People v. Johnson CA2/7

CourtListener 10005753Calctapp17 juil. 2024

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Filed 7/17/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B326616

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA227886)
v.

ROMEL DAVON JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis Rappe, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________

INTRODUCTION

In 2005 a jury convicted Romel Johnson of, among other
crimes, first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
In 2019 Johnson filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code former section 1170.951 (now section 1172.6), alleging that
he was convicted of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and that he could not be convicted of
murder under current law. The superior court found Johnson
failed to state a prima facie case for relief and denied the petition
without issuing an order to show cause. Because the record of
conviction does not preclude Johnson from showing he could not
presently be convicted of murder, we reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Johnson’s Accomplice Kills Two Men
In April 2000 Kevin Moguel, a member of the Rollin 20s
Blood criminal street gang, was shot and killed. Police suspected
the assailants were members of the rival Rollin 30s Crips gang.
Two days later, Johnson and Marquis Rangel, both members of
the Rollin 20s Blood gang, went to an area claimed by the
Rollin 30s Crips gang. Johnson drove a car he borrowed from his
girlfriend and parked near the intersection of Browning
Boulevard and Budlong Avenue. Rangel got out and walked

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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around a corner. Within minutes, Johnson heard gunshots.
Rangel ran back to the car, jumped in, and told Johnson to drive
away. According to Johnson, Rangel said he had seen some
Rollin 30s Crips gang members and shot them “‘for Kev.’”
Paramedics later found Omar Jemile Reed and Jermaine Fields
bleeding from fatal gunshot wounds. (People v. Johnson (May 21,
2007, B186191) [nonpub. opn.] (Johnson I).)
Police interviewed Johnson about the so-called “Browning
Boulevard Crimes,” which are the subject of this appeal. Johnson
admitted he drove Rangel to the location of the shooting, but he
denied he knew before the shooting Rangel had a gun or planned
to shoot anyone. Johnson said that he could not see the shooting
from where he parked and that he did not have a gun with him.
During questioning, police also asked Johnson about an
unrelated robbery that led to the deaths of two other people (the
“Milton’s Restaurant Crimes”). (Johnson I, supra, B186191.)

B. A Jury Convicts Johnson of First Degree Murder and
Conspiracy To Commit Murder, and We Affirm
The People charged Johnson and five codefendants in a
65-count indictment alleging crimes from both the Browning
Boulevard Crimes and the Milton’s Restaurant Crimes. Johnson
was tried separately, and the trial court renumbered the seven
counts against Johnson for the jury. Based on that numbering,
counts 1 through 4 concerned the Milton’s Restaurant Crimes
and charged Johnson with felony murder (§ 187, subd. (a);
counts 1 and 2), second degree robbery (§ 211; count 3), and
second degree commercial robbery (§ 459; count 4). The People
also alleged various firearms and gang enhancements in
connection with counts 1 through 4.

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Regarding the Browning Boulevard Crimes, the People
charged Johnson with two counts of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); counts 5 and 6) and one count of conspiracy to commit
murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 7). The People alleged six overt
acts for the purpose of carrying out the objectives and purposes of
the conspiracy. For counts 5, 6, and 7, the People alleged a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
proximately causing great bodily injury and death, within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1); a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and
(e)(1); and a principal personally used a firearm, within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e). The People
also alleged Johnson committed the crimes in counts 5, 6, and 7
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further
or assist in criminal conduct by gang members, within the
meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).
The jury convicted Johnson on all counts and found true
the firearm allegations, gang allegations, and all six alleged overt
acts. The jury also found true the allegation Johnson was guilty
of multiple crimes of murder, within the meaning of
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3). On count 5 the trial court
sentenced Johnson to life without the possibility of parole, and on
count 6 the court sentenced Johnson to a consecutive term of
25 years to life. The court stayed imposition of sentence on
count 7 under section 654. On counts 5 and 6 the court sentenced
Johnson to consecutive terms of 25 years to life on each of the
firearm enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d)
and (e). The court did not impose any sentence for the gang

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finding under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), and it stayed the
sentence under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (e), on
all counts. We affirmed the judgment. (Johnson I, supra,
B186191.)

