Joshua Judkins v. Kayla Judkins

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 524
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-24-534

Opinion Delivered October 29, 2025

JOSHUA JUDKINS
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 63DR-22-268]

KAYLA JUDKINS HONORABLE BRENT DILLON
APPELLEE HOUSTON, JUDGE

AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED IN
PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED
IN PART

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellant Joshua Judkins appeals from the decree of divorce entered by the Saline

County Circuit court divorcing him from appellee Kayla Judkins. His arguments on appeal

are that the circuit court erred when it awarded Kayla primary custody of their minor child

and in holding him in contempt. We affirm the award of custody, but we agree with Joshua

that there are issues surrounding the contempt and therefore reverse and remand the same.

Joshua and Kayla were married in January 2019 and divorced by decree of the Saline

County Circuit Court in April 2024. The parties have one child together, MC, who was born

in 2015. Kayla filed for divorce on March 29, 2022, and the following two years during which

the divorce was pending were filled with acrimony and litigation.
Pertinent to this appeal, during their separation leading up to the divorce, the parties

shared true week-on-week-off joint custody of MC pursuant to a temporary order entered

June 29, 2022. That order also required Joshua to pay Kayla $113 a month in child support

and to deposit the parties’ income tax refund into the court’s registry.

On December 20, 2022, Kayla filed a motion for contempt alleging that Joshua had

not deposited the income tax refund into the court’s registry, was behind on child support,

was interfering with her visitation with MC, and was harassing her. Shortly thereafter, on

December 28, the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) through

mediation. The MOU maintained the weekly joint-custody arrangement and outlined some

additional details clarifying typical custodial logistics, like pick-ups, drop-offs, and holidays.

Under the MOU, the parties also shared legal custody, which was specifically defined to

mean shared and equal access to MC’s school, medical, and similar records. Kayla was

designated the final decision maker for educational issues, and Joshua the final decision

maker for medical decisions. It was signed by the parties, their attorneys, and the attorney

ad litem and filed with the court.

On January 6, 2023, the court entered an order that, among other things, ordered

Joshua to pay the tax refund into the registry of the court within ten days, and if he was “not

making child support payments, he [was] Ordered to start paying immediately.”

On March 20, Kayla filed another motion for contempt alleging several instances in

which Joshua significantly interfered with visitation and that he was still behind on child

support.

2
On July 19, Kayla moved to set aside the MOU, alleging that it was not in the best

interest of MC and that Joshua had not followed it. Alternatively she asked that it not be

incorporated into the divorce decree.

A final divorce hearing was held on April 18, 2024. Kayla testified that Joshua did

not deposit the entire amount of the tax refund into the court’s registry or start paying child

support when ordered as part of the temporary order. She said that it was not until the

court’s January 2023 order that he did either. Presently, he was $293.80 past due on child-

support payments.

Concerning custody and visitation, Kayla testified to several instances in which Joshua

was difficult or interfered with her visitation. She testified about one instance, around

Christmas 2022, when Joshua would not bring MC to the scheduled exchange. She further

testified that, on several occasions during her custodial weeks, Joshua checked MC out of

school and did not return him, forcing Kayla to meet later for an exchange. On one occasion,

Kayla specifically asked Joshua not to check MC out for lunch because she planned to visit

him at school; however, when she arrived, MC had already been checked out and was not

there.

Kayla also testified about spring break in 2023. It was Joshua’s year to have MC for

spring break. Joshua took MC out of state but would not tell Kayla where they were going.

The following spring break was supposed to be Kayla’s, but Joshua threatened to not “let”

Kayla have MC unless she provided him a paper copy of a calendar she had already shared

with him electronically. Kayla testified that Joshua enrolled MC in therapy but refused to

3
disclose the therapist’s name. She further stated that Joshua would manipulate summer

vacations to have MC three weeks in a row (Kayla did not retaliate by trying to do the same

thing “back”). On another occasion, Joshua threatened litigation unless his two older

daughters (from another relationship) were permitted to visit MC during Kayla’s visitation

time.

