Strelkova v. Allen CA4/3

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Filed 7/30/24 Strelkova v. Allen CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

NATALIA STRELKOVA,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G062601

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01263079)
DOUGLAS ALLEN,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent;

PAVEL Y. KOUPRINE,

Objector and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Craig L. Griffin, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Pavel Kouprine and Pavel Y. Kouprine for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Attorney Pavel Y. Kouprine challenges a sanctions order issued
by the trial court against him in the amount of $7,315. The sanctions order
was entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 and was based
on the court’s findings that actions or tactics by Kouprine were taken in bad
faith or were frivolous and solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE COMPLAINT IS FILED AND THE ANSWER IS SUBMITTED BUT REJECTED
On June 6, 2022, Kouprine, as counsel for plaintiff Natalia
Strelkova, filed a complaint against Douglas Allen arising out of Strelkova’s
rental of property from Allen. Allen was served by personal service on
June 11, 2022. Allen’s counsel, Zachariah Tomlin, timely submitted Allen’s
answer to the complaint via electronic filing on July 11, 2022; due to an error
by the clerk, however, the filing was rejected.
Tomlin served the answer on Kouprine by mail. Tomlin also
served written discovery on Kouprine, which Kouprine acknowledges he
received on July 14, 2022.
II.
DEFAULT IS ENTERED, THEN SET ASIDE
On July 12, 2022, one day after Allen’s response to the complaint
was due, Kouprine electronically filed a request for entry of default with the
trial court. The default was entered by the court clerk the same day (the
July 12 default). Tomlin contacted Kouprine on July 14, 2022, advising him
the court had improperly rejected Allen’s answer to the complaint and Tomlin
was attempting to correct the error.

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On July 18, Tomlin proposed a stipulation to set aside the July 12
default. Kouprine refused to sign it. Tomlin then filed an ex parte
application to set aside the default. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) The
trial court denied the ex parte application on the grounds it did not establish
irreparable harm or immediate danger, but set the matter for hearing on
September 26, 2022.
In the meantime, on August 2, 2022, a clerk’s application and
order re correction of error was entered, confirming that the default entered
on July 12, 2022 was an error by the clerk’s office, since an answer had been
submitted on July 11, 2022. The order set aside the July 12 default due to
the clerk’s error and ordered the answer previously submitted by Allen to be
deemed filed as of July 11, 2022. Although the clerk’s application correctly
identified the default as having been filed on “07/12/2022,” the line setting
forth the terms of the order contained a typographical error, noting the
default being set aside was filed on “07/12/2021.” Tomlin electronically
served a copy of the August 2 order on Kouprine on August 16, and the clerk’s
office served the order on Kouprine by mail on August 17.
On August 31, 2022, Kouprine, on behalf of Strelkova, filed a
notice of appeal from the August 2 order setting aside the July 12 default.
(Strelkova v. Allen, case No. G061753.) He filed a notice of abandonment of
that appeal on September 19, 2022; two days later, Kouprine filed a petition
for writ of mandate in this court to reverse the August 2 order. (Strelkova v.
Superior Court, case No. G061835.) A panel of this court summarily denied
the petition.

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III.
DEFAULT IS ENTERED FOR A SECOND TIME
On August 12, 2022, Kouprine filed a second request to enter
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Allen’s default, which the court clerk entered as requested. Although this
time Kouprine was well aware of the identity of Allen’s counsel, Kouprine did
not first advise Tomlin that he intended to seek this second default. On the
same day, Kouprine filed a motion for a protective order, asking the trial
court to order that Strelkova need not respond to the discovery propounded
by Allen, because Allen was now in default. Tomlin filed an opposition to the
motion, requesting sanctions against Strelkova and Kouprine. Ultimately,
Kouprine took the motion for a protective order off calendar.
On August 29, 2022, again in response to a clerk’s application for
correction of error, the trial court entered an order vacating the August 12
default on the ground Allen’s answer previously had been filed on July 11.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ISSUES AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
REGARDING SANCTIONS AND IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON KOUPRINE,
KOUPRINE’S LAW FIRM, AND STRELKOVA
In December 2022, Allen moved for discovery sanctions against
Strelkova and Kouprine. In January 2023, the trial court on its own motion
issued an order to show cause (OSC) regarding sanctions based on the entries
of default. The OSC read, in relevant part, as follows: “To Plaintiff Natalia
Strelkova, and her attorneys of record herein, Pavel Kouprine and the Law
Offices of Pavel Kouprine: [¶] You are ORDERED to show cause (OSC) why
sanctions, consisting of a penalty to be paid to the Court or reasonable

1
This, too, was an error by the clerk, as the trial court had already ruled
that Allen’s answer was deemed filed on July 11, 2022.

