Rhodes-Hamby v. Askew

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

WILLIAM RHODES-HAMBY, Petitioner,

v.

ANYA ASKEW, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-SA 26-0064
FILED 04-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. DO2021-00049
The Honorable Ted S. Reed, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Tempe
By Keith Berkshire, Alexandra Sandlin, Elizabeth Nañez, Alicia Derr
Counsel for Petitioner

Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Respondent
RHODES-HAMBY v. ASKEW
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 William Rhodes-Hamby (“Father”) asks us to exercise our
discretionary special action jurisdiction to review the superior court’s
temporary order granting Anya Askew (“Mother”) temporary sole legal
decision-making authority and near-exclusive parenting time. He first
argues that despite Mother’s previous acts of domestic violence, the
temporary order fails to cite evidence rebutting the statutory presumption
that awarding sole legal decision-making authority and exclusive parenting
time to Mother is contrary to the child’s best interests. See A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(D). Father then argues the court’s temporary order improperly
allows the court-appointed therapist to determine the frequency and
duration of his exercise of parenting time.

¶2 We exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction
because questions relating to the well-being of children are of statewide
importance and the harm complained of can only be prevented by
resolution before an appeal. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(4), (6). We grant
relief and vacate the superior court’s temporary order because we agree
with Father that the court erred by not following the statutory framework
set forth in A.R.S. § 25-403.03 and by delegating its judicial decision-making
authority to the court-appointed therapist.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Father Obtains an Order of Protection Against Mother for
Domestic Violence, and Mother and Father Divorce.

¶3 Father and Mother married in March 2019 and had one child
born in September 2019. Father filed for divorce in February 2021. Before
the divorce was final, Father sought an order of protection against Mother
based on allegations of domestic violence. In December 2022, the court
issued a two-year order of protection prohibiting Mother from contacting
Father, finding “reasonable cause to believe that [Mother] may commit an

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act of domestic violence or has committed an act of domestic violence
within the past year.”

¶4 Mother and Father were divorced in February 2024. Their
consent decree kept the order of protection in effect, awarded Mother and
Father joint legal decision-making, and gave Father final legal decision-
making authority. In a separate order, the court awarded Mother and
Father equal parenting time.

B. Father Obtains a Second Order of Protection Against
Mother Because of a Criminal Trespass Conviction.

¶5 In May 2024, Mother was found guilty of criminal trespass in
connection with one of the incidents supporting the order of protection.
Mother was placed on probation for 18 months and was prohibited from
contacting Father, and the crime was considered domestic violence under
A.R.S. § 13-3601(A).

¶6 In January 2025, the superior court granted Father’s petition
for an additional two-year order of protection, which prohibited Mother
from contacting Father other than through a co-parenting app. The court
again found “reasonable cause to believe that [Mother] may commit an act
of domestic violence or has committed an act of domestic violence within
the past year.”

C. Mother Requests Modification of Legal Decision-Making,
Parenting Time, and Child Support.

¶7 In October 2025, Mother filed a Petition to Modify Legal
Decision-Making, Parenting Time, and Child Support, an Emergency
Motion for Temporary Orders under Family Law Rule 48, and a Motion for
Temporary Orders under Family Law Rule 47. Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 47, 48. In
her petition, Mother alleged that since entry of the decree, Father had
exercised his final decision-making authority as though he had sole legal
authority, excluding her from medical and mental health decisions. She
alleged that Father unilaterally hospitalized the six-year-old child in a
psychiatric unit at Phoenix Children’s Hospital, directed his transport to the
hospital without parental accompaniment, and excluded her from
participation in his care. Mother further alleged Father committed four
separate incidents of abuse while the child was in his care: one involving
bruising to the child’s torso, a second involving restraint-like bruising to
the child’s wrists, a third involving hitting the child in the stomach, and a
fourth in which school personnel observed multiple bruises and reported
that the child stated Father held him down in the car. Although prior

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Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) investigations had been inconclusive
or unsubstantiated, Mother asserted that the pattern of injuries, behavioral
dysregulation in Father’s home, and Father’s unilateral psychiatric
hospitalization of the child justified awarding her sole legal decision-
making authority and modifying parenting time to reflect
recommendations of a court-ordered custody evaluator.

