CourtListener 10011969•People v. Watson CA1/1
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Filed 7/23/24 P. v. Watson CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A165995
v.
WILL ANTHONY WATSON, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 17CR003246)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Will Anthony Watson was convicted by jury of second degree
murder of Gregory Ignacio, Jr., and sentenced to 40 years to life. On appeal,
defendant contends the trial court: (1) erred in admitting witness
identifications into evidence; (2) erred in preventing impeachment and cross-
examination of a witness; (3) abused its discretion in not striking a firearm
enhancement; and (4) violated defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights
to be present throughout his sentencing hearing. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The People’s Case
Prosecution witnesses testified to the following events: In September
2016, S.H. met her cousin T.L. and her friend T.J. in Berkeley to “hang out
1
and go[] to purchase some weed.”1 T.J. arrived with her friend Gregory
Ignacio, Jr., who S.H. and T.L. knew only by the nickname “G”.
T.J. eventually called Jacob Felipe,2 from whom she and T.L. had
previously bought marijuana. The three girls and Ignacio walked about four
or five blocks to meet Felipe to make the purchase. It was late afternoon or
early evening, but still light.
The group met Felipe, who was alone, near some apartment buildings.
They spent no more than five minutes buying the marijuana.
The three girls started walking away, but Ignacio stayed and spoke
briefly with Felipe. To T.J., it looked as though Ignacio and Felipe were
“chatting.” T.L. described their exchange as a “regular conversation, not
hostile.” S.H. did not remember any fights, arguments, or hostilities between
Ignacio and Felipe.
Ignacio then rejoined the trio, and the four continued walking back
toward where they had started. Shortly thereafter, a man, later identified as
defendant, approached them from behind—coming from where they had
purchased the marijuana. As he approached, he spoke to Ignacio. T.J. heard
him say something like, “ ‘This is Fairview’ ” and “ ‘Hey, you got a problem
with Jake?’ ” She heard Ignacio respond, “ ‘Who are you?’ ” T.L. initially
“heard a little bit of yelling. It was inaudible at that time.” As the man got
closer, she heard him twice yell at Ignacio, “ ‘Do you have a problem with J?’ ”
She described the man as “[a]ngry, hostile” and “three, four feet away” from
them. S.H. could not make out what the man was saying but she could tell,
1 At the time, S.H., T.J., and T.L. were teenagers, and T.J. and T.L.
were minors. We therefore refer to these individuals by their initials.
2 Felipe is referred to as Jake or “J” throughout the reporter’s
transcript. We refer to him by his last name.
2
“by the actions and the hands,” the interaction “was very hostile.” Ignacio
appeared shocked.
As the girls turned to continue walking, they saw the man “grab his
pocket” or reach for “his waistband,” “near where like your pocket on your
pants would be.” T.J. saw “two red flashes.” T.L. saw the man grab a
handgun and point it at Ignacio. She then heard gunshots. S.H. heard “a
pop, a loud pop,” which she recognized as gunshots. All three ran.
When they looked back at Ignacio, he was lying on the ground,
bleeding. All three spoke with a 911 operator.3 T.J. described the shooter as
having a “fairly white” “skin tone,” a “sharp, a pointy nose,” and wearing a
“hoodie and a cap.” She recalled seeing a curl of hair “like swooped under
around his ear” and thought his hair length was “a little past his ears,” “quite
a bit shorter” than Felipe’s. T.L. said the man was White but then said he
might be “Mexican or a mix,” based on his skin tone. S.H. described the
shooter as being “Latino or White,” having “a very pointy nose,” and wearing
a hat.
A few months after the shooting, Berkeley Police arrested T.J. for
“conspiracy” to commit murder, based on their mistaken belief she had placed
a call to Felipe after the killing. During the almost 13 hours she was held at
the police station, Berkeley Police Sergeant Jesse Grant conducted two
interviews. During the first, T.J. repeatedly said Felipe was not the shooter.
After the interview, she was placed in a holding cell. During the second
interview, after Grant explained what “conspiracy to commit murder means,”
T.J. identified Felipe, testifying at trial, “At that point, after thinking, ‘Wow,
3 T.J and S.H. made separate 911 calls which were played for the
jury. T.L. did not call 911 herself but spoke with an operator, and her
portion of the call was also played for the jury.
3
this is what it is’—I felt the officers presented me with so many pictures of
Jake after many things I told them, I just gave in. ‘Since you guys are telling
me it’s this person, it is this person. I want to go home.’ ” When asked if she
identified Felipe because he was the shooter, she testified, “No,” but “because
I wanted to go home. And since that is what the officers had told me, it was
like I was forced to believe it.” T.J. also testified, however, that she still
believed Felipe was involved, but he was not the shooter.
About four months after the shooting, in January 2017, the Berkeley
Police Department showed T.L. and S.H. photo lineups. Although
defendant’s photograph was included in both, neither identified anyone in the
lineup as the shooter. T.L. identified Felipe as the man they “bought weed
from” but stated he was not the shooter. T.J. was not presented with a photo
lineup.
The following month, T.J., T.L., and S.H. were taken to an in-person
lineup.4 All three sat in the viewing room; two were seated in the front row
with an empty chair between them, and one was seated in the second row.
They were each given a sheet with an admonition and boxes corresponding to
the “participants” positions in the lineup and instructed to put an “X” for a
positive identification and a “?” if they suspected the person was the shooter
but were not sure.
T.J. and T.L. put question marks on box three, which corresponded
with defendant’s lineup position. T.J. explained she put a question mark
because she was “playing it safe.” Since she “didn’t get a good look at this
person’s face, I only had a view from the side, going based off emotions,
feelings, I wasn’t going to put an ‘X’ there saying I’m confident that this is the
4 A video of the lineup was played for the jury but is not included in
the record on appeal.
4
person when I wasn’t so confident.” She also stated defendant’s “voice
sounded familiar” but “much more proper.” She recognized defendant’s nose
as being “pointy the way I remembered it” and stated his hair and skin tone
were similar to the person who confronted Ignacio. T.L. explained she put a
question mark because she was “not sure if that was the actual person who
was involved,” but told officers defendant’s hair, nose, build, and skin tone
matched the shooter’s. She stated his “hair and the nose,” which she
described as “narrow and pointy” matched the shooter’s. She also noted his
skin tone and voice were reasons she identified him. S.H. put an “X” on the
box that corresponded with defendant’s position and a “?” on a filler’s box.
She explained she put a “?” on box one because she “must have been not sure
when I seen that person or they must look . . . similar to the other person,”
and she put an “X” next to defendant’s number because of the “dark hat with
the hair,” he was tall, and “his nose is pointy.” When asked, if by marking
box three, she was “indicating that this person looked most like the person
[she] saw walk up to G” on the street? She responded, “Yeah.”
