CourtListener 10032508•In re S.C. CA2/4
Texte intégral
Filed 8/6/24 In re S.C. CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re S.C., a Person Coming B330769
Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
20CCJP06611,
20CCJP06611A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
J.M. et al,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.M.
Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Y.C.
Tarkian & Associates, Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Mother Y.C. and father J.M. appeal from the juvenile
court’s order terminating their parental rights over son, S.,
following a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26.1 Mother argues that the court failed to account
for the strong bond mother had with the child in terminating her
parental rights and determining that the parental benefit
exception did not apply. Father joins this argument. We find no
error. We accordingly affirm.
BACKGROUND2
I. Referral and Petition
S. was born in May 2017 and is the only child of mother
and father. At the time of intervention, S. was living with
mother and mother’s boyfriend, Nick. Father was incarcerated.
The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) based on
referrals in May and September 2020, alleging that mother and
Nick were selling and using drugs and engaging in domestic
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Mother and father challenge only the court’s finding that
the parental benefit exception did not apply as to mother. We
therefore summarize the facts as helpful for background and/or
as relevant to that issue.
2
violence. Both referrals were closed as inconclusive. DCFS
received the referral leading to the instant case on October 29,
2020, alleging that mother and Nick were using marijuana and
inhalants, marijuana plants were growing in their home
accessible to the child, and that there were concerns about the
condition of the residence.
A DCFS children’s social worker (CSW) visited mother’s
residence (the referral address) and observed a front yard
cluttered with several items presenting a safety risk to three-year
old S., as well as three marijuana plants in the yard. Mother and
S. were not present, but Nick spoke with the CSW and stated
that the home should have been “condemned” and that the “roof
was falling down.” He reported that the family planned to move
out the following week.
A CSW served an investigative search warrant at the
referral address on November 4, 2020. Mother and S. were not
present; Nick said they were staying with maternal grandmother
(MGM). The CSW observed structural damage to some of the
rooms of the home; one room had no roof and was exposed to the
open air. The police officer participating in the search pointed
out several items that were likely associated with the occupants
growing marijuana in the home. DCFS also unsuccessfully
attempted to locate mother and S. at S.’s daycare and MGM’s
residence.
On December 4, mother called the CSW and stated that she
would have her attorney reach out to DCFS right away. Mother
stated that she and S. were temporarily renting a room from a
friend. The CSW visited the referral address again on December
8, after receiving a report that the family was moving back in.
Nick was there and told the CSW that he was moving back in,
3
but mother and S. were staying with MGM. He denied that
mother was at the residence at that time, but then admitted that
mother was inside. He refused to tell mother that the CSW
wanted to speak with her, and complained that DCFS was
“harassing” the family. Both S.’s daycare provider and MGM
denied caring for S. since Thanksgiving.
Later on December 8, the CSW met mother outside of
MGM’s residence, and observed S. in the back seat of mother’s
vehicle. Mother accused the CSW of following her, but agreed to
allow the CSW to speak with the child. S. stated that he lived
with Nick and mother. When the CSW showed S. a photo of the
marijuana plant taken at the referral address, S. said he had
seen a plant like that before. Mother claimed that she and S. had
been staying alternately with MGM and at the referral address,
but MGM denied that mother and S. had stayed with her.
Mother also told the CSW that she and Nick had an agreement
with the owner to fix the roof of their home; the owner denied any
such agreement.
The court ordered S.’s immediate removal on December 11,
2020. However, DCFS was unable to locate S. or mother at the
referral address or at MGM’s home. The CSW spoke with mother
by phone, who confirmed that she was aware of the removal order
but declined to make a plan to allow the CSW to take S. into
protective custody. Mother continued to refuse to comply over
the next several days.
On December 15, 2020, DCFS filed a dependency petition
on behalf of S. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).3 In count b-
3 Section 300 states, in relevant part, “A child who comes
within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction
4
1, the petition alleged that on November 4, 2020, as well as on
prior occasions, mother’s home had several marijuana plants that
were easily accessible to the child. In addition, several rooms of
the home had “no roof and damaged walls.” Count b-2 alleged
that father had a prior criminal conviction for possession or
purchase for sale of narcotics and was a registered controlled
substance offender.
Neither parent appeared at the December 18, 2020
detention hearing. The court found a prima facie case for
jurisdiction over S. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and
ordered S. to remain detained from both parents. The court
ordered monitored visitation two to three times per week for both
parents once they contacted DCFS. The court issued an arrest
warrant for mother and a protective custody warrant for S.
