CourtListener 10032503•People v. Miller CA1/3
Texte intégral
Filed 8/5/24 P. v. Miller CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168367
v.
CHRISTOPHER MILLER, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05001204387)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Christopher Miller appeals an order resentencing him under
Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He contends the trial court should have stayed
the sentence for one or more of his convictions of failing to register as a sex
offender. We conclude that the sentence for one of these convictions must be
stayed under section 654.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was previously convicted of possessing child pornography,
which required him to register as a sex offender. He was released from
prison in December 2008, and thereafter he failed to complete his sex
offender registration.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
Around February 2009, defendant began living in the home of his
friend Jonathan, who had foster children.2 One of Jonathan’s foster children
was a friend of John Doe 1 (Doe 1) and John Doe 2 (Doe 2), two brothers who
were 11 and seven years old respectively in February. Doe 1 and Doe 2 would
often visit Jonathan’s house and frequently spent the night there. During
those visits, Doe 1 began sleeping in defendant’s bedroom and sharing a bed
with him, and defendant repeatedly sexually molested him.
During this period, the mother of Doe 1 and Doe 2 (Mother) became
friendly with defendant. She did not know he was required to register as a
sex offender. On June 1, 2009, defendant moved into the home Mother
shared with Doe 1 and Doe 2, where he occupied his own room.3 Doe 1 often
spent the night in defendant’s bedroom, initially on a sofa or a second bed,
but eventually in the same bed as defendant. Defendant continued to commit
sexual crimes against Doe 1.
Defendant was arrested on December 1, 2009.
2 Defendant testified at trial that he met Jonathan on the internet, in a
chat group or message board for men who shared a sexual interest in boys.
Defendant did not tell Jonathan he was a registered sex offender because he
wanted to live with Jonathan and knew that a foster parent would not be
allowed to live with a sex offender. In the interest of the privacy of the
children involved in this case, we will refer to Jonathan solely by his first
name.
3 Mother’s testimony was less specific; she recalled that defendant
moved in the last week of May or the first week of June, but defendant
testified to the more precise date of June 1, 2009. He also testified he had to
move out of Jonathan’s home because he learned about a month beforehand
that Jonathan was going to move to a different city and be a foster parent
there, and defendant knew that if he moved with Jonathan he would be
fingerprinted and his criminal history would be exposed.
2
A jury convicted defendant of 29 counts of committing a lewd act on a
child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1 through 29), one count of
possessing child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (b); count 30), and three counts
of failure to register as a sex offender: one for failing to register upon his
release from incarceration (§ 290.015, subd. (a); count 31); one for failing to
complete his annual registration within five working days of his birthday
(§ 290.012, subd. (a); count 33); and one for failing to register within five
working days of a change of residence (§ 290, subd. (b); count 34). Two
enhancement allegations for prior prison terms under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) were found true. The trial court imposed the upper term of
eight years for count 1 and consecutive terms for all remaining counts, for a
total sentence of 69 years and four months in state prison.
It appears that in June 2022, the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court that defendant might be
entitled to relief under section 1172.75, which invalidates certain prior prison
term enhancements imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and
establishes a mechanism for resentencing after the CDCR provides this
notification.4
4 Section 1172.75 requires the CDCR to identify inmates who may be
eligible for relief and provide that information to the sentencing court that
imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) This action vests the trial
court with jurisdiction to resentence the defendant, even after the judgment
is final. (People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332–333; People v.
Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447–449.) Here, the CDCR sent a list of
eligible inmates to the Contra Costa County Public Defender’s Office on June
29, 2022; it is the CDCR’s practice also to send the lists to the trial court.
Although the trial court did not retain emails from June 2022, we will
presume that the CDCR carried out its duty to provide the information to the
trial court as well. (See Evid. Code, § 664 [presuming that official duty is
regularly performed]; People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566.) The
3
A resentencing hearing took place on July 20, 2023. Among other
things, defendant asked the court to stay two of his sentences for failing to
register as a sex offender under section 654. The trial court denied this
request, instead striking the two one-year prior prison terms enhancements
and making no other changes to the original sentence.
DISCUSSION
Section 654 prohibits “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in
different ways by different provisions” from being “punished under more than
one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) Thus, a defendant may not receive multiple
punishment for “a single act or indivisible course of conduct”; rather, all but
one sentence for that act or course of conduct must be stayed. (People v.
Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.)
In considering whether multiple punishment is proper, courts follow “a
two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may
include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct
encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. [Citations.] We
first consider if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’
[Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that
act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a
course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct
reflects a single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or multiple intents and objectives.”
(People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311 (Corpening).)
In considering whether a defendant acted with only a single intent and
objective, courts must apply a “rigorous” test rather than taking “ ‘a “broad
and amorphous” view’ ” of the defendant’s intent. (People v. Morelos (2008)
Attorney General does not dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction to
resentence defendant.
