CourtListener 10007142•People v. Reyes CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 7/18/24 P. v. Reyes CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083572
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD292030)
DANIEL REYES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Rachel Cano, Judge. Vacated and remanded with directions.
Robert L. Hernandez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher Beesley and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Daniel Reyes appeals from an order revoking his probation and
reinstating it on modified terms. The challenged condition contains the
phrase “pornographic material,” which Reyes claims is unconstitutionally
vague. The People concede this point. Resolving this matter by
memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847), we accept the People’s concession, vacate and remand to the trial court.
Reyes pled guilty to a single count of lewd and lascivious act on a child
in violation of Penal Code section 288(a). The court placed Reyes on
probation.
Reyes was subsequently arrested for violating the terms of his
probation for failing to (1) register as a sex offender and (2) report to
probation. The court reinstated probation on modified terms, including
condition 10(p), which states in full: “Do not knowingly possess any
pornographic material, including computer files and disks, or knowingly be in
places where you know, or a P.O. or other law enforcement officer informs
you, that pornographic materials are the main item for sale.”
Constitutional challenges to probation conditions are reviewed de novo.
(People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723.) When a probationer
challenges a condition as unconstitutionally vague, we consider whether the
condition is “‘sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required
of [the probationer], and for the court to determine whether the condition has
been violated.’” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).)
Though we can rely on “context and common sense” when interpreting the
condition, we must reverse where no “reasonable and practical construction
can be given to its language.” (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
1123, 1129 [cleaned up].)
We agree with the parties that condition 10(p) is unconstitutionally
vague. The condition is not sufficiently precise to notify Reyes of prohibited
conduct because the term “pornographic material” is inherently subjective.
2
(In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 728-729 (D.H.).) Determining whether
material is “pornographic” is a process heavily influenced by the individual,
social, and cultural experience of the person making the determination. For
instance, “pornographic material” could conceivably encompass works with
fleeting sexual imagery regardless of its insignificance to the overall content
of an art exhibit, play, or movie. (People v. Gruis (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 19,
25-26 (Gruis).) Because condition 10(p) does not provide an objective limiting
definition of “pornographic material,” it also creates the risk of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. (See Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
For the same reasons, allowing law enforcement or probation officers to
determine whether “pornographic materials” are the main item for sale at a
given location does not solve the vagueness issue. (Gruis, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 25.) Nor does the inclusion of a knowledge requirement within the
condition address the inherent subjectivity in the term “pornographic.”
(D.H., 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 727.) We thus conclude condition 10(p) does not
pass constitutional muster.
Although we have the power to modify probation conditions to render
them constitutional, we decline to do so here. (Gruis, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 26.) Instead, we remand the matter to the trial court to either strike
condition 10(p) or define “pornographic material” in a way that
“distinguish[es] the prohibited materials from those depicting sexual conduct
but having primarily literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Id. at
p. 26 & fn. 4.) If it elects the latter, the trial court may consider, among other
things, defining “pornographic material” based on Penal Code
section 311.4(d), along with prohibiting materials having “a primary purpose
of causing sexual arousal.” (See In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657,
667.)
3
DISPOSITION
The order is vacated and remanded to the trial court with directions to
(1) strike or modify probation condition 10(p) consistent with this opinion,
and (2) forward a copy of the modified order to the probation authorities.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
4
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.