CourtListener 10003476•People v. Argel CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 7/15/24 P. v. Argel CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333232
(Super. Ct. No. 1488691)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
JOHN WILLIAM ARGEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
John William Argel appeals from the denial of his petition
for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75. He
contends the trial court erred in concluding it did not have
jurisdiction to resentence him. We agree, and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2015, a jury convicted Argel of criminal threats (§ 422),
domestic abuse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and elder abuse (§ 368, subd.
(c)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true
allegations that Argel had suffered two prior strike convictions
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and an allegation that he
had served a prior term in prison (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). It
sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in
state prison plus a determinate term of six years: 25 years to life
on the criminal threats, a concurrent eight years (the upper term
of four years, doubled) on the domestic violence, a concurrent 180
days on the elder abuse, a consecutive five years on the prior
serious felony, and a consecutive one year on the prison prior.
Seven years later, the trial court notified the parties that
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) had
determined that Argel was eligible for resentencing pursuant to
what is now section 1172.75. Argel urged the court to strike one
or both of his prior strikes, his prior serious felony enhancement,
and his prison prior. The district attorney opposed resentencing,
arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Argel
because he had already served the determinate portion of his
sentence. The court agreed with each party in part: It struck the
prison prior, but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to act further
because Argel had already served the determinate portion of his
sentence. (Citing § 669, subd. (a) [defendant serving sentence
with both determinate and indeterminate components must serve
determinate component first].)
DISCUSSION
Argel contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the
trial court erred when it determined it lacked jurisdiction to
conduct a full resentencing. We agree.
Section 1172.75 requires CDCR to inform trial courts of
inmates serving sentences with one or more now-invalid prior
prison term enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Once a court
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receives this information and confirms that the inmate’s sentence
includes an invalid enhancement, it “shall recall [their] sentence
and resentence” them. (Id., subd. (c).) During resentencing,
“[t]he court shall apply . . . any . . . changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion” (id., subd. (d)(2))—
i.e., the court shall conduct a full resentencing (People v.
Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 311-317 (Christianson),
review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189). Such resentencing
“shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed
as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
The plain language of section 1172.75 makes clear that the
trial court should have conducted a full resentencing. Section
1172.75 renders any prior prison term enhancement imposed for
a nonsexually violent offense—such as that imposed in Argel’s
case—legally invalid. And it applies to any judgment that
includes an invalid enhancement. (See People v. Escobedo (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 440, 451-452 [§ 1172.75 applies when current
judgment includes invalid prison prior].) It is not limited to a
defendant currently serving the determinate portion of a
sentence with a now-invalid enhancement, as the district
attorney argued below. Were that true here, the court would be
unable to apply Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)—
which permits striking a five-year serious felony enhancement—
thereby rendering section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) superfluous.
(Cf. People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400-402 [Senate
Bill No. 1393 applies during § 1172.75 resentencing].)
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As the Christianson court explained, “ ‘ “[A]n aggregate
prison term is not a series of separate independent terms, but one
term made up of interdependent components. The invalidity of
one component infects the entire scheme.” ’ [Citation.] ‘By
correcting one part of [a defendant’s] sentence, the trial court is
resentencing the defendant and, in so doing, is not only
permitted, but also obligated to look at the facts and the law in
effect at the time of that resentencing, including “ ‘any pertinent
circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was
imposed.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 315, review granted.)
DISPOSITION
The November 1, 2023, order striking the one-year prior
prison term enhancement from Argel’s sentence but declining
further resentencing is vacated, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court for a full resentencing. We express no opinion as
to the sentence the court shall impose upon resentencing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.
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John F. McGregor, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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