CourtListener 10005748•Varga v. Twitch Interactive CA1/1
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Filed 7/17/24 Varga v. Twitch Interactive CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JAMES VARGA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A166747
v.
TWITCH INTERACTIVE, INC., (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. CGC-18-564337)
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff James Varga appeals the judgment entered after a jury found
in his favor on his claims against Twitch Interactive, Inc. (Twitch) for breach
of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
negligent representation. He contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a new trial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1 section 657
because the jury’s awards of contract damages and tort damages were
inconsistent with the special verdict and inadequate as a matter of law. He
further asserts that the court abused its discretion in awarding Twitch nearly
$170,000 in electronic discovery costs and that such costs are not recoverable
under section 1033.5. We conclude that remand is required for the court to
redetermine the proper amount of Twitch’s electronic discovery costs. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I. BACKGROUND
We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.
(Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 693–694.)
A. The Parties’ Agreement
Twitch is a video livestreaming service that provides gaming-related
content. Varga is a popular live streamer (or “streamer”) who initially
broadcasted himself playing video games on a different platform. In 2012,
when Twitch was still a new company, it recruited Varga to livestream as a
partner. They entered into a “Content License and Base Network
Agreement” (Agreement or Partnership Agreement), whereby Varga agreed
to create video gaming-related content and grant Twitch an exclusive license
to use that content in exchange for the right to access Twitch’s media player
and receive certain forms of revenue. The Agreement was for two years and
would renew automatically for subsequent one-year terms unless either party
provided 90 days’ written notice prior to the end of the term.
The Agreement prohibited Varga from streaming content that was
“unlawful, libelous, defamatory, pornographic or obscene,” or that otherwise
violated the “Content Guidelines” attached to the Agreement. The Content
Guidelines listed “Prohibited Content and Subject Matter Types,” including
“X-rated material,” hate speech, “content which promotes discrimination” or
illegal activity, gambling, and “content that a reasonable person would deem
objectionable, indecent, vulgar or offensive.”
As relevant here, section 5.2 of the Agreement states, “If either Party
materially breaches any of its obligations under this Agreement, the non-
breaching party, at its option, shall have the right to terminate this
Agreement by written notice to the breaching Party unless, within thirty (30)
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calendar days after receipt of written notice of such breach by the breaching
Party, the breaching Party cures such breach.”
B. Twitch’s Terms of Service
Separate from the Agreement, everyone who created a Twitch account
was required to agree to the terms of service, which prohibited users from
broadcasting non-gaming content and content that “a reasonable person
could deem objectionable, offensive, indecent, pornographic, . . . hateful,
racially or ethnically offensive, or otherwise inappropriate.”
Despite the terms prohibiting non-gaming content, it was undisputed
that Twitch had an informal policy permitting the livestreaming of “CS:GO
gambling” (also referred to as “skins gambling”) content for up to 30 minutes
at a time. CS:GO skins gambling refers to “a form of gambling in which
players wager virtual in-game items [or ‘skins’] from the game Counter-
Strike Global Offensive.”
C. Varga’s Violations of the Content Guidelines and Terms of
Service
Twitch’s moderation team enforced the terms of service and Content
Guidelines. When the team received reports from users about a streamer
possibly violating the terms of service or Content Guidelines, it would
independently verify that a violation had occurred. If the team verified a
violation, it would escalate the matter to the “partner conduct” team. The
partner conduct team would then “vet the evidence, discuss amongst
[them]selves, if there’s need for discussion, kind of building a consensus, and
then tak[e] the appropriate action of warning [the streamer] or suspending”
the streamer’s account. Where, as here, the streamer is a partner, the
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partner’s account manager may be involved in the decision, as “they’re the
advocate for that partner.”
In Varga’s case, the moderation team escalated “approximately” 34
violations to the partner conduct team, consisting in part of 16 “sexual or
pornographic” violations and seven “gambling” violations. These violations
included Varga “grop[ing] his girlfriend’s breast” while streaming, showing a
video of a woman stimulating a sexual act, posting an image of a swastika,
and, on numerous occasions, violating the rule limiting CS:GO skins
gambling content to 30 minutes.
Several Skype messages were produced at trial showing that Varga’s
account manager, Jason Babo, had communicated to Varga that Varga was
reported for violating the Agreement’s Content Guidelines and the terms of
service. While this evidence showed that Babo would often tell Varga to
avoid the offending actions in the future, he also tended to minimize Varga’s
conduct. For example, on one occasion, Babo told Varga that him “licking”
his dog’s butt was “borderline” but did not break the terms of service. And on
another occasion, after Babo told Varga that he was reported for “posting
porn links,” Babo reassured him that he would not be banned. In other
instances, he characterized Varga’s conduct as “silly politics” or “funny as
shit.” These communications occurred between April 2013 and June 2016.
D. Twitch’s Suspension of Varga’s Account
In June 2016, Babo informed Varga that he received “7-8 reports of
diff[erent] things.” He said he was told “1 more slip up you get a 48h[our]
ban.” Less than a week later, Babo told Varga that “you may get suspended”
because “you were found groping your girlfriend (again) on stream.” Twitch
thereafter suspended Varga’s account for 52 hours.
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Shortly after his temporary suspension was lifted, Varga livestreamed
a 29-hour skins “giveaway,” during which he was “giving away $100,000
worth of [CS:GO] skins” on his channel. Varga made several sexually
suggestive comments during the livestream. The giveaway also resulted in
numerous fraudulent chargebacks from users who paid with a credit card to
enter the giveaway and then rescinded the payment after the giveaway.
A few weeks after the giveaway, a video game blogger, Richard Lewis,
published a post claiming that Varga was the owner of a CS:GO gambling
website that Varga regularly promoted on his channel. Lewis further
asserted that Varga “gambled exclusively with house money taken from the
business” and “rig[ged the] outcomes.” When Twitch learned of the report,
the moderation team had a “conversation about [it]” because of concerns over
the potential negative publicity. In the e-mail thread, Babo said he was
“looking into it” and “had discovered what he felt was compelling information
that . . . the information was valid.” The partner conduct team did not
otherwise investigate Lewis’s allegations.
