Keith Alan Dixon v. Holly Ann Dixon

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 519
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-22-330

Opinion Delivered November 8, 2023

KEITH ALAN DIXON
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PERRY
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 53DR-20-84]

HONORABLE AMY DUNN
HOLLY ANN DIXON JOHNSON, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

This divorce case between appellant Keith Alan Dixon and appellee Holly Ann Dixon

comes before this court for a second time. In the first appeal, Dixon v. Dixon, 2023 Ark. App.

217, we remanded to settle and supplement the record because the record failed to contain

a letter that had been evidently provided by Keith to the trial court regarding the amounts

that had been paid toward the loan under which the parties’ house was financed. The record

has now been settled and supplemented as ordered, and the supplemental record contains

the letter provided by Keith to the trial court, which shows that a total of $199,350.36 had

been paid toward the loan. We now reach the merits of the appeal.

In this appeal from the divorce decree, Keith alleges errors in the distribution of the

parties’ marital and nonmarital property. Keith and Holly were married on October 24,
2009, and after a bench trial, they were divorced on October 29, 2021. The divorce decree

contained various provisions wherein the trial court divided the parties’ property unequally

in favor of Holly due, in part, to the trial court’s finding that Keith brought substantial assets

to the marriage that he will retain after the divorce. With respect to the parties’ residence,

the trial court awarded the residence to Keith but ordered Keith to pay Holly the full amount

of the equity in the home.

Keith now appeals, raising two arguments for reversal. First, Keith argues that the

trial court clearly erred in awarding Holly an unequal division of marital property and in

awarding her a portion of his nonmarital property without stating the basis and reasons for

such division as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(a) (Repl. 2020).

Next, Keith contends that the trial court erred in giving Holly the benefit of a $199,350.36

reduction of debt against the house and states that there is no evidence in the record that

the debt was “reduced by any amount and certainly not $199,350.36.” As noted, the record

as supplemented now contains evidence of the $199,350.36 reduction in debt, which Keith

himself provided to the trial court. We disagree with both of Keith’s arguments on appeal,

and we affirm the divorce decree.

The pertinent facts are as follows. Keith is a medical doctor and had attained

substantial nonmarital property prior to the parties’ marriage, including $1.9 million in a

retirement account and ownership of Dixon Properties, LLC, and Dixon Tree Farms, LLC.

Keith testified that he has medical issues and became disabled shortly after the parties’

marriage, but he still earns substantial income from the ownership of his companies. Holly

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is a dietician, and she had about $44,000 in a retirement account when the parties married,

which increased to about $147,000 during the marriage. Holly also started a business called

HD Nutrition, LLC, during the marriage. Holly testified that she earns $5000 a month from

her business. Keith brought a Cessna airplane into the marriage, and during the marriage,

he bought an Audi vehicle and a Porche vehicle. Holly testified that the Audi and Porsche

were gifts to her from Keith but Keith disputed this and claimed ownership of both vehicles.

Documentation was introduced showing that Keith’s net worth is approximately $32

million. This information was provided in a personal financial statement prepared and

signed by Keith.

Keith had also acquired substantial real estate prior to the marriage. In 2017, the

parties decided to build a house on a tract of Keith’s premarital land. According to Keith,

he made a $50,000 payment to the builder, and the remaining $546,000 cost to build the

house was financed. The $546,000 loan on the house was rolled into a larger loan of

$4,485,500 from First Community Bank to one of Keith’s companies, Dixon properties,

LLC.

Although Keith owns Dixon Properties, LLC, and Dixon Tree Farms, LLC, Holly

testified that during the marriage, Keith held her out as a partner in the businesses. Holly

stated that “we had always said during our marriage that we were partners and we were going

to grow the business,” that she always assumed they were “in this together,” and that she

relied on Keith’s representations in believing they were partners. A letter dated November

6, 2019, that was prepared and signed by Keith, states:

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To Whom It May Concern:

Holly Dixon is a partner in the following LLC.
1- Dixon Properties LLC commercial properties
2- Dixon Tree Farms LLC 1000s of acres of farms
3- Dixon Residential LLC residential properties
She is involved in the daily operations and management of all of these and has been
doing this for the past 10 years. If you need a reference please call.

