CourtListener 10004694•People v. Brissette CA2/4
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Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Brissette CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B329579
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A532808)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
THOMAS F. BRISSETTE, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:*
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on July 11, 2024, be modified
as follows:
On page 6, in the Discussion, the word “degree” should be inserted in
the last sentence as follows: “We note that as the actual perpetrator of the
second degree murder, Brissette is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law.”
There is no change in the judgment.
COLLINS, Acting P. J. MORI, J. ZUKIN, J.
Filed 7/11/24 P. v. Brissette CA2/4 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B329579
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A532808)
v.
THOMAS F. BRISSETTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Thomas
F. Brissette, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 1985, defendant Thomas Brissette pled guilty to second degree
murder. He also admitted to personally using a firearm during the
commission of the murder and a prior serious felony conviction. In 2022,
Brissette filed a petition for resentencing of his conviction pursuant to Penal
Code section 1170.95 (1172.6).1 The trial court denied the petition after an
evidentiary hearing, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Brissette was
guilty of second degree murder under the current law as the actual
perpetrator. On appeal, appellate counsel filed a brief that summarized the
procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked
this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. Brissette submitted his own letter brief. We affirm
the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1985, Brissette pled guilty to second degree murder (§ 187) and
admitted to personally using a firearm during the commission of the murder
(§ 12022.5). He also admitted to a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced Brissette to 22 years to life in state
prison.
On June 29, 2022, Brissette filed a petition for resentencing. On
November 4, 2022, the People conceded Brissette made a prima facie showing
due to the inability “to locate documents from the record of conviction that
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section
1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For ease of
reference, we will refer to the section by its new numbering only.
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prove he is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.” However, on
January 9, 2023, the People then opposed the petition for resentencing
because Brissette “personally shot and killed” the victim. The People heavily
relied on the preliminary hearing transcript to establish Brissette was the
actual killer.
On March 27, 2023, the trial court accepted the People’s concession
that Brissette had made a prima facie case and proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing. Brissette testified on his own behalf. After argument from counsel
and review of the preliminary hearing transcript, the court denied the
petition. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Brissette was
guilty of second degree murder under the current law as the actual killer.
Brissette timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Principles
Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1.) Senate Bill No. 775 modified the law to “expand the
authorization to allow a person who was convicted of murder under any
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . to apply to have their sentence vacated
and be resentenced,” and to clarify “that persons who were convicted of
attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the
natural probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as
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those persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch.
551, § 1.)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as
amended,” now codified in section 1172.6. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis).) “If [a]
petitioner ma[kes] a prima facie showing for relief, the trial court [is]
required to issue an order to show cause for an evidentiary hearing.” (People
v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) In
assessing eligibility at the prima facie stage, the court “‘“takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
If the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At the evidentiary
hearing, the parties may rely upon evidence in the record of conviction or new
evidence to demonstrate whether the petitioner is eligible for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The prosecution bears the burden of proving, “beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the prosecution cannot meet its burden, and the
petitioner prevails, he is entitled to vacatur of the murder conviction and
resentencing as set forth in section 1172.6, subdivision (e).
In determining whether a trial court correctly denied a section 1172.6
petition following an evidentiary hearing, “‘“we review the factual findings for
substantial evidence and the application of those facts to the statute de
novo.”’” (People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.)
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B. Analysis
In his letter brief, Brissette contends the trial court violated his right to
due process when it denied his resentencing petition. We disagree. Brissette
was given a full evidentiary hearing, at which he was represented by counsel
and testified on his own behalf. We further disagree with his contention that
the court “did not approve” of the process for adjudicating a resentencing
petition and, in any event, that it had any bearing on its ruling on the
petition. In addition, Brissette’s assertion that the People introduced
inadmissible evidence at the hearing, specifically a comprehensive risk
assessment and parole hearing transcript, is unavailing. Not only does
Brissette fail to articulate how these documents are inadmissible but also
does not argue that the court relied on these documents. (People v. Gonzalez
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 410 [it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error].) In fact, the only document relied upon by the trial court
in issuing its ruling was the preliminary hearing transcript.
Brissette next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his murder
conviction. He argues that because the two witnesses were not credible,
there is insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate he is guilty of
murder under the current law. Because we do not substitute our own
evaluation of witness credibility with that of the court, we reject Brissette’s
argument. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; see also People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“[t]he mere filing of a section [1172.6]
petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to . . . attack the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings”].) Lastly, Brissette
argues the court erred in not considering his age at the time of the crime or
his status as elderly when denying his petition. However, those are not
proper considerations in disposing of a resentencing petition under section
5
1172.6. (See People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) We note that
as the actual perpetrator of the second murder, Brissette is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order denying Bissette’s section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
MORI, J.
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