A couple of days later, Twitch notified Varga via e-mail that his account
had been banned “for violating the following category: Other Terms of
Service Violation.” The e-mail did not provide further details as to the reason
for Varga’s suspension.
Varga subsequently contacted Babo about the basis for his suspension,
but Babo “didn’t really pinpoint anything specifically.” Varga reached out to
another Twitch employee, who told him the reason for his suspension was
“false subscribers.” Varga then contacted Twitch’s legal department but
received no answer until his attorney sent a letter to Twitch asserting that
Varga’s suspension was improper.
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In response to the letter, Twitch attributed Varga’s suspension to his
“long history of multiple violations of Twitch’s TOS, . . . and the Content
Guidelines included in the Agreement,” including the prohibition on
gambling and streaming “sexually suggestive content.” In a subsequent
letter, Twitch again cited Varga’s history of violations and said that “the final
breach that led to the termination of the Agreement and the suspension of
the account” was the “skins giveaway.” It claimed that even if Varga was
entitled to damages for the suspension, his damages would be limited by
section 5.2 of the Agreement, which allowed Twitch to terminate the
Agreement upon 30-days’ notice for Varga’s “material[] breach[]” of the
Agreement.
At the time Twitch suspended Varga’s account, there were
approximately nine months remaining on the Agreement.
E. The Parties’ Allegations
In February 2018, Varga sued Twitch for breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of
section 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code. He asserted that
Twitch materially breached the Agreement by suspending his account
“without notice, opportunity to cure, or cause.” He further alleged that
Twitch breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
representing to Varga that he was permitted to broadcast non-gaming
content and then suspending his account due to his non-gaming content.
Varga’s misrepresentation claims are based on the same alleged
representations.
Twitch filed a cross-complaint. Its operative second amended cross-
complaint asserted causes of action against Varga for breach of contract,
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negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. Twitch alleged that Varga breached
the Agreement and terms of service by, among other things, streaming non-
gaming content, sexually explicit content, hate speech, and promoting illegal
gambling activity. Twitch further claimed that Varga misrepresented or
omitted information regarding his ownership in a CS:GO gambling website,
and that he was “rigging jackpots” and manipulating the results.
F. Jury Verdict
The jury returned a special verdict in April 2021, finding in favor of
Varga on his breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of fair
dealing, and negligent misrepresentation claims. The jury awarded Varga
$20,720 in contract damages and $0 in tort damages.
The jury did not find for Twitch on any of its claims. For Twitch’s
contract claims, the jury found that Twitch did not perform under the
Agreement and had “freely and knowingly [given] up its right to have Varga
perform” under the terms of service. Regarding Twitch’s intentional
misrepresentation claim, the jury found that while Varga made false
representations to Twitch, Twitch’s reliance on the representations was not
reasonable.
G. Post Trial Proceedings
After the verdict, Varga moved for additur or, in the alternative, a new
trial. He argued first that a new trial was required because the jury’s award
of contract damages was inadequate, as it limited the damages to the 30-day
notice period under section 5.2 of the Agreement for terminating the
Agreement early instead of accounting for at least the nine months remaining
under the Agreement. He further argued that the jury’s award of $0 for his
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tort claims was unsupported by the evidence and fatally inconsistent with the
jury’s finding that Twitch’s negligent representations harmed him.
In opposition, Twitch argued that the jury’s limitation of damages to
the 30-day notice period under section 5.2 of the Agreement was supported by
evidence showing he repeatedly violated the Agreement. Twitch also
contended that the jury awarded $0 in tort damages because it was
attempting to avoid duplicative damages.
The court denied the new trial motion, concluding the jury “reached
precisely the correct result,” as the evidence showed Varga breached the
Agreement. “Indeed it is entirely implausible that, had Twitch decided to
afford 30 days’ notice, Twitch would not then have immediately terminated
Varga.” The court further concluded that an award of $0 in tort damages was
“entirely reconcilable” with a finding of liability on Varga’s negligent
misrepresentation claim, because the evidence showed “that Varga suffered
no more as a result of the tort than as a result of the contract breach, and the
jury was instructed not to award duplicative damages.”
Thereafter, the parties filed competing memorandums of costs, with
Twitch seeking costs pursuant to section 998. Varga moved to strike or tax
some of the costs claimed by Twitch, including electronic discovery costs. The
court awarded Twitch nearly $400,000 in costs and entered judgment in favor
of Twitch.
II. DISCUSSION
A. New Trial Motion
We begin with Varga’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling on the new
trial motion. As he did in the trial court, Varga contends the awards of
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contract damages and tort damages were inadequate and inconsistent with
the special verdict.
1. Legal Principles
“The authority of a trial court in this state to grant a new trial is
established and circumscribed by statute.” (Oakland Raiders v. National
Football League (2007) 41 Cal.4th 624, 633.) As relevant here, the statutory
grounds for a new trial include “inadequate damages” and a verdict that is
against the law. (§ 657, subds. (5), (6).)
Under section 657, subdivision (6), inconsistent verdicts are against
the law and are therefore grounds for a new trial. (City of San Diego v. D.R.
Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 668, 682.) “ ‘The
inconsistent verdict rule is based upon the fundamental proposition that a
factfinder may not make inconsistent determinations of fact based on the
same evidence.’ . . . Where there is an inconsistency between or among
answers within a special verdict, both or all the questions are equally against
the law.” (Ibid.) “[A] special verdict's correctness is analyzed as a matter of
law and [is] therefore subject to de novo review.” (Zagami, Inc. v. James A.
Crone, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1092 (Zagami).)
Where a new trial motion is based on inadequate damages under
subdivision (5) of section 657, the trial court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and is
free to reweigh the evidence. (Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 881, 900; § 657, subd. (5).) We reverse the denial of a
motion for a new trial based on inadequate damages “ ‘only if there is no
substantial conflict in the evidence and the evidence compels the conclusion
that the motion should have been granted.’ ” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1416; see Uva v. Evans (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 356, 364–
365 [reversal required under subdivision (5) of section 657 where damages
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award was “without evidentiary support”], disagreed with on another ground
by Jones v. Interstate Recovery Service (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 925, 929–930.)
