Cuevas v. Centurion Protection Services CA2/2

CourtListener 10013476Calctapp24 juil. 2024

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Filed 7/24/24 Cuevas v. Centurion Protection Services CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

WALTER CUEVAS, B333621

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV41627)

CENTURION PROTECTION
SERVICES et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.

Briggs Law, Cory J. Briggs and Nora Pasin for Defendants
and Appellants.
Gutierrez Derham Law Firm and Matthew Gutierrez for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
After a former employee sent a text message to a former
client asking to “meet up” to discuss the former employee’s
pending lawsuit against his employer, the employer cross-claimed
against the former employee for, among other claims, interfering
with its contractual relations, interfering with prospective
economic advantage, defamation, and libel. The trial court struck
certain paragraphs from the employer’s claims after concluding
that the text message at issue in those paragraphs constituted
“protected activity” under our anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., §
425.16)1 and that the employer had not made a showing that the
four claims had minimal merit. Because this ruling was correct,
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Employer Hires Then Fires Former Employee, and
Employee Sues
A. Employment relationship
Centurion Protection Services (Centurion) is a “private-
security firm providing customized protection and bodyguard
services to high-profile clients.” Centurion’s CEO is Richard Ray
Dudgeon, and its secretary is Tom Rogers.
In June 2019, Centurion hired Walter Cuevas as one of its
bodyguards. Because Cuevas represented that he had worked as

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
“SLAPP” is short for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.”

2
a firefighter, Centurion “provided him access to its high-profile
clientele and paid him at a higher rate of pay to reflect his
alleged experience.” As part of his employment, Cuevas executed
a nondisclosure agreement that prohibited him from disclosing
information regarding Centurion or its clients.
Cuevas provided services through Centurion to actor-
comedian Kevin Hart and his wife.
In November 2020, Centurion learned that Cuevas “had
mispresented his experience as a firefighter.” Shortly thereafter,
on November 15, 2020, Centurion terminated Cuevas’s
employment.
B. Employee’s lawsuit
In November 2021, Cuevas sued Centurion, Dudgeon, and
Rogers. In the operative first amended complaint, Cuevas
brought 10 claims for various violations of the Labor Code, for
installing a tracking device on his personal vehicle, and for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2
II. Employee’s Post-Lawsuit Conduct, Prompting
Employer to Cross-Claim
A. Employee’s post-lawsuit conduct
In January 2021, Cuevas “made various statements to
third-parties” disclosing confidential information.

2 More specifically, Cuevas alleged claims for (1) violation of
the Private Attorney General Act (Lab. Code, § 2699 et seq.); (2)
failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to reimburse or
indemnify for work-related expenditures; (4) failure to provide
meal and rest breaks; (5) waiting time penalties; (6) penalties
under Labor Code section 1198.5, subdivision (k); (7) penalties
under Labor Code section 226, subdivision (f); (8) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (9) violation of Penal Code section
637.7; and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

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On August 24, 2022, Cuevas attempted to call Kevin Hart.
When no one answered, he sent a text message to Hart’s wife
that stated:

“Hey ma’am sorry to bother, it’s walter [Cuevas]. I
used to work for you guys. I was calling because there
is a ongoing case with someone we both know that
decided to put my family in danger. The issue is if it
escalates anymore it will end up dragging kevin into
it and ultimately that night. I apologize for dropping
this out of no where on you. If you and kevin would
like to meet up so I can explain the situation better
please let me know. God bless you guys.”
(Grammatical and punctuation errors in original.)

B. Employer’s cross-claims
In April 2023, Centurion and Dudgeon (collectively,
Centurion) filed a cross-complaint against Cuevas. In the
operative second amended cross-complaint, Centurion alleged
four claims tied to the text message for (1) intentional
interference with contractual relations, (2) intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, (3)
defamation, and (4) libel.3 In a paragraph set forth as part of its
general allegations and repeated four more times in support of
each claim, Centurion alleged that Cuevas’s August 24, 2022 text
“message referenced [his] pending lawsuit against [Centurion],
made an outlandish and unfounded claim that [Centurion] had

3 Centurion and Dudgeon also alleged claims for (1) breach of
the nondisclosure agreement (arising out of Cuevas’s alleged
disclosures of confidential information), and (2) intentional
misrepresentation (arising out of Cuevas’s statement about being
a firefighter). Because these claims are not implicated by the
anti-SLAPP motion in this case, we do not discuss them further.