Kayla next described a situation in June 2023 when she was trying to pick MC up for

the start of her summer visitation, and instead of making MC available, Joshua scheduled

an activity for MC to do that day. When Kayla went to meet them at the activity, Joshua

shoved Kayla out of the elevator, and when Kayla went to physically pick MC up, Joshua

“grabbed” MC out of her arms. Kayla called security to help; the responding security officer

was Seargent Dustin Hamm, a police officer who worked security for the building when he

was off duty policing.

The following August, Kayla learned that the school district had rezoned some of the

schools. Previously, both her and Joshua’s homes were zoned for the same elementary school,

but after the rezoning that was no longer the case. Kayla, who had final say in educational

decisions under the MOU, decided she wanted MC to attend the school that corresponded

to her address. When Joshua found out, he unilaterally changed MC’s school to the one

assigned to his own address. When asked if she thought that the MOU could be modified

to incorporate her concerns, Kayla replied “No. Josh manipulates wording every step of the

way. There’s nothing that you could put on paper that he would follow. Not just with [MC],

with anything.”

4
Kayla called Seargeant Dustin Hamm, the security officer who responded to the June

2023 incident. In addition to working security, Hamm is also the sergeant over criminal

investigations at the Benton Police Department. Hamm testified that, on the day in question,

Kayla requested assistance, he looked at the court orders, and he concluded Kayla should

have had custody at the time but that Joshua was interfering. He said Joshua was adversarial

with him. Seargeant Hamm referred the matter to the prosecutor’s office, and Joshua was

ultimately charged with interfering with custody.

After Kayla rested, Joshua testified. His testimony was that Kayla interferes with his

phone visitation, will not allow him to have lunch with MC, and does not allow MC to have

any extracurricular activities. He said his only problem with the MOU was that it needed to

be more specific.

Joshua called his two daughters as witnesses. They testified they wanted to be able to

see MC more often. He also called his mother, Karen Judkins. She testified that she believes

the week-to-week visitation works well.

During closing argument, Kayla’s counsel asked that she be awarded primary custody.

Joshua’s counsel stated that the terms from the MOU should continue but that “it might

need to be tightened up a little bit.”

The attorney ad litem was asked for her recommendation. She said that Joshua was

trying to use his older daughters to infringe on Kayla’s visitation time. She said her opinion

is that Joshua is a bully. She acknowledged that, early in the case, she had insisted that joint

custody would be best for MC, and she worked hard to help the parties craft the MOU for

5
joint custody. But after witnessing how Joshua operates under the MOU, her current

recommendation was that Kayla have primary custody with full decision-making authority

because, otherwise, “[Joshua] is going to create a problem and bulldoze her.” That said, she

also stated that she believed that MC needed more than “just” every other weekend with his

father, and she therefore recommended an extended every-other-weekend schedule, with

Joshua having visitation every other Wednesday to the following Monday.

The court took the matter under advisement and issued a written order within the

week. That opinion made the following relevant findings:

6. [Kayla] requested she have full legal and physical custody of [MC] while
[Joshua] also requested full custody. For the reasons given below the Court has
determined by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child’s
best interests, that the statutory presumption has been overcome, and that [Kayla]
should be awarded full custody.

7. After hearing the evidence presented, the Court has determined there are
numerous facts which indicate to the Court that joint custody is not in the minor
child’s best interests. The parties had through mediation came to a joint custody
agreement through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Subsequent to the
MOU being entered by the parties on or about December 5, 2022, both parties have
requested that this Court terminate this agreement. Both have sought full custody of
the minor child at the final hearing. Additionally, [Joshua] seeks separate visitation
time with the minor child and his two daughters from another relationship.

8. With respect to credibility, the Court finds that [Kayla]’s testimony to be
more credible than [Joshua]’s based upon the Court’s observations of the parties, their
demeanor while testifying, and the consistency and/or inconsistency of their
statements.