2. Contract Damages
For Varga’s breach of contract claim, the jury awarded him damages for
the 30-day period following the suspension of his account. The jury also
found by special verdict that while Varga did not substantially perform under
the Agreement, he was “excused from having to do all, or substantially all, of
the significant things that the . . . Agreement required him to do.” Varga
contends this finding necessarily means the jury found he did not breach the
Agreement, and thus Twitch had no grounds to terminate the Agreement
early under section 5.2, which, as mentioned, allows a party to terminate the
Agreement with a 30-day notice only upon the other party’s “material[]
breach[].” Therefore, he claims the jury improperly limited his contract
damages to the 30-day notice period under the Agreement, and the damages
award was inadequate as a matter of law. We disagree.
a. Relevant Damages Evidence
Twitch’s damages expert, Krista Holt, testified at trial. She said she
“projected the revenues” that Varga would have received from the date his
account was suspended and subtracted his expenses to obtain his profits.
The sources of revenue she identified for Varga were user donations, Twitch
subscriptions and advertisements, and sponsorships.
She calculated Varga’s projected revenues based on two different time
periods. The first time period was the nine months remaining under the
Agreement after Twitch suspended Varga’s account. She calculated damages
for that period as totaling $160,461.
The other time period for which Holt calculated Varga’s damages was
based on the 30-day notice period under section 5.2 in the Agreement. She
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said that “if the trier of fact were to decide that there was the potential for a
cure and that a cure could have happened, then there’s a 30-day period that
Mr. Varga would have still been on Twitch if that were possible.” She
calculated Varga’s damages for the 30-day notice period as totaling $16,082.
Dr. Barry Ben-Zion, Varga’s expert in forensic economics, testified that
he calculated Varga’s “past” economic damages for the period of July 17,
2016—the date Varga’s account was suspended—to March 28, 2021, the date
he was told was the first day of trial. For this time period, he calculated
Varga’s damages as totaling over $35 million.
In closing arguments, Twitch’s counsel argued that if the jury found
Twitch liable to Varga for damages, the jury should base the damages on
Holt’s “reality-based projections. That means if you find that Twitch’s only
fault was not giving 30-days notice, give him what he would have gotten for
30 days.”
b. The Special Verdict
The special verdict at issue is quoted below with the jury’s answers
indicated.
“1. The parties have agreed that they entered into the [Agreement]. . . .
“2. Did Varga do all, or substantially all, of the significant things that
the . . . Agreement required him to do?
“ . . . No.
“3. Was Varga excused from having to do all, or substantially all, of the
significant things that the . . . Agreement required him to do?
“Yes . . . .
“4. Did Twitch breach the . . . Agreement, meaning did Twitch either:
(a) fail to do something that the . . . Agreement required it to do; or (b) do
something the . . . Agreement prohibited it from doing?
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“Yes . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“5. Was Twitch’s breach(es) of the . . . Agreement excused by Varga’s
prior material breach of the . . . Agreement?
“ . . . No. [¶] . . . [¶]
“6. Was Varga harmed by Twitch’s breach(es) of the . . . Agreement?
“Yes . . . .” (Italics added.)
The jury awarded Varga a total of $20,720.34 for his breach of contract
claim. It identified the time period the damages related to as the “First 30
Days (July 19, 2016–August 18, 2016).”
c. Analysis
Although Varga contends the contract damages award is inadequate
under subdivision (5) of section 657, implicit in his position is that the jury’s
finding that Varga was excused from substantially performing under the
Agreement is inconsistent with a finding that Twitch’s only breach of the
Agreement was a failure to provide Varga a 30-day notice under section 5.2 to
terminate the Agreement for his material breach.2 He seems to suggest that
based on the jury’s finding that he was excused from performing, Twitch had
no grounds to terminate the Agreement early under section 5.2, and thus it
breached the Agreement by terminating the Agreement without cause, in
which case Varga would be entitled to damages for the nine months
remaining on the Agreement. Under those circumstances, the evidence
established that Varga’s damages would amount to at least eight times the
amount of the damages award. (See Ryan v. Crown Castle NG Networks, Inc.
2 For the first time in his reply brief, Varga contends the award of
contract damages is also inconsistent with the jury’s finding on question 5 of
the special verdict form. But question 5 does not ask the jury to determine
whether Varga committed a material breach; it asks only whether Twitch’s
breach of the Agreement was “excused by Varga’s prior material breach.”
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(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 775, 787–789 [damages award lacked factual basis
where undisputed evidence established that the plaintiff’s damages
amounted to over four times that amount], disagreed with on another ground
by Huy Fong Foods, Inc. v. Underwood Ranches, LP (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1112, 1125–1126.)
We observe, however, that the special verdict form did not require the
jury to specify the breach. Since Varga asserted multiple theories of breach,
we treat the jury’s finding of breach as tantamount to a general verdict and
draw all reasonable inferences that support the verdict. (Jonkey v. Carignan
Construction Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 20, 24; see Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 530, 540, overruled on other grounds in Soule v. General
Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 580.) So long as a theory of breach is
consistent with the jury’s special findings and supported by substantial
evidence, we may conclude that the jury believed that theory. (Jonkey v.
Construction Co., at pp. 25–26; accord, Wilson v. County of Orange (2009)
169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193.) That is the case here.
On the face of the special verdict, the jury’s findings are consistent with
the theory that Twitch breached the Agreement by failing to provide a 30-day
notice of termination based on Varga’s material breach. Question 3 in the
special verdict form asks whether Varga was “excused from having to do all,
or substantially all, of the significant things that the . . . Agreement required
him to do,” while, in contrast, question 4 defines “breach” as “(a) fail[ing] to
do something that the . . . Agreement required [the party] to do; or (b) do[ing]
something the . . . Agreement prohibited [the party] from doing.” (Italics and
bold added.) Based on this definition of breach, question 3 in the special
verdict form did not ask the jury to specifically determine which type of
breach was excused. Thus, the jury could have concluded that while Varga
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was excused from performing under the Agreement, Twitch still had cause to
terminate the Agreement early under section 5.2 because Varga did
something prohibited by the Agreement.
