People v. Crane CA2/2

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Filed 8/6/24 P. v. Crane CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B324003

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A146112)
v.

RICHARD JOSEPH CRANE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul Kleven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant Richard Joseph Crane appeals
from the denial of his most recent petition for resentencing (Pen.
Code, § 1172.6).1 Because this third petition for resentencing is
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and public policy, we
affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Defendant’s conviction and sentence
In 1980, defendant “was charged with the murder of
Dennis P. Brown (Brown) with malice aforethought in violation of
section 187. The information alleged that [defendant] personally
used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife) within the
meaning of former section 12022, subdivision (b), and that his
personal use was an element of the crime charged. With respect
to crimes against other victims, [defendant] was charged with
kidnapping (§ 207), assault with intent to commit murder (former
§ 217), and assault with a deadly weapon and by means likely to
produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a).) On November 3,
1981, [defendant] was convicted of second-degree murder with a
finding that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon.
He was also convicted on the remaining counts. On March 12,
1982, the Hon. Gordon Ringer sentenced [defendant] to serve
24 years to life in state prison.” (People v. Crane (Aug. 4, 2021,
B305750) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Defendant’s 2009 petition for writ of mandate
In 2009, defendant “filed a petition for writ of mandate and
declared that the Los Angeles Police Department had withheld
evidence that would prove that he was acting in self-defense, and
that he had been falsely convicted of murder based on the

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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stabbing death of Brown.” (People v. Crane, supra, B305750.)
His petition was denied. (Ibid.)
III. Defendant’s 2020 petitions for resentencing
“On January 9, 2020, [defendant] filed a form petition for
resentencing under [former] section 1170.95. He checked the
boxes indicating that he was convicted of murder pursuant to the
felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of murder
because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189. He did not,
however, expressly deny being the actual killer. He requested
appointment of counsel. A few weeks later, he submitted [a
second and] same petition.” (People v. Crane, supra, B305750.)
The Hon. Mildred Escobedo summarily denied both
petitions, in part on the grounds that defendant was the actual
killer. (People v. Crane, supra, B305750.) In so doing, the trial
court quoted Judge Ringer, who presided over the trial and
sentencing hearing: “‘“[W]hat this case is all about is simply two
people, for reasons of racial hatred . . . (testified that they were)
cruising around on a Friday night which is a good night to cruise
and hunt for a [black person] to kill . . . they scoop up (victim 1)
he’s out of the car and he’s shot and left for dead. For what
reason? Pure unadulterated racial hatred. Four days later, we
have [a codefendant] and [defendant] like a conquering army
marching through Balboa Park. . . . Advertising their presence
as white racists, shouting white power slogans, comparing tattoos
with bikers. . . . [Defendant] stabbing to death [Brown] who did
not start a fight . . . here is this young man who declined to

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combat and genuinely didn’t want to get into this fight, stabbed
to death by [defendant].”’” (People v. Crane, supra, B305750.)2
On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s order: “The
information alleged that during the commission of the murder,
[defendant] personally used a knife, a deadly and dangerous
weapon, for purposes of an enhancement under former section
12022, subdivision (b). The trial court in the 1980’s served as the
factfinder during a bench trial and imposed a one-year
enhancement pursuant to former section 12022, subdivision (b)
when sentencing [defendant]. Later, [defendant] filed a petition
for writ of mandate and, claiming self-defense, admitted that he
killed Brown with a knife.” (People v. Crane, supra, B305750.)
Furthermore, based upon allegations in his appellate briefs,
defendant did “not dispute that he was the actual killer.” (Ibid.)
“Given that [defendant] was the actual killer, the record of
conviction necessarily establishes that he was convicted on either
a malice murder theory or a felony murder theory and could be
convicted under current murder law.” (Ibid.) Thus, defendant
was ineligible for resentencing and not entitled to the
appointment of counsel.
We continued: “Assuming for the sake of argument that
[defendant’s] petition was facially sufficient, the trial court
committed state law error when it refused to appoint counsel.
[Citation.] But we conclude that [defendant] has not

2 According to defendant, because certain reporter’s
transcripts are unavailable, there is no way to verify whether
Judge Escobedo accurately quoted Judge Ringer at the
sentencing hearing. But, we presume that the trial court
properly performed its duties (Evid. Code, § 664) and did not
fabricate the sentencing court’s 1982 statements.

