Paul Vincent Fox v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 285
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-25-433

PAUL VINCENT FOX Opinion Delivered May 6, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 23CR-22-1175]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE H.G. FOSTER, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

Paul Fox appeals from a Faulkner County Circuit Court sentencing order convicting

him of two counts of second-degree domestic battery, three counts of endangering the

welfare of a minor, criminal mischief, and intimidating a witness and sentencing him to an

aggregate of seventeen years’ imprisonment. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the convictions, Fox contends that the circuit court erred in denying

his request to represent himself at his jury trial and abused its discretion in not permitting

him to call his witnesses during trial. We affirm.

I. Facts

At a pretrial hearing the day before trial, defense counsel informed the court that he

was ready for trial but had a doctor’s appointment for his knee later that day and that the

doctor may tell him he needs to be off his knee. Fox said he did not want a continuance. He
wanted a trial the following day because he had witnesses coming into town to “speak up”

for him; otherwise, he wanted his case dismissed. The circuit court asked Fox, “Do you want

to represent yourself tomorrow?” Fox responded, “If [my attorney] cannot represent me, yes,

I do. It’s my only choice. Either that or throw the case out.” The court later asked Fox if he

was satisfied with defense counsel. Fox answered, “Yeah,” and when the court asked Fox if

he felt good about defense counsel, Fox said, “Of course I do.” However, Fox added, “I think

I could even represent myself to be quite honest with you.” The court determined that Fox’s

request to represent himself was a conditional request—not an unequivocal waiver of the

right to counsel.

The next day, defense counsel was present for the trial. After the jury was sworn in,

Fox again stated that he wanted his brother to testify, and the State objected because the

defense had not timely disclosed its witnesses. The court stated that the issue of whether the

defense would be allowed to call his brother was “an argument that we’re going to have to

have on the record at some point.”

The issue of self-representation was discussed again after Fox asked the court how to

contact witnesses to let them know he intended to call them to testify. When the court

informed Fox that the discovery deadline had passed, Fox asked, “[I]f I fire [my attorney]

today . . . if I let him go and then choose to represent myself, how would I go about contacting

them[?]” The court told Fox if he let his attorney go, the court would likely have to declare a

mistrial. The State objected, stating that it was too late to relieve Fox’s attorney because the

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trial had started. Fox said that he would “rather fire him and hire another attorney” if he

could. The court stated that could not be done in the middle of trial, and the trial proceeded.

Angel McFarland testified that she has three children with Fox and that she and the

children lived in Texas in November 2022. She stated that she was in Conway, Arkansas, on

November 22, to pick up the children, who had been visiting Fox over Thanksgiving.

McFarland testified that she and the children, along with her puppy, stayed overnight at

Fox’s apartment, but she decided to leave because Fox “had an issue” with the puppy making

noise. An argument ensued. Fox threw the children’s clothes and a dog kennel off his second-

floor balcony. McFarland retrieved the children and placed them in their car seats in the

back seat of her SUV. The two-year-old was behind McFarland, the four-year-old was in the

middle, and the six-year-old was behind the passenger seat.

McFarland allowed Fox to tell the children goodbye, and he began speaking poorly

of McFarland in front of the children. McFarland said that Fox reached through the rear

passenger-side window to give the six-year-old a hug before going to the rear driver’s-side

window. McFarland said that Fox continued to speak poorly about her and kept his hands

inside the vehicle so that she could not close the window. Once he removed his hands, she

began to close the window. When the window was almost closed, she heard “an explosion

of glass” behind her, and the children began screaming. McFarland said that she did not see

Fox hit the window, but she assumed he broke the window because no one else was around

her vehicle. She said she and the children were screaming, and Fox was tackled by a police

officer. McFarland said that the two-year-old and the four-year-old had scrapes on them from

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the glass and were bleeding. McFarland testified that a no-contact order was issued after the

incident but that Fox violated the order by sending her text messages and calling her.

Officer Brandon Huff of the Conway Police Department said that he was responding

to an unrelated incident when he heard “screaming and yelling” about 150 yards away. He

walked over to investigate, and when he was about 50 yards away from McFarland’s vehicle,

he saw a male silhouette make a violent motion toward the vehicle with something on the

right side of his body and then heard a crash of glass. The officer could not tell if the man

punched the vehicle or used his elbow or shoulder but said the movement was not accidental.

Officer Huff immediately ran to the vehicle, grabbed Fox, and pushed him on the ground.

Officer Huff did not see anyone else near the vehicle except Fox. Officer Huff testified that

in his experience, it is difficult to break a car window and often requires tools and intent.

