People v. Mixon CA1/4

CourtListener 10028016Calctapp1 août 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 8/1/24 P. v. Mixon CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, A166696
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(City & County of San Francisco
v. Super. Ct. Nos. CRI00929353,
JOHN MIXON, CRI00929354, SCN122235)
Defendant and Appellant.

John Mixon was convicted in 1987 by jury trial of various offenses and
sentenced to 41 years to life in prison. He petitioned for resentencing in 2022
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, which invalidated certain
enhancements to his sentence for prior prison terms.1 The trial court struck
the two one-year prison prior enhancements, but otherwise reinstated
Mixon’s original sentence, citing the gravity and extent of Mixon’s crimes.
Mixon now seeks remand to the trial court for further resentencing. He
argues that recent ameliorative legislative changes enacted during the
pendency of his appeal—pursuant to sections 1170, subdivision (b), 1172.1,
and 1172.75—should be applied to his now non-final sentence. The Attorney
General disagrees, arguing that Mixon forfeited his request for further relief
pursuant to section 1170, and even if he did not, none of the cited

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
provisions—even as amended—require remand for further resentencing.
Applying the plain language of the statutes and considering them in context,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1987, following a jury trial, Mixon was found guilty of one count of
murder and multiple counts of robbery, attempted robbery, assault, and
firearms violations.2 The trial court imposed an aggravated term on
count 11, one of the robbery counts, because “the crime involved a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness,” and a sentence of 25 years to
life for the murder count. The court imposed two one-year sentencing
enhancements pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), for Mixon’s two
prior felony convictions.
Mixon later sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 (then-
recently renumbered from section 1171.1), asking the trial court to strike the
prison prior enhancements and to engage in a full resentencing in light of
Mixon’s age, the length of his incarceration, his health problems, his
rehabilitation, his low risk of recidivism, and the support of his family.
Mixon asked the trial court to reduce the remainder of his sentence, in
relevant respect, by changing the murder conviction to voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense. He also asked the court to reduce
the sentence for count 11 from the upper five-year term to a term of one year
and eight months.
The court struck the prison prior enhancements consistent with the
pronouncement in section 1172.75 that such enhancements are invalid. It
declined to exercise its discretion to reduce Mixon’s sentence further, or

2 The facts of Mixon’s crimes are not relevant to the resolution of this

appeal.
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otherwise alter the sentence, noting that Mixon’s crimes were part of a spree
that involved the repeated use of firearms and that the new sentence should
be commensurate with the gravity of the offenses.
After the resentencing, and while Mixon’s appeal was pending, the
Legislature amended section 1172.1 to allow trial courts to resentence
defendants to lesser included or related offenses without the prosecution’s
concurrence, and section 1170, subdivision (b), to preclude the imposition of
an upper term sentence except in certain circumstances.
DISCUSSION
Mixon argues that his case should be remanded for further
resentencing under section 1172.75 so that the trial court can apply the
changes to sections 1172.1 and 1170. Section 1172.75, he contends,
incorporates sections 1172.1 and 1170 because they reduce sentences and
provide the resentencing court discretion. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
We review the application of these statutes de novo. (People v. Carter
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 967.) “Our fundamental task in interpreting a
statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate its purpose.
[Citation.] We begin with the text of the statute and give the words their
usual meaning while construing them in light of the statutory framework as
a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain
meaning controls. [Citation.] If the language ‘ “ ‘permits more than one
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘[S]tatutory ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in
which the language appears and adopting the construction [that] best serves
to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes.’ ” (People v.
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126.)

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I. Section 1172.75
Section 1172.75 permits recall and resentencing for defendants whose
original sentences included a now-invalid one-year enhancement for a prior
prison term pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75.) The
statute mandates “a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a
result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not
result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).)
The resentencing “court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) [italics added].) The courts
of appeal are now actively working to interpret various aspects of
section 1172.75 and similar statutes. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1259–1260 [discussing cases considering
whether a full resentencing is warranted in section 1172.75 proceedings];
People v. Esquivias (July 18, 2024, B329800) __ Cal.App.4th __
(2024 Cal.App.4th Lexis 461 at pp. *2–*8, [concluding that a full resentencing
is not triggered on habeas review].) We assume for purposes of this appeal
that when a defendant is entitled to recall and resentencing under the
statute, the resentencing court must engage in a “full” resentencing, meaning
that it revisits the entire sentence and each of its components. (People v.
Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 205–206.)

