CourtListener 10015354•People v. Posey CA1/4
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Filed 7/26/24 P. v. Posey CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169370
v. (Napa County Super. Ct.
MICHAEL SCOTT POSEY, No. CR122583)
Defendant and Appellant.
Michael Scott Posey appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition
for relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Section 1172.6 allows a
“person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” to petition to
have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced if the conviction
would not be valid under the recent amendments to sections 188 and 189.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) At the hearing Posey’s attorney stated Posey did not
qualify for resentencing and submitted on the prosecutor’s opposition brief.
The trial court agreed and denied the request for relief pursuant to section
1172.6. Posey filed a supplemental brief arguing the court erred in denying
his petition for relief. We disagree.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND
As described in our prior opinion in this matter, “[d]efendant’s
estranged wife, Elizabeth Posey (Liz) [fn. omitted], was shot to death when
she went to defendant’s house to drop off the couple’s children for a weekend
visit. She died from a contact shot to the head; the muzzle of the gun had
been pressed under her chin against the skin. Defendant told the police the
gun discharged accidentally during a struggle to disarm Liz after she tried to
kill him because he reneged on a promise to pay a $2,000 expense.” (People v.
Posey (Jan. 22, 2009, A118361) [nonpub. opn.] at p. 1–2.)
“The prosecution maintained that defendant planned to murder Liz
when she came to the house and did so by holding her down and shooting her
in the head. The prosecution presented numerous police officers and forensic
scientists who testified that the defendant’s account of the shooting was
inconsistent with the physical evidence. The prosecution also presented
evidence that Liz was too frightened and intimidated by defendant to attack
him as defendant claimed and that defendant, not Liz, had a reputation for
violent behavior.” (People v. Posey, supra, A118361 at p. 2.)
Nothing in the record suggests anyone else other than Posey was
involved in the murder of Liz. No jury instructions were given on aiding and
abetting. The court did instruct on excusable homicide; on justifiable
homicide; on imperfect self-defense; on manslaughter; on murder with
express and implied malice; and on provocation to reduce first-degree to
second-degree murder.
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Under section 1172.6 a person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural or probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
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which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime may petition to have the conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts. “A petitioner is ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law if, for example, the jury instructions show
that the jurors were not instructed on any theory of liability affected by
Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189. [Citation.] A petitioner is
also ineligible for relief if the record of conviction shows that their conviction
was based on a theory of liability that remains valid under Senate Bill 1437.
[Citation.] We review de novo a trial court’s prima facie determination that a
petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.” (People v.
Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395.)
II. Analysis
Posey’s supplemental brief argues section 1172.6 “does not exclude
actual perpetrators [nor] particular forms of malice.” As discussed above
section 1172.6 applies to persons convicted of felony murder, murder under
the natural or probable consequences doctrine, or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime. None of these apply to Posey. The jury rejected Posey’s version of
events and convicted Posey of first-degree murder with a true finding of
personal use of a firearm. In order to find Posey guilty of first-degree murder
the jury had to find Posey intended to kill his wife. Intent to kill is express
malice. As such, the trial court was correct in determining Posey was not
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
Posey makes further arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence
and error in admitting certain evidence at trial. These arguments are not
relevant to a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
DOUGLAS, J.*
We concur:
BROWN, P.J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Posey (A169370)
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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