Felipe testified, under a grant of immunity, that he knew the victim as
“Lil G.” They had gone to high school together and lived a block away from
each other. Although initially close, the two had had a falling out. Between
the falling out and the murder, they would occasionally see each other in the
neighborhood and “just star[e]” at each other. Except on one occasion, the
two never got physical. However, Felipe thought Ignacio was “trying to
confront” him after the sale. Ignacio had approached Felipe at the side gate
to his apartment building and “kind of hollered at me, like, ‘Hey, yo, check it
out. What’s up?’ ” Ignacio then complained about Felipe’s friends “mean-
mugging him” or “staring hard” at him. Felipe had responded something
like, “ ‘That’s not me. I’m not your man’ ” and “ ‘Hey, I don’t want any
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problems. . . . Just leave me alone.’ ” At that point, the conversation ended
and Felipe went into his apartment. He saw Ignacio walk back to T.J. and
S.H., who were waiting on the corner, and the group started walking back up
the street.
Felipe also saw defendant, who he knew from prior marijuana sales.
Defendant had gotten in touch with Felipe before T.J. contacted him, and
Felipe had let defendant into the gate of the apartment complex. After T.J.
called, Felipe told defendant he was going to “[s]erve somebody,” meaning sell
them marijuana, but he would be back. When he returned, Felipe told
defendant, “ ‘My bad. It took a little longer,’ ” stating “some kid”—referring
to Ignacio—“got in my face and he was talking crap or something, something
like that.”
Defendant then looked at Felipe “funny” and began walking away.
When Felipe asked where he was going, defendant asked where Ignacio was.
Felipe responded, “ ‘Fuck you.’ Like, ‘Whatchu doin’? you know. I was telling
him, ‘Leave it alone. It’s nothin’,’ you know. Told him to be cool.” Defendant
said, “ ‘Oh, dude, don’t worry man. I’m just about to go and check him or
something,’ ” which Felipe took to mean defendant was going to go
“[c]onfront” Ignacio. He later told police that after he told defendant to “leave
it alone,” defendant said, “ ‘Nah, dude, nah. I wanna get on somebody,’ ”
which Felipe took to mean to go and “assault somebody.” Felipe followed
defendant to the sidewalk, saying, “ ‘Just be cool. What are you doing?’ ” As
defendant continued walking up the street, Felipe turned around and went
back to his girlfriend’s apartment. He later heard police sirens.
A few months before the murder, Felipe had seen defendant with a
firearm. Defendant said he owned it “under his name” and possessed it
legally. Felipe described the gun as a .45-caliber, semi-automatic with a
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“chrome slide” or a “shiny silver type thing” that “runs like along the barrel”
of the gun.
Berkeley Police Patrol Sergeant Scott Castle and his partner arrived on
the scene of the shooting first and found Ignacio “down on his back in the
street.” Ignacio was unresponsive, and Castle began to render emergency
aid. While Castle was applying a tourniquet around Ignacio’s leg,
paramedics arrived and took over emergency aid. Berkeley Police Officer
Kevin Neff followed the ambulance to the hospital. Ten minutes after
arrival, hospital staff informed him Ignacio had died.
The parties stipulated to the following: Sergeant Grant obtained a
search warrant for defendant’s residence. During execution of the warrant,
defendant was arrested. During the search, officers seized defendant’s cell
phone. Grant obtained a subsequent warrant to search defendant’s cell
phone records and data. That data was then turned over to Berkeley Police
Sergeant Andres Bejarano for analysis.
Bejarano testified as an “expert in call detail records” and use of
“CellHawk,” a program used to plot a “Google-type map” of the cell towers
used during a phone call. Before and after the shooting, defendant made
phone calls which registered on cell phone towers in the area of the shooting.
The first call, made at 6:41 p.m., registered at a cell phone tower that was
“approximately .29 miles or about 1550 feet” away from the location of the
shooting. The second call, made at 8:03 p.m., registered at a cell phone tower
that was approximately “three-quarters of a mile or .78 miles” from the
location of the shooting.
Berkeley Police Department crime scene technician Anna Bolla arrived
at the scene as paramedics were rendering aid to Ignacio. Near Ignacio’s
clothing and shoes, which had been removed by paramedics, Bolla
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documented “two suspected .45 caliber shell casings.” Both shell casings bore
the same “head stamp,” which read “.45 Auto Federal.”
Cary Wong, “an expert in the examination, comparison and
identification of firearms, ammunition, fired ammunition, as well as the
functioning of semi-automatic handguns,” analyzed the two .45-caliber
cartridge cases. He determined both had been fired from the same Glock
firearm.
The parties stipulated that Sergeant Grant, during the search of
defendant’s residence, located a “green accordion folder,” which “contained a
receipt for a Glock Model 21 .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun” showing
defendant’s name, an address, and the purchase date. Grant “also found a
dealer’s record of sale of firearm or DROS paperwork for a Glock Model 21 .45
caliber semi-automatic handgun with serial number XNU275,” and the
paperwork showed defendant’s name, and the same address and purchase
date as the receipt. The paperwork listed the color of the firearm as black.
Berkeley Police Officer Paul Jason Tillberg testified Glock 21
handguns, which come “in a black finish,” are very popular and are “very
easily” modified. For example, “Cerakote is a ceramic-based paint,” used
“primarily for firearms because it’s extremely durable” and can be used to
alter the color of the slide so that it can be “rather shiny” and have a
“metallic appearance.”
Senior DNA Analyst Angela Butler testified as “an expert in body fluid
identification, as well as the analysis, comparison and interpretation of DNA
and DNA mixtures, as well as the use of eDNA Bullet probabilistic
genotyping software as it relates to the analysis, comparison and
interpretation of DNA and DNA mixtures.” After explaining her testing and
8
examination procedures, Butler opined defendant “could be included as a
possible contributor to the DNA results obtained from both casings.”
With respect to the first casing, “DNA evidence was at least 39,000
times more likely if it originated from [defendant] and one unknown
unrelated contributor than if it originated from two unknown unrelated
contributors.” In other words, the partial profile “would be 39,000 times more
likely to occur if [defendant] was included as a contributor to that sample.”
This figure indicated “very strong support for the inclusion of [defendant] in
this mixture.” With respect to the second casing, which contained a larger
sample, “the DNA evidence is at least 259 million times more likely if it
originated from [defendant] and one unknown unrelated person than if it
originated from two unknown unrelated individuals.” This figure indicated
“extremely strong support” for the inclusion of defendant in the mixture, with
“extremely strong support” being “the highest you can get.”
Defense Case
The defense focused on undermining the reliability of the lineup
identifications and challenging the reliability of T.J.’s statements during the
two interviews.
Defendant elicited testimony that Sergeant Grant had assembled the
photographs used in the photo lineup from the DMV data base, but another
officer unfamiliar with the case showed the lineups to S.H. and T.L. All six
photos were of White males, all “appeared to be young,” and all had dark
hair. The DMV photograph of defendant “look[ed] fairly different than from
how he looked” in 2017. The photo had been taken in 2013, three years
before the murder and three and half years before the lineup, but it was “the
only photo” of defendant Grant was able to locate. Neither S.H. nor T.L.
identified anyone in the photo lineups as the shooter.
