CourtListener 10010860•Chodosh v. Saunders CA4/3
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Filed 7/22/24 Chodosh v. Saunders CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
FLOYD CHODOSH et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G062591
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01272270)
JOHN SAUNDERS et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
William D. Claster, Judge. Affirmed. Petition for writ of coram vobis, motion
for discovery and an evidentiary hearing, and motion for taking of new
evidence. Denied.
Law Office of Patrick J. Evans and Patrick J. Evans for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Callahan & Blaine, Peter S. Bauman and James M. Sabovich for
Defendants and Respondents John Saunders, Robert Coldren, Diana
Mantelli, George Fiori, Lisa Salisbury, Edward Susolik, Palm Beach Park
Association, Pacific Current Partners LLC, ICC 35902 LLC, and 3187 Redhill
LLC.
Thomas Law Firm, Allen L. Thomas and Sivi G. Pederson for
Defendant and Respondent Allen L. Thomas.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, Larissa G.
Nefulda and Daniel R. Velladao for Defendant and Respondent Cary Wood.
Fidelity National Law Group and Kevin R. Broersma for
Defendant and Respondent Fidelity National Title Company.
* * *
This case is the next iteration of nearly a decade and a half of
litigation between the parties stemming from the sale of a mobilehome park
property on which plaintiffs used to reside. Frustrated and unhappy with
certain judicial decisions made relatively early on, plaintiffs have spent
roughly eight years trying to right the wrongs which they claim resulted from
fraudulent and conspiratorial conduct of defendants, judicial officers, private
mediators, elected officials, and others. Having failed to obtain their desired
relief from a judicial oversight body, government agencies and officials, state
courts, and federal courts, plaintiffs filed the instant action using the same
attorney who has represented them throughout. Relying on the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; RICO),
as well as fraud and unjust enrichment theories, plaintiffs seek monetary
damages and declaratory relief reversing the impacts of what they term a
“judge fix” and “judge crime.”
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend on statute
of limitations and collateral estoppel grounds. Their counsel, Patrick J.
Evans, also claims the court unwarrantedly imposed almost $89,000 in
2
1
sanctions against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 for
bringing a frivolous lawsuit. A thorough review of the record and judicially
noticed matters reveals no error. The court properly found plaintiffs’ RICO
claims to be barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, including well-
established accrual principles, and plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
of demonstrating error as to the other claims. Additionally, given the totality
of the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding this to
be a rare and exceptional situation in which monetary sanctions against an
attorney are warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the challenged orders.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I.
THE MOBILEHOME PARK LITIGATION
An understanding of the case before us requires an
understanding of a nearly 15-year litigation history between plaintiffs and
various parties concerning a San Clemente mobilehome park in which
1
All further statutory refences are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless other wise stated.
2
In conjunction with the challenged rulings, the trial court took
judicial notice of a wide variety of documents, including without limitation
pleadings, briefs, and judicial decisions filed in other trial court and appellate
court level proceedings in which plaintiffs have been involved. We take
judicial notice of the existence of those same matters, not the truth of the
statements made therein. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d), 459,
subd. (a).) Given the procedural posture of this case, the facts and procedural
background we recite are drawn from, inter alia, those judicially noticed
matters, the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint, and an unpublished opinion
from this court. (Chodosh v. Palm Beach Park Assn. (Dec. 17, 2018,
G053798) [nonpub. opn.].)
3
plaintiffs used to reside, Palm Beach Mobilehome Park (the mobilehome
park).
In 2007, the homeowners association for the mobilehome park,
the Palm Beach Park Association (the Association), acted on a right of first
refusal to purchase the mobilehome park property. A lender loaned most of
the purchase money to the Association. In turn, the Association’s directors
voted to assess each of its 126 members, on a per capita basis, the cost of
buying the park. It amounted to $200,000 per member. Those unable to pay
the money immediately were allowed to borrow the money from the
Association pursuant to a promissory note. If a member were to default on
monthly note payments, the entire remaining balance would become due and
payable. The note payments later became a condition of each member’s lease,
making nonpayment a material breach of the lease.
Unable to continue making payments, nine of the Association’s
residents (the Chodosh plaintiffs) sued the Association in late 2010.
(Chodosh v. Palm Beach Park Assn., Super. Ct. Orange County, 2010, No. 30-
2010-00423544.) Two years later, the Association filed a verified cross-
complaint seeking unpaid rent and ejectment. We refer to these two actions
and other cases with which they were consolidated in the trial court,
collectively, as the Original Action.
The Original Action was tried in four phases between 2013 and
2015. Now retired Judge Nancy Wieben Stock presided over the first phase.
Judge Robert J. Moss heard the remaining phases after Judge Stock’s
retirement. Among the determinations made were that the Chodosh
plaintiffs were not obligated to pay the $200,000 per capita assessment styled
as a loan from the Association, they were each entitled to restitution for any
sums already paid toward that amount, they had no real property interest in
4
any portion of the mobilehome park property, they owed the Association for
unpaid rent, and the Association was entitled to writs of possession to remove
plaintiffs from their mobilehome park spaces.
II.
THE ORIGIN OF PLAINTIFFS’ CONSPIRACY ACCUSATIONS
During the early stages of the Original Action, the Chodosh
plaintiffs’ counsel, Evans, began questioning the impartiality and integrity of
judges and others involved in the matter. The accusations have perpetuated
and explosively multiplied since that time.
It all started when the matter went to mediation in late 2013
before retired Justice John K. Trotter, a neutral at and cofounder of JAMS,
Inc., a private provider of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services. The
mediation was unsuccessful. Evans claimed Justice Trotter said he would
tell Judge Stock that the lack of settlement was the Chodosh plaintiffs’ fault.
When the Original Action returned to court after the failed
mediation, it was reassigned to Judge Moss due to Judge Stock’s retirement.
A few months later, in May 2014, the Chodosh plaintiffs sought to disqualify
Judge Moss, claiming there was reason to believe Justice Trotter’s supposed
communications with Judge Stock about the failed settlement must have
reached Judge Moss as well, and he would not be fair and impartial as a
result. Judge Moss struck the statement of disqualification, leading the
Chodosh plaintiffs to seek a writ of mandate from this court disqualifying
him. The writ petition was summarily denied, with a concurrence indicating
one justice would have issued an order to show cause as to why sanctions
should not be imposed for the filing of a frivolous writ petition.
Around the same time, Evans filed suit against Justice Trotter
and JAMS on behalf of many of the plaintiffs from the Original Action.