Consistent with the special verdict form’s language, the court
instructed the jury that for Varga to prevail on his contract claims, he would
need to prove that he “did all or substantially all of the significant things that
the contract required him to do, or was excused from having to broadcast
content on Twitch’s media player.” (Italics added.) That instruction obviously
required the jury to find that Varga was excused specifically from
broadcasting content on Twitch’s media player. Such a finding would not
conflict with a finding that Varga materially breached the Agreement by
doing something prohibited by the Agreement. In finding that Varga was
excused from doing the “significant things” required of him under the
Agreement, we must presume the jury followed the jury instruction in
making this finding. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 803–
804.)
Varga interprets the special verdict differently. He seems to contend
that question 3 in the special verdict form reflects a finding that Twitch
excused or waived all his violations, and thus it had no basis to terminate the
Agreement under section 5.2. He points out that when the jury sought
clarification on how to determine whether Varga was “excused,” the court
instructed the jury that “Party A” may be excused where, among other
things, “Party B accepts Party’s A’s actions (or failure to act).” Thus, Varga
claims, the jury, in answering question 3, made a finding that Twitch
accepted his “improper actions” because the evidence shows Twitch
“repeatedly” assured him that he was permitted to take those actions or
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declined to discipline him for his violations of the Agreement’s Content
Guidelines.
When a court is called upon to interpret a special verdict, the verdict
should be interpreted, if possible, to uphold it and give it the effect intended
by the jury as well as one consistent with the law and the evidence. (All-West
Design, Inc. v. Boozer (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1223.) A reversal is
required if the special verdict is “ ‘ “hopelessly ambiguous” ’ ” or inconsistent.
(Little v. Amber Hotel Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 280, 300.) “A special
verdict is inconsistent if there is no possibility of reconciling its findings with
each other.” (Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
338, 357 (Singh).)
If, on the other hand, the verdict is “merely ambiguous,” the court may
properly interpret the verdict “ ‘from its language considered in connection
with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.’ ” (Zagami, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 & fn. 5, citing Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding &
Equip. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 456; see Singh, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at
p. 358 [court must attempt to resolve any inconsistency “in light of the jury
instructions and the evidence”].) “[I]f any conclusions could be drawn which
would explain the apparent conflict, the jury will be deemed to have drawn
them.” (Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 413, 424, disagreed with on another ground by Nadaf-
Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 982–983.)
Preliminarily, we note that the parties spend much of their briefing on
the issue of whether a finding that a party was excused from performing
under a contract is equivalent to a finding that the party did not breach the
contract. The authority Varga relies on appears to concern the rule that a
party who is excused from performing its obligations under the agreement
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does not thereafter breach the agreement by failing to perform those
obligations. (See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 506, 550; Sackett v. Spindler (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 220, 227.)
But where a breach has already occurred, the other party has “the right and
option to determine what remedy he will pursue” (B.L. Metcalf General
Contractor, Inc. v. Earl Erne, Inc. (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 689, 693), unless
that party knowingly and intentionally opts to “ ‘keep the contract alive, for
the benefit of both parties,’ ” thereby waiving the breach (Alder v. Drudis
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 372, 381; see Gould v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1179).
Here, apart from some of Varga’s purported violations of the rule
against non-gaming content, it is undisputed that he repeatedly violated the
Agreement’s Content Guidelines. The evidence shows that Babo
communicated with Varga about most (if not all) of those violations after the
fact. Thus, in our view, the pertinent question is whether the jury made a
finding that Twitch had waived its right under section 5.2 of the Agreement
to terminate the Agreement. (See Neet v. Holmes (1944) 25 Cal.2d 447, 458
[“Waiver of a right to rescind [a contract] will be presumed against a party
who” knowingly accepts the benefits of the contract].) We think not,
considering the jury was never asked to determine whether Twitch knowingly
and intentionally waived its right to terminate the Agreement. (See Utility
Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 950, 959 [party
waives a contractual right when its conduct is “so inconsistent with any
intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been
relinquished”].)
In any event, to the extent the jury instructions on excuse created an
ambiguity, the special verdict’s language and the evidence demonstrates that
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the jury’s findings can be reconciled with the award of contract damages.
Contrary to Varga’s suggestion, the verdict form did not ask the jury whether
Twitch excused (or waived) “all” of his contractual breaches. Rather, it asked
whether he was excused from performing “all, or substantially all, of the
significant things that the . . . Agreement required him to do.” (Italics
added.) As far as we can tell, the court did not provide the jury a definition of
the term “substantially all” as used in question 3; it instead told the jury to
“use its own sense of the term,” permitting the jury to interpret it broadly.
Thus, the jury could have concluded that Twitch accepted many but not all of
Varga’s violations. If Varga wanted the jury to answer a question with more
specificity, such as whether Twitch had waived all his breaches, it was his
responsibility to request such a finding. (Behr v. Redmond (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 517, 530; see also Little v. Amber Hotel Co., supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 300 [where special verdict was “ ‘merely ambiguous,’ ”
party forfeited her contention that award of damages could not be reconciled
with special verdict for failure to seek clarification of the verdict before the
jury was discharged].)
Further, the evidence compels the conclusion that Twitch did not waive
its right to terminate the Agreement. Although Babo did little more than
reprimand Varga for years, the undisputed evidence shows that in June
2016, he expressly warned Varga that one more “slip up” could result in a
suspension. When Varga continued to violate the Content Guidelines, Twitch
carried out this warning by temporarily suspending his account. After that
suspension was lifted, Varga livestreamed his skins “giveaway,” during which
he made numerous sexually suggestive comments. Varga cites no evidence
indicating that Twitch “accept[ed]” or waived those violations. Twitch
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banned his account only a few weeks later.3 Thus, the record does not
support a finding that Twitch waived its right under section 5.2 of the
Agreement to terminate the Agreement. (See Budaeff v. Huber (1961)
194 Cal.App.2d 12, 20 [“Being a continuing covenant, each breach, not
thereafter waived, is itself a basis for forfeiture” of the contract].) Rather,
based on this evidence, the jury’s response of “yes” to question 3 can, at most,
be interpreted as a finding that Twitch “accept[ed]” many of Varga’s prior
breaches.
