Timothy Lee Jenks v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 265
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-25-244

TIMOTHY LEE JENKS Opinion Delivered April 29, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 72CR-17-1890]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JOANNA TAYLOR,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

Timothy Jenks appeals from a Washington County Circuit Court sentencing order

revoking his probation and sentencing him to an aggregate of fifteen years in prison. On

appeal, Jenks argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because

his probationary period had expired, and none of the factors in Arkansas Code Annotated

section 16-93-308(f) (Supp. 2025) that extend the circuit court’s jurisdiction applied. We

affirm.

On May 10, 2018, Jenks entered a negotiated guilty plea for three offenses—possession

of drug paraphernalia, possession of a controlled substance (Schedule IV) with purpose to

deliver, and possession of a firearm by certain persons. He was sentenced to seventy-two

months’ probation for each offense and ordered to pay a $1000 fine. Jenks signed the terms

and conditions of his probation, which were also filed on May 10, that required him to not
commit any new offense punishable by imprisonment, not use controlled substances, report

to his probation officer, attend substance-abuse treatment, and pay his fines and fees as

directed.

The State filed a petition to revoke on April 10, 2020,1 alleging that Jenks had violated

his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine, failing to report, failing to attend

substance-abuse treatment, and failing to pay his fines and fees as directed. An arrest warrant

for the probation violation was issued the same day. Jenks was arrested on July 13, 2020.

Thereafter, Jenks failed to appear on August 5, 2020; October 14, 2021; and May 13, 2024.

Jenks’s probation ended on May 10, 2024.

The State filed an amended petition to revoke on February 7, 2025, alleging that

Jenks had failed to report to his probation officer as directed; absconded from probation;

failed to pay his court-ordered obligations; and committed new offenses of failure to appear,

possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the revocation

hearing, the State presented evidence that Jenks reported to his probation officer only twice

in four years, failed to complete substance-abuse treatment as ordered, and was $1140 in

arrears in his court-ordered financial obligations. Jenks admitted that he has used

methamphetamine daily since 2020, and the State introduced sentencing orders showing

that Jenks had pled guilty to felony drug offenses in Benton County in December 2021,

1
The State had filed a petition for revocation in December 2018 but moved to dismiss
the petition. In June 2019, the circuit court entered a new sentencing order that granted the
motion to dismiss and reinstated all of the previous terms and conditions of probation.

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November 2023, and April 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court revoked

Jenks’s probation, finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to

report, failing to pay his court-ordered financial obligations, failing to complete substance-

abuse treatment, committing new felony drug offenses, and using methamphetamine. Jenks

was sentenced to an aggregate of fifteen years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Jenks contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation

because his probationary period had expired, and none of the factors in section 16-93-308(f)

that extend the circuit court’s jurisdiction applied. This is a statutory-interpretation

argument. The correct application and interpretation of an Arkansas statute is a question of

law, which we decide de novo. Minor Child v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 184, at 6, 665 S.W.3d

246, 250. Our supreme court has stated:

We construe criminal statutes strictly, resolving any doubts in favor of the defendant.
Short v. State, 349 Ark. 492, 79 S.W.3d 313 (2002). We construe a statute just as it
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common
language, and if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a
clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory
interpretation. Id. In construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant
to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect derived from the
whole. Id. However, we will not interpret a statute, even a criminal one, so as to reach
an absurd conclusion that is contrary to legislative intent. Windsor v. State, 338 Ark.
649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999).

Harness v. State, 352 Ark. 335, 342, 101 S.W.3d 235, 240 (2003).

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-308 provides:

(f) A court may revoke a suspension of sentence or probation subsequent to
the expiration of the period of suspension of sentence or probation if before
expiration of the period:

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(1) The defendant is arrested for violation of suspension of sentence or
probation;

(2) A warrant is issued for the defendant’s arrest for violation of suspension of
sentence or probation;

(3) A petition to revoke the defendant’s suspension of sentence or probation
has been filed if a warrant is issued for the defendant’s arrest within thirty (30) days
of the date of filing the petition; or

(4) The defendant has been:

(A) Issued a citation in lieu of arrest under Rule 5 of the Arkansas Rules
of Criminal Procedure for violation of suspension of sentence or probation;
or

(B) Served a summons under Rule 6 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure for violation of suspension of sentence or probation.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308(f).

Jenks contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation after

his probationary period expired because none of the conditions to extend probation

contained in section 16-93-308(f)(1)–(4) applied.2 He first argues that neither subdivision

(f)(1) nor subdivision (f)(2) of section 16-93-308 applies because each subdivision is written

in the present tense—i.e., the statute extends a circuit court’s jurisdiction “if before expiration

of the period” the defendant “is arrested” for a violation of probation or a warrant “is issued”

for the defendant’s arrest for a probation violation. He then argues that because “upon the

expiration of his probationary period” he was not “currently under arrest for a probation

2
The State concedes that subdivision (f)(4) of section 16-93-308 is not applicable.

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violation” or because there was no “arrest warrant for probation violation currently issued,”

the circuit court’s jurisdiction was not extended. He argues that the legislature could have

used the past-tense language “had been arrested” or that an arrest warrant “had been issued”

if it intended to mean that a previous arrest or warrant for a probation violation would

suffice. His argument suggests that the arrest or the issuance of the arrest warrant must occur

simultaneously or contemporaneously with the expiration of probation in order to extend

the circuit court’s jurisdiction under section 16-93-308(f)(1) or (f)(2).3

The statute’s use of the present tense in subdivisions (f)(1) and (f)(2) enumerating the

criteria that must occur “before expiration of the [probation] period” in no way supports

Jenks’s “textual argument” that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction under the plain language

of the statute. In the first instance, if a defendant “is arrested” “before the expiration of the

[probationary] period,” jurisdiction is extended. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308(f)(1). In this

case, that happened on April 10, 2020, years before the expiration of the probationary

period. In the second instance, if “[a] warrant is issued for the defendant’s arrest for violation

of . . . probation” “before the expiration of the [probationary] period,” jurisdiction is

extended. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308(f)(2). In this case, that happened on July 13, 2020,

again, years before the expiration of the probationary period. Plainly read and strictly

construed, the circumstances of this case clearly meet the statutory criteria. There is simply

3
Jenks did not raise this issue below; however, because it is a matter of jurisdiction, it
may be raised for the first time on appeal. Trif v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 452, at 4, 503 S.W.3d
802, 805.