4
168 Cal.App.4th 758, 769, citing People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321,
335–336.) Our high court has cautioned against accepting such a “broad,
overriding intent and objective” as to “preclude punishment for otherwise
clearly separate offenses,” because that would violate the statute’s purpose to
“[e]nsure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his
culpability.” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552 [multiple sexual
crimes against single victim for purpose of sexual gratification could be
punished separately].) We uphold a trial court’s express or implied
determination that crimes involved separate objectives if supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
These principles have been applied in the context of multiple
convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. Two cases are
particularly pertinent to our inquiry. The first is People v. Britt (2004) 32
Cal.4th 944 (Britt). The defendant in Britt moved from one county to another
and failed to notify authorities in either county of the move, in violation of
two statutory provisions requiring him to notify the authorities in both his
former and new residences. (Id. at p. 949, 951 & fns. 2 & 3; former § 290,
subds. (a)(1)(A) & (f)(1).) Our high court first noted that the defendant could
properly be convicted of both offenses. (Britt, at p. 951.) However, the court
continued, section 654 barred multiple punishment for the two offenses,
which were based on a single change of residence. The court explained:
“ ‘The purpose of [the registration requirements] is to assure that persons
convicted of [sexual offenses] shall be readily available for police surveillance
at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar
offenses in the future.’ [Citations.] Defendant’s objective in violating [section
290] was the opposite of the government’s—to avoid police surveillance. To
fulfill this objective, he committed two crimes of omission, but each crime
5
furthered the same objective. The failure to notify the former jurisdiction
([former] § 290, subd. (f)(1)) and the failure to register in the new jurisdiction
([former] § 290, subd. (a)(1)(A)) were means of achieving the same objective—
to prevent any law enforcement authority from learning of his current
residence.” (Britt, at p. 952.) The court thus held that a person who violates
separate reporting requirements through a single change of residence may be
punished for only one of those crimes. (Id. at pp. 953–954; see also People v.
Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 648–649 [following Britt, defendant
could not be punished both for not filing a change of address and not
providing new address in another state].)
On different facts, the appellate court in People v. Meeks (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 695 (Meeks) reached a different conclusion. The defendant there
was convicted of two counts of failing to register as a sex offender over largely
overlapping periods that ended when the defendant was arrested: one for
failing to register within five days of changing his address between January 1
and May 15, 2000 (former § 290, subd. (a)(1)(A)), and one for failing to
register within five days of his birthday between December 1, 1999 and May
15, 20005 (former § 290, subd. (a)(1)(D)), and the trial court imposed
sentences for both offenses. (Meeks, at pp. 699–700, 703.) After rejecting the
defendant’s contention that, because the duty to register is a continuing one,
5 The defendant’s birthday was on December 3, and he last registered
in mid-December 1997. (Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) He also
changed his residence more than once between this last registration and
March 2000. (Id. at pp. 700–701, 705.) The opinion in Meeks does not
explain why the time periods for the charged offenses were limited as they
were, but it does explain that the offenses were continuing ones, that is, that
they continued as long as the duty to register persisted and the defendant
failed to do so. (Id. at p. 703.)
6
he could be convicted of only one offense of failure to register (id. at pp. 702–
703), the appellate court likewise rejected his argument that he could be
sentenced for only one offense (id. at pp. 703–706). In doing so, it
distinguished Britt on the ground that the defendant in Britt needed to avoid
his reporting obligations in both counties to fulfill his objective of avoiding
police surveillance. (Meeks, at pp. 704–705.) In Meeks, in contrast, the court
explained there were multiple events that triggered the defendant’s
obligation to register: his birthdays on December 3, 1998 and 1999, and
changes in residence occurring sometime in 1998, in January 1999 when he
was evicted and became homeless, and in February or March 2000 when he
moved in with a family member. (Id. at pp. 700–701, 705.) “Although the
periods for [the two charged] offenses overlap somewhat and the objective of
each is the same, it cannot reasonably be argued that defendant can be
punished only once for each successive failure to register,” the court
concluded. (Id. at p. 705.)6
6 The facts of Meeks are complicated. The defendant there was
convicted of one count of failing to register within five days of his birthday
and one count of failing to register within five days of a move, offenses that
took place respectively between December 1, 1999 and May 15, 2000 and
between January 1 and May 15, 2000. (Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 699–700.) But the evidence showed he twice failed to register upon his
birthday (by December 8, 1998 and 1999), and three times failed to register a
move (when he was evicted sometime in 1998, when he was again evicted in
January 1999, and when he moved into a new home in February or March of
2000). (Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 699–701, 705.) As the Attorney
General points out, in the course of its analysis the appellate court noted,
“[a]lthough conceivably the triggering events of defendant’s two [1998]
registration requirements could have come on the same day, if defendant was
evicted on this birthday, the triggering events were nevertheless distinct.”