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demonstrated prejudice . . . . Given that he was the actual killer,
he is unable to show it is reasonably probable the error impacted
the trial court’s ruling.” (People v. Crane, supra, B305750.)
Defendant filed a petition for review with the California
Supreme Court. His petition was summarily denied. (People v.
Crane, Oct. 13, 2021, S270536.)
IV. The 2022 petition for resentencing; defendant’s appeal
In 2022, defendant filed another petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. In this resentencing petition,
defendant checked all of the boxes on the first page of the form
petition reciting the requirements under section 1172.6,
subdivision (a). He also cited newly amended resentencing
provisions as modified through recent legislative action, effective
January 1, 2022.
On July 1, 2022, without appointing counsel, the trial court
summarily denied the petition as “previously having been heard
and denied by another court whose order was upheld on appeal.”
In so ruling, the trial court noted that this was defendant’s third
request for resentencing under section 1172.6. It then found:
“The appellate court upheld the ruling of the lower court,
affirming the denial of the petition based on the fact that
[defendant] was the actual killer. There is nothing in the
amended version of [former] Penal Code section 1170.95 which
affords [defendant] relief. The amended version of this code
section simply sets forth the procedures the court must follow in
ruling on these petitions. It did not change the law as to those
individuals who are the actual killers such as [defendant].”
This timely appeal ensued.

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DISCUSSION
I. Relevant law
A. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 1437 to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not
a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created section 1172.6, which
“provides a mechanism whereby people ‘who believe they were
convicted of murder for an act that no longer qualifies as murder
following the crime’s redefinition . . . may seek vacatur of their
. . . conviction and resentencing by filing a petition in the trial
court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376,
382.)
B. Successive petitions and collateral estoppel
Successive petitions for resentencing are not explicitly
barred by section 1172.6. However, a successive petition may be
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.3 (People v. Farfan

3 The parties do not raise the question of whether a
successive petition is barred by the law of the case doctrine.
(Compare People v. Medrano (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1264
with People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50.) Under this
doctrine, a party may not seek appellate reconsideration of an
issue already decided in the same case absent some significant
change in circumstances. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412,
441.)

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(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 950; People v. Beaudreaux (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1242, fn. 5.)
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in criminal
proceedings. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 717.) “As
traditionally understood and applied, issue preclusion bars
relitigation of issues earlier decided ‘only if several threshold
requirements are fulfilled.’” (Id. at p. 716.)
“Application of collateral estoppel is not automatic, but is
subject to public policy considerations,” including “preservation of
the integrity of the judicial system” and “promotion of judicial
economy.” (People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 950.)
“We do not apply collateral estoppel ‘with the hypertechnical and
archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with
realism and rationality.’” (People v. Yokely (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1273.)
A successive petition based upon new legal authority is not
procedurally barred. (People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 951; see also People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716 [even
when the threshold requirements for issue preclusion are met,
the doctrine “does not apply when there has been a significant
change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that
warrants reexamination of the issue”].)
II. The trial court did not err
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing.4 Defendant does not dispute that the threshold
requirements for collateral estoppel have been met, and public

4 Because the trial court did not err, defendant’s
constitutional rights were not violated.

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policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of application of the
doctrine in this case. In this third petition for resentencing,
defendant is attempting to change the basis for his request for
relief—by simply checking a box on a form, he now claims that he
was not the actual killer. In light of his prior statements to this
court and our prior opinion, he cannot do so, particularly given
the fact that there has been no change to the record concerning
defendant’s conviction. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 549 [a petition for resentencing “is not a means by which a
defendant can relitigate issues already decided”].)
Admittedly, the law regarding petitions for resentencing is
ever-developing, and it did change between the time defendant’s
first two petitions were denied and the instant one was filed. But
it is unassailable that the law has not changed in a way that
affects this defendant (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216,
1222): A defendant who was convicted as the actual killer has
always been ineligible for resentencing. (People v. Allison (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 449, 461 [“The purpose of section [1172.6] is to
give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with
respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-
over on factual disputes that have already been resolved”].)
It follows that the trial court did not err in summarily
denying defendant’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie
stage.
For the sake of completeness, we note the following:
Assuming without deciding that defendant submitted a facially
sufficient petition and was entitled to the appointment of counsel
before the trial court denied his petition, any error by the trial
court in failing to appoint counsel was harmless as a matter of
law: As set forth above, defendant was the actual killer. (People

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v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 988, review granted Oct. 11,
2023, S281643; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957–958,
973–974.) As such, there is no reasonable probability that he
would have obtained a more favorable result had the trial court
appointed counsel for him. (People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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