten journals
detail his plans for meeting with Kathy B. “I kiss her left ear. I
whisper I love you.” Another passage predicted Kathy B.’s
husband “will become a faded memory. Kathy’s kids will be my
kids . . . .” A May 1, 2021 entry stated, “I want to see Kathy once
and for all face to face alone and in private. I’m getting my prom
kiss and that’s final.”
F
On August 12, 2022, an information charged Obermueller
with stalking with a prior felony conviction for stalking (§ 646.9,
subd. (a)) and disobeying a court order (§166.9, subd. (a)(4)). The
alleged dates of the stalking were from April 1, 2021 to May 31,
2021. The case went to trial in October 2022. The jury convicted
Obermueller on both counts. The trial court sentenced him to
five years in custody.
8
II
Obermueller incorrectly claims the trial court should have
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted
stalking. This kind of claim requires Obermueller to identify
evidence that would have permitted conviction on the lesser
offense but would not have allowed conviction on the greater
charge. Obermueller fails in this quest. He argues his decision
to email only Kathy B.’s father and sister, and to steer clear of
emailing Kathy B. directly, could have supported a conviction for
attempted stalking alone. But how a stalker proceeds does not
matter, so long as the prosecution proves the stalker made “a
credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable
fear . . . .” (§ 646.9, subd. (a).) Threats conveyed only by
messengers can be fully effective in terrorizing a target, as they
were in this case. Obermueller’s tactic of confining his emails to
Kathy B.’s father and sister was legally irrelevant so long as it
was clear, as it was here, that Obermueller was recklessly aware
of his statement’s threatening character. The lesser included
offense instruction was irrelevant. The trial judge was right not
to give it.
A
We summarize some law.
Trial courts must instruct on general legal principles
closely related to the case, including necessarily included offenses
when the evidence raises a question as to whether all the
elements of the charged offense are present. But the existence of
any evidence, no matter how weak, will not justify instructions on
a lesser included offense, for such instructions are required only
where there is substantial evidence from which a rational jury
could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense
9
but not the greater offense. (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
1263.) We independently review this issue. (People v. Simon
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133.)
We excerpt the stalking statute, adding bracketed
numbers, italics, and formatting for clarity.
“Any person who
[1] willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully
and maliciously harasses another person
and
[2] who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that
person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his
or her immediate family is guilty of the crime of stalking . . . .
(§ 646.9, subd. (a).)
The statute defines harasses as follows: “ ‘harasses’ means
engages in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a
specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or
terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”
(§ 646.9, subd. (e).)
We independently review questions of statutory
interpretation. In doing so, our fundamental task is to ascertain
legislative intent so as to effectuate the statute’s purpose. (Apple
Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)
B
Obermueller bases his appeal on the fact he sent the
pertinent messages to Kathy B.’s father and sister rather than to
Kathy B. herself. He evidently thought that, by crossing out the
names of the father and sister on the first restraining order, an
earlier judge gave him some kind of a legal loophole.
Obermueller’s attorneys carried this theme over to his trial. Now
it is the thesis of his appeal.
10
There was never a loophole. A limitation on a restraining
order is not a license to stalk.
The stalking statute forbids harassing and threatening
others. How a threat is conveyed is not legally pertinent, so long
as the prosecution establishes the statutory elements, including
that the stalker made a threat with a sufficiently culpable intent.
Our first task, then, is to specify exactly what the
prosecution must prove on this score.
1
The prosecution must prove a stalking defendant recklessly
made a threat that put the victim in fear. This mental state
requires the prosecution to show that the defendant consciously
disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be
viewed as threatening harm. We explain.
The statute makes clear some intent requirement is
necessary, but it does not specify what level of intent is the right
one. (See § 646.9, subd. (a) [“makes a credible threat with the
intent to place that person in reasonable fear,” italics added].)
We thus interpret the statute to decipher legislative intent.
We have the advantage of two authoritative and prestigious
guides: the Supreme Court of the United States and the Model
Penal Code.
This guidance is from the recent decision of Counterman v.
Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66 (Counterman), which applied the
Model Penal Code’s astute mental state analysis to a stalking
statute similar to section 646.9. (See id. at pp. 70–71, fn. 1
[partial text of statute].)
Counterman gives us valuable guidance. This federal
constitutional holding is not controlling, for we face a question of
state statutory law. But because of its acuity and its factual and
11
legal resemblance to this case, Counterman is highly persuasive.
We give it close attention.
Billy Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to
C.W., a local singer and musician. The two had never met, and
C.W. did not respond. C.W. repeatedly tried to block
Counterman, but he created new accounts and continued to
plague her with more messages C.W. interpreted as threatening.
His messages terrorized her and “upended her daily existence.”
(Counterman, supra, 600 U.S. at p. 70.) A jury convicted
Counterman of repeatedly making “any form of communication
with another person” in “a manner that would cause a reasonable
person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that
person . . . to suffer serious emotional distress.” (Ibid.)
We pause for emphasis. The Counterman statute required
a communication that would cause distress. Our statute requires
a threat with the intent to put the victim in fear. (§ 646.9.) These
stalking statutes thus are very similar. The similarity extends to
facts as well, for both cases are about stalkers using computers as
their main tool.
We continue with Counterman, whose appeal argued that
the First Amendment required the prosecution to prove he was
aware of the threatening nature of his statements. (Counterman,
supra, 600 U.S. at p. 71.) He claimed proof of his subjective
awareness that his words had a threatening character was
essential to avoid chilling protected, non-threatening speech. (Id.
at pp. 72–73.)