II. Adjudication and disposition
Nick emailed DCFS on January 12, 2021, refusing to turn
S. over to DCFS. Mother and father appeared by videoconference
at the next hearing on January 20, 2021. Mother had not
disclosed where she and S. were located, so the court admonished
her that the warrants remained outstanding. The court
continued the matter. At the continued hearing on January 27,
mother appeared in court with S., who was detained from mother
of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a
dependent child of the court: . . . [¶] (b)(1) The child has suffered,
or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the following: [¶] (A)
The failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child. [¶] (B) The willful or negligent
failure of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect
the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child
has been left.”
5
and placed in shelter care. The court found father was the
alleged father of S. and ordered monitored visitation for both
parents.
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS reported
speaking to S. on February 4, 2021. S. reported that his home did
not have a roof, but Nick (whom he referred to as “daddy”) was
fixing it. Mother told the CSW that she wanted to reunify with
S., that she thought the detention report was wrong, and that she
would prove that she was the best mother for S.
The CSW met with S. and S.’s caregiver at her home on
February 17, 2021. The caregiver reported that S. was doing
well; sometimes he would cry after mother’s phone calls, but he
was slowly adjusting to seeing mother through phone calls and
visits. Mother called S. once per day and visited twice per week.
The caregiver reported no issues with the visitation, except that
she had to call mother each time to remind her of the visit and
mother was “regularly” late.
Mother missed two drug tests in early February 2021. The
CSW confirmed with the testing facility that mother was enrolled
in weekly testing, and provided that information to mother.
Mother missed three more tests in February and March.
Mother moved to a new apartment in Pasadena (the
Pasadena address). In an interview on March 10, 2021, mother
told the CSW that she did not need individual counseling. The
CSW recommended that mother begin services and provided
referrals, but mother stated she did not want to engage until
services were court-ordered. Mother stated her visits with S.
were “great.” According to the CSW, during the interview mother
was acting “strange and erratic,” speaking rapidly and appearing
anxious. Mother agreed to take a drug test that day; the result
6
was negative. Mother missed her scheduled drug test the
following week.
The CSW conducted an unannounced visit on March 23
during mother’s visit with S. The caregiver reported that mother
arrived five minutes late and that mother’s boyfriend had
dropped off food for mother and S. The caregiver stated that S.
was eating and sleeping well, and no longer cried when mother’s
visits ended. The CSW observed mother and S. lying on the
grass, with S. playing on mother’s phone. S. told the CSW that
he did not want “mommy to go” and wanted to play with mother.
S. then asked the CSW to play with him. S. also stated that he
wanted to stay with mother at home.
On March 24, 2021, the property owner of the referral
address told DCFS that mother and Nick were still living at the
residence and she was trying to evict them. Multiple neighbors
complained about potential illegal activity at the residence,
including drug dealing.
In an April 13, 2021 last-minute information, DCFS
reported that father was arrested for violation of his probation
and was currently incarcerated. DCFS did not know if mother
was enrolled in any programs; the CSWs reported that when they
tried to ask mother, she said she needed to speak with her
attorney. Mother completed one negative drug test during this
period of supervision and missed seven tests. The caregiver
reported that mother was always late for her visits and did not
show up or call for a scheduled visit on April 8. She also stated
that mother never called to speak with S.
At the adjudication hearing on April 14, 2021, the court
continued the matter for father’s appearance. The court also
ordered S. placed with MGM.
7
In another last-minute information filed May 26, 2021,
DCFS reported that S. was doing well with MGM. The property
owner of the referral address told the CSW that mother and Nick
were still living at the residence. Regarding visits, the CSW
reported that mother had been consistent and would bring
activities. The CSW also reported that mother’s behavior was
“odd” at times, including that mother would get upset when S.
called her “grandma.” Mother failed to show for four additional
drug tests. DCFS recommended continued reunification services
for mother, but noted a continuing concern regarding substance
abuse by mother and Nick.
The CSW visited mother at the Pasadena address on May
25. The home appeared appropriate. Mother said she lived there
alone and had a bed there for S. The CSW stated that mother
was consistently visiting S. and he appeared comfortable with
mother. But the CSW expressed concern with mother’s behavior
during visits, explaining that mother would appear calm and
then suddenly start yelling at MGM.
