CourtListener 10010651•In re F.S. CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 7/22/24 In re F.S. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re F.S. et al., Persons Coming 2d Juv. No. B333553
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. Nos. 22JV00330,
22JV00331, 22JV00332,
22JV00333, 22JV00334,
22JV00335)
(Santa Barbara County)
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
E.M. (mother) and R.F. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s
order terminating parental rights as to Y.S., one of their six
children. (Welf. & Inst. Code1, § 366.26.) Mother contends
reversal is necessary because the juvenile court erred when it
found inapplicable both the parental-benefit and sibling
relationship exceptions to adoption. Father restricts his focus to
the sibling relationship exception but joins in mother’s
arguments. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2022, Santa Barbara County Child Welfare
Services (CWS) obtained protective custody warrants for Y.S., age
1, and her five older siblings. CWS filed a section 300 petition
alleging unsanitary and unsafe living conditions, as well as a
prior instance of domestic violence by father. On October 20,
2022 CWS detained all six children.
Pairs of the six siblings were placed in three confidential
resource homes. Y.S. and her sister F.S., age 8, were paired. At
the October 2022 detention hearing, the court ordered continued
detention. At the November 2022 jurisdiction hearing, the court
found the allegations in an amended petition true by a
preponderance of the evidence. In a December 2022 disposition
hearing, the court ordered family reunification services, including
at least four hours of supervised visits each week. At a contested
six-month review hearing in June 2023, the court terminated
reunification services as to both parents.
In November 2023, the court held a contested section
366.26 hearing at which social worker Adrian Rodriguez, mother,
and father testified. Based on his review of notes on the visits
between mother and Y.S., Rodriguez testified these visits
regularly occurred. Y.S. ran to mother and stretched her arms
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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out for a hug. Y.S. cried when mother put her down so she could
attend to the other children. After the visits, the resource
parents reported Y.S. had nightmares and soiled herself in bed.
Rodriguez testified Y.S. had a substantial and positive
attachment to mother. He could not determine whether an
emotional attachment existed.
Rodriguez stated Y.S. has a close relationship with her
resource parents. She would extend her arms toward her
resource mother and father. When Rodriguez first met Y.S., she
would hide behind her resource mother’s leg and ask to be picked
up. Rodriguez observed Y.S. laugh and play with resource father
during home visits. Y.S. appeared to be happy in the resource
home. According to resource mother, Y.S. would sometimes cry
and make gestures indicating she wanted to stay when leaving
for visits with mother and father. A Court Appointed Special
Advocate report indicated Y.S. called her resource parents “Mom”
and “Dad.”
F.S. indicated she enjoyed living with, playing with, and
having Y.S. as a sister. Rodriguez observed F.S. carrying Y.S., as
well as Y.S.’s laughter at F.S.’s joking facial expressions. They
appeared to have a close relationship. Rodriguez believed a bond
existed between the siblings, including Y.S. and F.S. He also
believed remaining in a home with F.S. was in Y.S.’s best
interest. A CWS report stated: “Although all the children live in
separate placements, it is in the best interest that the children
maintain their sibling relationships because they enjoy seeing
one another . . . .”
The resource parents were committed to legal guardianship
of F.S., but the process could take three to five years for
immigration status reasons. The resource parents were also
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willing to discuss adoption for F.S. once she obtained special
immigrant juvenile status.
Mother testified Y.S. has a strong bond with mother. Y.S.
never wants to go home and wants to stay with mother. Y.S.
wants mother to hold her constantly.
Father testified he provides food and soda during visits and
changes Y.S.’s diaper. Y.S. calls him “Poppy” and says she loves
him. Y.S. dances with father, and she would sleep on his
shoulder when the two still lived together.
The juvenile court found the parental-benefit exception
inapplicable as to both parents. The court concluded both
parents satisfied the visitation prong. The court found neither
parent established a substantial, positive, emotional attachment
to Y.S. The court noted Y.S. was removed one year and one
month ago and concluded she had spent “a little over one half of
her life outside of her parents’ care.” The court stated Y.S. is a
lively, happy child who reaches her arms out to not only mother
but also her siblings and resource parents. The court concluded
the benefits of adoption “clearly outweigh[ed] any detriment that
might exist.”