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II. Section 1172.1
Mixon first argues that remand to the trial court is warranted so the
court can exercise its discretion pursuant to section 1172.1 and consider
whether to reduce his conviction and sentence to a lesser related or included
offense—specifically, to reduce his murder conviction to manslaughter. In
relevant part, section 1172.1 provides: “When a defendant, upon conviction
for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . ., the court may, on its own
motion . . . at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of
original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or
case law, . . . recall the [defendant’s] sentence and . . . resentence the
defendant . . . provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence.”3 (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) “The court, in recalling and resentencing
under this subdivision, shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for
judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “The resentencing court may, in
the interest of justice . . ., [¶] (A) [r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment
by modifying the sentence [or] [¶] (B) [v]acate the defendant’s conviction and
impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related
offense, . . . with the concurrence of the defendant, and then resentence the
defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) But “[a]
defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under

3 The statute also permits certain correctional officials or prosecuting

agencies to request recall and resentencing on the defendant’s behalf.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) There was no such request here.
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this section,” and if a defendant does so, “the court is not required to
respond.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Mixon invokes the language in section 1172.1, subdivisions (a)(1) and
(a)(3) to argue that the trial court should recall and resentence a defendant at
any time if the applicable sentencing laws have changed, and should consider
reducing his sentence to a lesser included or related offense. The Attorney
General argues that section 1172.1’s ameliorative provisions apply only to
proceedings undertaken pursuant to the statute’s specified triggers—that is,
as relevant here, if and when the court exercises its discretion on its own
motion to recall and resentence the defendant under subdivision (a)(1). We,
like the Attorney General, do not read section 1172.1 to require the trial court
to reconsider its resentencing of Mixon and therefore to compel remand for
that purpose. Instead, the statutory language reserves to the trial court the
discretion whether to act pursuant to the statute.
We accept, for purposes of this appeal, that a full resentencing must
incorporate any applicable ameliorative changes in sentencing law enacted
during the pendency of Mixon’s appeal and that section 1172.1 grants the
trial court discretion to modify the judgment of conviction and reduce Mixon’s
sentence. But section 1172.1 is not like other sentencing laws that the
Legislature has amended to require the trial court to recall and correct
sentences imposed pursuant to statutory provisions that have since been
invalidated. (Compare, e.g., § 1170.126, subd. (f) [directing courts to
resentence defendants consistent with amendments to third-strike law];
§ 1172.75, subd. (a) [invalidating specified enhancements for prior prison
terms]; § 1172.7, subd. (a) [invalidating certain sentencing enhancements for
controlled substance violations].) We therefore do not read section 1172.1 to

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allow Mixon to bypass the court’s discretionary authority to choose in the
first instance whether even to consider reducing his sentence.
Not only does section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) leave to the trial court
the decision whether, on its own motion and at any time, to recall and
resentence a defendant, but as noted, subdivision (c) plainly states that a
defendant has no right to petition for relief pursuant to section 1172.1 and
the trial court need not respond to any request made. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“A
defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under
this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this
section, the court is not required to respond”].) Elsewhere, the Legislature
has made clear its intention to allow specified individuals to request the
benefit of ameliorative changes in sentencing laws (see § 1172.1, subds. (a)(1),
(a)(7) [authorizing correctional or prosecutorial officials to petition trial court
for recall and resentencing and requiring court to state on the record its
reasons for granting or denying petition]; § 1170.91, subd. (b) [requiring a
trial court to hold a resentencing hearing, upon petition by a defendant
suffering from one or more of various conditions arising from military
service]; § 1172.2, subd. (c) [requiring trial court to hold a hearing within
10 days of receipt of petition from correctional officials requesting recall and
resentencing of defendant suffering from specified medical conditions]), but
its explicit decision not to grant a defendant that option under section 1172.1
counsels against ordering a remand here.
Mixon nonetheless urges us to remand his case to the trial court for
further resentencing because the trial court might be inclined to exercise its
discretion and reduce his sentence, consistent with the Legislature’s broader
policy goals. While a limited remand to allow the trial court to consider
changes to the statute might prove efficient, we perceive from the statutory

