CourtListener 10003549•People v. Frontuto CA2/4
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Filed 7/15/24 P. v. Frontuto CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B329796
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA030740)
v.
SALVADOR FRONTUTO
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alan K. Schneider, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputies
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2000, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Salvador
Frontuto and co-defendant Jesus Rodriguez of first degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) for the killing of Steve
Alvarez.1 In April 2022, defendant filed a petition to vacate his
murder conviction under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now
§ 1172.6). The trial court summarily denied the petition.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by
denying his petition without issuing an order to show cause. The
People contend, and we agree, that defendant is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background2
On June 14, 1998, Steve Alvarez and two-to-four other
members of the Blythe Street Gang decided to “cruise around” to
find people tagging in their territory, intending to jump them if
they refused to stop. The group drove around in two cars until
finding a group of four men “hanging” outside of a building.
Several members of the group outside the building were from
Crazy Mexican Life (CML), a “party crew” that included
defendant and Rodriguez.3 The Blythe Street group parked their
cars and approached the CML group.
1 Subsequent references to statutes are to the Penal Code.
2 The following summary is taken from our prior opinion resolving
the direct appeal from judgment to provide context.
3 One witness testified that a party crew is a “group of people
getting together to go out and have a good time.” The group also
engaged in tagging, which involved writing their aliases on buildings.
At the time of the shooting, around 20 people were associated with
CML.
2
As the Blythe Street group approached, members of the
CML group asked where they were from and one person
responded, “Blythe Street.” Defendant and another person
repeated the question and, receiving the same response, one
member of the CML group (possibly defendant) shouted, “Fuck
Blythe Street.” Then, Rodriguez and defendant pulled out guns
and started shooting at the Blythe Street group. Defendant’s gun
jammed after firing several shots.
Members of the Blythe Street group turned and ran away.
Rodriguez and defendant ran behind Alvarez. Alvarez fell in
bushes several houses down from the apartment. One of the men
chasing Alvarez caught up, walked around, said, “Fuck Blythe
Street,” and fired around seven or eight shots at Alvarez. Law
enforcement recovered eight spent bullet casings from the scene.
Defendant and several others were arrested a few days
later. During his arrest, defendant told an officer a loaded .380
Lorcin handgun recovered from a car seat vacated by defendant
was his. At trial, counsel stipulated a firearm expert examined
the handgun and determined it had fired four expended cartridge
cases collected at the scene.
A deputy medical examiner who performed Alvarez’s
autopsy determined the cause of death was multiple gunshot
wounds. Of the eight gunshot wounds Alvarez suffered, five of
them were fatal, meaning they were “located in a vital organ or
extensive enough to produce death immediately.” The examiner
recovered five projectiles from Alvarez’s body. Counsel stipulated
a bullet recovered from a particular wound (“gunshot wound
denominated number 2”) came from the Lorcin handgun. The
examiner testified this particular gunshot wound entered from
the front of Alvarez’s body causing a “fatal wound[ ].”
3
B. Procedural Background
Defendant and Rodriguez were tried together in May 2000.
A jury convicted defendant of one count of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), found true the allegations he personally used a
firearm during the commission of murder (§§ 1203.06,
subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)), and that a principal personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to four years for the firearm
enhancement allegations, ordered to be served before an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life for first degree murder.
A panel of this court affirmed defendant’s conviction.
(People v. Rodriguez & Frontuto (June 21, 2002, B141976)
[nonpub. opn.] (Frontuto I).) In the opinion, this court rejected
various instructional and evidentiary errors and found sufficient
evidence to sustain defendant’s first degree murder conviction.4
In so finding, this court rejected defendant’s “continued insistence
that there was no evidence that a bullet from his gun caused a
fatal wound, and that the only bullet from his gun found in the
victim was the bullet found in his leg. Again, [defendant] has
misstated the evidence. Counsel stipulated that the bullet
removed from the gunshot wound denominated number 2 came
4 Among the instructional errors alleged was from an erroneous
reading on principles of aiding and abetting. This court noted the trial
court’s “misreading of its correct written instruction informed the jury
that knowledge of unlawful purpose or intent was sufficient. The court
said: ‘A person aids and abets the commission of the crime when he or
she, number one, with knowledge of the lawful purpose of the
perpetrator; and number two, with the intent or purpose of
encouraging or facilitating the purpose of the crime; or number three,
by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the
commission of the crime.’” (Frontuto I, supra, at p. 21.)