In July 2021, DCFS reported that Nick had been evicted
from the referral address. Mother was living at the Pasadena
address and visiting S. twice per week. Mother was not engaged
in services as they had not yet been court-ordered. Mother
continued to drug test inconsistently, with five negative tests and
19 missed tests between February and July 2021.
At the continued adjudication hearing on August 6, 2021,
mother testified that she moved from the referral address in
February 2021. She denied having any marijuana plants at the
residence. The court again continued adjudication.
On August 17, DCFS reported that it received a call stating
that mother and Nick were squatting in a warehouse. The caller
8
stated he was concerned about S., that law enforcement had been
called more than once, and that mother “gets drunk and high all
the time.” The CSW met with mother while she was visiting with
S. on August 19. The CSW observed that mother had extensive
bruises and cuts on her legs, which mother said she sustained
from falling in a warehouse while trying to find her phone.
Mother downplayed her injuries and said that the warehouse
belonged to a client of hers.
At the continued adjudication hearing on August 20, 2021,
the court found that the evidence demonstrated that mother
exhibited “deeply flawed judgment” that put S. at risk and
further, mother had not acknowledged that any of her conduct
was a problem or posed a risk. The court found mother’s
testimony denying many of the allegations was not credible,
sustained counts b-1 and b-2 of the petition and found
jurisdiction over S. S. remained detained with MGM. At
mother’s request, the court continued disposition.
The CSW received a call on September 21 from the
reporting party regarding the warehouse (Mr. L.), who stated
that he met mother about five months ago because his brother
owned the warehouse at issue. Mr. L. reported that mother and
Nick moved a lot of sound equipment into the building and
mother told him she had been sleeping there every night to
protect the equipment. Mr. L. stated that mother and Nick were
“either high or stoned on cocaine pretty much every day of the
week,” and would throw parties at night and sleep all day. He
said that mother was squatting in the warehouse and never
visited her own apartment except when having visits with S.
Mother agreed to drug test on September 21, but then failed to do
so, claiming that she was ill. The CSW provided the court with
9
call logs reflecting police responding to the warehouse address 10
times between March and September, including several times for
parties. DCFS concluded that mother had “not shown any
change in thought or action since the beginning of the case,” but
was continuing the same behaviors and substance use.
In a last-minute information filed October 15, 2021, DCFS
reported that MGM refuted some of the statements made by Mr.
L, including that mother was staying at the warehouse.
However, MGM provided a partial police report showing that
mother and Nick were living in the warehouse. Mother
continued to visit S. regularly, but missed three drug tests in
September and October.
At the disposition hearing on October 18, 2021, the court
found by clear and convincing evidence that it was reasonable
and necessary to remove S. from his parents and that it would be
detrimental to S. to return him to mother’s custody. The court
continued its order for monitored visitation for mother and father
with DCFS discretion to liberalize. The court also ordered weekly
drug testing for mother, individual counseling, and parenting
programs.
III. Period of Review
In an April 8, 2022 status review report, DCFS reported
that father’s whereabouts were unknown. Father’s probation
officer stated that he was not in compliance with his probation
and a warrant had been issued for his arrest. Mother was
arrested on November 26, 2021 for possession of nitrous oxide. In
March 2022, mother reported that she had enrolled in a
parenting program and individual therapy. Between October
2021 and the end of March 2022, mother tested negative for
drugs 11 times, but missed 12 tests. Mother gave various
10
reasons for missing tests, including being sick, having to work,
and her car being broken into.
DCFS reported that S. appeared happy with MGM, who
was meeting his needs and ensuring that he had access to mental
health services. Mother continued to visit S. twice a week for two
hours per visit. She was regularly 15 to 30 minutes late for
visits. The visitation monitor reported that mother played with
S. during the visits, but was inconsistent with discipline and
would immediately give in if S. pouted or cried.
DCFS assessed the risk level for harm in returning S. to
mother ‘s care as “high.” It concluded that although mother had
made efforts by enrolling in court-ordered classes, she was
inconsistent with her testing and had not begun services until
recently. As a result, DCFS had not liberalized her visitation and
had not been able to assess mother’s “ability to ensure child
safety and her ability to maintain a drug-free lifestyle.” DCFS
recommended six more months of services for mother in light of
her efforts to comply with her case plan.