He said that a window can be broken using a fist but that pushing or tapping will not cause

it to break, acknowledging that a window is easier to break if it is partially down. He also said

he saw the children covered in glass.

Officer Lucas Babcock of the Conway Police Department testified that when he

arrived at the scene, Fox was in custody, and the children were upset, crying, and had injuries,

which he photographed.

After the State rested, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on counts one

through six, arguing that there was no clear evidence that Fox broke the window since no

one clearly saw him break it and that there was no evidence he did so knowingly. The circuit

court denied his directed-verdict motion.

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Fox testified that when he was trying to hug the children goodbye through the SUV’s

window, McFarland rolled up the window and attempted to run over him, but he jumped

out of the way. Fox also testified that McFarland hit him with her vehicle, causing him to fly

fourteen feet across the yard. Fox denied hitting the window or intentionally breaking it. He

did not know how it broke but thought it could have broken when McFarland hit him with

her vehicle. Fox stated that police officers nearby saw the incident. The body-camera footage

from one of the officers on the scene, Officer Gary Griffin, was introduced into evidence

and played for the jury. In the video, Fox can be heard saying several times, “I did not mean

to. It was a fu***** accident.”

The State called Officer Huff as a rebuttal witness. He stated that he did not see Fox

get hit by a vehicle and “fly 14 feet in the air” and never saw the vehicle move until the

officers told McFarland to leave. Officer Huff also stated that Fox was standing when he

arrived on the scene.

Defense counsel renewed his motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence,

which was denied. The jury found Fox guilty on all charges and sentenced him to an

aggregate of seventeen years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence

in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.

Jackson v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 78, at 1, 729 S.W.3d 739, 740. We will affirm the verdict if

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substantial evidence supports it. Id. at 1–2, 729 S.W.3d at 740. Substantial evidence is

evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a

conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. at 2, 729

S.W.3d at 740. In resolving conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence, it is the jury’s

role to assess witness credibility and resolve discrepancies in the evidence. Id., 729 S.W.3d at

740. The jury may accept or reject testimony as it sees fit. Id., 729 S.W.3d at 740. The jury is

entitled to draw upon common sense and experience in reaching its verdict. Id., 729 S.W.3d

at 740.

Fox first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the two second-degree

domestic-battery convictions. “A person commits domestic battering in the second degree if

. . . [t]he person knowingly causes physical injury to a family or household member he or

she knows to be sixty (60) years of age or older or twelve (12) years of age or younger.” Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-26-304(a)(4) (Supp. 2024).

Fox contends that the State failed to establish that he was responsible for breaking

the window of the SUV. He asserts that no one saw him break the window—neither

McFarland nor Officer Babcock. He contends that Officer Huff, who saw a male silhouette

make a violent motion with something on the right side of his body and then heard a crash

of glass, could not positively say whether Fox used his hand, shoulder, or elbow to break the

window. Fox contends that because Officer Huff was fifty yards away, his testimony was less

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credible. Fox argues that the jury was left to rely on speculation and conjecture in

determining how the glass broke.1

The evidence established that Fox was the only person near McFarland’s vehicle when

she heard an “explosion of glass” and her children began screaming. Just before the glass

shattered, Officer Huff saw a male silhouette make a “violent movement with something on

the right side of his body,” heard the “crash of the glass,” and heard children “screaming and

crying.” When Officer Huff reached the scene, Fox was standing on the grass beside the

vehicle. Officer Huff did not see anyone else in the apartment parking lot at that time—just

Fox. Officer Huff said he saw a deliberate movement, not an accidental movement such as

bumping into the window or leaning up against it, adding that deliberate intention is needed

to break a car window. In addition, Fox can be heard in the body-camera footage stating that

he did not mean to do it—that it was an accident.

On this record, the jury could reasonably conclude that Fox was the individual who

broke the window of McFarland’s SUV. The jury is not required to abandon common sense,

and it may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Turner v. State, 2019 Ark. App.

476, at 5, 588 S.W.3d 375, at 378. We hold that substantial evidence supports the two

second-degree domestic-battery convictions.2

1
We note that although Fox argued in his directed-verdict motion that there was no
evidence that he broke the window knowingly, he does not make this argument on appeal.
2
Because we affirm the domestic-battery convictions, we also affirm the sentencing
enhancement pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-702 (Repl. 2024) since Fox
makes no independent argument that the enhancement should be reversed.