Varga further points out that the jury, in answering question 35 in the
special verdict form, found that “Twitch freely and knowingly gave up its
right to have Varga perform the obligations under the Terms of Service.”
However, as the trial court concluded, this was a finding on Twitch’s contract
claim regarding its waiver of Varga’s breaches of the terms of service; it was
not a finding that Twitch had waived its right under section 5.2 of the
Agreement to terminate the Agreement. Additionally, to the extent Varga is
claiming that the jury’s answer to question 35 is inconsistent with his award
of contract damages, he has not developed the argument beyond comparing
the terms of service to the Agreement’s Content Guidelines. “ ‘ “When an
appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
[forfeited].” ’ ” (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721.)
3 Based on testimony from a member of Twitch’s moderation team,
Varga contends the sole reason Twitch suspended his account was the
negative publicity from the Lewis report. However, that same employee
testified that the “top reason” for the suspension was “the volume of incidents
over the history of the account” and “the damage [Varga] was doing to, you
know, our brand name and our community . . . .”
18
In sum, the special verdict form did not ask the jury to find that Twitch
had waived its right to terminate the Agreement under section 5.2 of the
Agreement. To the extent there was any ambiguity as to this issue, the
record shows that the trial court’s denial of the new trial motion is supported
by the language of the verdict, the pertinent instructions, and the evidence,
as we have discussed. We therefore reject Varga’s argument that the
contract damages award was inadequate.
3. Tort Damages
Varga next argues that the jury’s award of $0 for his negligent
misrepresentation claim warrants reversal because it is inadequate under
section 657, subdivision (5), and against the law under section 657,
subdivision (6). Twitch responds that the award was consistent with the
evidence and the instruction to not award duplicative damages. We conclude
that Twitch has the better argument.
a. The Alleged Misrepresentations
Varga contends his negligent representation claim is based on the same
facts as his contract claims because “Twitch unlawfully suspended him in
violation of the . . . Agreement without notice and waived or excused” his
breaches because it “misrepresented to him whether his conduct violated
Twitch’s rules or deserved suspension.”
To show Twitch’s alleged negligent representations, he cites the
evidence adduced at trial showing Babo minimizing his conduct. As
discussed above, this evidence included Babo telling Varga he would not be
suspended after he posted “porn links,” that Varga “licking” his dog did not
violate the terms of service, and that Varga’s conduct in other instances was
“borderline” or “funny as shit.” Varga also cites evidence showing that
Twitch permitted him to engage in CS:GO skins gambling for no more than
19
30 minutes at a time, but because the rule was unclear as to whether it was
30 minutes in one day or 30 minutes consecutively, Varga was reported for
violating the rule by “go[ing] back and forth” between different streams.
b. The Jury Instructions on Damages
After the close of evidence at trial, the court instructed the jury on
damages as follows: “[E]ach item of damages may only be awarded once,
regardless of the number of legal theories alleged. You will be asked to
decide whether Twitch is liable to Varga under the following legal theories:
Breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. [¶]
The following items of damages are only recoverable once under all of the
above legal theories: 1, past economic [loss]; . . . 2, future economic loss; for
example, lost earnings, lost profits, . . . and other economic loss; 3, other
economic loss; for example, loss of earning capacity; and 4, special damages.”
c. The Special Verdict
The jury found by special verdict that Twitch made false
representations of fact to Varga, that Twitch did not have reasonable grounds
for believing the false representations were true, that Varga reasonably
relied on the negligent representations, and that Varga’s reliance on the
negligent representations was “a substantial factor in causing harm to [him].”
In the damages portion of the verdict form, the section for contract
damages was presented first. It stated, “Each item of damages may be
awarded only once as to this question, regardless of the number of legal
theories, such as contract or implied covenant, alleged.” The jury wrote in
$15,139.34, $3,060, and $2,521 for past lost earnings, loss of donations, and
loss of sponsorship and endorsement deals, respectively.
20
The next section in the special verdict form was entitled “TORT
DAMAGES.” It similarly noted that “[e]ach item of damages may be
awarded only once as to this question, regardless of the number of legal
theories, such as negligent misrepresentation or intentional
misrepresentation, alleged.” Varga sought the same items of damages for his
tort claims as he did for his contract claims. The jury wrote in $0 for each
item of damages listed.
The following section, entitled “SUMMARY OF ALL DAMAGES,”
asked the jury for the “total amount of damages, for all claims the jury
awards to Varga.” The jury listed the same damages it identified for Varga’s
contract claims, awarding him a total of $20,720.34.
d. Analysis
The trial court denied Varga’s new trial motion based on the award of
$0 in tort damages, concluding that the award was “consistent with the
evidence that Varga suffered no more as a result of the tort than as a result
of the contract breach, and the jury was instructed not to award duplicative
damages.” Varga offers no reason why we should depart from this conclusion.
In general, a jury must avoid awarding duplicative damages for
contract and tort claims. “Regardless of the nature or number of legal
theories advanced by the plaintiff, he is not entitled to more than a single
recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the
evidence.” (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1158; see also Pugh
v. See’s Candies, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 743, 761 & fn. 13 [“Ordinarily, a
plaintiff asserting both a contract and tort theory arising from the same
factual setting cannot recover damages under both theories”], disapproved on
another ground in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 351.)
21
The jury’s verdicts must also be consistent. As previously discussed,
“[a] special verdict is inconsistent if there is no possibility of reconciling its
findings with each other.” (Singh, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 357.) If a
verdict appears inconsistent or ambiguous, the court “will interpret the
verdict if it is possible to give a correct interpretation.” (Woodcock v. Fontana
Scaffolding & Equipment Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457.) We look to the
evidence and the jury instructions to try to resolve any inconsistency. (Singh,
at pp. 357–358.)