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put his ‘family in danger’ and threatened to disclose personal,
private information of the client that Cuevas had learned of
during his employment unless the client and his wife met with
him to discuss the litigation.” Centurion further alleged that the
text message “was intended to essentially accomplish . . . three
things . . .—(1) disrupt and interfere with [Centurion’s] ongoing
business relationships, in particular with [Hart], (2) tarnish
[Centurion’s] reputation with [Hart] in order to disrupt and
interfere with [Centurion’s] future business relationships, and (3)
coerce and leverage [Hart] to persuade [Centurion] to settle the
underlying litigation and pay Cuevas.”
III. Anti-SLAPP Litigation
In September 2023, Cuevas filed a motion under our anti-
SLAPP law asking the trial court to strike the five paragraphs
from the cross-complaint regarding the text message. Centurion
filed an opposition to the motion, which was accompanied by a
declaration from Dudgeon that (1) explained Centurion’s
business, (2) authenticated and attached the nondisclosure
agreement, and (3) denied ever putting Cuevas’s family in
danger. Cuevas filed a reply.
After holding a hearing in October 2023, the trial court
issued a ruling granting the anti-SLAPP motion and struck the
text message-related paragraphs supporting Centurion’s claims
for intentional interference with contractual relations,
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage,
defamation, and libel. The court ruled that the paragraphs all
involved activity “protected” by the anti-SLAPP law because they
“concern statements made in connection with pending litigation”;
specifically, the text message “was explicitly connected to
Cuevas’s attempt to gather evidence in support of his pending

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claims in this action.” The court further ruled that Centurion
had not carried its burden of showing that the four affected
claims had minimal merit because it did “not present evidence”
and merely relied on its “unverified pleading” and “argument.”
Centurion filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Centurion argues that the trial court erred in granting
Cuevas’s anti-SLAPP motion and striking the five paragraphs in
its cross-complaint regarding Cuevas’s text message. We
independently review a trial court’s grant of an anti-SLAPP
motion. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ.
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)
I. Pertinent Anti-SLAPP Law
“The anti-SLAPP law ‘provides a procedure for weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims [or allegations] arising
from’ activity that is protected by the law. (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Accordingly, a trial court tasked with
ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion must ask two questions: (1) has
the moving party ‘made a threshold showing that the challenged
cause of action [or allegation] arises from protected activity’
(Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056), and, if so, (2)
has the nonmoving party ‘established . . . a probability that [it]
will prevail’ on the challenged cause of action by showing that the
claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v.
Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, 887; Lee v. Kim (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 705, 720-721; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 93-94; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
In assessing whether the challenged cause of action or
portion thereof constitutes protected activity (the first question),
a court must ask “two subsidiary questions: (1) What conduct

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does the challenged cause of action ‘arise[] from’; and (2) is that
conduct ‘protected activity’ under the anti-SLAPP [law]?”
(Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 686, 698.)
In evaluating the first subsidiary question, a cause of
action “arises from” protected activity when it is “based on” or “its
elements arise from” protected activity—that is, when the
protected activity “itself” is the “‘“principal thrust or gravamen”’”
or “‘core injury-producing conduct’” warranting relief. (City of
Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78; Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009, 1015 (Bonni); Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060; Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community
Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 134.) In
evaluating this first subsidiary question, a trial court must
consider “the ‘pleadings’” as well as the “‘supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or [a] defense
is based,’” although the pleadings are of primary importance
because the plaintiff is the architect of their own complaint, such
that the core injury-producing conduct at issue in a case is
primarily a function of “‘“what is pled—not what is proven.”’”
(Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 936-
937; Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 942; § 425.16,
subd. (b)(2).)
In evaluating the second subsidiary question, the anti-
SLAPP law itself defines four categories of protected activity. (§
425.16, subd. (e); City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th
409, 422.) One is pertinent here: “[A]ny written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (§

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425.16, subd. (e).) Although “[n]ot all . . . conduct in connection
with litigation . . . is protected” (California Bank Specialists
Medical Group v. Rand (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037;
Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388,
1400), “‘“communications preparatory to or in anticipation”’” of
litigation (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268
(Neville), quoting Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115) and communications attendant to
ongoing litigation—including formal discovery requests, more
informal attempts to speak with potential witnesses to litigation,
and missives notifying interested persons of ongoing litigation—
are “made in connection” with issues under judicial review
(Mallard v. Progressive Choice Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
531, 538 [issuance of subpoena to obtain discovery in ongoing
lawsuit]; Neville, at pp. 1267-1268 [communications with
“potential witnesses”]; Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro,
Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1053-1054 (Contemporary
Services) [same]; Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation
Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 3-6 [letter to nonparties advising
them of ongoing litigation]; Contemporary Services, at pp. 1053-
1055 [same].)
II. Analysis
A. Do the challenged paragraphs involve
“protected activity”?
We independently agree with the trial court that the five
paragraphs Cuevas challenges from Centurion’s operative cross-
complaint arise from protected activity. As noted above,
“protected activity” includes communications made to potential
witnesses in litigation. (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1267-1268; Contemporary Services, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp.