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no language within the statute that somehow requires that an arrest warrant be issued or a

defendant be arrested “upon” or at the moment of the expiration of the probation period

for the circuit court’s jurisdiction to be extended.

Case law supports our statutory interpretation that a circuit court’s jurisdiction to

revoke probation is extended at the moment the events in subdivision (f)(1) or (f)(2) occur

as long as the events occur within the probationary period. In Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229,

85 S.W.3d 914 (2002), the supreme court analyzed the statutory exceptions for extending a

circuit court’s probation jurisdiction, which at that time were codified at Arkansas Code

Annotated section 5-4-309(e) (Supp. 2001).4 The supreme court held that under the plain

language of section 5-4-309(e), revocation of probation subsequent to the expiration of the

probation period is authorized only upon an arrest for violation of probation or when “a

warrant is issued for [an] arrest for violation of . . . probation” during the probation period.

Id. at 235, 85 S.W.3d at 918.5

4
Section 5-4-309(e) provided: “The court may revoke a suspension or probation
subsequent to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation, provided the
defendant is arrested for violation of suspension or probation, or a warrant is issued for his
arrest for violation of suspension or probation, before expiration of the period.”

5
In Carter, the supreme court held that an alias bench warrant for failure to appear—
as opposed to a warrant for violation of probation as in the present case—issued before the
expiration of probation did not extend jurisdiction beyond the probation period. Carter, 350
Ark. at 237, 85 S.W.3d at 919 (“When Ms. Carter’s probation period expired without her
having been arrested for a probation violation and without an arrest warrant having been
issued for violation of probation, the circuit court lost jurisdiction to revoke her probation
under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(e).”).

6
This court has reached the same conclusion on numerous occasions. See Malone v.

State, 2025 Ark. App. 83, at 3 n.4, 705 S.W.3d 896, 899 n.4 (noting that pursuant to section

16-93-308(f)(2), the circuit court had jurisdiction to revoke a suspended imposition of

sentence (SIS) in February 2023—after the expiration of the suspension period in September

2022—because in March 2022, before the expiration of the period, an arrest warrant had

been issued for the defendant’s violation of the SIS); Hanson v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 222, at

3 (holding that under section 16-93-308(f)(1) and (f)(2), the circuit court had jurisdiction to

revoke probation in 2022 after the period of probation had expired in 2020 because a

warrant for Hanson’s arrest had been issued in 2017, and his arrest had been made in 2018—

before his probation expired); Heatherman v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 40, at 5 n.2, 660 S.W.3d

370, 372 n.2 (noting that the circuit court had jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s

probation in January 2022—after her probation expired in December 2021—because a

“warrant had been issued for her arrest [in September 2019] before the probationary period

expired”); Adams v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 501, at 3, 612 S.W.3d 191, 192 (holding that

despite the defendant’s probation period ending in February 2016, the circuit court had

jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s probation in February 2017 pursuant to section 16-

93-308(f)(1) and (f)(2) because an arrest warrant for his probation violation had been issued

in August 2015 and was returned in September 2015).

Additionally, we will not interpret statutes to reach an absurd result. Harness, supra.

Jenks’s interpretation of section 16-93-308(f)(1) and (f)(2) leads to an illogical conclusion: an

arrest warrant for a probation violation must be issued or an arrest for a probation violation

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must be made upon the time a probation period expires—it cannot occur at any time prior.

We note that had the legislature intended to extend jurisdiction under section 16-93-

308(f)(1) only if a defendant was “currently under arrest” at the expiration of probation, it

could have easily used that language. Likewise, had the legislature intended to extend

jurisdiction under section 16-93-308(f)(2) only if there was an arrest warrant for a probation

violation “currently issued” at the expiration of probation, the legislature would have so

stated.6 The statute contains no such language.

In sum, Jenks was on probation from May 10, 2018, to May 10, 2024. On April 10,

2020, the State filed a petition to revoke, and on that same day, an arrest warrant was issued

for “VIOLATION OF PROBATION.” Jenks was arrested on July 13, 2020. We hold that

the issuance of the arrest warrant on April 10, 2020, or Jenks’s arrest on July 13, 2020,

extended the court’s jurisdiction to revoke beyond the probationary period under Arkansas

Code Annotated section 16-93-308(f)(1) or (f)(2).7 Therefore, we affirm the revocation of

Jenks’s probation.

Affirmed.

6
Jenks cites Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 546 (1952), for the proposition that the
arrest warrant had been exhausted at the time of the revocation, where the Supreme Court
stated that “[i]t has been said that the rule in criminal cases is that a warrant once executed
is exhausted.” Reliance on that statement is misplaced. First, that case has no effect on how
we interpret section 16-93-308(f)(2) in this case. And second, the statement in Carlson related
to whether the initial arrest warrant can serve as the basis for a rearrest after release.
7
Because either section 16-93-308(f)(1) or 16-93-308(f)(2) extended the circuit court’s
jurisdiction in this case, we need not address Jenks’s argument relating to subdivision (f)(3).

8
THYER and BROWN, JJ., agree.

D. Franklin Arey III, for appellant,

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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