D. Following an Evidentiary Hearing, the Superior Court
Issues Temporary Orders Modifying Legal Decision-
Making and Parenting Time.

¶8 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court issued a
temporary order awarding Mother sole legal decision-making authority
and limiting Father to “therapeutically supervised parenting time with the
minor child.” The court concluded the child remaining in Father’s custody
“present[ed] an immediate risk of serious emotional harm or physical harm
to the minor child,” because: (1) the “perpetual conflict” between Mother
and Father was adversely affecting the child’s welfare; (2) the child was
displaying alarming behavior in Father’s care; and (3) the child had suffered
unexplained bruising and stated that Father was “hitting him,” which was
the subject of an ongoing DCS investigation.

¶9 In addition to granting Mother’s request for sole legal
decision-making, the court’s temporary order limited Father to
therapeutically supervised parenting time, the frequency and duration of
which were to “be determined by the provider” and not to exceed “more
than twice per week for a maximum of two hours per visit.”

¶10 In a subsequent order, the court designated a Safe Haven
Family Therapist and ordered that Father exercise parenting time in family
therapy “until further court ordered, and as recommended by” the
therapist. The court also ordered that if the therapist “determines [Father]
and the child no longer need to participate in family therapy, [Father] is
entitled . . . to request a change in parenting time.” The order further
provided that the therapist “shall not make any recommendations
regarding legal decision making or parenting time,” and that a
“recommendation of no longer needing to participate in ‘family therapy,’ is
not considered a parenting time recommendation.” Father’s petition for
special action review followed.

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DISCUSSION

¶11 We review the superior court’s legal decision-making and
parenting time orders for an abuse of discretion. Gish v. Greyson, 253 Ariz.
437, 444 ¶ 31 (App. 2022). The superior court abuses its discretion when its
ruling is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or
for untenable reasons.” Quigley v. City of Tucson, 132 Ariz. 35, 37 (App.
1982). The superior court also abuses its discretion when “the record fails
to provide substantial support for its decision.” Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64,
65 ¶ 2 (App. 2001). A legal error is necessarily an abuse of discretion. Voice
of Surprise v. Hall, 255 Ariz. 510, 513 ¶ 11 (2023).

I. We Exercise Our Special Action Jurisdiction.

¶12 We exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction
because the well-being of children, especially surrounding custody
disputes connected with instances of domestic violence (as led to the two
protective orders against Mother), is an issue of statewide importance.
Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(4). Our review also implicates the welfare of a
child where the harm complained of can only be prevented by
consideration before appeal, given that the temporary order at issue can’t
be appealed. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(b)(6).

II. The Superior Court Erred By Not Applying the Statutory
Framework of A.R.S. § 25-403.03.

¶13 Father argues the superior court was required to apply the
statutory framework under A.R.S. § 25-403.03 in light of prior domestic
violence findings before awarding Mother sole legal decision-making
authority and near-exclusive parenting time, and that the temporary orders
do not reflect the proper analysis. Mother argues “the court’s ultimate
ruling . . . necessarily implies that the court considered and weighed the
evidence pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403.03.” Father is correct.

¶14 Section 25-403.03 of the Arizona Revised Statutes provides a
clear framework for courts to follow when deciding issues involving both
domestic violence and legal decision-making, which we outlined in Garcia
v. Vallon, --- Ariz. ---, 583 P.3d 421 (App. 2025):

If a court finds a parent has committed domestic violence, the
court must consider that finding contrary to the child's best
interests. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(B). The parent found to have
committed domestic violence then must prove “to the court’s
satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or

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significantly impair the child’s emotional development.”
A.R.S. § 25-403.03(F). And if a parent seeking legal decision-
making committed domestic violence against the other
parent, there is a rebuttable presumption that awarding legal
decision-making to that parent is against the child’s best
interests. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D).

Id. at 424 ¶ 10.

¶15 The court erred by not following that framework. Mother
previously committed acts of domestic violence against Father, triggering
the rebuttable presumption that awarding legal decision-making to Mother
is against the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). Even though
testimony elicited at the evidentiary hearing preceding the court’s
temporary order might have been sufficient to rebut this presumption (a
question as to which we intimate no view), “the court must make specific
findings on the record that there is sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption.” DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423 ¶ 12 (App. 2019). It did
not do so. And “[i]n making its specific findings in this regard, the court
must consider the factors listed in [A.R.S.] § 25-403.03(E).” Id. The court’s
temporary order likewise did not consider the factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-
403.03(E) or specifically find there was sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption. In these ways, the court’s temporary order did not comply
with A.R.S. § 25-403.03.