9
With respect to the physical lineup, Grant had no part in selecting the
“fillers.” Instead, the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department chose the fillers
from the inmate jail population. Each participant wore blue Santa Rita Jail
clothing and a plain black baseball cap, and each was required to walk
forward, one at a time, and say, “ ‘This is Fairview’ ” and “ ‘You got a
problem with J?’ ” During the lineup, the three girls were in the same room.
T.L. and T.J. both put question marks next to No. 3 (defendant).
Dr. Geoffrey Loftus, a psychologist, testified as an expert “in memory
and factors relating to eyewitness identification.” He explained the concept of
double viewing, where a witness is shown one lineup containing the suspect
and then sees a second lineup in which the only person common to the two
lineups is the suspect. The impact being that when a witness looks at the
second lineup the suspect “may look familiar to the witness, not because he
was the person that the witness saw commit the crime, but, rather, he was a
person that the witness saw during the first lineup.”
As for the interrogations of T.J., Grant said that during the second
interview, she “couldn’t think of anyone else who could be out there and does
mention Jacob Felipe.” And it was not until the second interview that she
said the shooter was wearing a baseball cap with a “B” on it.
DISCUSSION
In-Person Lineup
Prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to exclude “witness
identifications of defendant at a pretrial physical lineup and in court.”
Defendant claimed the lineup was unduly suggestive and therefore all
identifications based thereon had to be excluded, including “any in-court
identifications.” After the hearing, in which the court heard from the
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witnesses and watched the video of the lineup, the court denied the motion,
ruling the lineup was not “impermissibly suggestive.”
After being held to answer, defendant renewed his motion to exclude all
identifications as stemming from “unduly suggestive procedures.” The first of
these, according to defendant, was putting his DMV photo in the photo lineup
“[w]ithout ever providing a description of [defendant] or mentioning him.”
The second was he was the only participant that appeared in both the
photographic and the in-person lineups. The third was using fillers in the
physical lineup who assertedly did not “match the description provided by the
witnesses.”
The court again ruled the lineup was not suggestive.
The test to determine whether a defendant’s right to due process is
violated by the admission of identification evidence is two-fold. “[W]e
consider ‘ “(1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive
and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was
nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 556–557; People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259,
283 (Wilson).)
To be unduly suggestive, the challenged “procedure must ‘ “give rise to
a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” ’ [Citations.]
It is not enough that the procedure ‘may have in some respects fallen short of
ideal.’ ” (Sexton v. Beaudreaux (2018) 585 U.S. 961, 965–966; Wilson, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 283.) In evaluating the suggestiveness of a lineup, “we
consider ‘whether anything caused defendant to “stand out” from the others
in a way that would suggest the witness should select him.’ ” (Wilson, at
p. 284.) If “ ‘we find that a challenged procedure is not impermissibly
11
suggestive, our inquiry into the due process claim ends.’ ” (People v. Ochoa
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 412 (Ochoa).)
Even “[i]f we determine the procedure was suggestive, no due process
violation arises if ‘ “ ‘the identification itself was nevertheless reliable under
the totality of the circumstances.’ ” ’ [Citations.] In assessing the totality of
the circumstances, we consider ‘ “such factors as the opportunity of the
witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of
attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior
description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of
the identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and the
identification.” [Citations.] “Against these factors is to be weighed the
corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.” ’ ” (Wilson, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 283.)5
Suggestiveness
Despite the well-established framework for resolving complaints about
lineup identifications, defendant made no argument in his opening brief that
the lineup procedures were impermissibly suggestive. Rather, he focused
5 “A defendant’s claim that an identification procedure was unduly
suggestive is a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’ [Citations.] This standard
applies because ‘the facts are established, the law is undisputed, and the
issue’ we must resolve ‘is whether the law as applied to the established
facts is violated.’ [Citation.] We review the so-called ‘historical facts,’
those factual determinations that underpinned the trial court’s conclusion
that the identification was or was not suggestive, ‘under a deferential
standard.’ [Citation.] This standard acknowledges that the trial court
may have made ‘credibility determinations,’ that ‘contribute[d] to deciding
the facts of what had already happened, [but] were not dispositive of the
inquiry because the trial court did not have a “first-person vantage” ’ to
whatever ‘facts occurred outside of court.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 283.)
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solely on whether the totality of the circumstances nevertheless made the
identifications reliable—the second part of the analysis, which comes into
play only if it is first determined the lineup is unduly suggestive. In short, as
the Attorney General points out, defendant failed to establish the essential
predicate for a viable challenge to a lineup identification. (See Ochoa, supra,
19 Cal.4th at p. 413 [“for a witness identification procedure to violate the due
process clause, the state must, at the threshold, improperly suggest
something to the witness—i.e., it must, wittingly or unwittingly, initiate an
unduly suggestive procedure”].)
Not until his closing brief does defendant address the issue of
suggestiveness. However, “[i]t is axiomatic that arguments made for the first
time in a reply brief will not be entertained because of the unfairness to the
other party” and are waived. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075; see
also Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Office of Environmental
Health Hazard Assessment (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 220, 241 [“Although, for
good cause, we occasionally may exercise our discretion to consider issues
first raised in a reply brief [citation], ‘[m]ore often, however, issues not
properly addressed in the opening brief will be disregarded on appeal.’ ”].)
Even if we were to overlook defendant’s waiver, there is another
threshold difficulty with his belated argument that the in-person lineup was
unduly suggestive. Although defendant mentions the video of the lineup, it is
not included in the record on appeal, and in his reply brief, defendant cites to
still photographs made from frames of the video and which he attached to his
motion to exclude. These photographs are far from clear, and while they
show some physical attributes of the participants—such as height—they do
not show or allow comparison of most of the detailed attributes about which
defendant complains. In short, defendant has not provided a record that
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allows us to assess the merits of his claim that the lineup was unduly
suggestive. (See People v. Garcia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 864, 871 [it is
appellant’s burden to provide a record allowing review and demonstrating
error].)
In any case, given the record defendant has provided, he has not
demonstrated that the “physical buildup and appearances of the fillers were
so distinctively different from [him], as to make [him] stand out” as he claims
in his closing brief. All of the participants were wearing the same jail
clothing with a black baseball cap facing forward. Except for one filler, the
participants were all of a similar age, between 23 and 27 years old. Three
were “husky” and three were “thin.” They were all White and ranged in
height from 5’5” to 6’0”. Three of the participants, including defendant, were
six feet tall. Even assuming, as defendant claims, two fillers had visible
tattoos—which we cannot see from the photos—that would not have made
defendant stand out. Witnesses described the shooter as wearing long
sleeves, so they could not have seen whether there were tattoos on the
shooter’s arms, as defendant claims with respect to one of the tattooed fillers.
All of the participants, including defendant, had dark brown hair and
“variations of facial hair.” Three had long hair and three had short hair.
Indeed, the only feature defendant claims was not shared by at least one
other participant and was unique to him, is his “pointy” nose. However, the
still photographs on which defendant relies do not clearly show this to be the
case. In fact, based on our own review of the photographs, it appears at least
two other participants also have a pointy nose.