At the April 14, 2022 review hearing, the court found that
mother was in partial compliance with her case plan and
continued her reunification services. The court ordered mother to
complete a full drug treatment program and a minimum of 12
hours of parenting classes. The court cautioned mother that
“your conduct in this case from beginning to today indicates to me
that you are not taking this seriously.” The court told mother
that she had “a lot of work to do” prior to the next hearing or her
services would be terminated.
In its status review report filed June 3, 2022, DCFS
reported that mother was arrested on April 16, 2022. Police
officers investigating a group of individuals outside a home found
11
her with a glass pipe commonly used to smoke
methamphetamine. Mother denied that the pipe belonged to her.
DCFS reported that S. appeared happy and bonded to
MGM and she was continuing to meet his needs. MGM stated
she was willing to provide permanency to S. through a legal
guardianship if he was not able to reunify with mother. As for
her progress in her case plan, mother completed 12 hours of
parenting classes in May. She had completed five sessions of
individual therapy, but discontinued participation because of the
cost. Mother stated that she had enrolled in Telehealth sessions
instead and was scheduling her first session. Mother enrolled in
a drug and alcohol program on May 10, but was discharged later
that month for non-compliance. While in the program, mother
tested positive for methamphetamine on May 3, 2022. When the
CSW later asked mother about the positive drug test, she denied
any drug use. Mother had seven negative drug tests in April and
May and did not miss any tests. DCFS concluded that mother’s
risk assessment for reunification was “high” as she had
demonstrated minimal compliance with court orders and
remained inconsistent with programs and testing. Mother’s
continued association with individuals engaging in criminal
activities also posed a risk to S.’s safety. DCFS recommended
terminating reunification services.
In a last-minute information filed September 8, 2022,
DCFS reported that father was currently incarcerated. Mother
had no further arrests since the last report. Mother continued to
consistently visit S., but regularly arrived late. The CSW stated
that mother had stopped communicating with DCFS after the
last hearing in June, and DCFS had no new information on her
participation in any programs. Mother submitted to a
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psychological assessment on June 6, 2022; the psychiatrist
diagnosed mother with bipolar disorder, and recommended mood
stabilizers and further assessment. DCFS continued to
recommend termination of reunification services for mother.
On September 12, DCFS reported that mother continued
her enrollment in weekly drug testing. Mother tested negative
four consecutive times from May 24 to June 15, 2022. She then
missed nine tests from June 27 to September 7. Mother
submitted a letter to the court, stating that she continued to live
alone in her Pasadena apartment and had “everything my son
needs for his care and safety.” She also stated that she had
completed the parenting classes and psychiatric assessment
required by the court, but could not afford to leave her
“occupations as a Real Estate Agent and Executive Assistant” to
enter a drug treatment program. Mother stated she was moving
to dismiss the case based on DCFS’s “failure to meet the State
and Federal guidelines for removing a child from the mother’s
home,” failure to provide proper services, and failure to follow
court orders and procedures.
DCFS submitted service logs during this period reflecting
mother’s twice-weekly monitored visitation with S. at the park.
S. told DCFS that he loved to play at the park and on the swings
with mother, and that he liked talking to the visitation monitor.
Mother usually brought food for her and S. to eat and sometimes
brought activities or a new toy. Mother always greeted S. with a
hug and kiss and played with him. S. also often ignored mother’s
instructions and grabbed mother’s phone when she would not
allow him to play games on it. During a visit on April 28, the
monitor reported some unusual behavior by mother, including
rocking back and forth and laying down while S. was playing.
13
After the monitor told mother she should not be sleeping during
the visit, mother called S. over and gave him her phone to play
games. S. spent the last 45 minutes of the visit on mother’s
phone, while mother sat with her back to the monitor, seemingly
dozing on and off. At another visit in June, mother was 28
minutes late. When she arrived, S. wanted to play on mother’s
phone and she told him no. The monitor reported that S. was
whiny and moody for the rest of the visit because he was not
getting his way. Mother started mocking his behavior, then S.
started kicking her. Mother told him to stop, then eventually
gave in and let S. play on her phone. S. continued to ignore
mother’s directions and whine when he could not do what he
wanted, and mother would give in.
After several continuances, the court held the next review
hearing on October 10, 2022. The court found that continued
jurisdiction was necessary, it would be detrimental to S. to return
him to his parents, and mother had not made substantial
progress toward alleviating or mitigating the circumstances
necessitating placement. The court found that mother “has
shown a chronic problem of substance abuse and poor judgment
. . . , [and] an inability to accept responsibility and be truthful
with the court and herself.” The court terminated reunification
services for mother and father4 and set the matter for a
permanency planning hearing.