5
(Chodosh v. Trotter, Super. Ct. Orange County, 2014, No. 30-2014-00722371;
JAMS Action.) The complaint alleged a variety of contract and tort based
claims primarily grounded in Justice Trotter’s purported threat to tell Judge
Stock that the Chodosh plaintiffs prevented settlement, as well as a
purported failure to disclose that, at the time the mediation events occurred,
Judge Stock was in discussions with JAMS about joining JAMS after retiring
from the bench. Justice Trotter and JAMS successfully moved to strike the
complaint pursuant to section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit
against public participation) statute, and recover related attorney fees. That
disposition was affirmed on appeal by the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
Division One. (Chodosh v. Trotter (Sept. 13, 2017, D070952, D070953)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In November 2015, prior to the last phase of the Original Action,
Evans filed a lawsuit on behalf of another resident of the mobilehome park
seeking to stop the Association’s sale of the property to a third party
(Haugen v. Palm Beach Park Assn., Super. Ct. Orange County, 2015, No. 30-
2015-00819837; Haugen Action.) Evans promptly sought to disqualify Judge
Moss from the Haugen Action pursuant to section 170.6. A minute order
issued a few days later by a then supervising judge, Judge Charles Margines,
reassigned the case to another judge, Judge Gail A. Andler.
A few weeks thereafter, in late December 2015, following the
filing of an objection to the section 170.6 challenge and an opposition to the
objection, Judge Moss ordered the statement of disqualification stricken and
the case reassigned back to himself. Days later, he denied an ex parte
temporary restraining order (TRO) application which sought to stay the
impending sale of the mobilehome park property.
6
Between March and April 2016, Evans sent letters to the
attorneys representing the defendants in the Haugen Action and filed
complaints against Judge Moss with both the Commission on Judicial
Performance (CJP) and Judge Margines, in his capacity as then presiding
3
judge of the Orange County Superior Court. The letters to counsel accused
the Haugen Action defendants and their counsel of being part of a criminal
conspiracy to obstruct justice so they could financially benefit from the sale of
the mobilehome park property to the residents’ detriment. Evans believed
someone acting on behalf of the defendants “improperly contacted Judge
Moss ex parte for the specific purpose of requesting that Judge Moss take
over [the case] by reinstating himself as the judge on the case.” (Italics
omitted.) He further claimed Judge Moss was on vacation when he (1)
received the ex parte contact, (2) called his clerk to have the case reassigned
back to him, and (3) continued the ex parte TRO hearing to a few days later.
According to Evans, the sale of the mobilehome park property closed four
hours after Judge Moss took these actions. Counsel for the Haugen Action
defendants responded to Evans in writing denying all the accusations. The
complaint filed with Judge Margines recited the same factual circumstances,
and it asserted Judge Moss acted unlawfully and committed willful judicial
misconduct.
The CJP requested further information from Evans, which he
provided, and it ultimately notified him it “found no basis for action against
[Judge Moss] or determined not to proceed further [with] the matter.”
3
The letter sent to CJP indicates the basis for the complaint was
presented in documents enclosed therewith, contained in four three-ring
binders. Those documents are not included in the appellate record.
7
In the meantime, Evans sought to disqualify Judge Moss from all
the mobilehome park related cases pending before him pursuant to section
170.1. He claimed ex parte contacts with Judge Moss led the judge to
illegally reassume jurisdiction over the Haugen Action so he could enforce
illegal contracts. Following receipt of an objection, Judge Moss struck the
statement of disqualification as untimely and lacking legal grounds for
disqualification. Thereafter, Evans unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate
ordering the disqualification of Judge Moss. The 68-page writ petition
asserted the purported ex parte communications, as well as the December
2015 unlawful “reassumption of jurisdiction,” were the decisive events giving
rise to the disqualification, the surrounding circumstances indicated actual
bias on the part of Judge Moss, and additional facts demonstrated active non-
disclosure and concealment of the truth by the court and the Association.
Early the following year, 2017, Evans turned to the California
Attorney General’s Office for relief. His seven-page letter detailed his clients’
battle with the Association and Judge Moss’ purported actions, and it
asserted his clients’ loss of their homes “was the direct result of willful,
purposeful judicial misconduct and wrongdoing” by Judge Moss. The
Attorney General’s Office responded stating it could not assist and invited
Evans to contact the local district attorney’s office. It explained: “The
Department of Justice is committed to upholding and enforcing state law, but
it lacks the resources necessary to review all matters in which improper
activities are alleged. Ordinarily, local law enforcement authorities have
primary responsibility for investigating violations of law within their
jurisdictions.”
8
III.
FIRST APPEAL IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION
Seven of the nine plaintiffs in the Original Action (the Chodosh
appellants) appealed from the judgment entered following the four-phase
trial.
The introduction of the Chodosh appellants’ opening brief began:
“Illegal transactions and judicial wrongdoing render the judgment a nullity.
The judgment is void as it purports to uphold and enforce illegal agreements.
It is void as the product of judge misconduct, biased judicial officers’
intentional and wrongful enforcement of illegal agreements and transactions
against [a]ppellants in favor of their wrongdoer fiduciary homeowners’
association.”
And it ended: “The evidence and record proves that (i) Judge
Moss intentionally intervened to aid the fiduciary fraudulent self-dealing
Palm Beach Park sale; (ii) he and [a]ppellate justices ignored and allowed
enforcement of [Association] illegal transactions; (iii) . . . the Orange County
courts, confronted with such wrongdoing, did nothing and acted to uphold it.
[¶] . . . [¶] More rudimentary, they transgressed Rule of Law No. 1 - that a
judge follows the law. At Palm Beach Park, and in the Palm Beach Park
litigation, there has been no Rule of Law.”
In a December 2018 unpublished opinion, another panel of this
court affirmed the Original Action judgment, in part, and reversed it, in part.
(Chodosh, supra, G053798.)
Between addressing the Chodosh appellants’ many contentions,
the opinion “address[ed] [the opening brief’s] leitmotif that judicial bias
somehow rendered the entire judgment a ‘nullity.’” It wholly rejected the
allegations of illegality and judicial misconduct. Regarding the former, it
9
noted Judge Moss could not be faulted for a legally inaccurate ruling when it
resulted from Evans’ failure to bring the issue to his attention. As for the
latter, the court found an absence of any evidence of possible bias or
preconception. It explained: “We’ve been through this record and can only
compliment Judge Moss for extreme judicial restraint. All Judge Moss did —
besides hold his temper — was to rule against appellants on a number of
occasions. It is well established that adverse rulings — even many erroneous
adverse rulings — are no basis for a claim of judicial bias.”
In a similar vein, the opinion addressed what it described as
Evans’ “pattern of inflammatory accusations against any number of judges
who have ruled against him, including not only Judge Moss but the Presiding
Justice of this Division[,]” and Evans’ “practical[] invit[ation] . . . to hold him
in contempt for accusing Judge Moss of fixing the result.” It continued:
“Even the fairest judge sometimes cannot make up for poor pleading or poor
research by a litigant’s counsel. [¶] We choose not to set contempt
proceedings for Attorney Evans for the calumnies he has casually hurled at
Judge Moss, nor for those directed at this court. We conclude he craves the
attention of such a hearing more than he would suffer from its result. We
choose to deny him that attention and write off his intemperance to an excess
of zeal on behalf of vulnerable and elderly clients.”