In this case, the only evidence offered by the parties as to damages was
the expert testimony described above in section II.A.2.a of this opinion
regarding Varga’s lost profits, sponsorships, and donations. As already
noted, the jury, after considering the evidence, found that Varga was entitled
to damages for the 30 days following his suspension, implicitly finding that
Twitch had cause under section 5.2 of the Agreement to provide him a 30-day
notice to terminate the Agreement and that Twitch would have terminated
the Agreement after those 30 days had lapsed. The logical conclusion from
these circumstances is that Varga would likewise not be entitled to tort
damages beyond that 30-day period. (Civ. Code, § 3333 [measure of damages
for tort claims “is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby”]; Luttrell v. Island Pacific Supermarkets, Inc.
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 196, 205 [“As a general rule, a plaintiff in a tort
action is not to be placed in a better position than he would have been in if
the wrong had not been done.”].)
Varga presents several arguments for why the award of tort damages is
inconsistent with the special verdict and not duplicative of his contract
22
damages, all of which lack merit.4 First, he contends the award is
inconsistent with the jury’s special finding that Twitch’s negligent
representations were a “substantial factor in causing him harm.” He argues
this finding is necessarily a finding that the negligent representations caused
the suspension of his account, which is the only harm demonstrated by the
evidence. We understand his argument to be that because the jury found
that Twitch’s tortious conduct caused his suspension, he is entitled to
damages beyond the 30-day notice period provided by section 5.2 of the
Agreement, as Twitch had no cause to terminate the Agreement early. In
response, Twitch contends the evidence shows it would have suspended
Varga’s account for other, legitimate reasons. We agree with Twitch.
The record established that Varga violated the Content Guidelines
dozens of times in various ways. Yet the evidence he cites shows, at most, a
few representations of fact regarding specific instances or types of
misconduct. Thus, the jury could have believed that Varga’s reliance on
Twitch’s negligent representations contributed to the decision to suspend his
account but that it was not the only basis for his suspension, especially since
Twitch cited Varga’s entire history of violations as one reason for his
suspension.5
4 Twitch contends Varga waived any objection to the award of zero
damages. However, while defects in the form of a verdict may be waived,
“inconsistent jury findings in a special verdict are not subject to waiver by a
party.” (Zagami, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1093, fn. 6.)
5 Although he does not expressly argue this, Varga seems to suggest
that a “substantial factor” encompasses a “but for” standard of causation.
However, “the adequacy of the evidence must be measured against the
instructions given the jury.” (Null v. City of Los Angeles (1988)
206 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1535, italics added.) Varga has not shown that the jury
was instructed on the meaning of “substantial factor” such that we must
conclude the jury found that Varga’s suspension would not have occurred but
23
Further, any facial inconsistency or ambiguity in the special verdict is
resolved by the jury instructions on damages, which specifically directed the
jury to award each item of damages once for all claims asserted by Varga.
(See Singh, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) This is exactly what the jury
did. It does not appear that the court ever instructed the jury to assess
damages differently for each legal theory being asserted by Varga. We must
review the verdict under the law stated in the instructions given, rather than
under some other law on which the jury was not instructed. (Null v. City of
Los Angeles, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1534–1535; Weisenburg v. Molina
(1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 478, 487, disagreed with on another ground by Foggy v.
Ralph F. Clark & Associates, Inc. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1204, 1210–1213.)
Any assumption that the jury did not follow the instructions would be
speculation. (See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 803–
804.)
The California authority cited by Varga is distinguishable because it
does not involve duplicative damages. (See, e.g., Smith v. Covell (1980)
100 Cal.App.3d 947, 956 [award of zero damages to plaintiff was “a special
category of inadequate damages resulting from the failure of the jury to
follow the court’s instructions” regarding damages]; Campbell v. Zokelt (1969)
272 Cal.App.2d 315, 319–320 [verdict in favor of defendant’s passenger
against codefendant for zero damages was inconsistent with verdict in favor
of codefendant on his cross-complaint against defendant, and against
defendant on his cross-complaint against codefendant]; Bisnett v. Hollis
(1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 142, 148 [verdict finding in favor of plaintiffs was
for Twitch’s tortious conduct. (Defries v. Yamaha Motor Corp. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 846, 865 [appellant has burden to show the jury was
instructed on the issues being raised on appeal].)
24
inconsistent with award of no damages where evidence established that at
least one plaintiff suffered property damage and personal injuries].)
Varga’s reliance on federal authority is also misplaced. In Video
International Production, Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc.
(5th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 1075, the plaintiff asserted claims for antitrust and
civil rights violations and tortious interference with a contract. (Id. at
pp. 1077–1078.) The jury found liability on all three claims and awarded the
plaintiff zero damages for its antitrust claim, $200,000 compensatory and
$2.5 million punitive damages for its civil rights claim, and $1.245 million
actual and $500,000 punitive damages for the tortious interference with
contract claim. (Id. at p. 1078.) All three claims were based on the same set
of facts and the same injury. (Id. at p. 1085.) The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the
plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with contract. (Id. at p. 1078.) The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling on the motion but remanded for a new trial
on damages because it was “unable to discern a reasonable explanation for
the jury’s wide-ranging verdicts under the three claims, especially after the
major portion of damages under the tortious interference claim has been
invalidated.” (Ibid.) Thus, under the unique facts of Video International, the
reason for the $0 award for the plaintiff’s antitrust claim was unclear.
The court in Rosario v. Livaditis (7th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 1013 relied on
Video International in reversing the district court’s denial of a motion for a
new trial on damages. (Rosario, at pp. 1021–1022.) There, a class of the
defendants’ former students brought claims against them under state
consumer fraud law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.). (Rosario, at pp. 1015–1016.) The jury
awarded $640,224 in actual damages for the class’s consumer fraud claim
25
and zero damages for the RICO claims. (Rosario, at pp. 1016, 1021.) The
Seventh Circuit concluded that because the claims were based on identical
facts, “the facts must support some actual damages award for the RICO
claims.” (Id. at p. 1021.) It noted that the “jury in this case clearly did not
consider as damages the students’ undisputed loan obligations to the
government” of over $3 million, even though a finding of liability on the RICO
claims was “predicated on determining that the class was injured in business
or property, defined as obligations to pay student loans.” (Rosario, at
p. 1021.) It therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying a new trial
because the “jury verdict [was] in contravention of the court’s instructions.”