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1053-1054.) The five paragraphs at issue each allege that Cuevas
sent a text message referring to his “pending lawsuit against
[Centurion]” and urging Hart’s wife and Hart himself to “me[e]t
with [Cuevas] to discuss the litigation.” Thus, the conduct
alleged in these paragraphs—namely, sending a text message to
potential witnesses to discuss the events at issue in ongoing
litigation—constitutes protected activity. What is more, Cuevas’s
act in sending the text message is the “core injury-producing
conduct” underlying Centurion’s intentional interference and
defamation-related claims because the content of that text
message is what Centurion alleges damaged its relationship with
Hart and with potential future clients, and is what Centurion
alleges contains a false (and hence defamatory and libelous)
statement about making threats to Cuevas’s family.
Centurion resists this conclusion with what boils down to
three groups of arguments.
First and foremost, Centurion argues that what is most
important about Cuevas’s text message is the harm it has done to
Centurion’s current and future business arrangements and the
harm attendant to the false representation that Centurion
threatened Cuevas’s family; thus, Centurion urges, the text
message’s “mention of litigation” is merely “passing” and hence
“incidental background” rather than “core injury-producing
conduct.” To be sure, courts applying the anti-SLAPP law
continue to draw a distinction between acts that “supply the
elements of a claim” on the one hand, and acts that “are
incidental background” on the other. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 1012.) But that distinction is irrelevant here, where Centurion
alleges a single act—that is, Cuevas’s act in sending the text
message to Hart’s wife—which is the very act that causes the

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interference with its current and future business arrangements
and that constitutes defamation and libel. Put differently, the
fact that Centurion is suing Cuevas for what he communicated in
parts of his text message does not somehow negate the fact that
the text message is the basis for Centurion’s claims or the fact
that it is a communication connected to ongoing litigation (and
hence activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law). Similarly, the
fact that Centurion alleges that the content of the text message is
economically harmful and false does not somehow remove it from
the realm of protected activity; indeed, only conduct that is
conclusively or concededly illegal is deemed to be removed from
the ambit of the anti-SLAPP law’s protection (Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 319), and Centurion does not—and
cannot—make any claim of such definitive illegality in this case.
Second, Centurion argues that the trial court erred in
relying on the text message because it (1) did not explicitly spell
out which lawsuit was pending between Cuevas and Centurion,
and (2) was incomplete under Evidence Code section 356. These
arguments border on the frivolous. The record only suggests a
single lawsuit between Cuevas and Centurion, so Centurion’s
insinuation that the text message could be referring to some
other lawsuit between these parties is purely speculative. Along
the same lines, nothing in the record indicates that there was
some other part of the text message conversation that is missing;
indeed, Centurion chose to rely on only that text message, so is
not in a position to now complain that the message was part of
some broader back-and-forth conversation.
Third and lastly, Centurion argues that this case is
analogous to Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999 and
Gazal v. Echeverry (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 34. These cases are

10
inapt. In Starr, the court ruled that “[m]isconduct in the
administration of a trust and preservation of trust assets” is not
protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law (Starr, at p. 1021);
in Gazal, the court ruled that a church homily is not protected
activity when the damage caused to the plaintiff arose from
fraudulent conduct occurring after the homily (Gazal, at pp. 37,
41). Unlike Starr and Gazal, the harm Centurion complains of in
its interference and defamation-related claims is harm arising
from the very same text message sent to enlist aid from potential
witnesses in ongoing litigation.
B. Has Centurion established that its four
challenged claims have “minimal merit”?
We independently agree with the trial court that Centurion
did not carry its burden of producing evidence to support each
and every element of its four challenged claims.
To prove intentional interference with contractual
relations, a plaintiff must show “‘(1) a valid contract between a
plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of th[e]
contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a
breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual
breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5)
resulting damage.’” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55, italics added.) To prove intentional
interference with a prospective economic advantage, the plaintiff
must prove (1) “‘“‘an economic relationship between the plaintiff
and some third party’”’”; (2) “‘the defendant’s knowledge of the
relationship’”; (3)(a) “the defendant engaged in conduct that
interfered with that relationship and (b) the defendant’s conduct
was ‘independently wrongful’”; (4) “the defendant either intended
to interfere with the relationship or ‘knew that the interference

11
was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of its’
conduct”; and (5) “the defendant’s acts ‘proximately caused’
‘economic harm to the plaintiff.’” (Drink Tank Ventures LLC v.
Real Soda in Real Bottles, Ltd. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 528, 537-
538, italics added; Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc (2020) 9
Cal.5th 1130, 1141; Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1164-1165.) Here, Centurion adduced no
evidence whatsoever indicating whether and how its current
contracts or future business prospects were damaged by Cuevas’s
text message. This omission is fatal.
To prove defamation or libel, a plaintiff must show “‘([1]) a
publication that is ([2]) false, ([3]) defamatory, and ([4])
unprivileged, and that ([5]) has a natural tendency to injure or
that causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th
683, 720; see Civ. Code, §§ 44, 45, 45a.) Here, Centurion adduced
no evidence whatsoever on any element except the second element
of falsity. These omissions are fatal.
Centurion makes two arguments in response. First, it
argues that it is “not required to prove each cause of action to the
trial court.” That assertion is legally incorrect. Second,
Centurion argues that its opposition included Dudgeon’s
declaration and a copy of the nondisclosure agreement. This is
true, but these items of evidence—the only Centurion proffered—
do not respond to many elements of its challenged claims.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Cuevas is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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