Separately, the opinion analyzed the Chodosh appellants’
remaining arguments and found one ground for partial reversal on the issue
of whether the Chodosh plaintiffs owed the Association for unpaid rent.
Although it outlined the law and legal standards applicable to a proper
evaluation, the unpaid rent determination ultimately required a remand to
10
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and the making of relevant factual
4
findings.
IV.
FEDERAL AND OTHER ACTIONS
Between 2016 and mid-July 2022, when the instant case was
filed, Evans filed and represented various combinations of the mobilehome
park residents in several additional state and federal court actions. Those
actions were grounded in allegations of a conspiracy or “fix” among judges
and justices who had ruled adversely against Evans’ clients in some manner,
JAMS, CJP, state elected officials, the Association, various entities that did
business with or were affiliated with the Association in conjunction with its
handling of the mobilehome park property, and individuals who represented
or acted on behalf of such entities. The purported aim of these individuals
was to ignore and defy the law in order to validate illegal agreements and
transactions, to deprive the complaining mobilehome park residents of due
process, including an impartial judiciary, and for the judges and justices to
secure positions at JAMS upon retirement. Each of these cases was disposed
of early on, with the outcomes being against Evans’ clients.
In 2017, a federal district court dismissed a federal civil rights
action for lack of jurisdiction. (Eicherly v. Moss (C.D.Cal., Mar. 29, 2017, No.
SACV 16-02233-CJC) 2017 WL 6021426.) It based its determination on the
4
Following remand, the trial court held additional proceedings
and entered an amended judgment. The Association appealed from the
amended judgment and that appeal is separately pending in this court.
(Chodosh v. Palm Beach Park Assn. (G062202, app. pending).)
11
5
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” (Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp. (2005) 544 U.S. 280, 284.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
that determination, but concluded the dismissal should have been without
prejudice. (Eicherly v. O’Leary (9th Cir. 2018) 721 Fed.Appx. 625.)
In 2020, Evans brought claims on behalf of many of the same
mobilehome park residents and against the same defendants as in this case,
alleging violations of RICO, a RICO conspiracy, and unjust enrichment, all
grounded in claims of “a wide-spread conspiracy between [the] [d]efendants
and members of the state judiciary.” (Chodosh v. Saunders (C.D. Cal., Nov.
5, 2020, SACV 20-01326-CJC-KES) 2020 U.S.Dist. Lexis 225001.) After
denying a motion to disqualify the assigned federal judge based on prior
rulings adverse to Evans’ clients (Chodosh v. Saunders (C.D. Cal., Oct. 8,
2020, No. SACV 20-01326-CJC-KES) 2020 U.S.Dist. Lexis 225005), the
federal district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Relying
again on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court noted that the crux of the
claims was no different than that asserted in the 2017 dismissed federal case
despite being stylized as RICO based. (Chodosh, supra, 2020 U.S.Dist. Lexis
225001.) In doing so, it again rejected the notion that the narrow extrinsic
fraud exception to the doctrine applied.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the RICO action in
2021. (Chodosh v. Saunders (9th Cir., Dec. 16, 2021, No. 20-56252) 2021
5
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman (1983) 460 U.S. 462; Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co. (1923) 263 U.S. 413.
12
U.S.App. LEXIS 37151.) It explained: “Appellants had the opportunity to
present their claims in state court, and the basis of Appellants’ asserted
injury and RICO claim is not a wrongful act by the adverse party but rather
the state court’s purportedly ‘wrongful[ ] adjudicat[ion]’ that they were not
entitled to damages. [¶] The district court thus properly dismissed
Appellants’ action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine because it was in part a ‘de facto appeal’ of prior state-
court decisions . . . .” (Ibid.) And in closing, it expressed concern about the
repeated and protracted litigation conduct and warned Evans’ clients: “This
litigation has dragged on unnecessarily for years and is now perilously close
to frivolity. [Citation.] Appellants should consider themselves warned that
any future filings asserting these meritless claims may result in the
imposition of substantial monetary sanctions.” (Ibid.)
Finally, in mid-July 2022, the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend in a case
brought by Evans on behalf of Chodosh. (Chodosh v. Commission on Judicial
Performance (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 248, 253-254.) The underlying complaint
filed against the CJP, the California Department of Justice, and the then-
former California Attorney General, accused Judge Moss of committing
judicial misconduct by “‘fixing’” the mobilehome park related cases against
the plaintiffs therein, and “allege[d] the [CJP] and Attorney General
systematically fail to discharge their ostensible duties to protect the public
from ‘judge crime.’” (Id. at p. 256, fn. omitted.) The appellate court agreed
with the trial court that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against
any of the defendants. (Id. at p. 254.)
13
V.
THE PRESENT RICO ACTION
A. The Claims and Allegations
In late-July 2022, Evans filed the instant action on behalf of
plaintiffs, which they admit, is nearly identical to the dismissed federal RICO
action. The 157-page complaint, appended with nearly 300 pages of exhibits,
ostensibly sets forth four causes of action: (1) violations of 18 U.S.C. section
1962(c); (2) violations of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(d); (3) set aside of the
Original Action judgment due to fraud on the court; and (4) unjust
enrichment.
The relevant players consist of plaintiffs, defendants, and non-
defendant coconspirators. Plaintiffs are all former mobilehome park
residents who were plaintiffs in the Original Action and in various of the
other mobilehome park related cases. Defendants fall into four categories:
the mobilehome park buyer defendants (John Saunders, Robert Coldren, ICC
35902 LLC, 3187 Redhill LLC, and Pacific Current Partners); the HOA
related defendants (the Association, Diana Mantelli, and George Fiori); the
title policy defendant (Fidelity National Title Company); and the attorney
defendants (Lisa Salisbury, Allen Thomas, Cary Wood, and Edward Susolik).
The non-defendant coconspirators consist of current and former judges,
justices, ADR providers and neutrals, and state elected officials, agencies,
and their representatives, each of whom is alleged to have had some
involvement in something that touched on the underlying disputes between
the mobilehome park residents and others, and/or the legal or ADR
proceedings concerning the same.
The following allegations from the complaint convey the big
picture story set forth by plaintiffs: “The [Association] [b]oard [p]resident,
14
[d]irectors and attorneys lured, misled, and betrayed the HOA seniors into
voting to sell the [mobilehome] [p]ark to the [p]resident’s undisclosed
affiliates at an exceptionally low price”; “[p]laintiffs tried to stop the sale, but
a judge ‘fixed’ the case, enabling the fraudulent sale and taking of seniors’
homes and millions in real estate equity”; “[t]he wrongdoer judge concocted
‘self-re-qualification’ as the device to ‘fix’ the case so he could enable the
fiduciary fraudulent sale that stole millions from the seniors”; “[t]he
wrongdoer [d]efendants, by a judge they bribed to fix the sale, acquired the
rare coastal parcel at millions of dollars less than its market value”; “[t]he
racketeering enterprise injured [p]laintiffs by carrying out HOA taking of
their homes without compensation”; “the [‘fix’] judge was part of a
racketeering judge crime enterprise . . . where judges and justices, retired
judges and justices practicing as ‘neutrals’ . . . , alternative dispute
resolution . . . vendor companies, attorneys and clients, the judge oversight
disciplinary agency Commission on Judicial Performance . . . , and the
California attorney general . . . act and conspire to enable judge ‘fixes’ to
benefit favored clients and customers, attorneys, and themselves”; “[h]iding
behind immunity and secrecy, with judges judging judges, they all disregard
their oaths to law, ethics, and the people in order to give the green light to
judge crime”; and “[t]he presiding judge, the appellate court, the judge
commission, and the attorney general did and will do nothing about the judge
‘fix.’”