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attorney fees to be paid to Defendant Douglas Allen, in an amount not to
exceed $10,000 should not be assessed against you under Code of Civil
Procedure section 128.5 for the following conduct: [¶] 1. Taking the
Defendant’s default immediately after the answer was due. [¶] 2. Failing to
agree to set aside the default and forcing Defendant to file a motion to set
aside despite being presented with evidence that the default was entered by
an error of the clerk’s office, and having no evidence to the contrary. [¶]
3. Refiling a request for entry of default on August 12, 2022, after the Court
set aside the previous default by order of August 2, 2022, based on the clerk’s
office determination of error, and without performing your ethical obligation
to contact Defendant’s counsel prior to the filing of the second request for
default, and without providing Defendant a reasonable opportunity to avoid
the default. [¶] This OSC is based on the legal and ethical principles set
forth in LaSalle v. Vogel (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127, as recognized by Shapell
Socal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198.”
Kouprine and Strelkova filed a written response to the OSC.
Tomlin filed a declaration detailing the attorney fees he had incurred in
connection with the three categories of conduct by Kouprine that were
identified by the trial court in the OSC as having been made in bad faith,
frivolous, or solely intended to cause delay.
At the hearing on the OSC, the trial court expressed its belief
that Kouprine lacked credibility. “I am not getting any candor out of you
whatsoever.” “[Y]ou don’t have an answer because you knew the default had
been set aside as you say in your papers you knew it had been set aside, and
then you went and filed another request for default. [¶] I’m scratching my
head why you would do that. [¶] The answer you’ve given for that is clearly
false. It wasn’t to clear up some error or mistake because you also filed a

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request for judgment and a proposed judgment and then filed an appeal
afterward. [¶] I just get so little candor from you. It’s astonishing.”
The court acknowledged that the amount of sanctions reflected in its
tentative rulings on both the OSC and the discovery sanction motion “add up
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to almost $22,000.” But it explained: “[T]his is money that the other side
spent for nothing. I mean, to me, this is the most outrageous abuse of the
default procedure and of discovery that I’ve seen . . . in forever. I mean, the
fact that you knew that the court had removed the default, you knew it was a
clerk’s error, you knew the court had set it aside, then you refiled it anyway
knowing the court set it aside, then used it as a basis to file a motion for
protective order not to do any discovery, allow the other side any discovery.
[¶] To me, that’s just outrageous behavior. I don’t understand why you
would do that. [¶] But . . . I need to sanction you. I do very few OSC’s like
this, but I think it’s necessary. You know, I’m required to report you to the
State Bar and I’m giving you notice of that as required by rule. [¶] I just
think this is completely outrageous behavior. I think your declaration under
penalty of perjury as to why you filed the second default is not only
nonsensical, it’s also false. And . . . you were unable to answer the questions.
I mean, you made it sound like you didn’t know about it, the set aside . . . but
your papers said you did know about it, so I don’t think you’re being—having
any candor before the court in your argument. [¶] So I really don’t see a
need . . . to change any of my tentative ruling.”
In its final ruling on the OSC, the trial court declined to impose
sanctions for the conduct identified in the first paragraph of the OSC (taking

2
The trial court imposed sanctions in the amount of $14,300 against
Strelkova and Kouprine, jointly and severally, on Allen’s motion for discovery
sanctions. That order is not before us on this appeal.