4 Although the court initially denied reunification services
for father, there was some confusion in the record regarding
whether father ever received services. The court therefore
terminated father’s reunification services to the extent any had
been granted.
14
IV. Termination of Parental Rights
DCFS filed a section 366.26 report in January 2023, stating
that S. was doing well and MGM’s home was safe and
appropriate. Mother continued visiting S. twice per week,
monitored by MGM starting in September 2022. S. told DCFS
that mother was fun. DCFS reported that it was “evident that the
child and mother share a bond as mother continues to be present
in the child’s life.” MGM stated that she had no concerns
regarding mother’s visits and that S. enjoyed them. DCFS
concluded that, having reviewed the visitation notes, it “was
noted that mother and the child have a bond which is why DCFS
believes the best plan of permanence for the child is Legal
Guardianship.” MGM continued to be willing to provide
permanency to S. through legal guardianship, so that mother
might have a chance to reunify with S. if she was able to improve.
DCFS observed that MGM and S. had a strong attachment to
each other. S. told DCFS that he loved mother and mother was
“more fun because she buys him anything he wants.” DCFS
recommended appointing MGM as S.’s legal guardian, with
continued monitored visitation for both parents.
On January 24, 2023, mother filed a request to dismiss the
dependency case and also for a change in court orders. She filed
the document herself, although she continued to have appointed
counsel. Mother argued that she was never properly served with
the petition, the court lacked jurisdiction, DCFS filed fraudulent
reports regarding her treatment of S., and the court forced her to
comply with an unnecessary case plan. The court denied the
motion and admonished mother to file papers only through her
counsel.
15
In a February 2, 2023 last-minute information, DCFS
reported that MGM was now interested in adopting S. and it was
therefore changing its recommendation to adoption. The court
continued the matter and ordered DCFS to include an analysis of
the Caden C. factors5 in its next report.
DCFS filed an updated section 366.26 report on March 29,
2023. S. was in kindergarten, and he was also enrolled in
Taekwondo, math tutoring, Russian, and Korean. He was not in
therapy as DCFS reported he was doing well. Mother’s prior
visitation monitor reported that during visits mother often
appeared to be under the influence or coming off of a substance.
On some occasions mother would fall asleep during the visit and
S. would play on her phone. The monitor also reported that
mother was unable to set appropriate boundaries. MGM
continued to monitor mother’s visits without incident until
February 2023, when she asked for assistance to monitor the
visits because mother was upset after a court hearing. A CSW
monitored mother’s visit on March 7, 2023. Mother was 10
minutes late. S. appeared upset and said that he wanted to go
with mother, but she was always late. S. was excited to see
mother when she arrived. Mother brought food and a photo
5 In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). As
discussed further below, Caden C. set forth three elements a
parent must show to establish the parental benefit exception to
termination of parental rights: (1) regular visitation with the
child; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent”; and (3) terminating the parent-child
attachment “would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
16
album to share with S. Mother and S. also read a book together
and played a computer game. Afterward, MGM stated she was
comfortable to monitor the visits again, as mother seemed to be
doing better.
The report also included DCFS’s “bonding assessment”
under Caden C. as requested by the court. Regarding the first
element—regular visitation with the child—DCFS reported that
mother had maintained consistent and regular visits with S. As
for the second element—a substantial and positive parent-child
relationship—DCFS noted that mother had not yet completed a
full drug and alcohol program and it was unknown whether she
continued to abuse drugs since she was not enrolled in a program
or testing for DCFS. DCFS opined that mother’s failure to
mitigate her substance abuse issues posed a risk to S. as a young
child requiring care and supervision. DCFS acknowledged that
mother said she was ready to care for S. and had a bed for him in
her apartment. However, mother had not been able to progress
from unmonitored visits. S. appeared to have a good relationship
with mother, he expressed that he had fun with her during visits
and loved mother because they play and he feels safe with her.
According to MGM, S. asked why mother could not live with them
or visit at MGM’s home, but he no longer cried at the end of his
visits. The visitation monitors observed that S. viewed mother as
his mother, but he was able to manipulate mother to do what he
wanted.