Plaintiffs’ requested relief includes both monetary and
nonmonetary relief. On the monetary side, they request, inter alia, treble
damages on their RICO claims, compensation for the value of their homes,
and attorney fees and costs. On the nonmonetary side, they seek a
declaration that the judgment in the Original Action was and is “void for
15
fraud on the court because [they] were deprived of an impartial court, such
that [they] are entitled to a new trial before an impartial court where the
judicial officers are not bribed and not subject to JAMS’ influence.”
B. Trial Court Proceedings
A group of defendants, referred to by the trial court and the
parties as the Callahan defendants, demurred to the complaint and moved for
6
monetary and nonmonetary sanctions against plaintiffs and Evans. The
demurrer asserted, inter alia, plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel, the litigation
privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)), and the Noerr-Pennington7 doctrine.
The sanctions motion, brought pursuant to sections 128.5 and 128.7,
subdivisions (c) and (d), asserted the complaint was frivolous, it was filed “to
turn the machinery of justice against itself and to intimidate and harass the
judiciary and [d]efendants,” and sanctions were appropriate and necessary
given the lengthy history of conduct by plaintiffs and Evans. Submitted in
support of the sanctions request were a few litigation related documents; the
moving defendants requested the court take judicial notice of them.
After receiving an opposition from plaintiffs, declarations,
requests for judicial notice, and additional briefing, the court held a hearing.
It ultimately confirmed its tentative decision to sustain the demurrer without
leave to amend as its final decision. In a written order, the court explained
6
Various groups of defendants also filed other motions. The trial
court did not rule on most of those other motions due to its ruling on the
Callahan defendants’ demurrer, and none of the other motions are at issue or
relevant to this appeal.
7
United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965) 381 U.S. 657;
Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors (1961) 365 U.S. 127.
16
its reasoning: (1) the two RICO causes of action were barred by a four-year
statute of limitations which began to run no later than April 2016; (2) the set
aside cause of action was barred by a three-year statute of limitations, a
reasonable time filing limitation, and collateral estoppel; (3) the unjust
enrichment claim was barred by a three-year statute of limitations; and (4)
plaintiffs did not request leave to amend the complaint and the court could
not envision how any of the identified defects could be remedied through
amendment.
In light of the trial court’s demurrer ruling, and without waiving
the right to contest the court’s determinations, the parties stipulated, in
relevant part, to the following: that the court would sustain a demurrer
without leave to amend as to all other defendants based on the same grounds
set forth in its ruling concerning the Callahan defendants; that the complaint
should be dismissed; and that plaintiffs and the Callahan defendants would
be permitted to submit supplemental briefing on the pending sanctions
motion. The court issued an order consistent with the stipulation.
Following issuance of a lengthy written tentative decision and a
hearing at which all sides argued the sanctions matter, the trial court issued
an order granting sanctions requested pursuant to section 128.7 and denying
those requested pursuant to section 128.5.8 With respect to the latter, the
court found the moving defendants failed to provide any evidence of
subjective bad faith by plaintiffs or Evans. Regarding the former, the court
concluded: (1) the moving defendants complied with all procedural
8
Because the Association was not listed as a party on the
prefiling notice provided to plaintiffs in accordance with statutory
requirements, the court found it was not among the moving parties to whom
relief could be accorded.
17
requirements; (2) despite three prior judicial decisions rejecting various
aspects of plaintiffs’ conspiracy theory, they repackaged all those aspects
together into a RICO action, which is sanctionable conduct; and (3) plaintiffs’
responses to the sanctions motion were irrelevant or legally or factually
unsupported.
In determining the appropriate sanctions, the court deemed the
request for nonmonetary sanctions moot because of the demurrer ruling and
concluded monetary sanctions were necessary to deter repetition of the
concerning conduct. From its perspective, the single sale of a mobilehome
park had resulted in a slew of state and federal court litigation through
which Evans “‘engaged in a pattern of inflammatory accusations against any
number of judges who have ruled against him.’” And despite multiple
appellate court warnings about the possibility of sanctions, Evans continued
undeterred and filed what the court considered a frivolous RICO action in
state court. Based on the entirety of the circumstances, the court ordered
sanctions against Evans only, not against plaintiffs. Among other things, it
noted plaintiffs are “‘vulnerable and elderly,’” and though it was unclear how
much control they had over litigation related decisions, some evidence gave
the impression Evans controlled matters.
As for the amount, the court found reasonable the $88,855
requested by the moving defendants, consisting of that which they incurred
in defending the action. Hourly billing rates ranged from $265 to $510.
Clerical work and work concerning a separate dispositive motion filed by the
Callahan defendants which was later withdrawn was not included.
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
18
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding their claims to
be barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and collateral estoppel.
Evans also argues the section 128.7 sanctions were unwarranted.9 Pervading
their briefing are continued accusations of “judge crime,” a “fix,” and the
private ADR industry’s undermining of judicial integrity. Focusing on the
law, we find no error.
I.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Before turning to the substance of the appeal, we first address
three requests filed by plaintiffs: a petition for a writ of coram vobis; a
motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing; and a motion to take new
evidence pursuant to section 909.10 As we explain, each is defective or
inappropriate under the circumstances.
A. Writ of Error Coram Vobis
A writ of error coram vobis “direct[s] the trial court to reconsider
its decision based on new evidence discovered after its decision that would
have been grounds for granting reconsideration.” (In re Rachel M. (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295-1296.) It is “‘a drastic remedy’” (Daniels v. Robbins
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 228), and its use in civil proceedings in
California is rare (Chaganti v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 237,
9 Although Evans is not listed as an appealing party on the notice
of appeal, we construe the notice to include him because, inter alia, the
sanctions were imposed against him only. (See K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 888-890.)
10
Plaintiffs’ three requests are filed in a single 65-page pleading,
accompanied by a 21-page declaration made by Evans and 200 pages of
exhibits.
19
243). Among the requirements for its issuance are that proffered new
evidence (1) “will either compel or make probable a different result in the
trial court,” (2) “was not presented to the trial court for reasons other than
the fault or negligence of the petitioner,” and (3) “was unknown to the
petitioner at any time substantially earlier than filing the petition for the
writ.” (In re Rachel M., at p. 1296.)