(Ibid.)
In contrast, the award for tort damages in this case is consistent with
the evidence and the jury’s instructions on damages. (See Little v. Amber
Hotel Co., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 300–301 [interpreting jury’s failure
to state amount of damages as an attempt to prevent a double recovery based
on the evidence and instructions].) Further, it appears that the RICO claims
and the consumer fraud claim in Rosario involved different injuries (Rosario
v. Livaditis, supra, 963 F.2d at p. 1021), while Varga sought the same items
of damages for his contract and tort claims.6
6 The third case cited by Varga—AIG Aviation, Inc. v. Boorom Aircraft,
Inc. (6th Cir. 1998, Nos. 96-1503, 96-1563, 96-1582) 1998 U.S.App. Lexis
2143—similarly concerned an award of damages for the plaintiff’s state claim
but zero damages for its RICO claim, even though the jury found the
defendants liable on both claims. (AIG Aviation, at p. 1.) In remanding for a
new trial on the RICO damages, the Sixth Circuit noted that the claims—and
thus the damages—were alternative claims, and that the damages for the
RICO claim was likely to be larger than the damages for the state law claim.
(AIG Aviation, at p. 5–6.)
26
Varga next contends that based on the structure of the verdict form,
the jury was required to separately identify damages for the contract and tort
claims and account for any duplication in the section regarding “total”
damages. In particular, he argues that question 20 in the “TORT
DAMAGES” section “plainly instructed the jury only to calculate Varga’s tort
damages” because it stated that “ ‘[e]ach item of damages may be awarded
only once as to this question . . . .’ ” Although the special verdict form is not a
model of clarity, we agree with the trial court that in light of the jury
instructions, the jury clearly determined that Varga was not entitled to tort
damages above and beyond what it had already awarded him for his contract
claims in the previous section of the verdict form, a finding that is consistent
with the language of the verdict form.
We are aware of authority suggesting that special verdict forms should
not, as they did here, ask the jury to identify damages for each of several
causes of action and simply direct the jury to avoid duplicative damages
without explanation. (See Singh, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 360–361
[concluding that the “better practice” when a special verdict form is used for
multiple claims is to instruct jury to consider each question separately and
let the trial court eliminate any duplicative awards after verdicts are
rendered]; Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1612 [holding it
improper to award damages on different counts for the same wrong, even
where parties took steps to avoid award of duplicative damages].) But we
need not resolve here whether the instructions and the verdict form were
improper for these reasons because it does not appear that Varga made this
argument in the trial court at the time the forms and instructions were given
to the jury. (Zagami, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1093, fn. 6 [party must
object to form of verdict or risk waiver on appeal of defect].)
27
Third, Varga contends that because tort claims “permit awards of far
broader damages than contract claims,” he was entitled to tort damages
beyond the 30-day notice period. The authority he relies on is inapposite,
however. Nuvasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc. (S.D.Cal. July 20, 2015,
No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB)) 2015 U.S.Dist. Lexis 178452, concerned, in part,
the cross-defendant’s request in its summary judgment motion to limit the
cross-plaintiff’s damages to the term of the parties’ contract. (Id. at pp. 1, 39-
40.) The district court declined to limit damages at that stage of the
litigation because the cross-plaintiff was claiming that the cross-defendant
had tortiously interfered with its ability to perform under the contract, and
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the contract
would have been renewed absent the tortious conduct. (Ibid.) In contrast,
here, the jury implicitly determined that Twitch would have terminated the
Agreement even absent its tortious conduct.
In Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, our high court
acknowledged that the measure of both contract and tort damages is the
amount which will compensate for the detriment proximately caused by the
wrongdoing. (Id. at p. 550.) It noted, however, that contract damages are
limited to “the financial risks of [the parties’] enterprise,” while tort damages
are intended to compensate the victim for all injuries suffered, including
emotional injuries. (Ibid.) But here, the only damages Varga sought for his
contract and tort claims were his lost profits.
Lastly, Varga contends he suffered damages beyond the 30-day notice
period because “[e]ven if Twitch could have terminated [his] . . . Agreement
30 days after it suspended him, that would not have precluded Varga from
earning donations or sponsorships by streaming as a normal streamer.” This
does not appear to be an issue Varga raised in the trial court, and it lacks
28
merit anyway considering he continuously violated not only the Agreement
but also the terms of service applicable to all Twitch users despite repeated
warnings. Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude that Twitch would have
terminated its relationship with Varga after the 30-day notice period
required by section 5.2 of the Agreement.
In sum, Varga has not shown that the award of tort damages is
inconsistent with the jury’s special findings. And because the jury implicitly
determined that Twitch would have terminated the Agreement after the 30-
day notice period under section 5.2 of the Agreement, a finding we do not
disturb on appeal, we also conclude that the award of tort damages is not
inadequate as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of
Varga’s new trial motion.7
B. Motion to Tax Costs
Varga contends the trial court erred in awarding Twitch its electronic
discovery costs. After the jury returned its verdict, Twitch sought, among
other things, $169,406.31 in electronic discovery costs pursuant to
section 998. Counsel’s supporting declaration stated that Twitch incurred
those costs by using a vendor to convert electronic files into usable form,
process the files for production, and Bates-number them. The vendor also
hosted the data and charged hosting fees. Varga moved to strike the request
for electronic discovery costs, arguing that those costs were not reasonably
necessary or recoverable under section 1033.5. The trial court ultimately
7 In light of this affirmance, we need not and do not reach Varga’s
arguments regarding additur and the scope of a new trial.
29
awarded Twitch the full amount of its request for electronic discovery costs.
We agree with Varga that the court erred in doing so.
In general, a prevailing party in civil litigation is entitled to recover
their costs. (§ 1032.) Section 998 “ ‘establishes a procedure to shift costs if a
party fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer before trial.’ ” (Oakes v.
Progressive Transportation Services, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 486, 497.)
We presume Twitch’s settlement offer was sufficient to shift costs under
section 998 because Varga does not contend otherwise.