Counterman’s appeal thus posed two questions. (1) Did
the prosecution have to prove he had some intent to put C.W. in
distress? (2) If so, what level of intent was required? The
Supreme Court gave two clear answers. (1) Yes. (2)
12
Recklessness. (Counterman, supra, 600 U.S. at pp. 69, 77–78,
79–80.)
The first holding has no application here, for the California
statute already requires some level of intent to place a victim in
fear. (See § 646.9, subd. (a) [any person “who makes a credible
threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear,”
italics added].)
The second holding, however, addresses precisely the
question we must answer: exactly what level of “intent” must the
prosecution prove?
We relate Counterman’s analysis of this key point in detail.
“The law of mens rea offers three basic choices. Purpose is
the most culpable level in the standard mental-state hierarchy,
and the hardest to prove. A person acts purposefully when he
consciously desires a result—so here, when he wants his words to
be received as threats. Next down, though not often
distinguished from purpose, is knowledge. A person acts
knowingly when he is aware that a result is practically certain to
follow—so here, when he knows to a practical certainty that
others will take his words as threats. A greater gap separates
those two from recklessness. A person acts recklessly, in the most
common formulation, when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause
harm to another. That standard involves insufficient concern
with risk, rather than awareness of impending harm.”
(Counterman, supra, 600 U.S. at pp. 78–79, italics added and
citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted; cf. Model Pen.
Code § 2.02, subd. (2) [1962 source for these definitions of
culpability levels].)
13
The Counterman decision “complete[d] the mens rea
hierarchy” by noting “the last level is negligence . . . . A person
acts negligently if he is not but should be aware of a substantial
risk—here, that others will understand his words as threats.
That makes liability depend not on what the speaker thinks, but
instead on what a reasonable person would think about whether
his statements are threatening in nature.” (Counterman, supra,
600 U.S. at p. 79, fn. 5, italics added and citations, brackets, and
quotation marks omitted; cf. Model Pen. Code § 2.02, subd. (2)(d)
[1962 source for this definition of negligence culpability].)
The Counterman decision rejected negligence as a standard
for criminal liability in this situation, and its decision accords
with the atypical place the negligence standard occupies in the
criminal law. Legislatures occasionally make negligence the
basis for criminal liability, but those instances are the exceptions
rather than the rule. The general rule in criminal law is that
negligence is usually not enough.
“Among [the remaining] standards, recklessness offers the
right path forward.” (Counterman, supra, 600 U.S. at p. 79.) The
high court stressed the vital importance of “protecting against the
profound harms, to both individuals and society, that attend true
threats of violence—as evidenced in this case. . . . The injury
associated with those statements caused history long ago to place
them outside the First Amendment’s bounds. When despite that
judgment we require use of a subjective mental-state standard,
we necessarily impede some true-threat prosecutions. And as we
go up the subjective mens rea ladder, that imposition on [state
prosecutors’] capacity to counter true threats becomes still
greater—and, presumably, with diminishing returns for
protected expression. In advancing past recklessness, we make it
14
harder for a [prosecutor] to substantiate the needed inferences
about mens rea (absent, as is usual, direct evidence). And of
particular importance, we prevent States from convicting morally
culpable defendants. For reckless defendants have done more
than make a bad mistake. They have consciously accepted a
substantial risk of inflicting serious harm.” (Counterman, supra,
600 U.S. at pp. 79–80, citations omitted.)
We agree with, and adopt, this statutory interpretation as a
matter of California law. We thus interpret subdivision (a) of
section 646.9 to be satisfied by proof that defendants consciously
disregarded a substantial risk that their communications would
be viewed as threatening harm.
2
Obermueller consciously disregarded a substantial risk
that his communications would be viewed as threatening harm.
The evidence on this score was overwhelming.
Out of the blue and after 30 years of no contact,
Obermueller located his junior high school girlfriend online and
attempted to reignite the flame. When Kathy B. rejected his
advances, he began a campaign of harassment against her that
led to his 2021 conviction. When Obermueller perceived an
initial restraining order had not barred him from contacting her
father and sister, he exploited what he wrongly believed was a
legal loophole.
Obermueller shifted his email onslaught to family
members, despite knowing they probably would continue to
forward the messages to Kathy B. herself, as he knew they had
done in the past.
What Obermueller did not shift was his obsession with
Kathy B. He wrote about “Kathy,” about the prom kiss he
15
wanted from her, about her childhood pets, and about the
restraining order she had obtained against him. He mixed these
references with talk of guns, ammunition, knives, sharpened
scissors, killing pets, and “live free or die.”
Whether Obermueller knew others would perceive his
messages as threatening is not the statute’s test. Rather, the
issue was whether he consciously disregarded a substantial risk
that his communications would be viewed as threatening harm.
On this question there can be no debate, for his 2021 stalking
conviction drove home to him the probability of striking fear into
Kathy B.’s heart. Despite this consciousness of risk, Obermueller
proceeded.
Obermueller’s emails were completed stalking. His crime
was complete when he continued his course of harassment
against her and consciously disregarded a substantial risk that
his emails would be viewed as his effort to put Kathy B. in fear.
3
Obermueller’s argument that, after April 2021, he never
sent messages directly to Kathy B.’s personal email address is
irrelevant. The statute has no requirement of direct contact with
a victim. The statutory words erect no such rule. Neither does
the case law. (E.g. People v. Norman (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1234,
1241, fn. 4 [stalker did not contact victim].)
A rule requiring direct contact would counter the statutory
purpose of protecting victims, for it would merely encourage
stalkers to shift to indirect but still-frightening methods.
Obermueller’s threats violated the statute. His stalking
was completed stalking, not attempted stalking. The trial court
was right not to instruct on attempt, for there was no substantial
evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that
16
Obermueller committed the lesser offense but not the greater
one. (See Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1263.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
17
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