9. The Court is convinced that a joint custody situation will not work in this
case. The evidence demonstrates that [Joshua] is controlling, verbally abusive, and
bullies [Kayla] to get his way when it pertains to matters of custody as well as other
issues this Court has heard. For example, [Joshua] has unilaterally changed the
visitation times and pickup locations on his own without the agreement of [Kayla].

6
On one such occasion he kept the minor child an additional night and exchanged
him the following morning. Just prior to Spring Break in 2023 he insisted [Kayla]
would forfeit her holiday visitation time if she did not provide a Boys and Girls Club
calendar to him. This is a document that should readily be available to him from the
club and online. On numerous occasions he has picked the minor child up from
school at lunch during [Kayla]’s custodial time and not return him to school for
afternoon classes. This would require the parties to then schedule exchange times.
On one such occasion [Kayla] specifically asked him to not pick up the child because
she was planning on having lunch with him that day. This particular day was during
her custodial time. He refused and picked the child up in spite of her reasonable
request. On another occasion [Joshua] unilaterally changed the pickup location and
time in order for the minor child to be in a class at the River Center in Riverside Park
in Benton. He did so without consulting [Kayla] and just informed her of the changes.
In viewing the video of the incident from the River Center, it appears [Joshua] would
not allow [Kayla] to ride the elevator to the second floor with him and the minor child
to where the class was located. [Kayla] testified that she was pushed out of the elevator
by him. While the video does not show actual contact between the parties because of
the location and angle of the camera, it does show [Kayla] attempting to enter the
elevator only to back up and the doors close, which is consistent with her testimony.
It also appears [Joshua] later pulled the minor child from [Kayla]’s arms when she was
giving the child a hug. When questioned by an off-duty detective who was working
security for the River Center about the incident, [Joshua] was non-compliant, was
untruthful about the existence of court documents, and verbally abrasive when asked
about [Kayla] leaving with the minor child since it was her custodial time. Based upon
all of these facts, the Court is of the firm opinion that [Joshua] has intentionally
interfered with [Kayla]’s custodial time.

10. In 2023 [Joshua] unilaterally changed the school the minor child attended
when [Kayla] was the final decision maker for educational decisions pursuant to the
MOU the parties had executed in 2022.

11. This past year [Joshua] insisted on scheduling his vacation time in order to
allow him to have the minor child for three consecutive weeks. He refused to
negotiate with [Kayla] to allow her to have any time during the three-week period.
[Joshua] has again scheduled a three-week visitation period for the upcoming summer
in 2024 and has been unwilling to negotiate with [Kayla] concerning taking extended
time with the child.

12. [Joshua]has taken the minor child on trips outside the state and refused to
provide travel information to [Kayla].

7
13. [Joshua] has uploaded incorrect calendar information in the coparenting
app known as AppClose for doctor’s appointments and medical visits which appears
to have been done so [Kayla] would miss the appointment. He has refused to provide
the child’s therapist information to [Kayla].

14. [Joshua] has failed to abide by the orders of this Court with respect to the
payment of child support and is presently in arrears by three months.

15. Additionally, it appears [Joshua] is seeking to limit or otherwise control
[Kayla]’s custodial time by means of his request for sibling visitation with his two
daughters and the minor child. When [Joshua] was appearing pro se, he filed a motion
for sibling visitation. In it he stated that his daughters “wish to set up a visitation
schedule that allows them free and easy access to their sibling(s) without having to go
through either [Kayla] or [Joshua] to do so.” [ ] His motion leaves the Court with the
belief that [Joshua], through his two other children, is attempting to control and/or
limit [Kayla]’s custodial times. His children may certainly see the minor child when
he has them and there is no need for such an order unless he is attempting to interfere
with [Kayla]’s time by virtue of a court order. For these reasons the request for sibling
visitation is denied.