C. Johnson Files a Petition for Resentencing;
The Superior Court Issues an Order To Show Cause
for Counts 1 and 2, but Not for Counts 5 and 6
In 2019 Johnson filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. Johnson alleged that
he was convicted of first degree murder (without specifying any
counts) and cannot now be convicted of first degree murder
because of changes to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1,
2019;2 that he was not the actual killer; that he did not intend to
kill, or to aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or
assist the actual killer; and that he was not a major participant
in an underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The superior court appointed counsel for Johnson,
and on April 1, 2022 the court issued an order to show cause for
counts 1 and 2, but not for counts 5 and 6 because Johnson was
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in a related count
(i.e., count 7).
The People stipulated the court could resentence Johnson
on counts 1 and 2, and the People and Johnson entered into a
resentencing agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, the
superior court vacated Johnson’s convictions for felony murder
and associated allegations in counts 1 and 2 and redesignated

2 In an apparent typographical error, Johnson’s petition
referred to “changes to §§189 or 189” instead of sections 188 and
189.

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count 1 as a violation of section 211 (second degree robbery) and
count 2 as a violation of sections 664 and 211 (attempted second
degree robbery), and Johnson pleaded no contest to those
charges. On October 21, 2022 the superior court resentenced him
on counts 1 and 2 to an aggregate prison term of three years
eight months. Johnson timely appealed from the order denying
his request for an order to show cause on counts 5 and 6.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder and eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 462 (Curiel); see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.) Section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
an individual’s participation in a crime and requires proof of
malice to convict a principal of murder, except under the revised
felony-murder rule. (See Curiel, at p. 448; People v. Wilson (2023)
14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or
she could not now be convicted of murder because of the
legislative changes to the definitions of the crime. (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 450, 462-463; People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required information,

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the court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if
requested. (See § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); Lewis, at pp. 962-963.)
The prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 463-464.)
The court may consider the record of conviction, which will
“necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at
p. 971; see Curiel, at p. 460; People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) “In reviewing any part of the record
of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Estrada
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 337; People v. Eynon (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.) But “[i]f the record of conviction
‘“‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,’”’”
the “trial court is justified in rejecting them.” (Eynon, at p. 975;
see Lewis, at p. 971; People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389,
395.) We review de novo an order denying a petition under
section 1172.6 without issuing an order to show cause. (Estrada,
at p. 337; Williams, at p. 1251.)

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B. The Record of Conviction Does Not Refute Johnson’s
Allegation He Cannot Now Be Convicted of Murder
Johnson argues the superior court erred in failing to issue
an order to show cause for counts 5 and 6 because, according to
Johnson, his conviction on count 7 for conspiracy to commit
murder did not require the jury to find he had an intent to kill.
Johnson is correct.

1. Additional Procedural Background
At trial the People proceeded against Johnson on
counts 5 and 6 for first degree murder under a theory of aiding
and abetting an assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), the
natural and probable consequence of which was murder. The
court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.02 that “one who
aids and abets another in the commission of a crime or crimes is
not only guilty of those crimes but is also guilty of any other
crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable
consequence of the crimes originally aided and abetted.” The
court told the jury, “In determining whether a consequence is
‘natural and probable,’ you must apply an objective test based not
on what the defendant actually intended, but on what a person of
reasonable and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to
occur.”
On count 7 for conspiracy to commit murder, the court
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 6.10, but the court omitted
the italicized part of the pattern instruction in brackets: “As
relates to count 7, a conspiracy is an agreement entered into
between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to
commit the crime of murder [and with the further specific intent
to commit such offense], followed by an overt act committed in
this state by one or more of the parties for the purpose of