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As he did in his second-degree domestic-battery argument, Fox contends that because

there was insufficient evidence that he broke the window, the jury was left to speculate as to

how the glass broke; thus, there is insufficient evidence to support the convictions for second-

degree endangering the welfare of a minor and criminal mischief. “A person commits the

offense of endangering the welfare of a minor in the second degree if he or she knowingly

engages in conduct creating a substantial risk of serious harm to the physical or mental

welfare of another person known by the person to be a minor.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-

206(a)(1) (Repl. 2024). “A person commits the offense of criminal mischief in the first degree

if he or she purposely and without legal justification destroys or causes damage to any . . .

[p]roperty of another person[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203(a)(1) (Repl. 2024).

The same evidence supporting the two domestic-battery convictions supports Fox’s

endangering-the-welfare-of-a-minor and criminal-mischief convictions: Fox was the only

person near McFarland’s rear driver’s-side window when she heard an “explosion of glass”

and her children began screaming; Officer Huff saw a male silhouette make an intentional

and “violent movement with something on the right side of his body” toward the SUV, heard

the “crash of the glass,” heard children “screaming and crying,” and saw Fox standing on the

grass beside the vehicle; and Fox stated on the video that he did not mean to do it—that it

was an accident.

Last, Fox contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for

intimidating a witness.

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A person commits the offense of intimidating a witness if he or she threatens
a witness or a person he or she believes may be called as a witness with the
purpose of: (1) Influencing the testimony of that person; (2) Inducing that
person to avoid legal process summoning that person to testify; or (3) Inducing
that person to absent himself or herself from an official proceeding to which
that person has been legally summoned.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-53-109(a) (Repl. 2024).

The State argues that Fox made no motion for directed verdict challenging this

offense. We agree. At trial, defense counsel stated that his motion was for counts one

through six. Count seven was the offense of intimidating a witness. Moreover, nothing in

Fox’s directed-verdict motion challenged the offense of intimidating a witness. We do not

address arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence that supports a conviction if

the defendant did not move for a directed verdict on that charge. Burns v. State, 2024 Ark.

App. 329, at 5, 690 S.W.3d 133, 140.

B. The Circuit Court Erred in Denying Fox’s
Request for Self-Representation

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the

right to self-representation for criminal defendants is “necessarily implied by the structure of

the [Sixth] Amendment” to the United States Constitution. Our supreme court has stated

that “[t]here is an inherent tension, however, between the Supreme Court’s command that

criminal defendants receive effective counsel and permitting those same defendants to

handle their own defenses, virtually always without relevant expertise and sometimes with

literal life-and-death stakes.” Reed v. State, 2017 Ark. 246, at 1–2, 524 S.W.3d 929, 929. As

a result, defendants invoking the right to self-representation must “knowingly and

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intelligently forgo” the right to counsel after having been made aware of the “dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. Our appellate courts require

that (1) the request to waive counsel must be unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) the waiver

must be knowing and intelligent, and (3) the defendant must not have engaged in conduct

that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues. Reed, 2017 Ark. 246, at 2,

524 S.W.3d at 929−30. A defendant’s statements must be viewed in their entirety to

determine whether the defendant’s attempt to waive counsel and self-represent is sufficiently

unequivocal. Chambers v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 54, at 11, 595 S.W.3d 371, 378.

At trial, the issue of self-representation came up several times because Fox wanted to

call certain witnesses to testify on his behalf. Each time, the State objected, arguing that the

defense had failed to timely disclose the witnesses. In response, Fox asked the court about

firing his attorney and representing himself so he could call the witnesses. The circuit court

asked Fox a couple of times about representing himself, and Fox answered: “If [my attorney]

cannot represent me, yes, I do. It’s my only choice. Either that or throw the case out,” or “I

would rather fire [my attorney] and hire another attorney if I can.” When the court asked

Fox if he was satisfied with defense counsel, Fox answered, “Yeah,” and when the court asked

Fox if he felt good about defense counsel, Fox said, “Of course I do.” In light of Fox’s

statements, the circuit court determined that Fox’s request to represent himself was a

conditional request—not an unequivocal waiver of the right to counsel.

On appeal, Fox argues that after he made a request to represent himself, the circuit

court failed to conduct the proper inquiry to decide if he made a knowing and intelligent

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waiver of his right to counsel. He claims that the court “simply ignored [his] request to

represent himself.” However, the circuit court evaluated Fox’s request and found that Fox’s

request was equivocal.