16. For all of the reasons listed in paragraphs 8 through 15 including those
concerning credibility, the Court finds that the presumption stated in A.C.A. § 9-13-
101 favoring joint custody has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Therefore, the Court finds that [Kayla] having sole physical and legal custody is what
is in the child’s best interests pursuant to the statute, subject to [Joshua]’s rights of
visitation.

17. With respect to making important life decisions for the minor child,
normally this Court would require that the custodial parent consult with the other
parent prior to making important decisions. For the reasons given above, the Court
believes that the recommendations of the Ad Litem concerning parent consultation
in this case are reasonable, in particular because [Joshua] has been verbally abusive,
controlling, and bullies [Kayla] when given the opportunity to do so. For these reasons
the Court will not require [Kayla] to consult with [Joshua] prior to making important
decisions concerning the minor child. She is however required to keep him
reasonably informed of these decisions as they may occur through AppClose.

....

32. [Joshua] is hereby held in contempt for his non-payment of child support
which he was ordered to pay on a temporary basis in the amount of $113.00 per

8
month. He is presently behind three months. Further, [Joshua] is held in contempt
for failing to pay into the registry of the Court the parties’ tax refund in the amount
of $11,300.00 as directed by the Court. Lastly, [Joshua] is held in contempt for failing
to abide by the visitation orders of this Court and his intentional interference with
[Kayla]’s visitation times.

33. With respect to the contempt finding, [Kayla] is awarded $339.00 for three
months of unpaid child support which shall be paid from the registry of the Court
from the tax refund which is presently being held. Her attorney fees shall also be
awarded for the costs associated with the contempt motions which were filed. [Joshua]
is also sentenced to seven (7) days in the Saline County Jail which is suspended
conditioned upon him not being found in contempt for violating the orders of this
Court in the future.

From this order, Joshua appeals. On appeal he argues the circuit court erred when it

awarded Kayla primary custody, in holding him in contempt, and in suspending his

contempt sentence for an indefinite amount of time.

I. Custody

In an action for divorce, an award of joint custody is favored in Arkansas. Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2023). In an action concerning an original child-custody

determination in a divorce, there is a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best

interest of the child. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(a). Section 9-13-

101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b) provides that the presumption may be rebutted:

(1) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in
the best interest of the child;

(2) If the parties have reached an agreement on all issues related to custody of the
child;

(3) If one (1) of the parties does not request sole, primary, or joint custody; or

9
(4) If a rebuttable presumption described in subsection (c) [which triggered if a
party to the action has committed an act of domestic violence] or subsection (d)
[which is triggered if a party to the action is a registered sex offender] of this section
is established by the evidence.

The circuit court may enter an order to reduce areas of conflict in a manner determined

appropriate by the court. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(d). But while there is a

statutory preference for joint custody, this preference does not override the ultimate guiding

principle, which is to set custody that comports with the best interest of the child. McCandlis

v. McCandlis, 2024 Ark. App. 339. We refuse to find differently than the circuit court

regarding the appropriateness of joint custody and the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

On appeal, in custody matters, we consider the evidence de novo and do not reverse

unless the circuit court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Id. Due deference is given to

the circuit court’s superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Chaffin v.

Chaffin, 2011 Ark. App. 293. The supreme court has held that there is no other case in which

the superior position, ability, and opportunity of the circuit court to observe the parties

carries a greater weight than one involving the custody of minor children. Styles v. Styles, 2024

Ark. App. 435, at 22, 699 S.W.3d 693, 708–09.

Joshua argues that nothing in the record supports a finding that Kayla rebutted the

presumption of joint custody. He contends that Kayla neither (1) demonstrated that joint

custody was not in MC’s best interest nor (2) established he had engaged in a pattern of

domestic abuse. We agree with Joshua that a pattern of domestic abuse was not present such

10
that section 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b)(4) would have been triggered. But we disagree with his

contention that joint custody was in MC’s best interest.

