Billy Hoover v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 255
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-23-586

Opinion Delivered April 17, 2024
BILLY HOOVER
APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 17CR-20-361]
V.
HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Billy Hoover appeals the Crawford County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition

for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure

(2022). On appeal, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed (1)

to include the 2012 nolle prosequi order in his direct-appeal record; (2) to object to entry of

the 2012 nolle prosequi order for lack of good cause; (3) to move for a mistrial when Deputy

Keith Smith testified that he arrested Hoover after Hoover refused to give a statement; and

(4) to call Hoover’s sister, Melissa Black, during the trial to testify that their cousin, David

Pullin, was an alternative suspect in the rape of Hoover’s children rather than Hoover. We

affirm the denial of Hoover’s petition for postconviction relief.

Hoover was arrested on May 5, 2020, and charged with two counts of rape; the victims

were his daughter, MC1, and his son, MC2. The affidavit for the arrest warrant attached to
the information alleged that Hoover had raped his children on or about March 1 to July 30,

2011, when the children were five and six years old, respectively.

Hoover’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, alleging Hoover

had been arrested on December 1, 2011, for one count of raping MC1 on or about March

1 to July 21, 2011; that an order to nolle prosequi the 2011 case was entered on June 28,

2012; that the order did not state that the dismissal was for good cause; the time from June

28, 2012 (nolle prosequi order), to May 5, 2020 (date of second arrest), was not excludable

for purposes of speedy trial; and the case should be dismissed for violation of speedy trial.

The State argued Hoover had failed to raise the issue of lack of good cause when the nolle

pros order was entered, good cause existed to nolle pros the 2011 charge, and the 2011 case

was not near the speedy-trial time when the nolle pros order was entered. The circuit court

denied Hoover’s motion.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Hoover’s children testified regarding the sexual

abuse Hoover perpetrated against them as well as the sexual acts Hoover made them perform

on each other. The jury convicted Hoover of two counts of rape and sentenced him to thirty

years’ incarceration on each count, to be served consecutively. Hoover appealed his

convictions to this court, arguing only that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to

dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. This court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal in

Hoover v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 554, 682 S.W.3d 15, holding that Hoover had failed to

include the docket sheet from 2011, the motion for nolle pros, the transcript of the nolle

pros motion hearing if there was one, or the order of nolle pros in the record; therefore, he

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had failed to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate that he either made an objection to

the lack of good cause at the time the State moved to nolle pros the 2011 case or that he did

not have the opportunity to do so.1

Hoover timely filed for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansas

Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 After a hearing on April 23, 2023, the circuit court denied

Hoover’s Rule 37 petition in an order filed on May 17, 2023. In that order, the circuit court

found that Hoover’s counsel filed an appropriate motion for violation of speedy trial prior

to the 2020 trial; a hearing was held on that motion; there was no hearing and no transcript

regarding the 2012 nolle prosequi order so none could be provided; there was no evidence

trial counsel had been given an opportunity to object to the order; there was no proof

presented that the motion would not have been granted “with good cause”; and any

argument to the contrary was purely speculative. Regarding Deputy Smith’s statement that

he arrested Hoover after Hoover refused to come in for an interview, the circuit court found

that this statement did not rise to the level that would trigger a mistrial even if a motion had

been made, and calling attention to that statement could have been more prejudicial than

helpful. As for not calling Melissa Black as a witness, the circuit court found that trial

counsel has great discretion when it comes to trial strategy and that both children had

1
Hoover’s petition for review on direct appeal was denied.
2
The issues Hoover raised to the circuit court are the same four ineffective-assistance
arguments presented in this appeal as well as the argument that counsel was ineffective for
failing to impeach MC1 with her statement that she did not recall any rape occurring, an
argument that Hoover has abandoned on appeal.

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identified Hoover as the person who assaulted them and forced them to engage in

inappropriate sexual contact with each other—mistaken identity was not a factor or a

reasonable argument.

We do not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s

findings are clearly erroneous. Holland v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 594, 681 S.W.3d 526. A

finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, after reviewing

the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made. Id. In making a determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this

court considers the totality of the evidence. Id.

