CourtListener 3159294•Morin v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
Morin v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
CourtListener 3159294Arkctapp2 déc. 2015
Texte intégral
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 695
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-15-556
BRANDON MORIN Opinion Delivered: December 2, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE UNION COUNTY
V. CIRCUIT COURT
[NO.JV-2014-0107-3]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE EDWIN KEATON,
CHILDREN JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant appeals from the circuit court’s termination of his parental rights to A.M.,
born 7/21/2010; A.M., born 6/21/2012; and I.M., born 9/19/2013. 1 Appellant’s counsel
has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i), 3 stating
that there are no meritorious grounds to support an appeal. The clerk mailed a certified
copy of counsel’s motion and brief to appellant, informing him of his right to file pro se
1
The rights of the children’s mother, Annie Morin, were terminated pursuant to the
same order; however, Annie has not appealed the termination of her rights and is not a party
to this appeal.
2
359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2003).
3
(2014).
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 695
points for reversal. Appellant has failed to file any pro se points. We affirm and grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with
appellant following a report on May 5, 2014, that the children were not attending school
but once a month, that at least one child had been in the streets alone, that the same child
had sores all over his body, and that the children’s home had a “horrible stench.” An
investigator went to appellant’s home on May 6, 2014. The investigator had to call law
enforcement to gain entry to the home after hearing a child’s voice, but receiving no answer
at the door. The child eventually woke his parents up, which included appellant, and the
mother opened the door. The investigator saw clutter and indentions in the carpet indicating
holes in the floor. Appellant submitted to a drug test in which he tested positive for THC,
methamphetamines, and amphetamine. The mother advised the investigator that the family
was living in the home because they had no electricity in their own home. She admitted
that the oldest child did not go to school regularly. Appellant appeared to be under the
influence of an illegal substance during the interview. A 72-hour hold was taken on the
children at that time.
DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect due to parental
unfitness on May 9, 2014. An ex-parte order was entered on May 9, 2014. Following a
probable-cause hearing on May 12, 2014, an order was entered on May 30, 2014, finding
probable cause that the emergency conditions that necessitated removal of the juveniles from
appellant’s custody continued. Though he received notice, appellant did not appear at the
probable-cause hearing.
2
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 695
Following a hearing on June 16, 2014, the circuit court entered an adjudication and
disposition order on August 8, 2014, adjudicating the children as dependent-neglected.
Therein, it specifically found that appellant tested positive for illegal drugs while the children
were in his care and custody. The goal of the case was reunification and supervised visitation
was permitted so long as appellant tested negative for all illegal drugs. Appellant was ordered
to follow the case plan and obey court orders; obtain and maintain adequate and suitable
housing, keeping all utilities on; complete parenting classes; submit and test negative to
random drug screens; undergo a psychological evaluation; complete and follow the
recommendations of a drug assessment; not use or possess any illegal drugs; and attend and
participate in individual counseling. Regarding drug screens, the circuit court advised
appellant that any failure to submit a urine sample within forty-five minutes of a request
would be considered a positive drug screen.
In a review order entered October 30, 2014, the circuit court stated that appellant
had not complied with the case plan and court orders, specifically noting that it would have
put appellant in jail if he had shown up at the September 15, 2014 hearing. Additionally,
the circuit court ordered appellant to appear at the DHS office, no later than 4:00 p.m.,
every Tuesday and Thursday for a drug screen.
DHS filed a petition for termination of appellant’s parental rights on November 13,
2014, citing the following grounds:
1. That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition
for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the
custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and
that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the
incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues of factors or rehabilitate
3
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 695
the parent’s circumstances that prevent placement of the juvenile in the custody
of the parent; 4
2. That the parent has subjected any juvenile to aggravated circumstances,
specifically, that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in
successful reunification; 5 and
3. That the parent has abandoned the juvenile. 6
Following a hearing on December 1, 2014, a review order was entered on January 13, 2015,
in which the circuit court set a termination of parental rights hearing for February 6, 2015.
The goal of the case remained reunification up to and through this order.
At the termination hearing, appellant’s caseworker testified that appellant had
completed only 8 out of 41 scheduled drug screens; 7 had stated he did not use drugs on his
assessment although he admitted using at the time of the children’s removal; had not
obtained and maintained a suitable home with all utilities; had last visited the children on
November 12, 2014, and in August before that; had not completed the psychological
evaluation; and had not entered counseling. Appellant had a job currently that required him
4
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) (Supp. 2013).
5
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3). We note that in the statute, this
ground requires a finding from that court that the children have been subjected to aggravated
circumstances which may include a determination by a judge that there is little likelihood
that services to the family will result in successful reunification. DHS did not assert that the
court made this determination and this court did not find any evidence that the circuit court
had made this determination prior to this petition.
6
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(iv).
7
Appellant failed to submit a urine sample within forty-five minutes of a request and
so the same was treated as a positive drug screen, in addition to seven other submitted
screens.
4
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 695
to be on the road “a lot” although he had not submitted proof of employment prior to
December and had submitted no proof of income. She also stated that appellant had been
arrested for public intoxication on July 4, 2014, and arrested again on October 30, 2014, on
an old warrant. Appellant had refused a drug screen on July 9, 2014, and had tested positive
for amphetamines and methamphetamines on September 15, 2014.
The adoption specialist testified that a relative was interested in adopting appellant’s
children. She stated that there is “typically no difficulty” in getting children adopted who
were the ages of appellant’s children.
The children’s mother testified that she and appellant were living in the truck they
drove for employment and that they drove mostly in the northeast and southeast of the
country. She stated that appellant had taken the last two weeks prior to the hearing off from
work. 8 She testified that they had no transportation beyond the company truck, which was
to be used for work purposes only. She advised that appellant was again arrested for public
intoxication within twenty-four hours of his release from his July 4, 2014 arrest for public
intoxication. She further advised that the trailer they were currently living in was her
mother’s and that they were living there temporarily.
Appellant admitted that he had “used drugs in the past,” had not completed parenting
classes, had never set up or attended any counseling sessions, had had three jobs since the
case was opened, had not completed the drug assessment because he “didn’t feel like [he]
needed a drug assessment,” and had not done anything under the case plan. He stated that
8
Appellant did not visit the children during this time.
5
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 695
he had not visited with the children more because he was out of state and was “unable” to
make it.
The circuit court announced from the bench that it was terminating appellant’s
parental rights, finding termination to be in the children’s best interest due to his lack of
stability and specifically noting that he had not visited the children since November 12,
2014. Furthermore, it found that there was little likelihood that continued services to the
family would result in reunification of the family. It entered an order reflecting the same
on March 19, 2015.
In compliance with Linker-Flores and Rule 6-9(i), counsel ordered the entire record
and found that, after a conscientious review of the record, there are no issues of arguable
merit for appeal. Counsel’s brief adequately covered the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of termination of appellant’s parental rights, which was the only ruling adverse to
appellant. After carefully examining the brief, as presented to us, we conclude that the appeal
is wholly without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of appellant’s parental rights
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
GRUBER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
The Potter Law Firm, LLP, by: Thomas A. Potter, for appellant.
No response.
6
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.