Angel Lei'keil v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 324
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-38

Opinion Delivered May 21, 2025

ANGEL LEI’KEIL APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
SMITH DISTRICT
V. [NO. 66FJV-22-509]

HONORABLE LEIGH ZUERKER,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILDREN
APPELLEES AFFIRMED

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

Appellant Angel Lei’Keil appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her

sons, Minor Child 1 (MC1) (DOB 04-25-13) and Minor Child 2 (MC2) (DOB 09-11-22).1

On appeal, Angel argues that there was insufficient evidence that termination of her parental

rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

On December 22, 2022, appellee Arkansas Department of Human Service (DHS)

filed a petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody of MC1 and MC2. The facts

concerning the dependency-neglect were contained in an attached affidavit of a family service

worker. The affidavit stated that, while Angel and the children were staying at the Women’s

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The father(s) of the children were never identified in the proceedings below.
Crisis Center in Fort Smith, Arkansas, Angel had written on paper that “her children were

clones, trafficked, had been kidnapped and came back as clones, calendar about mass

murder, the baby turned into lead and pooped out the lead, sodomy, and her 10 year-old

son that had been trafficked in the Harps parking lot and brought back as a clone, she should

give the children up for adoption b/c they are the clones etc.” Angel made statements that

MC1 and MC2 were both killed, the children with her were their clones, and her children

were sodomized and sacrificed. Angel also talked about mass killings and sacrifices of

children. Angel was assessed by Western Arkansas Counseling and Guidance Center, and

inpatient treatment was recommended, but Angel refused. The affidavit stated that there

had been prior DHS involvement with Angel, which resulted in the oldest of her three sons

being placed in the custody of her brother, Kyle Theobold. The affidavit alleged that MC1’s

and MC2’s health and safety were in immediate danger due to Angel’s mental-health issues

and her unwillingness to undergo the recommended inpatient treatment.

On December 27, 2022, the trial court entered an ex parte order for emergency

custody of MC1 and MC2. A probable-cause order followed on January 17, 2023.

On March 21, 2023, the trial court entered an adjudication order finding that MC1

and MC2 were dependent-neglected on the basis of parental unfitness due to Angel’s mental

instability that seriously impaired her ability to supervise, protect, or care for the children

and due to her unwillingness to follow the direction for inpatient treatment. The trial court

ordered Angel to attend counseling, undergo a drug-and-alcohol assessment and a

psychological evaluation, submit to drug screening, complete parenting classes, obtain and

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maintain stable housing and employment, maintain a valid driver’s license, visit the children

regularly, and keep DHS apprised of her contact information. The primary goal of the case

was established as reunification.

On April 11, 2023, the trial court entered an order for expedited placement under

the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). In that order, the proposed

placement of the children was with their maternal uncle, Kyle Theobold, who lives in

Springfield, Missouri.2

After a review hearing held on May 18, 2023, the trial court entered a review order

on June 5, 2023. In the review order, the trial court found that Angel had visited the

children regularly and had completed a psychological evaluation. However, it also found

that Angel had not completed parenting classes and did not have stable housing,

employment, or transportation. Accordingly, the trial court found that Angel was not in

compliance with the case plan. The primary goal of the case remained reunification.

A second review hearing was held on August 3, 2023, and in the review order entered

August 24, the trial court noted that Angel had provided numerous addresses during the

case and that it was unable to determine whether Angel had stable housing, employment, or

transportation. The trial court—based on Angel’s erratic behavior throughout the case—

ordered her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. The primary goal of the case was

reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption following termination of parental rights.

2
MC1 and MC2 were placed in Kyle’s home on June 7, 2023, and they remained in
his care throughout the rest of these dependency-neglect and termination proceedings.

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A third review hearing was held on October 26, 2023, and the trial court entered a

review order on December 11, 2023. In that order, the trial court found that although Angel

had apparently completed parenting classes and a psychological evaluation, she had not

completed counseling; lacked stable housing, transportation, or verifiable employment; and

was not in compliance with the case plan or court orders. The trial court stated that, overall,

Angel had failed to make substantial or measurable progress. The primary goal of the case

was reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption following termination of parental

rights.