Included in the matters plaintiffs categorize as “new evidence”
are the following: (1) in June 2022, Judge Moss retired and became a private
neutral at Judicate West, another private ADR service provider; (2) three of
the justices involved in decisions related to the Original Action and the
Haugen Action have since retired and become neutrals at JAMS; (3) Callahan
& Blaine has settled cases at Judicate West and one of the firm’s attorneys
previously worked at Judicate West; (4) Callahan & Blaine’s retainer
agreements with clients designate JAMS and Judicate West as ADR
providers; and (5) various documents related to a lease involving a different
mobilehome park owned by defendant Saunders designate JAMS and
Judicate West as ADR providers. They contend this “new evidence” shows
“‘quid pro quo’ bribery bargains made between and among
[defendants], . . . JAMS, Judicate West, and the Orange County [j]udges and
[j]ustices that decided this case and [plaintiffs’] underlying cases and appeals,
including [the Original Action].” Evans separately contends defendants’
concealment of this evidence requires reversal of the sanctions order.
Setting aside any procedural deficiencies, which we do not
address, plaintiffs’ petition is substantively problematic. The trial court
sustained the demurrer on statute of limitations and collateral estoppel
grounds. None of the purported facts proffered by plaintiffs would have any
likelihood of changing the result of the demurrer in those regards. At best,
20
they are an attempt to enlarge and lend credence to the same conspiracy they
have attempted to articulate all along. Further, most of what plaintiffs offer
has long been public information; it is not new. And, contrary to plaintiffs’
assertions, that defendants deny the existence of a conspiracy and any
bribery or other nefarious conduct does not demonstrate concealment of the
alleged new evidence.
B. Motions for Discovery, Evidentiary Hearing, and Taking of New Evidence
Equally misguided are plaintiffs’ request for discovery and an
evidentiary hearing, and the section 909 request for the taking of additional
evidence. Citing California Rules of Court, rules 8.54 and 8.155, they ask we
remand the case “for discovery to supplement the record with new evidence of
judge and ADR company and attorney bribery ‘quid pro quos.’” Alternatively,
in reliance on section 909, they request we receive new evidence in the first
instance. But, nowhere in the California Rules of Court is there a provision
which speaks to the requested remand, and plaintiffs provide us with no
other support for our authority to so act. In addition, discovery and the
consideration of additional evidence, in the trial court or on appeal, is not
warranted under the circumstances. This appeal concerns a demurrer, the
disposition of which does not involve the consideration of facts or the making
of factual findings. And, not only do plaintiffs fail to articulate any relevance
to the challenged sanctions motion, but the applicable standard of review
does not allow us to engage in fact finding. Finally, plaintiffs seek to use the
additional evidence to allow the RICO action to move forward, an outcome for
which section 909 is not to be used. (See Bombardier Recreational Products,
Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 605.)
The petition for a writ of coram vobis and the two evidentiary
related motions are denied.
21
II.
DEMURRER GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘[I]n reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend[,] “[w]e independently review the ruling . . . and
determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a
cause of action. [Citation.] We assume the truth of the properly pleaded
factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly
pleaded, and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.”’” (Hagey v.
Solar Service Experts, Inc. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1303, 1308.) That
assumption of truth does not extend to contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of law or fact. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169
Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102.) In addition, although “‘“[w]e construe the pleading
in a reasonable manner and read the allegations in context”’” (Hagey, at p.
1308), “any allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which
judicial notice may be taken will be treated as a nullity.” (C.R., at p. 1102.)
When a demurrer is grounded in an affirmative defense, such as
a statute of limitations, it is properly sustained if “‘the complaint “has
included allegations that clearly disclose some defense or bar to recovery.”’”
(Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 191;
see Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 [statute of limitations defect clearly and
affirmatively appearing on fact of complaint is grounds for general
demurrer].) Stated differently, “‘a demurrer based on an affirmative defense
will be sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the
action is necessarily barred by the defense.’” (Stella, at p. 191.)
22
III.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The trial court determined each of plaintiffs’ claims is barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. Except for the set aside claim, the
parties generally agree about which statutes of limitations apply. Their
biggest point of contention is the time at which the RICO cause of action
accrued. Resolution of this issue is critical because “statutes of limitation do
not begin to run until a cause of action accrues.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806.)
A. RICO
RICO, founded on the concept of racketeering, “created
four . . . criminal offenses involving the activities of organized criminal
groups in relation to an enterprise. [Citation.] [It] also created a . . . civil
cause of action for ‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation’ of those prohibitions.” (RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Community (2016) 579 U.S. 325, 329 (RJR Nabisco).)
Relevant here are sections 1962(c) and 1962(d) of title 18 of the
United States Code, the portions of the statute on which plaintiffs’ claims are
based. The former “makes it unlawful for a person employed by or associated
with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity.” (RJR Nabisco, supra, 579 U.S. at p. 330; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c).) The latter makes it unlawful to conspire to, inter alia, commit
such a violation. (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); RJR Nabisco, at p. 330.) “The statute
defines ‘racketeering activity’ to encompass dozens of state and federal
offenses, known in RICO parlance as predicates. These predicates include
any act ‘indictable’ under specified federal statutes, . . . as well as certain
crimes ‘chargeable’ under state law . . . and any offense involving bankruptcy
23
or securities fraud or drug-related activity that is ‘punishable’ under federal
law . . . . A predicate offense implicates RICO when it is part of a ‘pattern of
racketeering activity’ — a series of related predicates that together
demonstrate the existence or threat of continued criminal activity.” (RJR
Nabisco, at pp. 329-330.)
The statute of limitations for a RICO claim is four years. (Rotella
v. Wood (2000) 528 U.S. 549, 552 (Rotella).) Although that aspect of the
statute of limitations became clear in the late 1980s (Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. (1987) 483 U.S. 143, 156), the United States
Supreme Court did not provide guidance on the accrual of a RICO claim until
10 years later. Up until that time, lower courts took varying positions, with
three distinct approaches emerging. Some federal appeals courts “applied an
injury discovery accrual rule starting the clock when a plaintiff knew or
should have known of his injury.” (Rotella, at p. 553.) “Some applied [an]
injury and pattern discovery rule . . . , under which a civil RICO claim
accrue[d] only when the claimant discover[ed], or should [have] discover[ed],
both an injury and a pattern of RICO activity.” (Ibid.) And, one appeals
court used a “‘last predicate act’ rule,” under which “the period began to run
as soon as the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and the
pattern of racketeering activity, but began to run anew upon each predicate
act forming part of the same pattern.” (Id. at p. 554.)
