People v. Vasquez CA2/4

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Filed 8/1/24 P. v. Vasquez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B333572

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA078205)
v.

RUDY EVAN VASQUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Rudy Evan Vasquez appeals from an order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed
a supplemental brief. We review the contentions appellant raises
in his supplemental brief and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior proceedings
The following facts and prior history are taken in part from
our previous nonpublished opinion, People v. Vasquez (May 19,
2021, B308426) (Vasquez).
“In May 1992, a reputed member of appellant Rudy
Vasquez’s gang was killed by a rival gang member. Two weeks
later, appellant drove into the rival gang’s territory. A fellow
occupant of his car fired five or six gunshots into a group of rival
gang members. Two of the rivals were hit, and one died.[ ]”
“In 1994, a jury found appellant guilty of one count of
second degree murder, with an enhancement for a principal’s use
of a firearm, and one count of attempted first degree murder. The
trial court sentenced appellant to 16 years to life plus a
consecutive life sentence.” (Vasquez, supra.)
In 2015, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
asserting in part that the felony murder rule as applied to second
degree murder was void for vagueness. The trial court denied the
petition on the grounds that appellant “was not convicted of

1 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further undesignated statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

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second degree murder on a felony-murder theory. . . . [I]t is clear
from the record that [appellant] was convicted of second degree
murder on an aiding and abetting theory.”
“On August 30, 2019, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing under [former] Penal Code section 1170.95.
Appellant asserted that he had been convicted of murder under
the felony murder rule or natural and probable consequences
doctrine and could not now be convicted of murder because of
changes made to Penal Code sections 188 and 189 in January
2019.” (Vasquez, supra.)
The trial court denied appellant’s petition, and appellant
appealed. His appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues
and requesting review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436. Appellant did not file a supplemental brief. A different
panel of this division dismissed the appeal pursuant to People v.
Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496. (Vasquez, supra.)
B. Proceedings relevant to this appeal
On February 2, 2022, appellant filed another petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. The trial court
appointed counsel for appellant. The People opposed the petition
on the grounds that appellant was not eligible for relief because
he was convicted of second degree murder and willful, deliberate,
premeditated attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor; he
was not convicted under the felony murder rule, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any theory in which malice is
imputed. The People asserted that appellant’s jury was never
instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The People submitted the nonpublished
opinion from appellant’s original appeal, People v. Vasquez (Nov.
22, 1995, B084452), which noted that appellant “admitted driving

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the car while Jose Garcia shot at the victims. [Appellant] said
the shooting occurred after someone from the Primera Flats
group threw a bottle at the car.” The People also submitted some
of the jury instructions that had been given at appellant’s trial.
Appellant filed a reply brief stating that the jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine in
CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.11, and 8.31. Appellant asserted that he
therefore was not ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
The trial court denied appellant’s petition. The court noted
the 2015 finding that appellant was not convicted under a felony
murder theory. The court stated that it had reviewed the case
file, and “the jury was not instructed on any theory of felony
murder nor on a theory of natural and probable consequences.”
The court noted that appellant was convicted on an aiding and
abetting theory, which “is still a valid theory.” The court denied
the petition because appellant had not made a prima facie case
and was not entitled to relief.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues
and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. Appellant was advised of his right to file a
supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-
232), and he did so. We evaluate the arguments set forth in that
supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232 [“If the defendant
subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented
in that brief and to issue a written opinion”].)
Appellant asserts that the use of jury instructions CALJIC
Nos. 8.11 and 8.31 in his trial established a prima facie showing

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for resentencing. CALJIC No. 8.11, defining implied malice,
states in part that malice may be implied when “[t]he killing
resulted from an intentional act,” “[t]he natural consequences of
the act are dangerous to human life,” and “[t]he act was
deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for, human life.” CALJIC No. 8.31, defining
second degree murder resulting from an unlawful act dangerous
to life, states in part that second degree murder may occur where
“[t]he killing resulted from an intentional act,” “[t]he natural
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life,” and “[t]he
act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to,
and with conscious disregard for, human life.” CALJIC No. 8.31
therefore “recapitulate[s] the elements of implied malice as
elements of second degree murder.” (People v. Carr (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 136, 145 fn. 3 (Carr).)
Section 1172.6 allows for resentencing when a person has
been “convicted of . . . murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in
a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Appellant argues that because
CALJIC Nos. 8.11 and 8.31 include the phrase “natural
consequences,” his petition sufficiently established a prima facie
showing with respect to the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
Appellant confuses the phrase “natural consequences” in
the jury instructions with the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. They are not the same. It is well established that a
jury instruction stating that death is a “natural consequence” of
the defendant’s act “does not concern the imputed malice theory
of criminal liability that is part of the natural and probable

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consequences doctrine of accomplice liability affected by” changes
to the Penal Code relevant to section 1172.6. (People v. Carney
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1146.) “[W]hile the words ‘natural’ and
‘consequences’ overlap, the rest of the two formulations are
completely different.” (Carr, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 144; see
also People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1056 [“Although
the instructions related to implied malice and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine of aiding and abetting include
similar language regarding a ‘natural consequence,’ they are
distinctly different concepts”].) The instructions given to
appellant’s jury “did not allow implied malice to be imputed
solely from the natural consequences of the act.” (Carr, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 145 [discussing CALJIC No. 8.11]; see also
People v. Martinez (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 314, 334 [“the use of
the term ‘natural consequences’ in [jury instructions’] definition
of implied malice does not import into the crime of murder the
caselaw relating to the distinct ‘natural and probable
consequences’ doctrine developed in the context of aiding and
abetting liability”].) Defining implied malice to include the
“natural consequences” of the act remains valid after the
statutory changes relevant to resentencing under section 1172.6.
(See, e.g., People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)
Appellant cites two cases that do not support his
contentions: Henry v. Spearman (9th Cir. 2018) 899 F.3d 703 and
Woratzeck v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 648. Both cases
involve whether, under federal law, the petitioners may file
second or successive habeas corpus petitions to challenge their
convictions. These cases are not relevant to a petition for
resentencing under California’s section 1172.6 or the validity of
appellant’s convictions.

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In addition to rejecting the arguments appellant raised in
his supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
independently review the record, and we conclude no arguable
issues exist. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying relief is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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