In sum, while the participants were not identical to defendant, nothing
about them made defendant “stand out.” (See Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 284–285 [lineup not suggestive because although “[a]ll of the men in
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defendant’s six-pack were distinct in some respect from one another, with
varying hairstyles and clothing,” nothing “ ‘in the lineup suggested that the
witness should not select defendant’ ”].)
Given that the lineup was not unduly suggestive, we need not address
the second prong of the analysis—reliability. (See People v. Virgil (2011)
51 Cal.4th 1210, 1256 (Virgil) [“because we find that the challenged
procedure was not unduly suggestive, our inquiry into the due process claim
ends”]; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1355 [having failed to show the
various identification procedures were unduly suggestive, we need not
address any argument the identifications were nonetheless reliable under the
totality of the circumstances].) However, defendant’s challenge also fails
under that prong, as well.
Reliability
“In assessing the totality of the circumstances, we consider ‘ “such
factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the
offense, the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense, the
accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty
demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of time between
the offense and the identification.” [Citations.] “Against these factors is to be
weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.” ’ ”
(Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 283.)
Defendant asserts the witnesses did not have a good opportunity to
view the shooter, pointing to T.J., T.L., and S.H.’s testimony they only saw
the shooter “for a very short time, ‘it happened kind of fast,’ ‘maybe about
almost 60 seconds,’ ‘a couple of seconds,’ ‘quick second viewing his face.’ ” He
also points to T.J.’s testimony to police that she “ ‘did not see his face at all,’ ”
T.L.’s testimony she “barely” saw the shooter’s face, and S.H.’s testimony that
15
she “ ‘didn’t really get a glimpse of the face.’ ” However, while the young
women may have only briefly viewed the shooter’s face, they all did so at very
close range and while it was still light outside. T.L. testified the shooter was
“about three, four feet away.” S.H. said, “[w]hen he was approaching” the
shooter was “very close.” He was “like a few feet away,” “We could touch each
other. It was pretty close.” Moreover, they all heard the shooter’s voice and
were able to compare the voices of the lineup participants, each of whom
repeated what the witnesses had heard the shooter say.
Defendant next points out T.J. “was too busy paying attention to what
[the shooter] was reaching for” and afterwards told police, “ ‘the incident
happened so fast that I don’t think I could identify the male.’ ” Similarly,
T.L. stated after “barely” seeing the shooter’s face, her attention turned to the
firearm. And after S.H. saw the shooter, she turned and ran, was scared, and
her attention was on the shooter’s pocket. Indeed, all three witnesses said
they ran after hearing the gunshots. However, they ran only a very short
distance, they remained at the scene, and they were able to provide
descriptions of the shooter to the 911 operator and later to the police.
Further, T.L. later confirmed she did, in fact, see the shooter’s face. And
after the lineup, she told police, “Everything physical about No. 3 looks like
what I described.”
Defendant further contends “discrepancies in the accuracy of all the
witnesses’ descriptions” weigh “in favor of finding the identification procedure
unreliable.” He points to T.J.’s police interrogation where she identified the
shooter as Mexican, stated she only saw the side of the shooter’s face and that
he had curly hair, and identified Felipe as the shooter; T.L.’s statement to the
police that the shooter was Hispanic and testimony at the preliminary
hearing that she “hardly” saw the shooter’s face and did not notice anything
16
distinctive about the shooter’s face; and S.H.’s statement to the 911 operator
that she was not necessarily able to see the shooter and her later description
to police that the shooter was “Latino” and five feet seven inches tall,
“whereas the appellant is over 6 feet tall.”
However, as we have recited, all the witnesses described the shooter as
having fair skin, as White and maybe Hispanic, and as being fairly tall or
taller than Felipe. They also all described him as having a pointy nose and
as having hair reaching or touching his ears. These consistencies in the
witnesses’ observations are sufficient to meet the reliability prong. (See
People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 400 [witnesses’ identification reliable
where both described suspect as having a ponytail].) Thus, any
inconsistencies in the witness’s descriptions were “matters affecting the
weight of [the] witnesses’ testimony, not its admissibility” and were properly
left to the jury. (Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)
Defendant next points out neither T.L. nor S.H. identified defendant in
the photo lineup, T.J. and T.L. placed question marks next to defendant’s
number at the in-person lineup, and although S.H. put an “X” next to
defendant’s number in the lineup, she also put a “?” next to participant No. 1.
However, the witnesses’ lack of absolute certainty did not render their
identifications unreliable, requiring exclusion of the evidence.
The officer admonitions immediately prior to the witnesses viewing the
lineup—that the shooter might not be present in the lineup and they need not
identify anyone—and the witnesses’ confirmation that they understood these
admonitions, also support the reliability of the identifications. (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 990 [no “ ‘substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification’ ” during photographic lineup where the witness
“ ‘was instructed that he was not to assume the person who committed the
17
crime was pictured therein, that it was equally important to exonerate the
innocent, and that he had no obligation to identify anyone’ ”].)
Defendant also had ample opportunity to, and did, cross-examine the
witnesses about their identifications. This significantly reduced the
possibility of any “ ‘irreparable misidentification.’ ” (Manson v. Brathwaite
(1977) 432 U.S. 98, 116; see People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022)
12 Cal.5th 719, 770 [identification was reliable where “[t]he defense was able
to thoroughly cross-examine [the witness] and delve into factors bearing on
reliability of his identifications”]; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846,
903 [no due process violation where the “circumstances of the identification
were disclosed to the defense, they were the subject of thorough cross-
examination, and the jury was able to evaluate the reliability [of the
witness’s identification]”].)
Defendant lastly complains that the witnesses’ limited views of the
shooter’s face and the fact four months passed between the crime and in-
person lineup, rendered the identifications unreliable, citing to Martin v.
Indiana (1977) 438 F.Supp. 234, 237. In Martin, the court held the passage
of approximately four months between the crime and the confrontation was a
“substantial amount of time,” and, coupled with the “short observation at the
scene of the crime,” the “likelihood of misidentification becomes less a
possibility and more a probability.” (Martin, supra, at p. 237.) However,
numerous other courts have held such time periods are not so substantial as
to make an identification unreliable. (United States v. Rivera-Rivera (2009)
555 F.3d 277, 284–285 [“six-month span here is de minimis”]; United States v.
Henderson (2003) 320 F.3d 92 [two and one-half years gap between in-court
identification and crime permissible “given strength of the other factors”];
United States v. Flores-Rivera (1995) 56 F.3d 319, 331 [seven-year gap
18
between crime and identification permissible where “other reliability criteria
were sufficiently persuasive”].) All of these cases ultimately turn on their
unique constellation of facts. The totality of the record here simply does not
support a conclusion that the witnesses’ identifications were unreliable.
Finally, even overlooking the waiver and record issues, and even
assuming the physical lineup was unduly suggestive and under the totality of
circumstances the identification was unreliable, any error was harmless.
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman); People v. Chavez
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663, 675 [“If a defendant’s federal constitutional right
to due process is violated” because an identification procedure was unduly
suggestive, “reversal of the defendant’s conviction is required unless the
People show that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”].)
