CourtListener 10013469•In re B.M. CA2/5
Texte intégral
Filed 7/24/24 In re B.M. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re B.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. B333410
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 20CCJP06535A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.M., Jr. and J.P.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Conditionally reversed
and remanded with directions.
Richard B. Lennon and Merrill L. Toole, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
K.M. Jr.
Erin Riley Khorram, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.P.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2
In this appeal from a parental rights termination order,
parents K.M., Jr. (Father) and J.P. (Mother) contend the juvenile
court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) did not fully comply with their
obligations under California law related to the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA). Specifically, they argue the record does not
confirm the Department contacted all three federally recognized
Cherokee tribes after two family members reported minor B.M.’s
paternal great grandmother was a Cherokee tribal member. We
agree there is some ambiguity in the record that should be
cleared up, so we shall conditionally reverse the parental rights
termination order and remand for that purpose.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2020, the Department filed a dependency
petition alleging then-newborn B.M. was a dependent child under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 because of her parents’
history of domestic abuse and her mother’s substance abuse.1
During the initial dependency court proceedings, Father informed
the Department and the juvenile court that his grandmother
(B.M.’s paternal great grandmother) Amanda M. (Amanda) was a
member of the Cherokee tribe.2 Mother denied having any Indian
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
We discuss only Father’s claim of possible Cherokee
ancestry in this opinion because there is no argument on appeal
that the Department or the juvenile court committed ICWA-
related error in any other respect.
3
ancestry. The trial court ordered the Department to investigate
whether B.M. is or may be an Indian child.
Father referred the Department to his father K.M., Sr.
(Senior) as a potential source of additional information about any
Indian heritage. Senior told the Department that his mother
Amanda was a registered member of the Cherokee tribe and
provided her date of birth and date of death (in 2011). Senior
said he was not a tribal member, nor was Father.
The Department summarized this information in a
February 2022 report for the juvenile court and added that it had
“sent inquiries to the Cherokee Tribes regarding the ICWA status
for this family. At the time of the writing of this report, the
Department is waiting for a response from the respective
branches of Cherokee tribes.” At a review hearing held that same
month, the juvenile court ordered the Department to provide a
future update on “any responses from the Cherokee tribe” but
found it had no reason to know B.M. was an Indian child and did
not order formal notice to any tribe or the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.
A report filed with the juvenile court later in May 2022
states an “ICWA-020 ‘Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for
Indian Child’ Notice was mailed to the Cherokee tribe. A
Response Letter from the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,
dated 03/10/2022 and attached herein, documents the following,
in part: [¶] ‘Our office has reviewed the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians’ tribal registry and based on the information
received from you, [B.M.] is neither registered nor eligible to
register as a member of this tribe.’ [¶] No additional Response
Letters or Certified Mail Return Receipts have been received by
the Department” (typeface emphasis removed). This appears to
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indicate that the Department made the ICWA-related inquiry it
referenced in its earlier report by mailing a copy of Father’s
ICWA-20 form that bore only Amanda’s name and information
concerning the ongoing dependency proceedings. The statements
in the Department’s February and May reports also leave
matters unclear as to whether the other two federally recognized
Cherokee tribes (beyond the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians)
were contacted: the February 2022 report says inquiries were
sent to multiple branches of the Cherokee tribes but the May
2022 report says an ICWA-20 notice was sent to “the Cherokee
tribe” (singular) and reports no return receipts were received
from mail sent to any tribe other than the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians.
While ICWA-related investigation was ongoing, the
juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over B.M. Father
appealed the jurisdiction finding and the parties to the appeal
contended this court should direct the juvenile court to comply
with ICWA without reversing or affirming the jurisdiction
finding. (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 636.) We
dismissed the appeal and explained our reason for doing so:
“[A]ll we could order in resolving this appeal is that the
Department and juvenile court fulfill their inquiry and notice
obligations under ICWA and related California law. Because
that is what the Department is already doing, and because we
are not in a position to micromanage that process in this appeal
(detailing, for instance, all those who must be interviewed, what
they must be asked, and what must be included in any notice to
tribes that is required), there is no effective relief we can now
provide. The juvenile court must direct that process, at least in
the first instance.” (Id. at 638-639.)
5
During the proceedings in the juvenile court that followed,
the court found there was no reason to know B.M. was an Indian
child, ordered parental rights terminated at an October 2023
hearing, and set adoption as B.M.’s permanent plan. The parents
appeal from the parental rights termination order and contest
only the adequacy of the Department’s ICWA-related inquiry into
whether B.M. may be a member of, or eligible for membership in,
any of the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes.
II. DISCUSSION
The record reveals the juvenile court and the Department
made conscientious efforts to comply with their ICWA-related
obligations. They largely succeeded. But we nonetheless believe
a remand for ICWA-related reasons is required because the
record is unclear in one limited respect: whether the Department
managed to make adequate contact with all of the Cherokee
tribes after Father and Senior both reported Amanda was a
member of a Cherokee tribe.
Under ICWA and related California law, the Department
and the juvenile court have “an affirmative and continuing duty
to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).)
Section 224.2, subdivision (b) states “[i]nquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the
child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” Subdivision
(e)(1) of the same statute explains “[t]here is reason to believe a
child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the
6
court, social worker, or probation officer has information
suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”
Under section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2), when reason to believe a
child is an Indian child exists, “further inquiry is necessary to
help the court, social worker, or probation officer determine
whether there is reason to know a child is an Indian child” and
such further inquiry includes contacting (among others) the tribe
or tribes in question. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) This contact with
tribes “shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or
electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt
of notices under [ICWA]. Contact with a tribe shall include
sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the
tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as well
as information on the current status of the child and the case.”3
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).)
The statutory obligation just discussed is why we now
remand the matter. While the record is clear that the
Department did contact the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
(albeit with limited information given the apparent decision to
inquire simply by mailing a copy of Father’s ICWA-20 form), the
record does not adequately establish the Department made any
contact with either of the other two federally recognized Indian
tribes. (See generally In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184,
210 [the three Cherokee tribes are the Cherokee Nation of
3
When there is reason to know a child is an Indian child, the
Department must provide formal notice to the tribe or tribes in
question as provided in section 224.3. (§§ 224.2, subd. (f), 224.3,
subd. (a)(5).)
7
Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians].) Instead, the
record in places suggests only an attempt to contact a single
Cherokee tribe was made and in another place indicates that if
there was an attempt to contact all the tribes, the attempt may
have failed as to two of them because no mailing return receipts
were received. The Department must therefore clarify and
document its efforts to contact the Cherokee tribes on remand.
8
DISPOSITION
The parental rights termination order is conditionally
reversed and the cause is remanded solely for the purpose of
permitting the juvenile court to order the Department to
document its contact with all federally recognized Cherokee
tribes as required by section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(C). Upon
receipt of this documentation, the juvenile court shall make a
finding on the record as to whether there is reason to know B.M.
is an Indian child. If such reason to know exists, the juvenile
court shall order the Department to provide formal notice to the
tribe(s) in question and thereafter proceed in accordance with
ICWA and related California law. (Nothing in this disposition
precludes the juvenile court from directing the Department to
provide formal notice in the first instance as a prudential matter.
(In re P.H., Jr. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 992, 996, fn. 3.)) If the
court again finds there is no reason to know B.M. is an Indian
child, the court shall reinstate the parental rights termination
order and make any other necessary orders not in conflict with
this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J. KIM, J.
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