In Chambers, this court rejected Chambers’s argument that his request to represent

himself was unequivocal:

Here, while Chambers requested to represent himself because he did not want his
court-appointed defender and could not afford to hire a private attorney, he stated
that he would represent himself “if [he had] to.” After the circuit court asked
Chambers about his education and why he thought he could represent himself,
Chambers stated that he did not think he could. The circuit court reiterated on two
more occasions that it did not believe Chambers had really indicated he wanted to
represent himself; after the circuit court’s second statement to that effect, Chambers
responded that he did not want to represent himself, but he did not feel he had any
other option. These statements indicate that Chambers’s requests to proceed pro se
were not unequivocal; therefore, the circuit court correctly denied Chambers’s
request to represent himself at trial.

2020 Ark. App. 54, at 11–12, 595 S.W.3d at 378.

Like Chambers, Fox’s request to represent himself was equivocal. He said: “[I]f I fire

my attorney today . . . then [I] choose to represent myself,” and I “would rather fire him and

hire another attorney if I can.” Moreover, he voiced satisfaction with his attorney. These

statements indicate that Fox’s requests to represent himself were equivocal. If his request is

equivocal, the circuit court does not need to respond or to conduct a hearing on the issue of

self-representation because there has been no clear indication of the defendant’s desire to

waive the right to counsel. Bohanan v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 338, at 1, 634 S.W.3d 583, 584.

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s finding that Fox did not unequivocally invoke his

right to self-representation.

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C. The Circuit Court Abused its Discretion in Not Permitting Fox
to Call All His Witnesses During Trial

Fox contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses—

specifically his brother—he wanted to call to testify on his behalf during trial. Matters

pertaining to the admissibility of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the circuit court,

and we will not reverse such rulings absent an abuse of that discretion. McEwing v. State, 366

Ark. 456, 460, 237 S.W.3d 43, 46 (2006). In addition, we will not reverse absent a showing

of prejudice because prejudice is not presumed. Id. at 461, 237 S.W.3d at 47.

The day before trial, Fox informed the court that he had multiple family members

coming to trial to “speak up for [him].” The State objected, stating that the witness deadline

had passed, the State had not been provided with a witness list, and no defense witnesses

had been subpoenaed. Defense counsel acknowledged that Fox had sent him a letter stating

that he was not satisfied with counsel’s representation because he had not submitted the list

of witnesses Fox thought should be called.

The following day after the jury was empaneled, the witness issue arose again during

a discussion of the exclusionary rule pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 615. The court

asked Fox if his brother was going to testify, and Fox said yes. The court stated that if Fox

wanted him to testify, then he would have to leave the courtroom. Again, the State objected

on the basis that the witness had not been disclosed. The court responded:

Right . . . . I anticipate that the issue of whether he is allowed to be called due
to a failure of discovery on the defendant’s part . . . that’s an argument that we’re
going to have to have on the record at some point.

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Thereafter, Fox testified, but he did not move to call his brother or any other witnesses to

testify.

On appeal, Fox argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it excluded

his witnesses. He argues that the State did not request the disclosure of defense witnesses

pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.3, and in the absence of a request, the

circuit court erroneously sanctioned Fox for not providing the information to the State. See

Watson v. State, 50 Ark. App. 98, 902 S.W.2d 253 (1995). Alternatively, Fox contends that

the court should have allowed the State time to interview Fox’s brother when the issue arose

before trial, thereby alleviating any prejudice to the State. See Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647,

910 S.W.2d 682 (1995). Fox asserts that he was prejudiced because without his brother’s

testimony, he had no one to corroborate his testimony or discredit McFarland’s testimony.

Fox’s arguments are not preserved for review. The court specifically stated that the

issue of whether Fox’s brother would be allowed to testify due to a discovery violation was

“an argument that we’re going to have to have on the record at some point.” However, no

further argument or objection was made on the record following this discussion. Neither

Fox nor his attorney sought to call Fox’s brother or any other witness; therefore, the circuit

court did not rule on the issue. The failure to obtain a ruling on an issue at the circuit court

level, including a constitutional one, precludes review on appeal. Kelley v. State, 375 Ark.

483, 488, 292 S.W.3d 297, 300 (2009); see also Bayless v. State, 326 Ark. 869, 878, 935 S.W.2d

534, 539 (1996) (holding that the defendant’s discovery-based objection was not preserved

because the defendant failed to obtain a ruling).

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Moreover, we do not reverse in the absence of prejudice. Although Fox contends that

he was prejudiced because he had no one to corroborate his testimony or discredit

McFarland, Fox failed to proffer his brother’s testimony. We cannot determine whether he

has suffered prejudice without a proffer of the excluded testimony. McEwing, 366 Ark. at

462, 237 S.W.3d at 47.

Affirmed.

THYER and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Erin W. Lewis, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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