Our standard of review also requires that we assess the effectiveness of counsel under

the two-prong standard set forth by the United Stated Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which necessitates that a petitioner first demonstrate that

counsel’s performance was deficient—that counsel made such serious errors that counsel was

not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution— and that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness. Id. Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, fall

within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment and are not grounds for finding

ineffective assistance of counsel; there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and the burden is on the

petitioner to overcome this presumption and identify specific acts and omissions by counsel

that could not have been the result of reasoned professional judgment. Id. Counsel is

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allowed great leeway in making strategic and tactical decisions, particularly when deciding

not to call a witness. Id. Conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the

basis for postconviction relief. Id.

Second, if the petitioner can demonstrate that counsel’s representation was deficient,

he must then show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense; this requires a

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious that the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial

and that there is a reasonable probability—a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome of the trial—that the fact-finder’s decision would have been different absent

counsel’s errors. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, the allegations do not meet

the benchmark on review for granting relief on a claim of ineffective assistance. Lee v. State,

2017 Ark. 337, 532 S.W.3d 43.

Hoover’s first two arguments on appeal concern the denial of his motion to dismiss

based on speedy-trial violations. He contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

include the 2012 nolle prosequi order in the direct-appeal record, asserting that had the

2012 order been included, his convictions would have been reversed and dismissed on direct

appeal because the order did not state that the 2011 case was dismissed for good cause. 3

Hoover also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the entry of the

nolle prosequi order in 2012.

3
We note that the 2011 case had no allegations as to MC2; therefore, the motion to
dismiss for speedy-trial violation would have no bearing on the 2020 charges against Hoover
as to MC2.

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Ryan Norris, the second-chair attorney at Hoover’s trial in 2020, testified that Arron

Edwards was the attorney assigned to Hoover’s case in the public defender’s office; that she

filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Hoover in the 2020 case on the basis of her

belief that there was a speedy-trial violation because Hoover’s original case had been assigned

to the public defender’s office in 2011, and that case had been nolle prossed in 2012; and

that Dan Stewart had represented Hoover in the 2011 case when it was nolle prossed. Norris

explained that when a case is nolle prossed, the public defender’s office usually receives an

email from the prosecutor stating that the case has been nolle prossed; there was not a

hearing on the matter; and it was “hit or miss” if the office received an order stating that the

case had been nolle prossed. Norris stated that he had never objected to a nolle prosequi

filed by written order; he admitted that in 2011, he was not familiar with the good-cause

requirement as it related to a nolle prosequi order for speedy-trial purposes, but he was not

the primary attorney on the 2011 case; and that this was the only case he could remember

that had been nolle prossed and had actually been reset for trial.

Arron Edwards, the lead attorney in Hoover’s rape trial, testified that she filed a

motion to dismiss Hoover’s case as to MC1 for speedy-trial violation, but the circuit court

had denied the motion. Edwards stated that she had seen the 2012 nolle prosequi order

and had access to it when she filed her motion to dismiss, but she did not recall if she

presented the order to the circuit court; she admitted that this court affirmed the denial of

the motion to dismiss in light of the fact that the issue was not preserved because the 2012

dismissal order was not included in the record nor was a transcript of the hearing on the

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motion to dismiss. Edwards said that in her opinion, it would have been unethical for

Hoover’s trial attorney to have objected to a nolle prosequi of the charges against Hoover in

2012; she said that she had never objected to a nolle prosequi of charges against a client.

She explained that the circuit court did not hold hearings on nolle prosequi motions; that

often she did not know that a case had been dismissed until she received the docket and a

case was no longer on it; and therefore, there would have been no opportunity to object to

the entry of a nolle pros order.