Regarding the sibling relationship exception, the court
concluded that while F.S. and Y.S. shared a bond, it could not
find a substantial sibling relationship between them. The court
noted the adoptive parents were willing to keep F.S. in
guardianship and indicated any inference of separation from Y.S.
would be speculative. However, the court concluded that even if
F.S.’s guardianship ended, the benefits of adoption outweighed
maintenance of that sibling relationship. The court terminated
parental rights as to both parents.
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DISCUSSION
Parental-Benefit Exception
Mother asserts the court erred in finding the parental-
benefit exception inapplicable. We disagree.
“‘“At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may
order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable,
there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.” [Citation.]’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 316, quoting In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it
must terminate parental rights unless one of several statutory
exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
The parental-benefit exception allows the court to consider
a plan other than adoption if it “finds a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child”
because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent invoking the exception has the burden of proof
and must establish three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence: (1) “regular visitation and contact” between the parent
and child; (2) “a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “terminating
that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).)
The inquiry’s focus is the child’s best interests. (Id. at p. 632.)
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We review the first two elements for substantial evidence
because they are essentially factual determinations. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We likewise review for
substantial evidence any factual determinations underpinning
the third element. (Id. at p. 640.) “In reviewing factual
determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should
‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts.’” (Ibid.)
The third element’s “ultimate decision—whether
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child
due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary
and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) A court abuses its discretion only when
“‘“‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.’”’” (Id. at p. 641.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that mother did not share a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment with Y.S. Y.S. was just over two-and-a-half years old
at the hearing. Y.S. had spent over a year in the care of resource
parents, over 40 percent of her young life. (See In re Autumn H.
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s slight
overestimation of this percentage does not appreciably diminish
its import. Although Rodriguez believed Y.S. had a substantial
and positive attachment to mother, he could not determine if an
emotional attachment existed. Moreover, while Y.S. displayed
positive behavior with mother, Y.S. experienced nightmares and
soiled herself in bed after visits. Given this mixed factual
picture, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding.
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Nor did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in concluding
that severing the relationship would not be detrimental when
balanced against the benefits of the adoptive home. Rodriguez
testified to Y.S.’s close relationship with her resource parents.
She would extend her arms to both resource parents. Rodriguez
observed Y.S. play with her resource father and ask to be picked
up by her resource mother. Y.S. called her resource parents
“Mom” and “Dad.” She appeared to be happy in the resource
home. Considering the equivocal impact of Y.S.’s contact with
mother, the court did not act irrationally in finding the benefit of
a stable, adoptive home outweighed the detriment of severing
that parental relationship.
Sibling Relationship Exception
Mother and father argue the court erroneously found the
sibling relationship exception inapplicable. We disagree.
An exception to termination of parental rights exists when
“[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling
relationship . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) To make this
determination, courts consider “the nature and extent of the
relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child
was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child
shared significant common experiences or has existing close and
strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in
the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional
interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through
adoption.” (Ibid.)
“If the court determines terminating parental rights would
substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is
then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that
sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by
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the permanency of adoption.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 942, 952.) “[W]e apply the substantial evidence
standard to the juvenile court’s underlying factual
determinations, and the abuse of discretion standard to the
court’s weighing of competing interests.” (In re D.O. (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 166, 174.)
Even assuming substantial interference with Y.S.’s sibling
relationships, no abuse of discretion occurred. Y.S.’s closest
sibling relationship is with F.S., with whom she has lived all her
young life. Rodriguez testified to their sibling bond, and the
court recognized it was “clear” they shared a bond. However, we
cannot say the court acted irrationally in finding the benefits of
adoption by the resource parents—with whom Y.S. had also
bonded—outweighed the detriment of terminating the sibling
bonds, including with F.S. Application of the sibling relationship
exception is “rare, particularly when the proceedings concern
young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable
parent are paramount.” (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
987, 1014.) We are not met with that rare case.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J.
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Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant E.M. (mother).
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant R.F. (father).
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent
Santa Barbara County Department of Social Services.
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