Between Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corporation (1997) 521 U.S. 179
(Klehr), and Rotella, the high court disposed of two of these approaches — the
last predicate act rule, and the injury and pattern discovery rule. Among
other things, Klehr recognized that a pattern of predicate acts can continue
indefinitely, meaning the last predicate act rule could extend the limitations
period over many decades and beyond any limit conceivably contemplated by
24
Congress. (Klehr, at p. 187.) And in Rotella, the high court explained that
“tying the start of the limitations period to a plaintiff’s reasonable discovery
of a pattern[,] rather than to the point of injury or its reasonable
discovery, . . . would extend the potential limitations period for most civil
RICO cases well beyond the time when a plaintiff’s cause of action is
complete.” (Rotella, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 558, fn. omitted.) Such a result is
inimical to “the basic policies of all limitations provisions: repose,
elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for
recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” (Id. at p. 555.)
Though Klehr and Rotella limited the possibilities, the Supreme
Court made clear it was not settling upon a final rule. (Rotella, supra, 528
U.S. at p. 554, fn. 2.) Among the remaining options it identified are an injury
discovery rule and a straight injury occurrence rule, with the latter stemming
from a concurring opinion in Klehr. (See id. at pp. 553-554 & fn. 4.)
The Ninth Circuit has long followed the more plaintiff friendly
injury discovery rule, which has two aspects. (See Kurtz v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. (9th Cir. 2021) 859 Fed.Appx. 22, 24 [noting Supreme Court has
not disturbed injury discovery rule]; Grimmett v. Brown (9th Cir. 1996) 75
F.3d 506, 511 (Grimmett).) The first aspect is the general rule: the civil
RICO limitations period begins to run “when the plaintiff knows or should
know that [they have] been injured.” (Grimmett, at p. 512.) “The plaintiff
need not discover that the injury is a part of a ‘pattern of racketeering’ for the
period to begin to run.” (Ibid.) The second aspect, referred to as the separate
accrual rule, concerns the impact of additional injuries that postdate the
initial injury. “[A] new cause of action accrues for each new and independent
injury.” (Id. at p. 510.) As Grimmett explained, two elements are required to
trigger a new, separate accrual: (1) there must “be a new and independent
25
act that is not merely a reaffirmation of a previous act”; and (2) the new and
independent act “must inflict new and accumulating injury on the plaintiff.”
(Id. at p. 513, italics omitted.)
Turning to this case, the complaint alleges more than one dozen
times, using slight variations of wording, that the purported racketeering
activity “injur[ed] [them] in their property by causing loss of their homes.”
This is consistent with RICO’s civil action requirement of an injury to a
11
person’s business or property. (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 479, 496-497.)
Other allegations tie that loss to two sets of purported actions
taken by Judge Moss, referred to by plaintiffs as “the judge ‘fix.’” The first
set concern the Original Action. The complaint alleges: “Starting in 2014,
[Judge Moss] routinely ruled against [p]laintiffs and the law and facts. He
engaged in willful judicial misconduct by intentionally disregarding the law
to cause [p]laintiffs to lose their case.” It further states that in October 2014,
“Judge Moss reversed Judge Stock, declaring that [p]laintiffs had no ‘real
property interest consisting of their [Association] membership and
membership lease,’” and by doing so “Judge Moss permitted the [Association]
to take a senior’s home with only a Board of Directors vote; he permitted
11
For the first time in their reply brief, plaintiffs claim their
injury was a “denial of due process.” This belated assertion contradicts the
allegations in the complaint, and plaintiffs do not provide any authority for
the proposition that a due process violation, alone, can amount to a
cognizable RICO injury. And for good reason; the right to due process, itself,
is not a property or business interest. (See Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation (1998) 524 U.S. 156, 164 [due process clause protects rather than
creates property interests].) At best, plaintiffs’ argument could be construed
to claim the purported due process violation resulted in the wrongful taking
of their property without just compensation. This brings us back to the loss
of home property related injury.
26
illegal strict foreclosure.” That determination was later incorporated into the
March 2016 Original Action judgment.
The second set of purported actions taken by Judge Moss relate
to the Haugen Action. According to the complaint, in December 2015, Judge
Moss engaged in ex parte communications with certain coconspirators, he
“‘self-re-qualifi[ed],’” reassigning the Haugen Action back to himself, and he
continued the ex parte hearing on the TRO which sought to immediately stop
the impending sale of the mobilehome park property. A deed making the sale
official allegedly was recorded four hours after Judge Moss took those actions.
These allegations demonstrate the RICO claims are barred by the
four-year statute of limitations. They reveal plaintiffs arguably knew or
should have known of their alleged property injury no later than October
2014 or December 2015, but certainly no later than March 2016. Thus, the
RICO claims needed to be filed by March 2020. But plaintiffs did not file the
complaint until more than two years later, in July 2022.
Plaintiffs contend they did not sustain injury for RICO purposes
until rehearing was denied on appeal in the Original Action in January 2019
after issuance of the 2018 appellate decision. From their perspective, because
an appealed judgment is not final, injury did not occur until the appellate
court affirmed the lower court judgment.
We are not persuaded. First, plaintiffs do not provide any legal
authority to support their position. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 408 [appellant has burden of demonstrating reversible error with
citation to legal authority].) Contrary to their assertions, that an appealed
judgment is not final for res judicata purposes under California law until the
appeal is resolved (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 954, fn. 11,
disapproved on another ground in White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th
27
563, 574, fn. 4), is not determinative of when a RICO injury occurs. (See
Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606, 618 (Laird) [injury is concept distinct
from finality of judgment]; Diaz v. Gates (9th Cir. 2005) 420 F.3d 897, 900 [en
banc] [RICO injury determined by reference to state law principles
concerning cognizable business or property interest].)
Second, as the trial court noted, although an appellate decision in
the Chodosh plaintiffs’ favor might have lessened the damage caused by the
Original Action judgment, the injury nonetheless existed once the claimed
property interference occurred by way of the judgment. (See Grimmet, supra,
75 F.3d at pp. 516-517 [mere fact that extent of injury may be uncertain does
not impact RICO cause of action accrual].)
We find analogous a situation involving legal malpractice which
leads to an adverse trial court judgment. Our state high court and other
state courts have rejected the argument that the statute of limitations on the
legal malpractice claim would not begin to run until final resolution of an
appeal. (See, e.g., Laird, supra, 2 Cal.4th 609; Seed Co. Limited v.
Westerman (D.C. Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 325, 334; Beesley v. Van Doren (Alaska
1994) 873 P.2d 1280, 1282 & fn. 1 [accumulating state cases]; Zimmie v.
Calfee, Halter & Griswold (Ohio 1989) 538 N.E.2d 398, 402.) In that context,
the injury occurs no later than “when a client suffers an adverse judgment or
[upon] order of dismissal in the underlying action” (Laird, at p. 609), and
“[t]he ‘lingering hope’ that an appellate ruling might lead to a different
outcome on remand is ‘irrelevant for purposes of determining’ the date the
statute of limitations begins to run” (Seed Co. Limited, at p. 334). Among
other things, “the only difference between affirmance and reversal is the
amount of damage sustained,” not the fact of damage. (Belden v. Emmerman
(Ill.Ct.App. 1990) 560 N.E.2d 1180, 1183.) And, an exhaustion of appeals rule
28
would “allow clients, with knowledge that they have suffered actual injury,
unilaterally to control the commencement of the statute of limitations” and
thereby undermine the statute of limitations goal of “resolving cases while
the evidence is fresh, witnesses are available, and memories have not faded.”