Hoover, citing Hicks v. State, 340 Ark. 605, 12 S.W.3d 219 (2000), contends that case

law makes it clear that a nolle prosequi order has to be in the record in order to obtain review

of a speedy-trial ruling based on it, and counsel was objectively deficient for failing to include

that order in the appeal record. He also cites State v. Washington, 273 Ark. 82, 617 S.W.2d

3 (1981), for the principle that the act of the State in filing a nolle prosequi motion does not

toll the speedy-trial provisions absent a showing of good cause for the period of delay; the

State is not relieved of speedy-trial limitations “merely because a defendant is permitted

absolute release pending disposition of the charges.” 273 Ark. at 88, 617 S.W.2d at 6.

Hoover admits that the State’s motion to nolle prosequi was granted without a hearing; he

argues that because there was no hearing, there could be no finding of good cause for the

nolle prosequi.

We disagree that counsel’s performance was deficient because the nolle prosequi

order was not included in the direct-appeal record. In the motion to dismiss for speedy-trial

violation, counsel admitted that the 2012 order did not state that the case was nolle prossed

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for good cause; therefore, that information was before the circuit court when it made its

decision to deny the motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the circuit court noted at the hearing

on the motion to dismiss that it had reviewed the older case prior to the hearing on the

motion to dismiss. Hoover has failed to show that the inclusion of the order would have

changed the circuit court’s denial of his motion to dismiss on a speedy-trial violation.

Hoover also contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the entry of

the 2012 nolle prosequi order for lack of good cause. A petitioner has the burden of

overcoming the presumption that counsel is effective by identifying specific acts and

omissions that, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time, could not have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment. Lee, 2017 Ark. 337, 532 S.W.3d 43.

When a petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to make a motion or

an argument, the petitioner must show that the motion or argument would have been

meritorious because the failure to make an argument that is meritless is not ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id.

It is not necessary to determine the periods excluded from speedy-trial computation

until a defendant has moved to enforce the right to a speedy trial pursuant to Rule 28 of the

Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure unless it is specifically provided to the contrary in

Rule 28. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3. (2022). Rule 28.3(f) provides that the period of time

between a nolle prosequi on the prosecutor’s motion for good cause shown and the time the

charge is later filed for the same offense is excluded for purposes of speedy trial. Evidence

presented at the Rule 37 hearing revealed that it was Edwards’s and Norris’s understanding

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that the case was nolle prossed in 2012 for lack of evidence. A lack of evidence is good cause

for a nolle prosequi so long as the State is not simply attempting to evade the speedy-trial

requirement. Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 455, 65 S.W.3d 402 (2002). Hoover has failed to show

that objecting to the nolle pros order in 2012 would have resulted in a different outcome.

Hoover next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a

mistrial when Deputy Keith Smith testified that he arrested Hoover after he refused to give

a statement, asserting that such a statement was an improper comment on his right to remain

silent. We disagree.

At the Rule 37 hearing, Deputy Smith testified that in 2020, he received an email

from the Arkansas State Police Crimes Against Children Division (CACD) providing

additional evidence concerning allegations against Hoover; on the basis of this information,

he began an investigation of Hoover. CACD had already interviewed MC1 and MC2, so

after locating Hoover’s phone number, he called Hoover and asked if he would come in for

an interview; when Hoover declined, Deputy Smith took the case file to the prosecutor’s

office to obtain a warrant. Deputy Smith explained that his request for the warrant was

based on allegations that rapes had occurred approximately ten years earlier, that Hoover

was raping his six-year-old son and five-year-old daughter, and he was making his son rape

his daughter. Deputy Smith explained that he would try to talk to a defendant as part of an

investigation, but whether or not he was able to talk to a defendant made no difference as

to whether he sought an arrest warrant from the prosecutor’s office. He testified he did not

seek an arrest warrant because he was unable to talk to Hoover.

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Norris did not recall Deputy Smith making the statement at issue until Hoover’s

counsel showed him the transcript, but he said that technically he did not see anything wrong

with the statement. On cross-examination, Norris was provided with an expanded version

of Deputy Smith’s testimony, which was that Deputy Smith had received some new

disclosures, and on the basis of that information, he had opened the case.