A permanency-planning hearing was held on December 14, 2023, and in the resulting

permanency-planning order entered January 19, 2024, the trial court found that Angel did

not have verifiable housing or employment and that she did not have stable transportation.

The trial court also found that Angel had not regularly attended counseling sessions since

April 2023. The trial court found that Angel had not made significant, measurable progress

on the case plan and was not in compliance with the case plan or court orders. The trial

court stated that concurrent goals of the case were adoption following termination of

parental rights and reunification.

After a fifteen-month review hearing held on April 11, 2024, the trial court entered

a review order on May 20, 2024. In that order, the trial court noted that it had considered

Kyle’s Theobold’s testimony at the fifteen-month review hearing at which Kyle had testified

that MC1 and MC2 are healthy and thriving in his and his wife’s care. Kyle had also testified

that he wanted to provide permanency for the children and that he was willing to either

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adopt the children or have guardianship of them. In the fifteen-month review order, the

trial court found that Angel was not in compliance with the case plan or with the court’s

orders; did not have stable housing, employment, or transportation; had not visited the

children regularly; had not maintained regular contact with DHS or kept DHS apprised of

her residence; and had not made substantial, measurable progress toward the goal of

achieving reunification. The trial court noted that, according to Angel’s testimony, she was

presently residing at the Dallas Life Homeless Center in Dallas, Texas. The trial court

changed the primary goal of the case to adoption following termination of parental rights

with a concurrent goal of reunification.

On April 16, 2024, DHS filed a petition to terminate Angel’s parental rights to MC1

and MC2.3 In its petition, DHS alleged that it was in the children’s best interest for Angel’s

parental rights to be terminated based on the statutory grounds of failure to remedy,

subsequent factors, and aggravated circumstances. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a), (vii)(a) & (ix)(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2023). The termination hearing was held on

September 19, 2024.

Bridget Cornett, the DHS caseworker assigned to the case, testified at the termination

hearing. Ms. Cornett stated that Angel had completed parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol

assessment, and a psychological evaluation. However, she had not completed counseling.

3
The termination petition was filed after the trial court had changed the case goal at
the fifteen-month review hearing but before the fifteen-month review order was formally
entered. Because Angel was no longer living at the Dallas Life Homeless Center and her
whereabouts were unknown, the termination petition was served on Angel by warning order.

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Ms. Cornett stated that MC1 and MC2 were removed from Angel’s custody due to her

mental-health issues, which had remained a concern throughout the case.

According to Ms. Cornett, contact with Angel had been sporadic, and it was difficult

to confirm where she was living. During the case, Angel had lived in different locations,

including Dallas, Texas and Joplin, Missouri. Ms. Cornett stated that Angel had recently

presented her with a copy of a lease agreement for an apartment in Joplin, but she was unsure

whether Angel actually lived there or had made the necessary financial arrangements. Angel

had also provided a copy of an “option agreement” that required her to make payments

before moving into a house, but Ms. Cornett didn’t know whether any payments had been

made.

Ms. Cornett testified further that Angel’s employment during the case was sporadic.

Angel had different jobs but only for limited periods of time. Ms. Cornett stated that Angel

had provided some paystubs to her over the past few months, the most recent of which was

from Maxim Healthcare Services, which showed that Angel earned thirty dollars an hour

and worked for twelve hours at that rate of pay over the course of a week. However, Ms.

Cornett was concerned because this paystub was from a different employer than the previous

paystub Angel had provided, and Ms. Cornett did not believe Angel had established stable

employment. Ms. Cornett stated further that there was no proof that Angel had a driver’s

license or her own transportation. Ms. Cornett stated that throughout the case, Angel’s lack

of stable housing, employment, and transportation continued to be impediments to

reunification.