Keith Dixon Senior Partner (501) xxx-xxxx
Mark Dixon CPA/realtor manager of commercial (501) xxx-xxxx
Steve Shirar manager residential (501) xxx-xxxx

Sincerely,
/s/ Keith A. Dixon Senior Partner

Also on November 6, 2019, Mary Kathryn McKenzie, CPA, wrote a letter stating:

I have prepared income tax returns for Holly Dixon for at least ten years. She and
her husband have extensive real estate holdings in Dixon Tree Farm, LLC and Dixon
Properties, LLC. They are active in the operations and management of these
properties.

Holly testified that during the marriage, they lived on earnings from and paid the bills for

Dixon Properties, LLC.

At the conclusion of the divorce hearing held on October 12, 2021, the trial court

noted that there was an outstanding loan of $546,000 on the marital residence and asked

Keith’s counsel if he could provide documentation as to how much, if any, had been paid

against the loan. Keith’s counsel replied, “We can do that, Your Honor.” After the trial but

before the divorce decree was entered, Keith provided a letter to the trial court from First

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Community Bank stating that the total debt of $4,485,500 had a remaining balance of

$4,286,149.64, meaning that $199,350.36 of the total debt had been paid. 1

The trial court entered a divorce decree on October 29, 2021, which provides in

pertinent part:

The Court has considered the age, health, and abilities of the parties for the
future and finds that: [Keith] is 66 years old, in poor health and disabled. [Holly] is
54 years old, employed and has a good earning potential based on the business she
has established. The Court has also considered the amount of income of each party
and the assets they brought into the marriage and their overall estates, the liabilities,
and the needs of each party, their opportunities to acquire property, the monies and
sources of funds spent during the marriage, as well as the intent of money spent by
the parties during the marriage in an attempt to balance the equities between the
parties. These considerations include the substantial assets that [Keith] brought to the
marriage and will retain after the divorce, [Keith’s] commingling of nonmarital and
marital assets and liabilities during the marriage, and [Keith’s] representations to
[Holly] regarding the nature of their partnership. As such, the Court is deviating
from what would otherwise be an equal division of marital property and awarding
some nonmarital property to [Holly] in order to achieve a balance of the equities and
the resources that are available to the parties. In so doing the Court orders the
following division by the parties:

....

As part of the Court’s deviation with regard to the division of marital assets
and award of some nonmarital assets, [Holly] is awarded the Cessna airplane; HD
nutrition consultants, LLC; [Holly’s] entire retirement account at Edward Jones in
[Holly’s] name; the Porsche and Audi vehicles, with [Holly] to get the Porsche and
Audi titled in her name and to assume all present debt going forward, for which she
will hold [Keith] harmless; and the equity in the new home on [Keith’s] real property.
The amount of equity to be determined as follows: each party shall select and engage,
at his or her expense, a licensed appraiser to complete an appraisal of the home to
exclude the real property, which the Court finds to be nonmarital and owned by
[Keith]. [Holly] will select the appraisal that she considers most favorable to her for

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As previously stated, Keith rolled the note and mortgage on the marital residence
into a larger loan of $4,485,500 from First Community Bank to one of Keith’s companies,
Dixon properties, LLC.

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her purposes of calculating the equity to which she is entitled. The equity awarded
to [Holly] will be calculated using the selected appraisal, less the outstanding portion
of the $546,000 loan applicable to the house. That loan amount is to be further
reduced by $199,350.36, which represents all amounts paid toward the consolidated
and refinanced First Community Bank loan of $4,485,000, leaving a balance of
$346,659.64 to be subtracted from the appraised value of the home. [Keith] shall pay
[Holly] the full amount of such equity,[2] if any, and [Holly] will simultaneously execute
and deliver a quitclaim deed for the real property to [Keith] within Sixty (60) days of
entry of the decree.

....

[Keith] is granted as premarital property all the real estate in his name, Dixon
Properties, LLC and all its assets, Dixon Tree Farms, LLC and all its assets, all of
[Keith’s] Edward Jones accounts, and any and all other personal property and real
property not divided specifically by this decree which may be in [Keith’s] possession
or in his name.

Keith appealed.

On appeal from the divorce decree, Keith argues that the trial court clearly erred in

awarding Holly an unequal division of marital property and in awarding her a portion of his

nonmarital property without stating the basis and reasons for such division as required by

statute. He further argues that the trial court erred in giving Holly the benefit of a

$199,350.36 reduction of debt against the house, stating that there is no evidence in the

record to support that finding.