Norris testified that generally, prior to obtaining an arrest warrant, evidence was

gathered and there was an attempt to talk to the defendant. However, he said that sometimes

there was no attempt to speak to a defendant prior to seeking a warrant; it was different every

time. Norris stated that Deputy Smith had followed the steps of conducting an investigation,

and he did not arrest Hoover solely because Hoover would not come to the sheriff’s office

and speak with him.

In Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (2013), Salinas was developed as a suspect in a double

murder; he voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station for a noncustodial

interview; he answered officers’ questions for most of the interview, but when asked if his

shotgun would match the shells recovered at the murder scene, Salinas remained silent

before proceeding to answer additional questions. The Supreme Court of the United States

held that Salinas’s silence in response to the question of whether his shotgun would match

the shells found at the scene was not a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain

silent because Salinas never invoked the protection of that privilege during the voluntary

interview; a defendant normally does not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights by remaining

silent.

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In the present case, Hoover never even participated in a voluntary interview with law

enforcement. If silence at a voluntary interview is not protected without a specific invocation

of a person’s Fifth Amendment rights under Salinas, Hoover’s refusal to speak to law

enforcement officers at all would also not be protected without a specific invocation of the

protection of the Fifth Amendment.

Furthermore, a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to

only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing

the trial. Castillo v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 313, 669 S.W.3d 609. When a witness’s reference

to an accused’s silence is not responsive to the question asked, and the State does not dwell

on the reference, a mistrial is not warranted. Sylvester v. State, 2016 Ark. 136, 489 S.W.3d

146. Deputy Smith’s comment was not responsive to the prosecutor’s question regarding

what led him to seek an arrest warrant, which was the evidence of new disclosures by

Hoover’s children, and the prosecutor did not ask questions about Hoover’s refusal to be

interviewed. Hoover has failed to show that a mistrial would have been granted even if

requested.

Hoover’s last argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call his

sister, Melissa Black, as a witness to testify that their cousin, David Pullin, was a likely suspect

in the rapes of MC1 and MC2. At the Rule 37 hearing, Black testified she knew that in

2011, MC1 had said the person who abused her was wearing women’s clothing; while she

had never known Hoover to do that, she said that Pullin, who had lived with Hoover and

his children for a brief time in 2010 and 2011, had long been a cross-dresser who wore

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women’s clothing on a daily basis. Black also testified that she had found many notebooks

filled with stories written by Pullin about sodomizing or sexually assaulting children or young

women, and about a month before the jury trial, she took some of those notebooks to the

public defender’s office and gave them to Norris and Edwards, although both attorneys

testified that they did not meet with Black until the day of jury selection. Edwards testified

that Black had brought in a stack of written ramblings purportedly written by Pullin; that

the writing was “scrambled” and “hard to comprehend” and was of a deviant sexual nature

involving sex with underage children; but Black could not authenticate the stories as being

authored by Pullin because she did not see him write them. Edwards stated that she did not

attempt to proffer Black’s testimony because she did not find her to be a credible witness.

Furthermore, Edwards testified that even though there had been some mention about

women’s clothing, there was no evidence to support the introduction of a possible third-

party suspect because Hoover’s children testified that it was their father who had sexually

abused them night after night.

Hoover argues that had his attorneys called Black as a witness, she would have testified

about Pullin’s penchant for cross-dressing, his sexually deviate writings, and the fact that

Pullin had lived with Hoover and the children during the time of the charged acts, thus

giving him access to the children; he asserts that had this evidence been presented to the

jury, there was a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted of one or both of

the offenses. We disagree.

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Trial strategy and tactics are matters of professional judgment and are not generally

grounds to find counsel ineffective. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). An

ineffective-assistance claim predicated on an alleged failure to investigate potential witnesses

must demonstrate how a more in-depth pretrial investigation would have changed the

outcome of the trial. Wertz v. State, 2014 Ark. 240, 434 S.W.3d 895. The children testified

at trial that it was Hoover—their father—who raped them and forced MC2 to rape MC1.

There was no case of mistaken identity.

Affirmed.

HARRISON, C.J., and VIRDEN, J., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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