Defendant matched descriptions given by the witnesses to 911 operators and
the police before the lineups, i.e., a White or Latino male with fair or light-
colored skin, dark longish hair, a pointy nose, and tall or taller than Felipe.
Felipe’s testimony also placed defendant at the scene at the time of the
murder and confirmed there was a shooting. The murder weapon, a .45-
caliber Glock handgun, was the same type of gun registered in defendant’s
name. The registered gun matched Felipe’s description of the gun he knew
defendant possessed. Expert testimony established that DNA evidence
indicated it a “very strong” and “extremely” strong likelihood defendant was a
contributor to the DNA on the bullets found at the scene of the crime. Cell
phone data also placed defendant in the area at the time. In short, the
evidence supporting defendant’s convictions was overwhelming. (See People
v. Sandoval (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 73, 86 [error in admitting “tainted
identification” harmless in light of “ample untainted, highly probative
evidence linking defendant to the [crimes]”].)
19
Witness Impeachment
During motions in limine, the prosecutor moved to introduce evidence
of defendant’s “arrest and possession of firearms with silencers and extended
magazines, as well as a violation of court ordered bail terms, as impeachment
evidence.” During a search of defendant’s cabin, which was located outside
the area set forth in defendant’s bail terms, officers found a .40-caliber Glock
27 firearm and a 9mm Glock 17 firearm, both of which were loaded with
chambered rounds. Additionally, the Glock 17 “had an illegal ‘SilencerCo’
silencer attached to it,” and officers located “multiple extended magazines in
a backpack next to the bed.” The prosecution anticipated defendant would
“mount a defense of mistaken identity and third-party culpability,” and as
such sought admission of the evidence for impeachment because it involves
“moral turpitude [and] suggests a willingness to lie.” Defense counsel
objected that the evidence was highly prejudicial, irrelevant to the issues in
the case, and it was being introduced “merely to smear my client’s character.”
The court granted the motion “for impeachment purposes only, but
there’s going to have to be a reason for this impeachment. I think that it is
probative, more so than prejudicial, the fact that he is found in a home with
some weapons. [¶] So . . . if your client testifies, I will allow it in as
impeachment evidence, but I also need to hear the nature of his testimony
first. Okay? So I am granting it now, but we can review this request at a
more appropriate time.”
The prosecutor also sought to exclude evidence of Felipe’s prior bad acts
and criminal history and specifically his arrest while the murder
investigation was underway, where he was found to have “a .380 caliber
revolver in his waistband.” Felipe told the police he “started carrying” the
gun because he and a friend were being blamed for the murder, and Felipe
20
“was afraid for his safety,” especially since his friend and the friend’s mother
had “actually been shot” already in retaliation. The prosecutor argued, under
Evidence Code section 352, “the fact that [Felipe] possessed a .380 revolver is
substantially more prejudicial than probative. It’s not a conviction. It’s a
pending case. I concede that he can probably [be] impeach[ed by] the
existence of that charged case and things like that, but in terms of being
specifically impeached with possessing a firearm, it’s far too prejudicial, it’s
irrelevant, and I would ask the court to exclude that.” The prosecutor also
sought to exclude the evidence as impermissible character evidence under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a),6 designed to show the jury that
“Felipe has a propensity to carry firearms,” and considering the weapon he
was arrested with was not the type of weapon used in the shooting meant it
was not probative of any third party culpability defense.
Defense counsel argued, “With regard to the pending possession of a
firearm case, you know, Judge, I just don’t think we can have it both ways,
right? If you think my client’s possession of a firearm in 2020 is probative
and relevant to impeaching him if he testifies, why wouldn’t it be probative to
impeaching Mr. Jacob Felipe in this situation? He admits to possessing it.
6 Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) provides: “[E]vidence
of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances
of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her
conduct on a specified occasion. [¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits
the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or
other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, [or] absence of mistake or
accident . . . ) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.
[¶] (c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered
to support or attack the credibility of a witness.” (Evid. Code, § 1101.)
21
It’s not an issue. And so I think it’s totally relevant and it’s—for purposes of
impeachment and it would be really quick.”
The prosecutor responded, “I understood the court’s ruling with respect
to [defendant’s] post-murder arrest for the firearms and the silencer. You
had said I could impeach him dependent upon what he says. It’s not just
coming in if he testifies. And so I would ask, if the court is inclined to allow
impeachment with Mr. Felipe the same, to fashion the ruling that same way.”
The court excluded the details of Felipe’s arrest, and specifically his
possession of the .380-caliber firearm, stating the gun evidence as to
defendant and the gun evidence as to Felipe presented different issues.
“Possession of a .380 caliber revolver and possession of a or owning a Glock,
and the murder weapon is a Glock, that’s different, because there’s no
allegation that this person was killed or shot with a .380. It’s a totally
different weapon. [¶] And I think if that is presented to the jury, then that
goes to propensity, I think. I think it goes to character. And I don’t think
that that is—I think that’s more prejudicial than probative. And I think that
you can distinguish those two, the possession of and ownership of the Glock
as opposed to that .380. Those are two different things. I don’t think you can
lump those up together and say, ‘Well, if we’re going to do it for this
incident—we’re going to enter Mr. Watson’s connection with the gun in this
incident and we’re not for the .380.’ Those are just different.” Thus, while
the fact Felipe had a “pending case is relevant, . . . the details of it are not.”
Defense counsel then maintained he would not use Felipe’s possession
of the firearm as propensity evidence, but “exclusively for the purposes of
impeachment as a conduct of moral turpitude.” The court again declined to
allow details of the arrest, stating “I hear where you’re going, but I do think
that—that might be your direction, but I think that there’s a danger that it
22
would be taken as propensity, and I think that that would be highly
prejudicial and not—and that outweighs the probative nature, because it’s a
.380. It’s not a Glock. If he had a Glock on him, then we’re talking, but he
didn’t.”
“ ‘A trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence offered for
impeachment is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be upheld unless
the trial court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People
v. Foss (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 113, 125.)
Defendant maintains “the court arbitrarily evaluated the prejudicial
effect of the moral turpitude of firearm possession in a contradictory way” in
that it ruled “the facts of Felipe’s firearm possession were unduly prejudicial
even when used only for impeachment purposes” but “the facts of
[defendant’s] alleged 2020 possession of firearms w[ere] not unfairly
prejudicial.”
The trial court’s evaluation was not “contradictory.” As the trial court
observed, the murder weapon was a Glock firearm and defendant was found
with several Glock firearms. Felipe, however, possessed a different kind of
weapon. Accordingly, the firearm Felipe possessed had no connection with
the instant case. There was “no allegation that [Ignacio] was killed or shot
with a .380. It’s a totally different weapon.” Accordingly, the court did not
unreasonably conclude that the fact Felipe was arrested with a different type
of firearm was “highly prejudicial” and “more prejudicial than probative.”
People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463 (Davis), cited by the Attorney
General, supports the trial court’s exclusion of the details of Felipe’s arrest.