(Laird, at p. 618.) The same is true with a RICO action, like the present, in
which the alleged injury is a result of purported actions by judges and others
involved in trial court proceedings.
Third, even assuming arguendo the Original Action appeal
precluded the Original Action judgment from being a RICO injury while the
appeal was pending, the injury linked to the sale of the mobilehome property
in December 2015 which allegedly resulted from wrongful actions by
defendants and Judge Moss in the Haugen Action still stood. The pendency
of the appeal in the Original Action had no impact on the Haugen Action.
For the first time in their reply brief, plaintiffs claim “‘new
evidence’” impacts the RICO statute of limitations in two ways. First, they
contend defendants’ supposed concealment of the new evidence tolled the
limitations period. Second, they argue the new evidence shows new injury,
which triggers a new statute of limitations under the separate accrual rule.
Having failed to raise these arguments in their opening brief, plaintiffs have
waived them. (Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
266, 296, fn. 7 (Aptos Council) [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening
brief are deemed waived or abandoned”]; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 92, 99 (Jones) [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are
not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the
issues waived”].) And, plaintiffs would be no better off had they been
properly raised. There is no legal authority to support the tolling of the
limitations period where the complaint, along with judicial noticed matters,
29
demonstrates plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of the claimed RICO
injury prior to being aware of the purported new facts. Further, even under
plaintiffs’ claimed sequence of events, there would be no new RICO injury.
The suggested new evidence concerns additional conspiratorial actions, but
the argument is that those additional actions failed to remedy the original
property deprivation. Put another way, plaintiffs claim those additional
actions reaffirmed the underlying property related injury; the injury is the
same. (See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) [RICO injury is to business or property].)
In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding plaintiffs’ RICO
claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
B. Set Aside of the Prior Judgment
Plaintiffs’ cause of action to set aside a prior judgment concerns
the Original Action. It alleges plaintiffs, who were among the Chodosh
plaintiffs, were denied a fair trial in the Original Action due to extrinsic fraud
and, therefore, they are entitled to “a new trial with impartial jurists.” The
associated relief requested is “[a] declaration that the judgment entered by
Judge Moss and affirmed on appeal . . . [is] and [was] void for fraud on the
court because [p]laintiffs were deprived of an impartial court, such that
[p]laintiffs are entitled to a new trial before an impartial court where the
judicial officers are not bribed and not subject to JAMS’ influence.”
Courts possess the inherent equitable power to set aside a
judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud; “‘[a] showing of fraud practiced in
the trial of the original action will not suffice.’” (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40
Cal.3d 607, 614.) An action seeking such a set aside is either subject to the
three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 338, or simply subject to
the principles of unreasonable delay and/or laches. (Hudson v. Foster (2021)
30
68 Cal.App.5th 640, 668, fn. 5 [identifying split of authority and listing cases
on each side].)
Plaintiffs contend “there can be no three-year limit on [their]
claim to overturn the JAMS driven judgment.” We need not decide whether a
three-year statute of limitations is appropriate. The trial court applied both
possible timeliness standards, giving plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt by
assuming the set aside cause of action did not accrue until the denial of
appellate rehearing in the Original Action in January 2019. Assuming a
three-year limitations period, the attempt to set aside the judgment was at
least six months too late. And instead assuming the unreasonable delay
standard governs, plaintiffs do not challenge the court’s untimeliness
conclusion and, thus, have forfeited the issue. (Aptos Council, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 296, fn. 7; Jones, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 99.)
C. Unjust Enrichment
“Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action . . . or even a remedy,
but rather ‘“‘a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and
remedies’”. . . . [Citation.] It is synonymous with restitution.’” [Citation.]
Unjust enrichment has also been characterized as describing ‘“the result of a
failure to make restitution . . . .”’” (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 379, 387 (McBride).)
In reviewing whether the complaint pleads facts which would
entitle plaintiffs to relief, we look to the actual gravamen of the complaint
and ignore erroneous or confusing labels. (McBride, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th
at p. 387.) Although not expressly stated, given the remainder of the
complaint’s allegations, we construe plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim to be
grounded in fraud. (See id. at p. 388 [construing noncontract based unjust
enrichment allegations to be quasi-contract claim for restitution due to
31
fraud].) As such, it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, with
accrual occurring upon plaintiffs’ discovery “of the facts constituting the
fraud.” (§ 338, subd. (d); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 333, 338.)
Plaintiffs do not argue the trial court should have used a
different statute of limitations, and their opening brief does not articulate
12
any claimed error in its application to their unjust enrichment allegations.
The attempt in their reply brief to tie in the same new evidence tolling
argument asserted in the RICO context is of no avail, as the failure to raise it
earlier amounts to waiver of the issue. (Aptos Council, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 296, fn. 7; Jones, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 99.)
IV.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The trial court found collateral estoppel to be an independent
basis for sustaining the demurrer to plaintiffs’ claim for a set aside of the
Original Action judgment. In doing so, it relied on the appellate decision in
the Original Action, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of the federal
RICO complaint which rejected an extrinsic fraud argument made by
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appear to misunderstand the trial court’s collateral
estoppel determination as applying to their RICO claims, arguing the
appellate decision in the Original Action did not consider a RICO conspiracy.
Even so, our determination the trial court did not err in sustaining the
12
Even assuming arguendo, as plaintiffs generally advocate, the
unjust enrichment resulted from the 2018 appellate decision in the Original
Action and the January 2019 denial of rehearing, the unjust enrichment
allegations would be time barred because the limitations period would have
expired in January 2022, six months before the filing of the complaint.
32
demurrer as to each cause of action on statute of limitations grounds
13
precludes the need to reach the question of collateral estoppel.
V.
LEAVE TO AMEND
“In the case of . . . a demurrer . . . , leave to amend should be
granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a
good cause of action.” (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.) “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility
is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Plaintiffs do not request leave to amend or address the court’s denial thereof.
Accordingly, they have forfeited the issue and we do not consider the
propriety of the trial court’s denial of leave to amend.
VI.
SECTION 128.7 SANCTIONS
Evans’ challenge to the sanctions order does not concern the
propriety of the type or amount of sanctions; rather, it only challenges the
trial court’s imposition of sanctions against him. Among other things, he
contends the lack of a contempt holding against him in the Original Action
proves the Judge Moss “fix” is true, the various lawsuits in which plaintiffs
were involved were not repetitive and had disparate purposes, the federal
lawsuit dismissals are of no import as they did not go to the merits of the
underlying allegations in those cases, and the instant RICO action is not
13
For the same reason, we also do not reach the alternative
grounds for sustaining the demurrer offered on appeal by defendants
Fidelity, Thomas, and Wood.
33
factually or legally frivolous. On the record before us, we do not find the
imposition of sanctions to be an abuse of discretion.