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language a clear intent to leave to the trial court the decision whether to
initiate any such proceedings. And even without a remand, the trial court
retains the discretion to reduce Mixon’s sentence further—on its own motion
and as it deems appropriate. Any instruction from us to exercise such
discretion would be superfluous at best and an impermissible intrusion into
the trial court’s discretionary purview at worst. Of course, by our resolution
of Mixon’s appeal, we express no opinion as to whether the trial court should
take that initiative now or at any time in the future; we simply decline to
order the trial court to act.
III. Section 1170, Subdivision (b)
Mixon also challenges the trial court’s imposition of an upper-term
sentence on count 11, contending that the court did not make the specific
findings required by section 1170, subdivision (b). The Attorney General
argues that Mixon forfeited this argument by not raising it in the trial court.
Mixon agrees counsel did not raise the argument below, but states there is no
forfeiture where the trial court failed to understand its statutory obligations,
citing People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825.
As in People v. Panozo, there is no indication in the record here that the
trial court considered section 1170, subdivision (b), and we decline to find
forfeiture. But it appears that the trial court did not consider section 1170,
subdivision (b) because it is not applicable. (See People v. Fredrickson (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 984, 989 [cases discussing possible forfeiture of statutory
sentencing considerations were inapplicable because statute did not apply in
the first place].)
Section 1170, subdivision (b) was recently amended to narrow the
circumstances in which a trial court can impose an upper-term sentence by
providing that “(1) [w]hen a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and

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the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term,
except. . . [¶] (2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b).) Section 1172.75 sets forth a
slightly different rule for choosing an appropriate sentence term at
resentencing. Subdivision (d)(4) states: “Unless the court originally imposed
the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle
term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those
facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
(§ 1172.75 subd. (d)(4).)
Mixon argues that the resentencing court did not find circumstances in
aggravation justifying imposition of the upper term on count 11, as the
revised version of section 1170, subdivision (b) requires. We assume that
specific provisions in a statutory scheme were intended to control over more
general ones. (People v. Superior Court (Ortiz) (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 851,
884.) Section 1172.75 specifically governs a resentencing proceeding
undertaken pursuant to its terms—that is, as here, when now-invalid
enhancements for prior prison terms imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) make up part of the defendant’s sentence. Section 1170,
subdivision (b), by contrast, sets forth the general rules for determinate
sentencing.

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The plain language of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), which
controls here, creates an exception that allows a resentencing court to
reimpose an upper-term sentence if that sentence was imposed at the
defendant’s initial sentencing. Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) includes
the extra prefatory phrase, “Unless the court originally imposed the upper
term [sentence],” expressly preserving a court’s authority to reimpose an
upper-term sentence without satisfying section 1170, subdivision (b), which
otherwise closely tracks the remaining portion of section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4). While the recent amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b) are ameliorative, and section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2)
directs courts to “apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion,” the specific carveout in subdivision (d)(4)
conveys the Legislature’s intent to create an exception to the more general
rules of sentencing set forth in section 1170.
That the two statutes were amended almost simultaneously, as Mixon
points out, only reinforces our conclusion that the Legislature intentionally
chose to structure the statutes in this manner. In amending both sections,
the Legislature seems to have intended the statutes to be consistent in their
approach to upper-term sentences, with the caveat that the resentencing
court applying the more specific provisions of section 1172.75 could, in its
discretion, defer to the initial sentencing court’s determination that the crime
warranted an upper-term sentence. We see no reason to depart from the
legislative intent conveyed by the statutory language, which harmonizes and
gives force to both provisions.
Mixon argues that the prefatory language in section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) indicates that the resentencing court should follow
subdivision (d)(2) in the case of a defendant initially sentenced to an upper

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term. Mixon suggests that subdivision (d)(2), then, implicitly incorporates
section 1170, subdivision (b), and that section 1170 essentially supplies the
default rules applicable in instances where the initial sentencing court
imposed an upper-term sentence. But no language in the statutes directs a
resentencing court to follow this circuitous path to a sentence. Further, our
reconciliation of the statutes does not effectively repeal section 1170,
subdivision (b), as Mixon contends, because that provision continues to
govern more generally in sentencing proceedings not initiated pursuant to
section 1172.75. Nor does it create an absurd result in potentially offering
different discretionary choices to courts resentencing defendants pursuant to
sections 1172.1 and 1172.75; as discussed, sections 1172.1 and 1172.75 were
enacted with distinct resentencing provisions reflecting distinct legislative
objectives. The trial court did not impermissibly reimpose an upper-term
sentence on count 11.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.

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