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The trial court included a footnote in the decree stating, “Because the $546,000 in
financing for the home was commingled with a larger loan intended to also cover purchases
related to [Keith’s] businesses, and because both marital and nonmarital funds were used
throughout the marriage to make purchases for the benefit of the marriage, the Court is
taking into account the equitable considerations set forth [above] in giving [Holly] credit for
all payments made toward the consolidated loan, rather than a pro rata share. The Court is
also excluding from these calculations the $50,000 advance made to the builder.”

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Domestic-relations cases are tried de novo on appeal, and the appellate court does

not reverse a trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Taylor v. Taylor, 345 Ark.

300, 47 S.W.3d 222 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence

to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made. Norman v. Norman, 342 Ark. 493, 30 S.W.3d 83

(2000).

Keith’s first argument is that trial court erred in awarding Holly an unequal division

of marital property and in awarding her a portion of his nonmarital property without

reference to or consideration of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a) and without stating the basis

and reasons for such division. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(a) provides, in

pertinent part:

(a) At the time a divorce decree is entered:

(1)(A) All marital property shall be distributed one-half (1/2) to each party unless the
court finds such a division to be inequitable. In that event the court shall make some
other division that the court deems equitable taking into consideration:

(i) The length of the marriage.
(ii) Age, health, and station in life of the parties;
(iii) Occupation of the parties;
(iv) Amount and sources of income;
(v) Vocational skills;
(vi) Employability;
(vii) Estate, liabilities, and needs of each party and opportunity of each for further
acquisition of capital assets and income;
(viii) Contribution of each party in acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of
marital property, including services as a homemaker; and
(ix) The federal income tax consequences of the court’s division of property.

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(B) When property is divided pursuant to the foregoing considerations the court
must state its basis and reasons for not dividing the marital property equally between the parties,
and the basis and reasons should be recited in the order entered in the matter;

(2) All other property shall be returned to the party who owned it prior to the
marriage unless the court shall make some other division that the court deems equitable taking
into consideration those factors enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, in which event
the court must state in writing its basis and reasons for not returning the property to the party
who owned it at the time of the marriage.

(Emphasis added.)

Keith argues that the trial court failed to state in the divorce decree its reasons for an

unequal distribution of the parties’ property, nor did it apply the nine considerations

required for a deviation. Keith states that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a) requires more than

a mere formality of the court stating it is balancing the inequities. Keith asserts that the trial

court awarded Holly marital property acquired during the marriage, including her business

and the increase in her retirement account. Keith further states that Holly was awarded a

portion of his nonmarital property, which included the Cessna airplane and the equity in

the house that he states was generated with funds that were borrowed by Keith alone. Keith

argues that because the trial court did not explain its reasons for its unequal division of

property, this case should be reversed and remanded with directions to revise the divorce

decree. For the following reason, we disagree.

A trial court has broad powers to distribute both marital and nonmarital property to

achieve an equitable division. Wilson v. Wilson, 2016 Ark. App. 256, 492 S.W.3d 534. In

accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(1), at the time of entry of a divorce decree,

the trial court shall distribute all marital property one-half to each party unless it is

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determined that such distribution would be inequitable; if the property is not divided

equally, then the trial court must state the reasons and bases for not doing so, and the bases

and reasons should be recited in the order. In accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-

315(a)(2), all nonmarital property shall be returned to the party who owned it prior to the

marriage unless the court shall make some other division it deems equitable taking into

consideration the factors enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) of the statute, and the trial court

must state in writing its reasons and bases for such division.

However, while the trial court must consider the statutory factors and state its reasons

for dividing property unequally, the court is not required to list each factor in its order nor

is it required to weigh all the factors equally. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 371 Ark. 323, 265

S.W.3d 746 (2007). Further, the specific enumeration of the factors within the statute does

not preclude a trial court from considering other relevant factors, where exclusion of other

factors would lead to absurd results or deny the intent of the legislature to allow for the

equitable division of property. Id. The list of statutory factors is not exhaustive nor is proof

of every statutory factor required. Barron v. Barron, 2015 Ark. App. 215.