Joshua compares his relationship with Kayla to the relationships of parents in Wallace

v. Pyle, 2024 Ark. App. 496; Pilcher v. McWilliams, 2022 Ark. App. 487, 655 S.W.3d 868;

Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2019 Ark. App. 416, 588 S.W.3d 38; and Hoover v. Hoover, 2016

Ark. App. 322, 498 S.W.3d 297, and explains that joint custody can remain appropriate

even when relationships are marked by conflict, poor communication, or questionable

conduct.

In all of these cases (with the exception of Pilcher), however, we affirmed the circuit

court’s award of joint custody, specifically giving deference to the circuit court to weigh the

evidence before it. In the lone exception, Pilcher, we reversed because the circuit court

misapplied the statutory domestic-violence exception, section 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b)(4), and

cut its analysis short. That provision refers the reader to subsection (c), which provides that

there is a presumption that it is not in the best interest of a child to be placed in the custody

of a parent who has “engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse.” And because the record in

Pilcher contained evidence of only a single incident, there was therefore insufficient evidence

to establish a “pattern.” Because the circuit court relied on that provision as a matter of law

without the required showing, we reversed and remanded.

Joshua argues that the evidence established that MC was doing well, is fine in both

homes, and wants equal time with his parents. He highlights the ad litem’s report that both

parents are good people, work hard at parenting MC, are gainfully employed, and have stable

11
homes. He argues that the circuit court should have exercised its authority to reduce the

areas of conflict between the parties, and joint custody should have been granted.

It is true that Arkansas law favors joint custody. But it is also reversible error to award

it when the parties demonstrate an inability to cooperate and communicate in matters

concerning their child. See Hoover v. Hoover, 2016 Ark. App. 322, at 7, 498 S.W.3d 297, 302

(stating that the mutual ability of the parties to cooperate is a crucial factor in determining

whether joint custody is appropriate). Here, Joshua had almost two years to demonstrate to

the court that he was capable of sharing joint custody of MC with Kayla. Instead, he

demonstrated the opposite. Each child-custody determination ultimately must rest on its

own facts. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2019 Ark. App. 416, at 8, 588 S.W.3d 38, 42. The

circuit court was well within its discretion to conclude that joint custody was not in MC’s

best interest. We affirm the custody award.

II. Contempt

Joshua makes three arguments on appeal concerning contempt. First, he argues that

the initial order to deposit the tax refund was too vague to enforce, and when the circuit

court entered its more specific order, he timely complied with it. Second, he argues the

circuit court erred when it found him in contempt for nonpayment of child support without

first determining whether he had the ability to pay. Last, he argues that the circuit court

entered an impermissible sentence when it sentenced him to jail for seven days but then

suspended the same for an indefinite time period. He makes no argument regarding the

finding that he interfered with visitation. We agree with two of his three points.

12
Willful disobedience of a valid order of a court is contemptuous behavior. Symanietz

v. Symanietz, 2021 Ark. 75, at 13, 620 S.W.3d 518, 527. However, before one can be held in

contempt for violating the court’s order, the order must be definite in its terms and clear as

to what duties it imposes. Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, at 12, 426 S.W.3d 427, 435.

Contempt can be civil or criminal. Id., 426 S.W.3d at 435. The purpose of criminal contempt

is to preserve power, vindicate the dignity of the court, and punish for disobedience of the

court’s order. Id., 426 S.W.3d at 435. By comparison, civil-contempt proceedings are

instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel

obedience to orders made for the benefit of those parties. Id., 426 S.W.3d at 435. Because

the contempt findings here were civil, the standard of review is whether the circuit court’s

findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 13, 426 S.W.3d at 435.

To begin, Joshua was held in contempt for three reasons: nonpayment of child

support, failing to deposit the tax refund into the registry of the court as directed, and

interfering with Kayla’s visitation. The sanctions for the contempt were that Kayla was

awarded the amount of past-due child support from the registry of the court; Kayla’s attorney

fees were awarded “for the costs associated with the contempt motions which were filed”;

and Joshua was sentenced to seven days in jail suspended “upon him not being found in

contempt for violating the orders of this Court in the future.”