Regarding the third element—whether the harm of
severing the relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption—
DCFS opined that if visits were terminated, S. would be affected,
as mother was consistent in her visits. However, DCFS noted
that S. was also affected by mother’s chronic lateness. DCFS also
17
stated that severing S.’s relationship with mother would not
greatly adversely affect him, as he had established a strong bond
and attachment to MGM and she continued to allow mother and
S. to develop a relationship. DCFS also noted that S. was
“emotionally stable” after visits. According to DCFS, adoption
would benefit S. by providing him with permanency and
continued stability in a home he had been in since he was three
years old. MGM told DCFS that while she previously wanted to
have legal guardianship of S., she now was willing to adopt S.
because it was the most permanent plan for him.
DCFS concluded that while mother had consistently visited
S. and developed a relationship with him, he viewed her as the
fun parent who played with him and he did not have a difficult
time leaving visits.
In a June 2023 interim review report, DCFS reported that
father had joined mother’s twice weekly visits, which continued
to be monitored without incident by MGM. S. said he was excited
about visits with both parents. DCFS reported that the case was
adoption ready and there were no barriers to adoption. DCFS
observed that MGM was a loving and patient caregiver for S. and
they had a close and loving relationship. S. was an active and
happy child. In an interview on May 18, 2023, S. stated that he
loved MGM and wanted to continue living with her. DCFS
recommended terminating parental rights and proceeding with
adoption.
At the July 11, 2023 permanency planning hearing,
mother’s counsel stated that mother had just filed a section 388
petition seeking a home of parent order or, alternatively,
additional reunification services. The court denied the petition,
finding that mother had not shown changed circumstances, and
18
that her “drug use and her failure to be forthcoming about it has
been an issue throughout this case.” The court also found that
mother “has consistently shown an inability to follow court orders
and complete programs.”
Turning to termination, mother’s counsel asked the court to
find that the parental bond exception applied and also to order a
legal guardianship instead of adoption. She noted that mother
was consistent in her visits and that DCFS had acknowledged
mother’s bond with S. The court acknowledged that mother
visited S. and had remained in his life, but that she had
displayed throughout the case an “inability to be stable in her
own life and to confront and acknowledge the problems identified
by . . . the court and the department.” The court explained the
concern that “if I were to order a legal guardianship, mother
would continue for years to come back to the court, ask the court
to terminate legal guardianship even though she has shown a
clear inability to acknowledge, admit, and address the problems
in the sustained petition. This would lead to instability in S[.]’s
life.” The court further found that S. had spent half of his life
with MGM, who provided “stability, love, and care,” and she and
S. had developed a “very strong bond.” S.’s counsel added that
mother seemed unable to set boundaries during visits and at
times appeared to be under the influence. The court agreed,
finding that mother’s visits were consistent but “of low quality.
And the bond is merely as . . . though mother is a friend to S. and
not the strong parental bond that is required. . . . And her
inability to take a parental role and redirect her son to make good
decisions is consistent with . . . her own lifestyle.” The court
further found that any benefit accruing to S. from his
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relationship with mother was outweighed by the benefit of
adoption, and that adoption was in S.’s best interests.
During the hearing, mother (who was attending by phone)
ignored the court’s admonishment to wait to speak until invited
by her counsel and refused to take her phone off of the speaker
phone setting despite the confidentiality of the proceedings. She
stated that she was demanding recusal of the judge for “fraud”
and demanding a “judicial review.” After warning mother
repeatedly, the court placed her in the virtual lobby, noting that
mother “is showing again that she’s not stable, not able to follow
up court orders.”
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that S.
was adoptable. The court concluded that no exceptions to
adoption applied and terminated the parental rights of mother
and father. The court ordered adoption as the permanent plan
and designated MGM as the prospective adoptive parent.
Mother and father timely appealed from the court’s order.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the court erred in finding that the
parental benefit exception to adoption did not apply and thereby
terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 366.26.
Father joins mother’s arguments but does not raise any points of
his own. We find the court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that mother had not established the necessary
exception.
A. Legal Principles
1. Parental benefit exception
Section 366.26’s express purpose is “to provide stable,
permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)
If the juvenile court has decided to end reunification services,
20
adoption is the legislative preference. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); see
also In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“‘Adoption is the
Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best
chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible
caretaker.’”]) Thus, once the juvenile court finds the child is
adoptable, “the court must order adoption and its necessary
consequence, termination of parental rights,” unless a parent can
establish one of the exceptions set forth in section 366.26,
subdivision (c). (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; see
also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625.)