Section 128.7 “authorizes trial courts to impose sanctions to
check abuses in the filing of pleadings, petitions, written notices of motions or
similar papers.” (Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 514
(Musaelian).) Specifically, subdivision (b) states that an attorney or
unrepresented party who signs, files, submits, or advocates regarding, a
pleading or other written matter, thereby “certify[ies] that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances, all of the following conditions are met:
[¶] (1) [i]t is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation[;] [¶] (2) [t]he claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law[;] [¶] (3) [t]he allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
or discovery[;] [¶] [and] (4) [t]he denials of factual contentions are warranted
on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack
of information or belief.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b).)
“Subdivision (c) authorizes sanctions for a violation of subdivision
(b)” (Musaelian, supra, 45 Cal.4th, at p. 516), with a focus on whether the
person’s conduct was objectively, not subjectively, unreasonable (Guillemin v.
Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 167 (Guillemin)). Based on the statutory
language, sanctionable matters generally fall into three categories: “factually
frivolous (not well grounded in fact); legally frivolous (not warranted by
34
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law); and papers interposed for an improper purpose.”
(Ibid.) In deciding whether to impose sanctions, a court must also consider
“whether the party seeking sanctions exercised due diligence.” (McCluskey v.
Henry (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1205.) “Subdivision (d) limits the sanction
‘to what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated’ and provides that a sanction may include
payment ‘of some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.’ Finally, subdivision (e) requires
the court to describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of [the]
section and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.” (Ibid.)
“We review a section 128.7 sanctions award under the abuse of
discretion standard. [Citation.] We presume the trial court’s order is correct
and do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. [Citation.] To
be entitled to relief on appeal, the court’s action must be sufficiently grave to
amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 175, 190 (Bucur).) “[W]e may affirm the court’s sanctions order
on any ground supported by the record.” (In re Marriage of Corona (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225.) Because section 128.7 is modeled on, and
almost identical to, rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rule 11),
federal case law construing rule 11 is persuasive in evaluating a sanctions
decision made pursuant to section 128.7. (Guillemin, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th
at p. 167.)
Here, the trial court imposed sanctions based on a statement in
Bucur: “Filing a new complaint based on the same facts to evade a ruling
made in a previous litigation constitutes sanctionable conduct under section
128.7.” (Bucur, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 191.) In its written order, the
35
court provided three primary bases for concluding that “is exactly what
[p]laintiffs’ have done here.” It explained: “The [c]ourt of [a]ppeal rejected
[plaintiffs] allegations about Justice Trotter in [the JAMS Action], holding
they had no admissible evidence of the scheme to force a settlement by
threatening to tell Judge Stock what happened at mediation”; “[t]he [c]ourt of
[a]ppeal similarly rejected their allegations about Judge Moss and the ‘fix’ in
the [Original Action] opinion”; and “the [c]ourt of [a]ppeal rejected [p]laintiffs’
allegations about the function of the Commission on Judicial Performance.”
And, as the court put it: “Having been thrice rejected, [p]laintiffs combined
all three sets of allegations into a single RICO conspiracy. This is exactly the
sort of frivolous litigation Bucur holds sanctionable. Plaintiffs cannot evade
the [c]ourt of [a]ppeal’s prior rulings by repackaging their rejected allegations
with new labels and insisting that every judge who previously ruled against
them was part of a conspiracy.”
The principle expressed in Bucur stems from a combination of all
three categories of sanctionable matters previously mentioned — factual
frivolousness, legal frivolousness, and improper purpose. (See Bucur, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 189-191.) When an attorney files a lawsuit grounded
in allegations that were factually or legally dispelled or disposed of in prior
litigation related proceedings in which they were involved, a reasonable
conclusion to draw is that the attorney has buried their head in the sand and
failed to make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal
basis for the allegations. Another objectively reasonable conclusion that
follows is that the lawsuit has been brought for an improper purpose.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, including judicially
noticed matters, we cannot say there was a manifest miscarriage of justice.
Rather, justice appears to have been served.
36
Over the course of nearly a decade, and in the context of no less
than one dozen lawsuits, Evans has filed a veritable mountain of pleadings,
declarations, briefs, and other documents, and made oral assertions,
expounding grand conspiracy theories involving defendants and nearly any
judicial officer, neutral, and government official who has failed to give his
clients the relief he feels is due. With each new decision or response received,
and each new judicial officer retirement, the conspiracy grows. And upon
each legal dead-end reached, there is an attempt to pivot to get around the
roadblock.
Under these circumstances, it is virtually inevitable that what
arguably may have been objectively reasonable actions at their origin, at
some point will turn and evolve into objectively unreasonable conduct — i.e.,
something that “‘any reasonable attorney would agree . . . is totally and
completely without merit.’” (Bucur, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) The
trial court implicitly concluded that point was reached, a conclusion which we
find reasonable. Every substantive response provided by an individual,
government entity, or law firm at which fraud and conspiracy allegations
have been hurled has been a resounding denial. And, whenever a court has
had the opportunity to review the accusations in some manner, the common
threads articulated have been that the accusations are pure speculation, they
improperly rely on irrelevant material or silence as an admission of
wrongdoing, no evidence of a conspiracy has been produced, and the persons
or entities who purportedly failed to follow the law in order to harm Evans’
clients have not erred.
There is no doubt Evans has been at the forefront of it all, aware
of each response and each judicial decision. Yet he has marched on in state
court, federal court, and back again. Along the way, courts of review have
37
cautioned him three times regarding the possibility of sanctions for frivolous
claims or contemptuous acts. The most recent came from the Ninth Circuit
in 2021 and warned “this litigation . . . is now perilously close to frivolity.”
(Chodosh, supra, 2021 U.S.App. Lexis 37151.)
This case, the most recent in the seemingly endless parade, rests
on the same purported wrongdoing and claimed injury raised, in part or in
full, at some point in those other contexts. And, a reasonable attorney in
Evans’ shoes, performing a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the claims
alleged in the complaint, would have determined the claims were time barred
under well-established law and there was no available “nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b)(2).)
We recognize section 128.7 “should be utilized only in ‘the rare
and exceptional case where the action is clearly frivolous, legally
unreasonable or without legal foundation, or brought for an improper
purpose.’” (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 1121.) Indeed, it
“‘“must not be construed so as to conflict with the primary duty of an attorney
to represent his or her client zealously,”’” which may include “‘“read[ing] a
case or an agreement in an innovative though sensible way.”’” (Id. at p. 1121,
fn. 9.) Effective representation sometimes compels attorneys to take the lead
in evolution of the law, and the sanctions statute should not be transformed
into a bar to such progress. (Guillemin, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 168,
citing Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. A-C Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 859 F.2d
1336 [regarding rule 11].)
But, on this record, those concerns are not extant. The trial court
sensibly concluded this is one of the rare and exceptional situations in which
section 128.7 sanctions are warranted.
38
DISPOSITION
The challenged orders are affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
costs on appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
39
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