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the first default on the first day after the answer was due without contacting
the other side), noting that, at the time, no one acting for the defendant had
contacted Kouprine. The trial court, however, did impose sanctions for the
conduct identified in the second paragraph of the OSC (failing to agree to set
aside the first default despite knowing default had been entered by the clerk
in error) and the third paragraph of the OSC (filing a second request to enter
default after the prior default was set aside and without contacting
defendant’s counsel before doing so). In explaining its ruling, the court made
a number of findings and conclusions:
First, the trial court found Kouprine was aware no later than
July 14, 2022, that Allen’s answer had been timely submitted to the court
and the clerk had erred by entering default. Thus, the court concluded
Kouprine’s “baseless refusal to stipulate to set aside the default” and his
opposition to Allen’s ex parte application “were undertaken in bad faith and
for the purpose of delay.”
Second, the trial court found Kouprine’s professed explanations
for filing the second request for default on August 12, 2022, were “facially
nonsensical” and “plainly false.” Kouprine suggested that he only sought the
second default as “an expeditious and economical means” of correcting the
typographical error in the date in the court’s August 2, 2022 order setting
aside the first default. The court found this was “facially nonsensical” and
“belied” by the facts that (1) Kouprine concurrently filed with the second
request for default a proposed judgment and a request for entry thereof; and
(2) he also filed a notice of appeal from the court’s corrected order setting
aside the first default. The court also found Kouprine’s filing of the motion
for a protective order regarding discovery concurrently with the second
application for default “demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s filing of the second

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default was for the purpose of delay, and not to simply clean up a typo on the
earlier set-aside motion.” The court concluded, “Plaintiff refused to cooperate
in setting aside a plainly erroneously entered default, and then quietly
sought another default and judgment after the Court had appropriately
stricken the first one. The explanations Plaintiff’s attorney offered for
seeking the second default—under penalty of perjury—are plainly false.”
Third, the trial court found that the conduct of Strelkova and
Kouprine “reflects actions or tactics made in bad faith that were frivolous and
solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, and that such conduct warrants
imposition of monetary sanctions under C.C.P. § 128.5 against both Plaintiff
and her counsel.”
Fourth, the trial court rejected Plaintiff’s safe harbor defense,
finding that the safe harbor provisions of Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.5, subdivision (f)(1) did not apply because, among other reasons,
“the filing of an application for default is not ‘a complaint, cross-complaint,
answer, or other responsive pleading.’”3
Fifth, with respect to the amount of sanctions awarded, the trial
court found that Tomlin’s hourly rate of $550 was reasonable and that
13.3 hours of attorney Tomlin’s time (somewhat less than Tomlin had
requested) were properly claimed. The court concluded that Strelkova,
Kouprine, and the Law Offices of Pavel Kouprine were jointly and severally
liable for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 in the
amount of $7,315, to be paid to Allen through his counsel of record within
45 days. The trial court also found the amount of sanctions assessed did not

3
We agree the safe harbor defense does not apply here and, in any event,
Kouprine does not pursue this argument on appeal.

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exceed the amount “‘sufficient to deter repetition of the action or tactic or
comparable action or tactic by others similarly situated’” under Code of Civil
Procedure section 128.5, subdivision (f)(2).
Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.7, the
trial court’s order referred the matter to the State Bar and provided notice to
Kouprine as required by rule 10.609 of the California Rules of Court.
Kouprine paid Tomlin’s law firm the ordered sanctions.
Strelkova filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPEALABILITY
After the filing of this appeal, Strelkova and Allen settled their
dispute. As Kouprine notes, however: “This appeal is focused on the action
taken by the Respondent Court in reporting the attorney Pavel Kouprine to
the California State Bar. The appeal does not seek to reverse any orders
affecting the parties to the underlying matter.” We conclude, despite the
settlement of the underlying action, this appeal is not moot.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘The award of sanctions for a frivolous action [or tactic] under
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 is within the sound discretion of the
trial court.’” (Wallis v. PHL Associates, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 882,
893.)4 “‘“The abuse of discretion standard . . . measures whether, given the
established evidence, the act of the lower tribunal falls within the permissible

4
One of the cases Kouprine cites in his appellate brief regarding the
standard of review is unpublished and uncitable. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1115(a).)

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range of options set by the legal criteria.”’ [Citation.] The scope of the trial
court’s discretion is limited by law governing the subject of the action taken.
[Citation.] An action that transgresses the bounds of the applicable legal
principles is deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] In applying the abuse
of discretion standard, we determine whether the trial court’s factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence and independently review its legal
conclusions.” (In re Marriage of Drake (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 934, 939–940.)
III.
ANALYSIS
The conduct by Kouprine the trial court found sanctionable was
(1) his refusal to set aside the first default even after he learned Allen’s
answer had been timely submitted to the court and the clerk had erroneously
refused to accept it; and (2) his stealthy second request for entry of default,
without advising Allen’s counsel that he intended to do so and despite
knowing the answer had already been filed weeks earlier.5
“The obligation to advise opposing counsel of an impending
default is part of an attorney’s responsibility to the court and the legal
profession and takes precedence over the obligation to represent the client
effectively.” (Shapell Socal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc.,