(Id. at p. 705.) True enough. But that does not mean that if those were the
only two triggering events and they took place on the same day, the
defendant would have had separate intents and objectives in concealing his
7
Defendant acknowledges Meeks, but he argues that it is not good law
on this point in light of Supreme Court precedent. In particular, he points to
Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th 307. The question in Corpening was whether the
forceful taking of a vehicle, which accomplished the crimes of both robbery
and carjacking, was a “single physical act subject to the prohibition on
multiple punishment under section 654.” (Id. at p. 309.) Setting forth the
applicable law, the court explained that application of section 654 “requires a
two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may
include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct
encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. [Citations.] We
first consider if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’
[Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that
act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single physical
act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of
conduct reflects a single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or multiple intents and
objectives.” (Id. at p. 311.) In Corpening, the court reached only the first step
of that inquiry, concluding that a single physical act served as the basis for
both crimes and that multiple punishment was therefore improper, thus
ending its analysis. (Id. at p. 316.)
Relying on Corpening, defendant argues that all three offenses of
failure to register furthered the same intent and objective—that is, to prevent
law enforcement from learning his whereabouts—and that multiple
punishment is therefore improper under the second step of the test set forth
in Corpening.
whereabouts, and the Meeks court did not so hold. In any case, the events of
1998 do not appear to be the basis for the defendant’s convictions of failing to
register in late 1999 or early 2000.
8
We do not give Corpening such a cramped interpretation. While all
three of defendant’s registration offenses may have shared a generic objective
to avoid surveillance, there was a significant separation in time between the
offense charged in count 31 and those charged in counts 33 and 34. That is,
count 31 was based on defendant’s failure to register upon his release from
custody in 2008. The other two offenses took place months later, around
June 1, 2009, at a time when defendant was moving into a home where a
child victim of his ongoing sexual abuse resided. This record supports a
reasonable inference that defendant’s general intent to avoid surveillance at
the time of his release was distinct from his particular objective several
months later to live with Doe 1 undisturbed, so as to continue his sexual
crimes against him.
There is a more persuasive argument that defendant may not be
punished separately for counts 33 and 34, however. In count 33, defendant
was charged with failure to complete his annual registration within five
working days of his May 28, 2009 birthday, which fell on a Thursday.7
(§ 290.012, subd. (a).) In count 34, he was charged with failure to register
within five working days of a change of address. (§ 290, subd. (b).) The
record in the underlying case indicates defendant moved in with Mother on or
about Monday, June 1, 2009, a mere two working days after his birthday. It
thus appears that there was an overlap of several days during which he could
have simultaneously satisfied both registration requirements with a single
visit to the police station.
7 We grant defendant’s May 31, 2024 request for judicial notice of the
calendars for May and June 2009.
9
In the context of these two offenses, Meeks is readily distinguishable.
As in Meeks, there was more than one triggering event and thus there were
separate offenses. (See Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) But the
two triggering events in the case before us were so close in time that
defendant had not yet committed the crime of failing to register within five
working days of his birthday when his obligation to register upon his move to
Mother’s home arose. (See Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521,
526 [offense complete at expiration of grace period].) In Meeks, on the other
hand, the evidence showed that the defendant’s failure to register his most
recent change of address did not take place until two or three months after
his most recent birthday. (Meeks, at pp. 701, 705.) As to these offenses, thus,
the crimes—although continuing in nature—were completed at different
times.
The case before us is in some respects similar to Britt, in that
defendant here had to avoid his registration requirement as to both those
triggering events to achieve a single objective of obscuring from authorities
his residence as of June 1, and as a result maintaining access to Doe 1.
(Britt, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 953.) Thus, as to these largely simultaneous
offenses, “each failure to report was ‘a means toward the objective of the
commission of the other.’ ” (Ibid.)
In fact, this case may present a stronger argument for the application
of section 654 than Britt, since here defendant’s single omission was his
failure to register in the first few days of June 2009. This act, or failure to
act was the basis for the charge in both counts 33 and 34. Thus, as in
Corpening, the court need only have reached the first step of the two-part
inquiry, concluding that because a single physical act or omission served as
the basis for both crimes, multiple punishment was therefore improper,
10
without regard to whether defendant harbored a single or multiple objectives.
(Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 311, 316.)
The Attorney General suggests that defendant’s failure to register
within five days of his May 28 birthday was intended to forward the goal of
continuing to live with Jonathan and his foster children, a goal separate from
his goal of living with Mother and Doe 1. But we have already explained that
the record indicates defendant moved to Mother’s home before his crime of
failing to register upon his birthday was complete. Even if we reach the
second step of the inquiry, we are not persuaded that substantial evidence
supports a conclusion that defendant had separate intents and objectives for
failing to register within five working days of his birthday and of his move to
Mother’s house. The trial court must therefore stay the sentence for either
count 33 or count 34.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed in part. On remand, the trial court is
directed to stay the sentence for either count 33 or count 34. The clerk of the
superior court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it
to the CDCR. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
TUCHER, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, J.
PETROU, J.
People v. Miller (A168367)
11
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