We will address Joshua’s point concerning the child-support finding, first. On appeal,

Joshua argues that the court erred in holding him in contempt for failure to pay child support

without first finding that he had the ability to pay it. The inability to pay is an affirmative

13
defense, and the contemnor has the burden of proving his inability to pay. This is logical

because, in most cases, all of the items of proof needed to prove ability or inability to pay are

in the hands of the contemnor. Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Ark. App. 430, 444–45, 97 S.W.3d 429,

439 (2003). Joshua was well aware that one of the issues to be resolved at the hearing was

contempt for failure to pay child support since Kayla had testified to it immediately prior. If

Joshua needed to mount a defense on inability to pay, he had the opportunity to do so, and

he did not. We hold there was no error in finding Joshua in contempt for failure to pay child

support.

We do, however, agree with Joshua that finding him in contempt for failure to pay

the parties’ tax refund into the registry of the court was erroneous.

The temporary order entered on June 29, 2022, stated that “[t]he parties were issued

a tax [refund] valued at or about $11,300.00 based on testimony. [Joshua] shall submit this

amount to the registry of the Court until a time that a ruling can be made on the

disbursement of the funds.” It did not contain a performance date. Joshua deposited funds

into the registry on June 29, 2022 ($8,600); July 26, 2022 ($100); October 11, 2022 ($100);

and December 8, 2022 ($100). Considering this partial performance and the lack of a

performance date in the order, we cannot say that Joshua violated the court order such that

contempt may be imposed. See Holifield v. Mullenax Fin. & Tax Advisory Grp., Inc., 2009 Ark.

App. 280, at 6, 307 S.W.3d 608, 612 (holding that an order was not specific enough to hold

a litigant in contempt when ordered to submit to discovery on an “expedited basis,” but no

time frame was otherwise specified).

14
The second order entered on the matter was more specific. That order was entered

on January 6, 2023. It provided that “the remaining balance of the $11,300.00 in marital

funds that the Court previously Ordered to be deposited into the registry of the Court shall

be deposited by [Joshua] within ten days of this Order or he shall be subject to the contempt

powers of the Court.” Joshua paid the remaining balance due, $2400, on January 19, 2023.

Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) instructs that “[i]n computing any period of time

prescribed . . . by order of the Court,” if the time period prescribed is less than fourteen days,

then we do not count Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays. Considering Martin Luther King

Jr. Day was on January 16 in 2023, ten days from the date ordered would have been January

23, 2023. Therefore, when Joshua paid the remaining balance into the registry of the court

on January 19, he had complied with the order of the court such that the specific finding of

contempt was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Finally, Joshua argues that the circuit court erred when it sentenced him to seven days

in jail and then suspended the sentence for an indefinite amount of time. He is correct. It is

well settled that suspension of a sentence for contempt is, in effect, a complete remission of

the contempt. Styles, 2024 Ark. App. 435, at 27–28, 699 S.W.3d at 711–12. The jail sentence

is therefore set aside.

In domestic-relations proceedings, the circuit court has the inherent power to award

attorney’s fees, and the decision to award fees and the amount of those fees are matters

within the discretion of the circuit court. Barter v. Barter, 2024 Ark. App. 182, 686 S.W.3d

872. However, because the attorney’s-fee sanction was possibly intertwined with all three

15
contempt findings—one of which was unsupported—we therefore reverse and remand the

award of attorney’s fees and costs for the circuit court to reconsider, if necessary.

In sum, we affirm the award of custody, reverse the contempt finding regarding the

tax refund, set aside the jail-time sentence, reverse the contempt sanction insofar as it

concerns attorney’s fees and costs, and remand for the circuit court to reconsider any

sanctions it chooses to impose for the remaining findings of contempt.

Affirmed in part; modified in part; reversed and remanded in part.

GLADWIN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Stephen A. Shoptaw, for appellant.

LaPorte-Jenner Law, PLLC, by: Kelli LaPorte-Jenner and Frank LaPorte-Jenner, for

appellee.

16