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Although the court’s order imposed sanctions jointly and severally against
Strelkova, Kouprine, and Kouprine’s law firm, it is only Kouprine who is
pursuing this appeal. As he candidly concedes in his appellate brief: “The
intent of this Appeal is to avoid a disciplinary action, through, perhaps, a
directive that the amount of sanctions, which is subject to the Business and
Profession[s] Code 6068.7, be considered to not to exceed $1,000.00. The only
order this Appeal effectively seeks is the reversal of the referral of attorney
Pavel Kouprine to the State Bar of California.”

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supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.) Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s findings that Kouprine and his law firm violated this obligation.
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s findings that
Kouprine acted in bad faith and pursued frivolous tactics solely to cause
unnecessary delay when he refused to set aside the first default despite
knowing it had been entered erroneously by the clerk and when he sought
(and obtained) a second default despite knowing Allen’s answer had already
been filed. It takes no elaborate analysis or citation to know that such
conduct by an attorney is beyond the pale.
Further, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings
that Kouprine failed in his duty to act with candor toward the court. “An
attorney is an officer of the court and owes the court a duty of candor.”
(Levine v. Berschneider (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 916, 921.) It is obvious that
Kouprine’s attempts to explain his actions to the court violated that duty.
In short, we find no error either in the trial court’s conclusion
that sanctions were appropriate or in the amount of sanctions awarded.
None of Kouprine’s arguments to the contrary is persuasive.
Kouprine argues the entire sanctions award is improper because
no party made a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.
This argument relies on Kouprine’s selective quotations from the statute.
Read in its entirety, Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 gives the trial
court the authority to issue an OSC regarding sanctions and then impose
sanctions. The necessary notice was provided to Kouprine through the OSC.
The amount of sanctions, tied to the attorney fees incurred by Allen as a
result of Kouprine’s improper tactics, was appropriate.
Kouprine also argues the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding sanctions for the attorney fees spent opposing his petition for a writ

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of mandate. It is clear that the filing of the writ petition was part of a long
string of actions by Kouprine undertaken in bad faith after he had notice the
July 12 default had been entered in error. The appeal from the order setting
aside the July 12 default and the subsequent petition for writ were part of
Kouprine’s persistent, bad faith refusal to agree to set aside the default after
he was aware it had been improperly entered, and to then attempt to reverse
the order setting it aside. The OSC did not deny Kouprine an opportunity to
respond vis-à-vis his actions regarding the petition for a writ; to the contrary,
his response to the OSC filed with the trial court specifically addressed his
actions in filing the petition for a writ.
Kouprine’s argument that the time period for Allen to seek
attorney fees and costs in connection with the petition for a writ expired
before the OSC was issued also is without merit. The trial court had
inherent authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 to manage the
cases before it and to effectuate its judgments and orders. (Rutherford v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967; Blueberry Properties, LLC v.
Chow (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1021.) The court’s ability to sanction
Kouprine was not restricted by the statutory time limits imposed on a
prevailing party seeking costs.
Kouprine argues his opposition to the ex parte application to set
aside the July 12 default cannot be deemed frivolous because the trial court
judge denied the ex parte application and set the matter for a hearing. This,
too, is wishful thinking by Kouprine. It is true the trial court found Allen
“has not made ‘an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing
competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm,
immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.’”
But that was not a ruling on the merits of the motion to set aside the default;

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it was simply a determination that considering the matter at a regularly-set
hearing would not cause irreparable harm to Allen.
In sum, the findings in the trial court’s order imposing sanctions
under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 are supported by substantial
evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions or
in determining the amount of the monetary sanctions imposed. We decline
Kouprine’s request to reduce the amount of the monetary sanctions (or deem
them to be reduced) to something under $1,000 so that he can avoid being
referred to the State Bar for potential disciplinary action. Kouprine’s conduct
here is precisely the kind of egregious conduct by counsel that should be
brought to the attention of the State Bar. Although “sanctions should be
reserved for serious violations of the standard of practice,” they are entirely
appropriate where an attorney’s lack of civility or candor toward the court is
severe. (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 293–
294.) That is the case here.
DISPOSITION
The sanctions order is affirmed. Because no other party
appeared on appeal, no party shall recover costs on appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.

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