4
from the Lorcin pistol. [The medical examiner] testified that
bullet number 2 caused one of the fatal wounds. A bullet from
[defendant’s] gun therefore killed Alvarez, even though there may
have been a concurrent cause.” (Frontuto I, supra, at p. 40, citing
People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 846–847; People v. Pock
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1276.)
In April 2022, defendant filed a form resentencing petition
under section 1172.6, seeking resentencing on his murder
conviction.5 The trial court appointed counsel and received
additional briefing. Following a prima facie hearing, the court
summarily denied the petition, finding defendant ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. Based on the jury instructions and
verdict forms, the court reasoned defendant must have been
convicted as an actual killer or direct aider and abettor who acted
with an intent to kill. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law: Section 1172.6
Through Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1)
(S.B. 1437), the Legislature clarified the felony murder rule and
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
ensure any murder conviction and attached sentence is
commensurate with individual culpability. (People v. Gentile
5 In the form petition, defendant checked the boxes indicating he
was convicted of murder following trial and that an information was
filed against him allowing the prosecution to proceed under felony
murder, the natural and probable consequences, or other theory under
which malice is imputed based solely on the person’s participation in a
crime. Defendant did not check the box indicating he “could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes made to . . . §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
5
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 971 (Lewis); accord, § 189, subd. (e).) The
Legislature also added former section 1170.95 (now section
1172.6), pursuant to which individuals convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
may petition for vacatur of their convictions and resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Within 60 days after service of a facially compliant petition,
the prosecutor must file and serve a response, to which the
petitioner may file and serve a reply. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Following this briefing period, the court “shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (Ibid.) If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter
of law, the trial court may summarily deny the petition. (See
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 970–972; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
As relevant here, persons liable for murder under current
law include actual killers and aiders and abettors who act with
the intent to kill. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).)
We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
a section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to show cause.
(People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
B. Defendant Was Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of
Law
Defendant contends the trial court erred by summarily
denying his petition because “the record does not conclusively
show that [he] was convicted on a currently valid theory of
6
homicide.” We disagree and conclude defendant was convicted of
murder as an actual killer or direct aider and abettor.
To begin with, defendant acknowledges the jury never
received instruction on theories of felony murder, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any target crime on which
either theory could be based. (Accord, People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [“the jury was not instructed on any theory
of liability . . . that required that malice be imputed to him”].)
Because defendant “is not ‘[a] person convicted of felony murder
or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory,’
and he is therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law.”
(People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677.)
Resisting this conclusion, defendant contends the jury
could have convicted him under an uncategorized theory of
imputed malice. Based on the record of conviction, we disagree
and conclude defendant was convicted of first degree murder as
an actual killer or direct aider and abettor.
The jury was instructed on the elements of murder
(CALJIC No. 8.10), which required the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that “1. A human being was killed;
[¶] 2. The killing was unlawful; and [¶] 3. The killing was done
with malice aforethought.” CALJIC No. 8.11 defined express
malice (“an intention unlawfully to kill”), while CALJIC No. 8.70
further instructed the jury to decide degree of murder, and
CALJIC No. 8.74 required unanimity “as to whether he is guilty
of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree. . . .”
In turn, CALJIC No. 8.20 defined first degree murder as any
“murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willfull [sic],
deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice
aforethought. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If you find that the killing was
7
preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the
part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation
and premeditation, . . . it is murder of the first degree.”