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Ms. Cornett also testified that Angel failed to complete a substantial number of

scheduled visits with the children. Most of these scheduled visits were Zoom meetings with

the children, who had been placed with Angel’s brother, Kyle. Ms. Cornett stated that out

of eighty scheduled visits, Angel completed only twenty-eight. While acknowledging that a

few of these visits had been canceled by DHS and some by Kyle, there were thirty-four “no

shows” in which Angel failed to appear at all.

Ms. Cornett testified that although DHS had provided services and made meaningful

efforts to help Angel stabilize her situation and correct the conditions that caused removal

of the children, Angel’s mental health had not significantly improved, and there had been

no meaningful progress toward reunification. Ms. Cornett did not believe there was a

reasonable likelihood that continued DHS services would help Angel reach that goal, and

she thought that placing the children back in Angel’s custody would be potentially harmful

to the children’s health, safety, and well-being.

Ms. Cornett stated that MC1 and MC2 are “very sweet, bright, loving, and caring

children,” and they are both “very adoptable.” She stated that MC1 and MC2 were living

with Angel’s brother, Kyle, who also had a guardianship of the children’s older brother from

a prior dependency-neglect case involving Angel. Ms. Cornett stated that Kyle was interested

in adopting MC1 and MC2. Ms. Cornett stated further that, regardless of adoptability, she

thought termination of parental rights was in MC1 and MC2’s best interest due to Angel’s

mental-health issues and lack of stability.

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On cross-examination, Ms. Cornett was asked about DHS’s policy on a possible

guardianship versus adoption and why a guardianship with Kyle would not be effective for

creating permanency for MC1 and MC2. Ms. Cornett stated that DHS was not considering

a guardianship as an alternative to adoption due to Angel’s lack of consistency throughout

the case and the fact that Kyle had stated he was interested in adoption and would not be

open to a guardianship.

Angel testified that she is currently living with a friend, Michael Hughes, in Joplin,

and she does not pay rent or utilities. She stated that the lease on her apartment was to start

the following day. She also stated that she had made one payment on the option agreement

on the house and would have to pay $6400 more before she could move in. Angel stated

that her friend was letting her live with him free of charge so she could save money toward

the down payment on the house.

Angel stated that she is an LPN and started working for Maxim Health Care doing

home-health services a few months ago. Angel stated that this was initially a part-time job

but that at the end of last week, it became a full-time job. Therefore, she had not yet received

a paycheck reflecting full-time hours. Angel stated that she does not own a car but uses Uber

or Lyft, which she thought was reliable transportation. Angel took a bus from Joplin to

attend the termination hearing.

Angel testified that, since the case was opened, she has had three in-person visits with

the children. She also stated that for almost a year she had no visits at all, which she said

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was DHS’s fault. With respect to the Zoom visits, Angel disputed the number of “no shows”

reported by DHS and stated that some of her missed visits were due to scheduling issues.

Angel stated that she was attending counseling. She also stated that she does not have

a mental-health diagnosis. Angel believed that she met the requirements necessary to achieve

reunification with MC1 and MC2. Angel stated further that, if her sons were not returned

to her, she wished for her brother to have a guardianship rather than termination of her

parental rights and adoption.

The trial court questioned Angel about a text exchange between Angel and a DHS

employee concerning her visitation. In this text exchange, Angel, made unsolicited random

statements about the Holocaust, Vikings, the Biden Presidency, an alien invasion, a chainsaw

massacre, human trafficking, the Trail of Tears, and New World Order.

A CASA report, which was prepared ten days before the termination hearing, was

also introduced into evidence. The report stated that the CASA worker had had no recent

contact with Angel because her location was unknown. The report stated further that MC1

and MC2 continued to thrive in their uncle’s home. The CASA report expressed concern

about Angel’s mental health and stability, and it recommended termination of Angel’s

parental rights with the goal of adoption.