In Davis, the defendant sought to introduce “evidence of other crimes” by a
third party to corroborate his defense that the third-party committed the
23
charged murder. (Id. at p. 500.) The trial court ruled the evidence “did not
exhibit sufficient similarities to the events related by defendant to establish
[the third party’s] motive, intent, or identity. Instead, it found that the
evidence of prior acts constituted character evidence, showing [the third
party’s] propensity to engage in the kind of activity alleged to have resulted”
in the murder. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court affirmed, stating “evidence of
third party culpability must be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt; ‘there must be direct circumstantial evidence linking the
third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.’ ” (Id. at p. 501.) The
proffered evidence was properly excluded because it “did not relate to motive
and intent but was essentially an attempt to show that [the third party] was
more likely to have been the killer because he had a history of violence.
Moreover, there was no evidence supporting defendant’s testimony that [the
victim] knew [the third party] or that the [third party] was present when [the
victim] was assaulted.” (Ibid.)
Here, Felipe knew Ignacio, and Felipe was in the immediate area when
Ignacio was killed. However, the fact Felipe was later arrested with a .380-
caliber weapon did not provide “direct or circumstantial evidence linking”
him to the “ ‘actual perpetration of the crime,’ ” since the murder was
committed with a Glock. (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 501.) Thus, the
evidence Felipe was in possession of a .380 was useful only as to propensity,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. (See ibid.)
Cross-Examination
During defendant’s cross-examination of Felipe, the following exchange
occurred:
“[Defense counsel]: Mr. Felipe, did you carry a gun back in September
of 2016?
24
“[Prosecutor]: I’m going to object.
“THE COURT: All right. On that—the day in question that we’re
talking about, were you armed with a firearm?
“[Felipe]: No.
“[Defense Counsel]: Okay. On that day that we’re talking about,
September 22, 2016, did you keep a firearm in the apartment?
“[Prosecutor]: Objection. Relevance.
“THE COURT: Sustained.
“[Defense Counsel]: Can we approach, your Honor?
“THE COURT: No.
“[Defense counsel]: On September 22nd, 2016, Mr. Felipe, did you keep
a firearm near the side gate in the back of your apartment?
“[Felipe]: No.
“[Prosecutor]: Objection. Relevance. Move to strike.
“THE COURT: Overruled. The answer remains.
“[Defense counsel]: So it’s your testimony today that you had no access
to a firearm on September 22nd, 2016?
“[Prosecutor]: Objection. Misstates the witness’s testimony.
“THE COURT: Sustained.”
Defendant contends the “trial court erred by preventing the defense
from properly cross-examining Felipe about his access to a firearm.” He
contends Felipe’s answer to whether he had a gun in his apartment was
relevant as it “would clearly ‘have a tendency to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence’ to appellant’s guilt or innocence”—that it
was Felipe, not defendant, who killed Ignacio.
“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” (Evid. Code,
§ 350.) However, Evidence Code section 352 provides, “The court in its
25
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “We review the trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 895 (Dworak).)7
The trial court did not expound on its reasoning for sustaining the
objection. Nor did defendant request that the court to do so or request an
opportunity to place his position on the record. We must therefore assume
the trial court understood the applicable evidentiary principles and made all
findings necessary to support its ruling. (See People v. Coddington (2000)
23 Cal.4th 529, 644 [we presume “the court knows and applies the correct
statutory and case law [citation] and is able to distinguish admissible from
inadmissible evidence, relevant from irrelevant fact, and to recognize those
facts which properly may be considered in the judicial decisionmaking
process”], overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001)
7 There is no “special rule governing evidence of third party
culpability.” “ ‘[C]ourts should simply treat third-party culpability
evidence like any other evidence: if relevant it is admissible ([Evid. Code,]
§ 350) unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of
undue delay, prejudice, or confusion ([id.,] § 352).’ [Citation.] In making
this assessment, courts should be mindful that third party evidence ‘need
not show “substantial proof of a probability” that the third person
committed the act; it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of
defendant’s guilt.’ [Citation.] [People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833]
explained that, in general, ‘evidence of mere motive or opportunity to
commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise
reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt: there must be direct or
circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration
of the crime.’ ” (Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 895.)
26
25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13; Evid Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official
duty has been regularly performed.”].)
We therefore presume the trial court’s sustaining of the prosecutor’s
objection was consistent with its earlier evidentiary ruling, which we have
upheld, excluding details of Felipe’s subsequent arrest and, specifically, that
Felipe was in possession of a firearm. Although the court did not expressly
engage in an Evidence Code section 352 analysis in sustaining the objection,
we must infer that it did so. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1237
[trial court need not expressly weigh section 352 factors on the record if that
weighing can be inferred from the record].) Defendant makes no argument to
the contrary, and concedes “on its own . . . the trial court’s state evidentiary
errors do not meet” People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) standard
of prejudice.8
Firearm Enhancement
While ensuring defendant understood the repercussions of going to trial
and rejecting any plea deal, the trial court observed it had discretion to strike
the Penal Code section 12022.539 enhancement but that it might not do so.
The court stated, “[Y]ou do realize if you are convicted of that second, that my
hands are pretty much tied. You’d be doing that 40.” Defense counsel
responded, “Your Honor, I just want to clarify for the record that, in fact, the
25-to-life enhancement is actually discretionary now.” The court replied,
“That is true. So I do have discretion. Thank you. I do have discretion. I
could exercise my discretion. I couldn’t. If I don’t, that means you’re doing
8 Given our conclusion there was no evidentiary error, we need not
and do not address defendant’s claim of cumulative error.
9 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
27
the max. If I do, that means you could do less. All right? [¶] But you’re
willing to, say, gamble and go to trial?” Defendant stated, “Your Honor, if the
Court is worried about me, yes, your Honor” and later, “Yes. You can put it
on the record I understand, your Honor.”
In the probation report, defendant, while speaking with the probation
officer, described his childhood as not “ ‘terrible or anything like that,’ ” and
he “denied encountering any mental, physical, or sexual abuse as a child or
teenager.” He stated his mother “may have had ‘Substance abuse’ issues
prior to his birth,” and he “had been diagnosed with ‘Bipolar, Asperger’s, and
ADHD.’ ” He reported having previously taken medication “to address his
mental health in elementary and middle schools,” but that he “did not take
medications in high school.” Defendant was 24 years old at the time of the
murder.
The probation report stated defendant was statutorily ineligible for
probation and listed three factors in aggravation and one in mitigation.10 The
mitigating factor was that defendant had no prior criminal record.
The prosecution urged the court to decline to exercise its discretion to
dismiss the firearm enhancement and to sentence defendant to 40 years to
life.
Defendant asked the court to exercise its discretion, under newly
enacted legislation (Sen. Bill No. 620),11 “not [to] impose any additional
10 The factors in aggravation included: (1) the “crime involved great
bodily harm and callousness which resulted in death”; (2) the “victim was
unarmed”; and (3) defendant “has engaged in violent conduct which
indicates a serious danger to society.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a) &
(b).)
11 Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620)
(Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1, 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2018).