The jury also received instruction on the personal firearm
use allegation (§ 1203.06(a)(1)) that “the defendants personally
used a firearm during the commission” of murder. (CALJIC
No. 17.19.) The instruction then provided that the “term
‘personally used a firearm,’ . . . means that the defendant must
have intentionally displayed a firearm in a menacing manner,
intentionally fired it, or intentionally struck or hit a human being
with it. [¶] The People have the burden of proving the truth of
this allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you
must find it to be not true.” (Ibid.) Regarding the term
“defendant,” the instructions clarified it “applies to each
defendant unless you are instructed otherwise.” (CALJIC
No. 1.11, italics added.)
At trial, defendant stipulated “that one of the fatal bullets,
number 2, came from a Lorcin pistol, and [he admitted] that the
loaded Lorcin pistol found by arresting officers on the car seat
that [he] had just vacated was his.” (Frontuto, supra, at p. 22.)
In turn, the instructions directed the jury to regard any
stipulated fact “as proven as to the party or parties making the
stipulation.” (CALJIC No. 1.02.) As defendant acknowledges on
appeal, this stipulated fact comprises part of the record of
conviction on which the trial court can rely. (See People v.
Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1212; Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 970.)
Defendant contends these components of the record of
conviction do not conclusively establish his liability for murder as
the actual killer. He raises several arguments in support.
8
Defendant first argues that “[a]t most, the stipulation
states that a shot fired by appellant [(defendant)] led to a series
of events that ultimately resulted [i]n the death of the victim. It
makes no mention of ‘the’ shot that resulted in the death of the
victim.” Defendant misconstrues the effect of his stipulation. As
this court previously noted, the bullet defendant concedes he fired
caused a “fatal” wound, “meaning [it was] located in a vital organ
or extensive enough to produce death immediately.” (Frontuto I,
supra, at p. 17.) Construed together, defendant’s stipulation and
the jury’s personal use finding conclusively establishes defendant
as an actual killer of Thomas.
Anticipating this result, defendant argues the personal use
instructions “did not require the jury to make findings as to each
individual defendant as opposed to the defendants (appellant and
Rodriguez) considered collectively.” While we agree a portion of
CALJIC No. 17.19 referred to defendants in the collective, we do
not agree this isolated language removed from the jury’s
consideration and finding that defendant himself used a firearm.
Beyond referencing the “defendants” collectively when
introducing the enhancement allegation, CALJIC No. 17.19
defined the term “personally used a firearm” as the defendant
having personally used a firearm in the commission of the
offense. We presume the jury heeded the court’s instruction not
to isolate the prefatory plural language (see CALJIC No. 1.01
[directing jury not to “single out any particular sentence or any
individual point or instruction and ignore the others”]).
Moreover, the jury’s verdict form verified its finding that “said
defendant SAL FRONTUTO, personally used a firearm, within
the meaning of Sections 1203.06(a)(1) and 12022.5(a)(1) to be
true.”
9
The foregoing components of the record of conviction
demonstrate defendant’s conviction as an actual killer as a
matter of law.6 This theory remains valid under current law.
(See § 189, subd, (e)(3); People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
956, 970–971; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47, 56.)
We further conclude defendant’s first degree murder
conviction as a direct aider and abettor, the only alternative
theory of liability on which his conviction was based, required his
intent to kill. The instructions on direct aiding and abetting
required (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator; (2) intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of murder; and (3) aiding, promoting,
encouraging or instigating the commission of murder. (CALJIC
No. 3.01.) In addition, the jury was instructed to consider each
codefendant’s guilt separately (CALJIC No. 17.00) and to find an
intent to kill on the part of defendant individually (CALJIC
Nos. 3.31, 3.31.5 [requiring “specific intent and mental state” for
murder], 8.20 [“If you find that the killing was preceded and
accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the
defendant to kill, . . . it is murder of the first degree”], italics
added).
“We ‘credit jurors with the intelligence and common sense’
[citation] and presume they generally underst[ood] and follow[ed]
instructions.” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670.)