¶16 Mother’s suggestion that the court’s order “necessarily
implies that the court considered and weighed the evidence pursuant to
A.R.S. § 25-403.03” is incorrect. Mother rightly notes that we generally
“infer that the superior court has made whatever additional findings are
necessary to sustain its judgment.” Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 249
Ariz. 289, 297 ¶ 19 (App. 2020). But this “general principle does not apply
if the court failed in its obligation to make findings of fact.” Id. “Where the
basis on which the court reached a certain conclusion is not clear, it is not
enough that the appellate court is able to derive bases on which the trial
court could have permissibly reached the decision it did from the record. It
must be clear how the court actually did arrive at its conclusions.” Id.
(quoting Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 135 (App. 1990)). Without this
clarity, “there is no assurance that the court itself thought out each issue”
so we cannot “effectively review the decision-making process of the trial
court.” Id. (quoting Elliot, 165 Ariz. at 135). Because the court erred by not
making the requisite findings on the record before awarding Mother sole
legal decision-making and exclusive parenting time, we must reverse.

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III. The Superior Court Improperly Delegated Its Judicial Decision-
Making Authority to the Therapist.

¶17 Father argues the provisions of the court’s temporary orders
allowing the therapist to both limit the frequency and duration of his
therapeutically supervised parenting time and conclude that Father and
child no longer needed to participate in family therapy improperly
delegated the court’s sole decision-making authority. In addition to
arguing waiver and judicial estoppel, Mother argues the court did not
abuse its discretion because the order at issue is temporary and not a final
parenting time decision. Again, Father is correct.

¶18 The court’s order allows the therapist to decide how much
parenting time Father receives each week, between zero and four hours.
The order also allows the therapist to unilaterally decide that
therapeutically supervised parenting time is no longer needed, in which
case, due to the structure of the temporary order, Father will be required to
move the court to modify the temporary order to exercise any parenting
time. This improperly delegates the court’s judicial authority. See
DePasquale v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 333, 336 (App. 1995) (The superior
court “may consider expert opinion in making [its] decisions,” however, it
can “neither delegate a judicial decision to an expert witness nor abdicate
its responsibility to exercise independent judgment.”). Our law doesn’t
prevent the court from “establishing milestones for [Father] to receive
additional or unsupervised parenting time . . . . But unless the milestones
are self-effectuating, the court, not a behavioral health professional, must
determine whether a requirement has been met.” Gish, 253 Ariz. at 447 ¶ 48.
The therapist’s independent judgment is not a “self-effectuating . . .
milestone,” so making it the deciding factor in Father’s parenting time
going forward is an impermissible delegation of ultimate judgment to the
therapist.

¶19 By granting the therapist sole discretion over the duration
and frequency of Father’s parenting time, the court abdicated its
responsibility to exercise independent judgment as to the child’s best
interests. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A) (“The court shall determine legal decision-
making and parenting time . . . in accordance with the best interests of the
child.” (emphasis added)). This is not a permissible delegation, as Mother
suggests, because the court did this through a temporary order rather than
a final parenting time decision. As we made clear in DePasquale, “[t]he best
interests of the child—even on an interim custodial basis—are for the court
alone to decide.” 181 Ariz. at 336 (emphasis added).

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¶20 We appreciate that the court recites in its temporary orders
that the therapist “shall not make any recommendations regarding legal
decision making or parenting time,” and that a “recommendation of no
longer needing to participate in ‘family therapy,’ is not considered a
parenting time recommendation.” Unfortunately, those contrary recitals
do not negate the practical effect of the other provisions of its orders, which
amount to an improper delegation of exclusive judicial decision-making
authority, for the reasons we have explained. The court erred by granting
the therapist discretion over the frequency, duration, and conclusion of
Father’s exercise of therapeutically supervised parenting time.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretionary
special action jurisdiction, vacate the superior court’s temporary order, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. We grant
Father his costs as the prevailing party in this appeal, subject to his
compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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