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accomplishing the object of the agreement. Conspiracy is a crime.
In order to find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, in addition to
proof of the unlawful agreement and specific intent to commit
murder, there must be proof of the commission of at least one of
the acts alleged in the information to be an overt act and that the
act found to have been committed was an overt act. . . .” (See
People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 987.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury the
“theories of liability” on counts 5 and 6 were “either aiding and
abetting or conspiracy.” The prosecutor told the jurors that, in
determining whether Johnson committed the murders in the first
or second degree, “you look [at] the mental state of Marquise
Rangel” and whether he acted “in a willful, deliberate and
premeditated manner to get you to first degree, or did he act with
the intent to kill but not sufficient premeditation and
deliberation which will put you at second degree.” Regarding the
conspiracy to commit murder charge in count 7, the prosecutor
stated: “The definition, was there an agreement with the intent
to agree. It would be by at least one overt act committed for the
purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement. That still
seems complicated. Okay. Basically, what it means is, did more
than one person agree to commit . . . the crime of murder. Did
Marquise Rangel and defendant agree they will get in that car,
drive in enemy territory, look for some people that seem to be
Crips and kill them.”
The prosecutor then read the instruction defining an “overt
act” for purposes of conspiracy to commit murder, but discussed
that definition in the context of both the Milton’s Restaurant
Crimes and the Browning Boulevard Crimes. He stated, “When
[the two defendants] went out to get guns the night before [the

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Milton’s Restaurant Crimes], there is an overt act. All
conspirators are now in for it. Any natural and probable
consequences thereafter, everyone is guilty for it. . . . The same
analysis applies to the murder of Mr. Fields and Mr. Reed when
the defendant got, borrowed that green car from his girlfriend,
. . . that is an overt act.”
The prosecutor continued mixing the theories of liability
under the felony murder counts from counts 1 and 2 with those
underlying counts 5 and 6, as well as the theories of aiding and
abetting and conspiracy to commit murder. He said: “Joint
responsibility. Natural and probable consequences. Now, within
the body of aiding and abetting and conspiracy we are talking
about now, it requires that the killing have been either . . .
a number of persons conspire together to commit the crime of
robbery or burglary, and it also relates to the crime of murder.
And if the life of another person is taken by one or more of them
in the perpetration of, or attempt to commit that crime, and if the
killing is done in furtherance of common design—which with
regard to [the Browning Boulevard Crimes] the common design
was to kill and [with regard to the Milton’s Restaurant Crimes] it
was to commit robbery or burglary—or is the natural and
probable consequence of the pursuit of that purpose, all of the co-
conspirators are equally guilty whether intentional,
unintentional, or accidental.” The prosecutor read the definition
of natural and probable consequences and argued murder was an
expected consequence in the Milton’s Restaurant Crimes. He
then addressed conspiracy to commit murder again: “So you
break this down and look at all facts of the case as to what was
natural and probable, and I think it will speak for itself. That is

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conspiracy, an agreement, overt act, murder, death if I may,
which was natural and probable, aiding and abetting.”

2. The Jury Did Not Find Johnson Harbored an
Intent To Kill
The People argue, and the superior court ruled, Johnson is
not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because the
jury necessarily found, in convicting him of conspiracy to commit
murder, he intended to kill Reed and Fields. In general,
“‘[c]onspiracy is a specific intent crime requiring an intent to
agree or conspire, and a further intent to commit the target
crime, here murder, the object of the conspiracy.’” (People v.
Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 31-32 (Whitson); see People v.
Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602.) A “conviction of conspiracy to
commit murder requires a finding of intent to kill, and cannot be
based on a theory of implied malice.” (Swain, at p. 607; see
People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 179, 183
(Medrano I).) Thus, where murder is the object of a conspiracy
and a jury necessarily finds a defendant intended to kill in
connection with a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder,
that defendant is not eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
(Medrano I, at pp. 179, 182-183; see People v. Lovejoy (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 860, 863, 866 [defendant was ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 where her conviction for conspiracy to
commit murder was necessarily based on a jury finding she
personally harbored an intent to kill]; People v. Allen, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 397 [defendant was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because “to find that [the defendant] conspired to