6 As noted in Frontuto I, this theory of liability was fully
consistent with Rodriguez’s own conviction for the same offense. (See
Frontuto I, supra, at p. 24 [“Frontuto and Rodriguez both shot the
victim, and the wounds inflicted by either or both of them could have
been the cause of death”]; id. at p. 40 [“A bullet from Frontuto’s gun
therefore killed Alvarez, even though there may have been a
concurrent cause”]; see also CALJIC No. 3.41.)
10
Consistent with the law at the time defendant was convicted, the
foregoing instructions required a finding defendant share the
specific intent of the perpetrator to kill the victim. (See People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117–1118 [an accomplice
“‘“share[d] the specific intent of the perpetrator” [by] “know[ing]
the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and giv[ing]
aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating
the perpetrator’s commission of the crime”’”].)
People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), on
which defendant relies, is inapposite. In that case, a jury
convicted the defendant of second degree murder in connection
with the beating death of a robbery victim. (Id. at p. 976.) The
robbery victim fell and struck his head after someone in a group
that included the defendant punched the victim “directly in the
face.” (Ibid., original italics.)
“As the case was tried, the jury could have found [Langi]
guilty as an aider and abettor even if it found that someone else
threw the fatal punch. The jury was not required to find, and did
not necessarily find, that it was [Langi] who threw that punch.
Read with the caution dictated by Lewis, the prior opinion [and
jury instructions do] not conclusively establish that [Langi] was
convicted as the actual killer.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 980.)
Absent any finding by the jury that Langi was the actual
killer, the Langi court reviewed jury instructions comprising part
of Langi’s record of conviction. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 980–981.) In its review, the court found Langi’s conviction
based on two instructions “of central significance” to its analysis:
(1) a second degree murder instruction (CALJIC No. 8.31), and
(2) general principles of aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01).
11
(Id. at p. 981.) As Langi’s conviction was for second degree
murder, the court found CALJIC No. 8.31 permitted a conviction
insofar the perpetrator deliberately performed a fatal act, such as
a punch, “with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life,” and did not require finding the
perpetrator’s purpose was to kill the victim. (Id. at pp. 981–982.)
For the jury to convict the defendant as an aider and abettor of
second degree murder, it could have found Langi “need only have
intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this
case, punching [the victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to
aid or encourage [the] killing, and whether or not he personally
knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.” (Id. at p. 983,
fn. omitted.)
Unlike the defendant in Langi, defendant in this case was
convicted of first degree murder as an actual killer or direct aider
and abettor. As discussed, those theories required the jury to
find defendant was the actual killer of Alvarez or aided and
abetted his murder with knowledge of the actual killer’s purpose
and intent to unlawfully kill. The instructional ambiguities
found in Langi do not exist in this case.
C. No Violation of Constitutional Rights
Defendant contends he was denied the benefit of having an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3),
requiring the prosecution to prove his ineligibility for relief
beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues this violated his
rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment.
12
Defendant has forfeited these arguments for failing to
develop them on appeal. (See People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th
673, 683, fn. 7.)
To the extent defendant articulates them, the arguments
also fail on the merits. As to equal protection, defendant does not
specify any group to which he claims to belong. Nor does he
specify a group to which he claims to be similarly situated beyond
“those found guilty of murder who make a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief.” Absent any connection or similarity to
those who establish a prima facie entitlement for relief,
defendant’s equal protection claim fails. (See People v. Chatman
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 [right to equal protection violated when
the government treats similarly situated group of people
unequally without “some justification”].)
Equally unavailing are defendant’s procedural due process
and Eighth Amendment claims. Because defendant has not
established a prima facie case for relief, he cannot claim to have a
fair expectation the court would issue an order to show cause
under section 1172.6. In addition, defendant’s prison sentence
was based on his valid conviction for murder, not on any
proceeding held under section 1172.6. The trial court proceeded
in a manner that was procedurally lawful and fair and issued a
ruling that was substantively correct. The outcome would be no
different were we to remand the matter for further proceedings.
(See People v. Jefferson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 399, 409 [“remand
is not appropriate when it would be an idle act”].)
13
DISPOSITION
The order summarily denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
MORI, J
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
COLLINS, J.
14
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