The specified circumstances in section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B) are “exceptions to the general rule that the court must
choose adoption where possible.” (In re Celine R., supra, 31
Cal.4th at p. 53.) “At this stage of the dependency proceedings, ‘it
becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden
efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home.’
[Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in
exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other
than the norm, which remains adoption.” (Ibid.; see also In re
A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1150.)
The exception at issue here is the parental benefit
exception, which permits the selection of another permanent plan
if “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact
with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631, our Supreme Court “discern[ed] three
elements the parent must prove” to establish the parental benefit
exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
First, the parent asserting the exception must show
“regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account
21
the extent of visitation permitted.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 636.) This element is “straightforward,” involving an
assessment of whether the parent visits consistently. (Id. at p.
632.)
Second, the parent must show that “the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
636.) In assessing whether the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship with the parent, “the focus is the
child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors,
such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent
in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of
interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular
needs.’” (Id. at p. 632.) Thus, “courts often consider how children
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.”
(Ibid.)
For the third element, the parent must show that
terminating the parent-child attachment “would be detrimental
to the child even when balanced against the countervailing
benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) “Because terminating parental rights eliminates any
legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship,
courts must assume that terminating parental rights terminates
the relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine
therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.”
(Id. at p. 633.) This evaluation consists of a “subtle, case-specific
inquiry[,]” including consideration of whether “the benefit of
22
placement in a new, adoptive home” outweighs the harm the
child “would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive,
emotional relationship” with the parent. (Ibid.) In making this
detriment determination, the juvenile court does “not look to
whether the parent can provide a home for the child,” and “is not
comparing the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative
to those of any potential adoptive parent(s).” (Id. at p. 634.)
2. Standard of review
In Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, our Supreme Court
clarified the standard of review applicable to a juvenile court’s
findings regarding the parental-benefit exception. The first two
elements—regular visitation and a beneficial relationship—
involve determinations that are essentially factual; we therefore
review those findings for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 640.)
The third element requires the juvenile court to determine
whether any harm the child would suffer from the severance of
the parental bond would outweigh the benefit to the child of
adoption. (Ibid.) This requires a “hybrid” standard of review.
(Id. at pp. 640-641.) Like the first two elements, the juvenile
court must make a series of factual determinations including
determinations about the child’s relationship with a parent,
which we review for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 640.)
However, “the ultimate decision—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the
child’s relationship with his [or her] parent—is discretionary and
properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
We also note that, unlike in Caden C., the juvenile court
here found that mother did not meet her burden of proving the
exception. In such a case, where the trier of fact has “expressly
or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof
23
did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading
to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial
evidence supports the judgment. This follows because such a
characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1)
the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof,
and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable conclusion that the party
with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the case
[citations].” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528,
overruled on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989.) Thus, to the extent mother challenges the juvenile
court’s findings regarding her failure of proof, we determine
whether the evidence compels a finding in mother’s favor as a
matter of law, asking whether that evidence was uncontradicted
and unimpeached and of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination it was insufficient to support
a finding. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)
B. Analysis
The juvenile court expressly found that mother met the
first element under Caden C., as she consistently visited S.
throughout the dependency proceedings. No party challenges
that finding on appeal. Instead, the parties focus their
arguments on the second and third elements.
To prove the second element—that S. would benefit from
continuing their relationship—mother needed to show that S. had
a “substantial, positive, [and] emotional attachment” to her.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) That meant
demonstrating that S.’s attachment was “significant” and
conferred more than “some incidental benefit” to the child. (In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The court was
entitled to consider factors including “‘[t]he age of the child, the
24
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632.) We are not persuaded that mother has
established that the evidence compels a finding in her favor on
this element.
At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, S. was six years
old. He had spent almost half of his life, more than two and a
half years, out of mother’s custody, and the majority of that time
with MGM. Although the court and DCFS recognized that
mother and S. shared a bond, the court found that their
relationship was closer to the nature of friends, rather than a
parent and child, and that their visits were “of low quality.”
There is ample evidence in the record supporting that conclusion.