Contrary to Keith’s argument, it is patently clear from the divorce decree that the trial

court did make the requisite findings stating its reasons and bases for dividing the marital

property unequally and awarding Holly a portion of Keith’s nonmarital property. The

divorce decree states:

The Court has . . . considered the amount of income of each party and the assets they
brought into the marriage and their overall estates, the liabilities, and the needs of
each party, their opportunities to acquire property, the monies and sources of funds

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spent during the marriage, as well as the intent of monies spent by the parties during
the marriage in an attempt to balance the equities between the parties. These
considerations include the substantial assets that the [Keith] brought to the marriage and will
retain after the divorce, [Keith’s] commingling of nonmarital and marital assets and liabilities
during the marriage, and [Keith’s] representations to [Holly] regarding the nature of their
partnership. As such, the Court is deviating from what would otherwise be an equal
division of marital property and awarding some nonmarital property to Defendant in
order to achieve a balance of the equities and the resources that are available to the
parties.

(Emphasis added.) We hold that the findings recited above were in compliance with the

requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a).

To the extent Keith may also be arguing that the trial court’s distribution of the

marital and nonmarital property was inequitable and clearly erroneous, we cannot agree.

The overriding purpose of section 9-12-315 is to enable the trial court to make a division of

property that is fair and equitable under the circumstances; mathematical precision is not

required. Copeland v. Copeland, 84 Ark. App. 303, 139 S.W.3d 145 (2003). The trial court

is vested with a measure of flexibility in apportioning the total assets held in the marital

estate upon divorce. Id. In awarding Holly an unequal division of the property, the trial

court considered the extensive assets that Keith brought into the marriage and would retain

after the divorce, including substantial real estate, investment accounts, and Dixon

Properties, LLC, and Dixon Tree Farms, LLC, and all their assets. Notably, Keith himself

represented to the court that he has a net worth of $32 million. Moreover, the trial court

considered evidence that Keith had commingled marital and nonmarital assets and had led

Holly to believe she was a partner in his companies during the marriage and that he held her

out as such. There was evidence that Holly had been involved in the daily operations and

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management of these companies. Finally, we note that in the divorce decree, the trial court

declined to award alimony to Holly in part because of its unequal award of marital and

nonmarital property to her. Property division and alimony are complementary devices that

the trial court may utilize in combination to make the dissolution of marriage equitable.

Chambers v. Chambers, 2017 Ark. App. 429, 527 S.W.3d 1. Having considered all the

evidence presented and the specific reasons recited by the trial court for dividing the parties’

property unequally, we hold that the trial court’s division of the property was not clearly

erroneous.

Keith’s remaining argument is that the trial court erred in giving Holly the benefit of

a $199,350.36 reduction of debt against the house, stating that there is no proof in the record

to support this reduction of the debt. However, we observe that upon supplementation of

the record, there was evidence of such debt reduction in the record, and it was provided to

the trial court by Keith himself. Keith also argues under this point that he should have been

given credit for the $50,000 he advanced to the builder to build the house, and that any

reduction in the debt should not be credited solely against the value of the house in

determining the equity because the $546,000 home loan was rolled into a larger loan of

$4,485,500 to one of Keith’s companies, Dixon Properties, LLC. However, the trial court,

in addressing these issues and balancing the equities, found in the divorce decree that

[b]ecause the $546,000 in financing for the home was commingled with a larger loan
intended to also cover purchases related to [Keith’s] businesses, and because both
marital and nonmarital funds were used throughout the marriage to make purchases
for the benefit of the marriage, the Court is taking into account the equitable
considerations set forth in Paragraph 3 in giving [Holly] credit for all payments made

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toward the consolidated loan, rather than a pro rata share. The Court is also
excluding from these calculations the $50,000 advance made to the builder.

Paragraph 3, referenced above, is the paragraph in the divorce decree where the trial court

stated its reasons and bases for its unequal division of the property, which included the

substantial assets Keith will retain after the divorce. Having reviewed the record, we find no

clear error in the trial court’s distribution of the parties’ house or in giving Holly credit for

the $199,350.36 reduction of debt on the loan under which the house was financed.

In conclusion, we hold that neither of the points raised by Keith in this appeal has

merit. Therefore, we affirm the divorce decree.

Affirmed.

HARRISON, C.J., and GRUBER, J., agree.

Branscum Law Offices, by: Herby Branscum, Jr., for appellant.

LaCarra, Dickson, Hoover & Rogers, PLLC, by: Traci LaCerra, for appellee.

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