Section 1033.5 lists cost items that are allowable under section 1032,
including filing fees and attorney fees when authorized by contract or law.
(§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(1)–(10).) Subdivision (b) of section 1033.5 identifies costs
that are not allowable. These include investigation expenses in preparing for
trial and photocopying expenses other than for exhibits. (Id., subd. (b)(2)–
(3).)
“Expenses which do not fit into either of these two categories . . . may
be recovered but only at the discretion of the court.” (Science Applications
Internat. Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103 (Science
Applications); § 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).) “Allowable costs must be ‘reasonably
necessary to the conduct of the litigation’ and ‘reasonable in amount.’ ” (Doe
v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 675, 693; § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2)–(3).) Costs that are “merely
convenient or beneficial to [the] preparation” of the conduct of the litigation
are not recoverable. (§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).)
“The standard of review applicable to a cost order depends on the issue
raised on appeal. When the question is whether a claimed cost comes within
the general cost statutes and is recoverable at all, the question is one of
statutory interpretation, subject to de novo review. . . . Whether a cost item
30
was reasonably necessary to the litigation, however, ‘ “ ‘presents a question of
fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ ” ’ ”
(Coalition for Adequate Review v. City and County of San Francisco (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1050–1051.)
Electronic discovery costs are neither specifically allowed nor
prohibited under section 1033.5. Thus, these costs are generally recoverable
at the trial court’s discretion. (Science Applications, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1103.) Because Varga properly objected to the electronic discovery costs
requested by Twitch, Twitch had the burden of proving the costs were
recoverable, reasonable, and necessary. (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 222.)
As he did in the trial court, Varga contends Twitch failed to meet its
burden to prove that its electronic discovery costs were reasonably necessary,
“ ‘rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.’ ” (§ 1033.5,
subd. (c)(2)–(3).) Citing Science Applications, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, he
also argues that the costs were not recoverable as a matter of law. We agree
with the latter contention as to a portion of the costs claimed by Twitch.
In Science Applications, the prevailing party paid a vendor $200,000 “to
keep track of the voluminous records in the case—that is, to ‘Bates-stamp’
the documents, input them for retrieval, maintain a document library,” and
create a searchable database for use during discovery and trial. (Science
Applications, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104.) The appellate court held
these expenses were akin to hiring “a ‘high tech’ paralegal” to compile
documents and create a searchable database, and that such labor costs were
“not recoverable” because attorney fees were not recoverable. (Ibid.)
In comparison, in Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 323 (Hooked Media), the trial court awarded $92,000 for
31
electronic discovery costs to convert “native electronic files into usable form.”
(Id. at p. 338.) The appellate court affirmed the cost award, finding that
“Hooked makes valid arguments that the e-discovery costs may have been
incurred more out of convenience than necessity. But given our deferential
standard of review, reversal is not warranted. The trial court, having closely
observed the litigation as it progressed over several years, was in a much
better position than we are to decide whether expenses associated with
managing electronic data were necessarily incurred.” (Id. at pp. 338–339.)
The concurrence in Hooked Media distinguished Science Applications
from the facts before it: “Here, unlike in Science Applications, the third party
vendor expenses incurred by Apple for data conversion of files into a ‘usable
form’ so that those files could be produced to Hooked were not akin to
paralegal or attorney expenses. The costs incurred for the technical process
of converting data files into a usable form so that those files can be produced
in response to document production requests was not addressed in Science
Applications, and such costs are not addressed in . . . section 1033.5. It
follows that the superior court had discretion to allow or disallow these costs.
Hooked makes no argument that the court abused its discretion.” (Hooked
Media, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 354 (conc. opn. of Mihara, J).)
The distinction drawn by Science Applications and Hooked Media
between recoverable electronic discovery costs and nonrecoverable costs
appears based on the commonsense notion that a prevailing party who may
not recover attorney fees and costs related to storing, organizing, and
managing documents, cannot recover equivalent discovery costs merely
because the documents are in electronic form. (See City of Oakland v.
McCullough (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [paralegal services are includable in
an award of attorney fees].) But costs unique to the electronic form of the
32
documents—such as the costs required to convert files into a usable form—
are “not akin to paralegal or attorney expenses” and may be reasonably
necessary to respond to a discovery request. (Hooked Media, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 354 (conc. opn. of Mihara, J).)
The record in this case indicates that at least some of Twitch’s
electronic discovery costs were associated with the technical processes of
converting files into usable forms, creating “tiff image[s],” and producing
metadata, and thus those costs were similar to the costs found recoverable in
Hooked Media. (Hooked Media, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 338–339.) The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding these costs were
reasonably necessary to the litigation, considering that Varga served “at
least” six sets of requests for production on Twitch, and Twitch collected
“thousands of pages of documents.” Under the circumstances, using an
electronic document platform to manage discovery was more “efficient than
any low-tech method of doing the same thing.” (El Dorado Meat Co. v.
Yosemite Meat & Locker Service, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 612, 620.) And,
as in Hooked Media, the court, having observed the litigation for years, was
in a better position to determine whether the electronic discovery expenses
requested by Twitch were reasonable and necessary. (Hooked Media, at
pp. 338–339.)
However, we cannot determine from the record whether the fees
associated with “hosting” and Bates-numbering the documents were “akin” to
paralegal expenses. (Science Applications, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.)
Twitch did not seek attorney fees and costs, which suggests it was not
entitled to such expenses. Accordingly, we remand for a redetermination by
the trial court consistent with Science Applications of the proper amount of
recoverable costs pertaining to electronic discovery. (See Coalition for
33
Adequate Review v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1060 [remanding for trial court to determine which of the costs claimed
by the prevailing party were recoverable].)
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Varga’s motion to tax or strike Twitch’s electronic
discovery costs and the portion of the judgment awarding Twitch its
electronic discovery costs are reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial
court to recalculate in accordance with this opinion the amount of Twitch’s
electronic discovery costs that are recoverable under section 1033.5. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs in this
appeal.
34
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
BANKE, J.
A166747
Varga v. Twitch Interactive Inc.
35
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