The visitation logs show that S. often spent much of his time
during visits playing with mother’s phone and playing with other
children. Although they hugged and kissed at the start and end
of visits, there is little evidence in the record of affectionate
interactions during the visits. S.’s statements about mother
echoed this relationship—he told DCFS that he loved to play with
mother and that she would buy him what he wanted. DCFS
observed that mother was not able to set appropriate boundaries
for S. and would give in to his demands.
Moreover, the visitation monitor and DCFS both expressed
concern that mother frequently behaved erratically during visits,
including lying down, appearing to be asleep, and yelling. As
mother points, out, her continued struggles with substance abuse
may not on their own be used as a bar to applying the exception.
However, these struggles are relevant to the extent they impact
the relationship with the child, as, for example, “[a] parent’s
25
struggles may mean that interaction between parent and child at
least sometimes has a ‘“negative” effect’ on the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th p. 637.) Here, the court was entitled to find
that mother’s conduct during visits negatively affected her
relationship with S.
Mother largely ignores the evidence of her struggles,
instead pointing to other evidence she contends shows that she
acted as a parental figure and had a substantial and positive
bond with S. We are not permitted to reweigh the evidence but
must make all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the
judgment. It is undisputed that there is some evidence of
positive aspects of the relationship between mother and S. But “a
reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’
[Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported
by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a
different result had it believed other evidence.’” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
Even if we were to conclude that mother had met her
burden to establish the second element, we find no error in the
juvenile court’s conclusion that she did not meet the third, i.e. she
did not establish that terminating her relationship with S. would
outweigh the benefits of adoption.
Although MGM initially stated that she preferred a legal
guardianship in order to allow mother the chance for
reunification, MGM ultimately decided she was willing to adopt
S. in order to offer him permanency and stability. DCFS’s
recommendations agreed with these caregiver preferences.
Mother contends, without support, that the court gave “extra
26
weight” to the legislative preference for adoption in expressing
concern that mother could continue to seek to interrupt the
guardianship in the future while failing to address her ongoing
issues. “‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives
the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a
responsible caretaker.’ [Citation.] ‘Guardianship, while a more
stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus
falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature
had in mind for the dependent child.’” (In re Celine R., supra, 31
Cal.4th at p. 53.) Here, S. was thriving in MGM’s care, and she
had provided a stable, loving home for the child for almost three
years. S. was no longer upset when visits ended and expressed a
desire to live with MGM. In addition, the court was entitled to
consider mother’s behavior throughout the case, including her
refusal to cooperate with DCFS or abide by court orders, in
determining that legal guardianship would not give S. the
stability he needed and in weighing more heavily the benefits of
adoption by MGM, a stable and loving caregiver to whom S. was
deeply bonded. We find no abuse of discretion in this conclusion.
We are not persuaded otherwise by mother’s citation to
cases upholding a trial court’s finding that legal guardianship
was in the child’s best interest. For example, in In re Brandon C.
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1532, mother consistently visited her
twin sons throughout the dependency proceedings and had a
close, loving relationship with the children. The trial court
ordered legal guardianship for the children, finding that mother
had maintained regular visitation and the children would benefit
from continuing their relationship with her.6 (Id. at p. 1533.)
6 Of course, neither the juvenile court nor the court of appeal
had the benefit of Caden C., which was not decided until 2021.
27
DCFS appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to
support the finding that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the children. (Ibid.) A different panel of this court
affirmed, finding that the “trial court obviously credited the
testimony from both mother and grandmother that there was a
close bond between mother and the boys, and that a continuation
of contact would be beneficial to the children. DCFS did not
present any evidence to the contrary.” (Id. at p. 1537.) As such,
“[s]ubstantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
mother had maintained regular visitation and that the children
would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.) This
court also noted that DCFS could not rely on an absence of
evidence regarding the quality of mother’s visits when it was
DCFS that failed to provide such information in its reports. (Id.
at pp. 1537-1538.)
Here, the juvenile court found mother’s testimony not
credible and concluded that mother and S. did not have a
substantial enough relationship to outweigh the benefits of
adoption. Mother has not demonstrated that the court erred in
weighing the benefits and burdens of that relationship and
concluding that the evidence demonstrated that adoption was in
the best interest of the child.
“‘The statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing
court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s
best interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard,
reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s comprehensive and
controlling provisions.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th p. 641.)
The record demonstrates that the juvenile court properly
analyzed the Caden C. factors. As such, we find no error by the
28
juvenile court in concluding that mother failed to satisfy the
parental benefit exception.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P.J.
ZUKIN, J.
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