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commit murder required jurors to find that he harbored the
intent to kill”].)3
In Medrano I the trial court instructed the jury with a
version of CALJIC No. 6.10 that included the portion of the
instruction the trial court in Johnson’s trial omitted. (Medrano I,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 184.) Thus, the jury in Medrano I
convicted the defendant of conspiracy to commit first degree
murder only after finding he acted “‘with the specific intent to
agree to commit the public offense of first degree murder and
with the further specific intent to commit such offense.’” (Ibid.,
italics added again.) “In view of this instruction,” the court in
Medrano I stated, “the conspiracy conviction shows that the jury
found appellant had specifically intended to commit first degree
murder.” (Ibid.)
The jury in Johnson’s trial did not make the same finding
because the trial court did not instruct the jurors that, to convict
Johnson of conspiracy to commit murder, they had to find he
acted with the specific intent to commit murder. The trial court

3 Johnson cites People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433 for the
proposition a jury finding of intent to kill in connection with a
conviction for conspiracy to commit murder does not conclusively
establish a defendant is ineligible for relief. The People argue
Curiel is distinguishable and did not affect the court’s holdings in
Medrano I and cases following it because the defendant in Curiel
was not convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. (See Curiel,
at p. 440; People v. Medrano (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1267
(Medrano II) [distinguishing Curiel and holding the defendant
was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because, “[u]nlike
Curiel, appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first
degree murder”].) Because we conclude the jury in this case did
not find Johnson had the intent to kill, we do not address
Johnson’s argument Medrano II was wrongly decided.

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in Whitson, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 22 made the same error the
court made here. (Id. at p. 32 & fn. 7.) The court in Whitson
reversed the superior court’s summary denial of the defendant’s
petition under section 1172.6 because the conviction for
conspiracy to commit murder did not include the finding by the
the jury that defendant intended to kill. The court in Whitson
stated: “Had the jury been fully instructed with respect to
conspiracy to murder, including the portion of the form
instruction deleted, its guilty verdict would have encompassed
the finding that [the defendant] intended to kill.” (Whitson, at
p. 32.) For the same reason, Johnson’s conviction for conspiracy
to commit murder did not require the jury to find Johnson had
intent to kill Fields and Reed.
The People argue Whitson is distinguishable because the
trial court here instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 6.10 that,
“in addition to proof of the unlawful agreement and specific intent
to commit murder, there must be proof of the commission of at
least one of the acts alleged in the information to be an overt
act . . . .”4 (Italics added.) This instruction, however, did not tell
the jurors that, to find Johnson guilty of conspiracy to commit
murder, they had to find Johnson intended to commit murder or
to kill. The instruction based on CALJIC No 6.10 assumed the
jury already made that finding.
And the prosecutor’s closing argument made it even less
likely the jurors inferred from the incomplete instruction that, to
find Johnson guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, they had to
find he intended to commit murder. Like the trial court, the

4 It is unclear whether the trial court in Whitson provided
this part of the pattern instruction. (See Whitson, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 32, fn. 7.)

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prosecutor never told the jurors that they had to make that
finding; he said they needed to find only that Johnson had the
“intent to agree . . . to commit the crime” of murder. And the
prosecutor never argued Johnson had an intent to kill. In
explaining the concept of an overt act, the prosecutor stated that
“any natural and probable consequence” flowing from an overt act
makes “everyone . . . guilty for it” and that, in connection with the
Browning Boulevard Crimes, “driving over to the crime scene”
was an overt act. In contrast, the prosecutor in Medrano I told
the jury, “‘I’ll be arguing to you that [the defendant] clearly did
harbor the intent to kill . . . .’” (Medrano I, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
at p. 183.) The prosecutor’s closing argument here also entangled
(or mangled) the elements of first degree murder based on
natural and probable consequences and conspiracy to commit
murder in such a way that a reasonable juror may have believed
Johnson could be convicted for conspiracy to commit murder
based solely on his intent to agree to commit murder, with or
without the specific intent to commit that crime. (See Whitson,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 33 [“Absent an express finding by the
jury of intent to commit murder, [the defendant] is not barred
from relief on that basis as a matter of law.”].)

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DISPOSITION

The order is reversed. The superior court is directed to
issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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