28
prison sentence for the gun enhancement.” Counsel urged the court to
consider defendant’s age at the time of the offense (24 years old), that he had
no prior criminal record, and his “very challenging upbringing and mental
and psychiatric history.” This included that defendant was “raised in an
unstable and broken home,” as his parents divorced “at a young age, causing
his mother to raise him essentially alone.” Additionally, his mother’s
frequent moves caused “resentment by [defendant] as he did not have a
pleasant experience moving . . . and being away from his father.” Defendant’s
father, in turn, subjected defendant “to severe beatings and physical
violence,” and the “combination of violence and an unstable family household
had a tremendous impact on [defendant’s] ability to make proper decisions
throughout his life.” Counsel also pointed out defendant “suffered from
learning disabilities, psychological disorders and failed attempts at providing
him the necessary tools to handle his circumstances.” Defendant “was
regularly diagnosed and treated for a mood disorder, Asperger’s disorder, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,” and he had been “prescribed
Risperdal, a drug often prescribed to help treat schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and irritability caused by autism.” Counsel urged that, “considering
all of these mental health issues, the crime before the court is a reflection of a
hyper-sensitive overreaction from mental health concerns rather than from a
sophisticated hardened criminal.”12
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the court
for leave to withdraw the sentencing memorandum stating, “I wanted to
bring to the court’s attention this morning that Mr. Watson wanted to
express to the court his desire to have me withdraw my arguments in
12 Defendant attached to his sentencing memorandum a mitigation
report, several education plans, and medical conclusions and findings.
29
mitigation as well as any arguments I made to this court to exercise its
discretion and not impose the gun enhancement in this case. . . . Mr. Watson
wants to express to the court, by making that request, his insistence that he’s
innocent in this case. So he is in disagreement with any arguments in
mitigation that I’ve submitted in my sentencing memorandum . . . .” The
court denied the request to withdraw.
The prosecutor urged the court to decline striking or dismissing the
firearm enhancement, arguing the nature of defendant’s actions indicated
defendant “poses an extreme risk to the community.” He characterized
defendant’s asserted mitigation factors as “boil[ing] down” to “his parents got
divorced and he was disciplined too much,” which was “not an excuse or
mitigation.” The defense submitted on the sentencing memorandum.
After hearing from the victim’s family, the court sentenced defendant to
a term of 40 years to life. The court stated, “I don’t find any factors in
mitigation, any. . . . Not the upbringing, none of that. I know a number of
people that had IEPs, that were from divorced households. They don’t go
around carrying guns, shooting people. [¶] And then when he’s arrested,
after he’s accused of murder, he’s found in a house with an arsenal, with a
silencer, with magazines loaded with bullets. That’s a person, to me, that is a
serious danger to society. He has already exhibited violent conduct. This
event included great violence, great bodily harm, a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness and callousness. He was armed with a weapon the victim was
not.
“[¶] . . . [¶] This is one of those upsetting trials for me, and I see them
all. But when a life is lost because someone is a poser or a wannabe and
wants to be something else to be accepted or to be seen as tough and they
hurt somebody, those really get to me, because he was not about that life. No
30
one should be about that life. But he wanted to show people that he was
tough, and that’s why he’s here. And the fact that he’s shown no remorse
throughout this trial indicates to me more so that he’s a serious danger to
society. [¶] He knew exactly what he was doing. During the lineup changing
his voice, cutting his hair, presenting as if he’s a choir boy in this church—in
this courtroom. But the evidence showed something different. . . .
“So, he is statutorily ineligible for probation. Probation is denied. He
will be sentenced as follows: [¶] First, just to make it clear, I find all the
circumstances in aggravation that are listed in the DA’s report to be true.
The only factor in mitigation is no prior criminal record, but he has displayed
some serious, concerning conduct. [¶] . . . [¶] For count 1, the 187, the
indeterminate term of 15 years to life. I am not going to exercise my
discretion in this case for all the reasons listed by [the prosecution’s]
sentencing memorandum, for what happened here today, the fact that there
are factors in aggravation more so than mitigation.”
The court then sentenced defendant to a consecutive 25-years-to-life
term for the section 12022.53 enhancement, declining to exercise its
discretion under section 1385 or section 12022.53, subdivision (h). The court
also imposed but stayed sentences for the remaining three enhancements
pursuant to section 654.
“Before 2018, sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 prohibited a trial court
from striking a firearm enhancement required to be imposed under those
sections. [Citation.] The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 620 . . . to
amend sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, effective January 2018, to give the
trial court discretion to strike those enhancements: Sections 12022.5,
subdivision (c) and 12022.53, subdivision (h), now provide that a court ‘may,
in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of
31
sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be
imposed by this section.’ [Citations.]
“In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 81), which amended section 1385 to specify mitigating
circumstances that the trial court should consider when deciding whether to
strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.”
(People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15–16 (Lipscomb).) In
particular, section 1385, subdivision (c) now provides:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal
of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.
“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any mitigating circumstance in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means
there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious dangers to others.”13 (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)–
(2).)
13 The mitigating circumstances include: application of the
enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial impact; multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case; application of an enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years; current offense is connected to
mental illness or to prior victimization or childhood trauma; current
offense is not a violent felony; defendant was a juvenile when the offense
was committed; enhancement is based on a prior conviction, which is over
five years old; and an inoperable or unloaded firearm was used in the
commission of the crime. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)–(I).)
32
Citing Lipscomb, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 9, defendant complains the
“trial court did not explicitly find [he] would endanger public safety.”
Defendant’s reliance on Lipscomb is misplaced. While the trial court in that
case did, indeed, make “an explicit finding that dismissing the enhancement
‘would endanger public safety,’ ” the Court of Appeal did not hold an explicit
finding is required to support imposition of the enhancement. Rather, the
appellate court pointed to the finding as evidencing the trial court understood
the scope of its discretion under the recent amendments. (Id. at p. 18.) The
Court of Appeal went on to hold, contrary to the defendant’s argument in that
case, that the trial court “was not required to ‘consider and afford great
weight’ to evidence that application of the enhancement could produce a
sentence of over 20 years.” (Ibid.) In short, the appellate court did not rule
that a trial court must employ any particular language—explicit or
otherwise—before declining to strike a firearm enhancement.
Section 1385 contains no requirement that the trial court articulate any
findings or rulings in dismissing or refusing to dismiss an enhancement.
(§ 1385, subd. (c); see In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [noting the
express findings requirement of section 1385, former subdivision (a) only if a
strike is dismissed].) Moreover, the record demonstrates the trial court was
aware of the scope of its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) and
(2), as defendant’s sentencing memorandum addressed the issue. Indeed, the
trial court also stated during the sentencing hearing that defendant was a
“serious danger to society” and it was declining to exercise its discretion
under section 1385.
Defendant further argues any finding “that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety” is unsupported because “there is
no realistic likelihood that dismissing the 25-years-to-life enhancement would
33
result in another person suffering physical injury or being placed in serious
danger.” That is because, says defendant, “even if the enhancement is
dismissed, appellant would still be serving a life sentence on the underlying
murder conviction.” Further, since defendant could not be released on parole
if the board finds he presents a public safety concern, “adding 25 years on top
of an already indeterminate sentence served no purpose in protecting the
public.”
Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court
abuses its discretion by imposing a sentence enhancement where the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate life term. Nor are we aware of
any such authority. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court explained in
People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 70, “Although defendant contends it
would be unreasonable to assume that the Legislature intended that the
section 12022.53 enhancements would be imposed on a defendant who is
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, because the
enhancement would have no practical effect, the words employed in
section 12022.53 defeat defendant’s argument: the statute states specifically
that it is intended to apply to ‘any felony punishable by death or
imprisonment . . . for life.’ (§ 12022.53, subd. (a)(17)).” (Shabazz, at p. 70
[reversing Court of Appeal judgment vacating 25-years-to-life enhancement
under § 12022.53, subd. (d), on the defendant’s LWOP sentence]; see also
People v. Chiu (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1262 [the defendant properly
sentenced to § 12022.53, subd. (d) firearm enhancement on consecutive
LWOP sentence].)
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
dismiss the firearm enhancement.
34
Presence at Sentencing Hearing
At the start of trial, defendant, who was in custody, was admonished by
the trial court after he was twice observed communicating with his family
members—despite a courtroom sign prohibiting such communication and
despite a deputy telling him to stop doing so. The prosecutor also reported
there had been some “pushback” from defendant when the deputy told him to
stop talking to his family.
Specifically, the court stated, “All right. So, Mr. Watson, there’s no
communication. There’s no turning around. There’s no waving. Okay?
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . If my deputy tells you to do something, then you do it. If I hear
that you’re giving lip, we’re going to have a problem. I want you here because
this is your trial, but there’s rules that have to be followed. Okay? If you
can’t follow those rules, then I’ll exclude you from the proceedings. I don’t
want to do that. All right? If she tells you to do something, that’s what you
do. Okay?” Defendant responded, “Yes.”
At the sentencing hearing, after hearing from the victim’s family
members and defense counsel, defendant gave a statement. During his
statement, defendant used a curse word, and the court admonished him to
“Watch your mouth.” Despite defendant’s immediate apology, he
subsequently cursed again. However, the court gave no admonishment, and
defendant finished his statement. The court then heard from the prosecutor.
After the statements, the court began to pronounce sentence, with
interruptions by defendant:
“THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, let me start off by saying this:
This is tragic on so many levels. I sat here and I saw the witnesses testify
and how this event has affected them. I saw the family throughout the whole
trial and there was not a dry eye in this courtroom. I feel for the victim in
35
this case. This didn’t have to go down like this. [¶] I grew up in LA, in
Oakland, and I had a lot of friends that were in gangs or sold drugs or, you
know, just got into trouble, but one thing folks did is they stayed in their lane
of traffic. This wasn’t your beef. You had nothing to do with this. And don’t
sit in here and say you are innocent. Don’t give me that.
“[Defendant]: That’s exactly what—that’s what—
“THE COURT: See, and that’s your problem, because you pinged—you
pinged all the way from start to finish where this happened, your phone.
You’re trying to blame this on another person who didn’t want that smoke.
He didn’t want those issues. [¶] You are a wannabe. That’s what happens.
People that want to belong, they end up doing stuff and going too far. This
wasn’t your fight. It was a fight, not a gun battle. You chased down a 19-
year-old and shot him in the back. You can say that all you want, but I know
the truth. The evidence and the jury saw it.
“[Defendant]: The evidence you let them see.
“THE COURT: Shut your mouth.
“[Defendant]: Oh, what about the other evidence?
“THE COURT: Shut your mouth.
“[Defendant]: You’re restricting me in court.
“THE COURT: Take him out.”
Defendant was then removed from the courtroom.
Defendant claims the trial court prejudicially violated his
constitutional and statutory rights to be present throughout his sentencing
hearing.
“A defendant has the constitutional right to be personally present in
court ‘where necessary to protect the defendant’s opportunity for effective
cross-examination, or to allow him to participate at a critical stage and
36
enhance the fairness of the proceeding.’ ” (People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th
686, 710.) “The right is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the federal Constitution as well as article I, section 15 of the
California Constitution.” (People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57.)
“Critical stages of a defendant’s criminal prosecution include the imposition
of sentence . . . .” (Ibid.; § 977, subd. (b)(1) [“in all cases in which a felony is
charged, the accused shall be physically present . . . at the time of the
imposition of sentence”].)
However, the right to be present is not absolute. “ ‘[A] defendant can
lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge
that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly,
disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on
with him in the courtroom.’ ” (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 117; § 1043,
subd. (b)(1) [same].)
Defendant maintains that, in violation of section 1043, subdivision
(b)(1), he “was not warned that he would be removed for bad behavior prior to
his removal.” And while he concedes he “engaged in a contentious exchange
with the court,” he asserts his “conduct” was not so extreme, aggravated or
prolonged as to warrant “his removal contrary to statute and without
warning.”
“ ‘On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to
a trial court’s exclusion of a criminal defendant from pretrial and trial
proceedings, either in whole or in part, “insofar as the trial court’s decision
entails a measurement of the facts against the law.” ’ ” (Virgil, supra,
51 Cal.4th at p. 1235; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 741.)
37
The Attorney General, pointing to the trial court’s warning at the
beginning of trial when defendant persisted in attempting to communicate
with his family, argues defendant was sufficiently warned about the
possibility of removal if he continued being disruptive. He further argues
that, even if the court should have given a second warning, the error was
harmless under the circumstances. We agree any error was harmless and
therefore do not address whether a second warning should have been given.
Error in excluding a defendant represented by counsel is assessed
using the harmless error analysis under both state law (Watson, supra,
46 Cal.2d at p. 836) and federal law (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24).
(People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 902; People v. Whitmore (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 116, 127.) Any error in excluding defendant, here, from the
remainder of the sentencing hearing was harmless under either standard.
Defendant posits that the trial court’s supposed abuse of discretion in
imposing the firearm enhancement, without “properly evaluating the reforms
enacted” by Senate Bill No. 81, “may well have occurred because of a
momentary lapse in judgment caused by the contentious nature of the trial
court’s confrontation with appellant and his subsequent removal.” However,
as we have explained, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
the enhancement. Moreover, defendant’s argument is wholesale speculation.
The record does not remotely support a conclusion that defendant’s
interruptions caused the court a “momentary lapse in judgment,” let alone
one that resulted in the court’s mistakenly imposing a firearm enhancement
it had intended not to impose.
Despite defendant’s request that his counsel withdraw his sentencing
statement and that the court not consider any mitigating factors, the court
denied the request, considered the sentencing memorandum, heard from the
38
prosecutor, and heard from victim’s family members. Defendant was present
during all of this and was not removed from the courtroom until the final
minutes of the hearing. In sum, any error in excluding defendant from the
courtroom during the final minutes of the sentencing hearing was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23; see In re
Guoimar (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 265, 279 [“violation of [the] petitioner’s right to
be present at the resentencing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”];
People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 534 [concluding the defendant’s
absence from pretrial hearing was harmless beyond reasonable doubt].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BANKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
A165995; People v. Watson
39
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