On October 23, 2024, the trial court entered an order terminating Angel’s parental

rights to MC1 and MC2. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that all

three statutory grounds alleged in DHS’s petition supported termination. Pursuant to Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a), the trial court found that the children had been

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adjudicated dependent-neglected and had continued to be out of Angel’s custody for twelve

months and, despite a meaningful effort by DHS to rehabilitate Angel and correct the

conditions that caused removal, those conditions had not been remedied by Angel. Pursuant

to subdivision (b)(3)(B)(vii)(a), the trial court found that other factors or issues arose

subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that

placement of the children in Angel’s custody is contrary to their health, safety, or welfare,

and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, Angel has manifested the incapacity

or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate her circumstances

that prevent the placement of the children in Angel’s custody. Finally, under subdivision

(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3), the trial court found that Angel had subjected the children to aggravated

circumstances, meaning that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in

successful reunification. The trial court specifically found that Angel had not substantially

complied with the case plan or court orders; had not demonstrated meaningful progress; had

failed to obtain and maintain stable housing, employment, and transportation; and had

failed to regularly visit the children. The trial court found further that Angel’s testimony

cannot be relied upon because it continually shifted and was not credible.

The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of

parental rights was in MC1 and MC2’s best interest, and the court considered the likelihood

that the children would be adopted as well as the potential harm of returning them to Angel’s

custody as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The

trial court specifically found:

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As to the juveniles’ adoptability, the Court finds that they are adoptable
because they are young children and have no extreme medical or behavioral issues.
And the Court also notes that the uncle (Angel’s brother), with whom the children
are placed, has indicated to the Department a preference to adopt them. Regardless
of adoptability, though, the court finds that it is in the best interest of the juveniles
for the rights of the parent to be terminated.

As to potential harm, the Court finds that the juveniles would be subjected to
substantial risk of harm if they were returned to the parent. That includes the threat
of harm to the juveniles’ health and safety due to the parent’s lack of suitable lifestyle;
the parent’s history of mental illness or instability; the parent’s lack of stability due to
her lack of stable housing, income/employment and transportation; the parent’s
failure to meaningfully comply with case plan reunification services; the parent’s
failure to remedy the problems which caused removal; and the fact that the juveniles
have been doing well in foster care, which status would likely be disrupted by a return
to the parent. Further, the parent has failed to show that she can meet the juveniles’
basic needs, despite having ample opportunity over the course of more than a year to
change her behavior and to remedy her underlying problems.

This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

A trial court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved by

clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3). Clear and convincing

evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm

conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum.

Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews

termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless

its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a finding is

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clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court

to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing

evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)

the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and

(2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,

caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing

of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). However, only one ground must be proved to support

termination. Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918.

The intent behind the termination-of-parental rights statute is to provide permanency

in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is

contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative;

the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her

child. Cobb v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 85, 512 S.W.3d 694. Moreover, a

child’s need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request for additional time

to improve the parent’s circumstances. Id. Finally, a parent’s past behavior is often a good

indicator of future behavior. Id.

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III. Best Interest

On appeal, Angel does not challenge the trial court’s findings as to the statutory

grounds supporting termination. Angel instead argues that there was insufficient evidence

that termination was in MC1’s or MC2’s best interest. Angel specifically argues that MC1

and MC2 had the ability to achieve permanency through a less restrictive alternative of a

guardianship with a relative, the children’s uncle Kyle, with whom they had been placed long

before termination.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-329(d) (Repl. 2020), provides, “In initially

considering the disposition alternatives and at any subsequent hearing, the court shall give

preference to the least restrictive disposition consistent with the best interests and welfare of

the juvenile and the public.” The least-restrictive alternative is a relevant inquiry at the

termination-of-parental rights hearing. Lively v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App.

313, 456 S.W.3d 383.

Angel asserts that because MC1 and MC2 were already in Kyle’s care, termination

was not necessary to achieve permanency, which instead could have been achieved through

a guardianship that would have maintained the status quo. Angel contends that she was

making progress in the case, had demonstrated stability, and is strongly bonded with the

children. She therefore argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the

children’s best interest and that trial court should have chosen the less restrictive alternative

of a relative guardianship.

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In support of her argument, Angel cites Borah v. Arkansas Department of Human

Services, 2020 Ark. App. 491, 612 S.W.3d 749. In Borah, we reversed and remanded a

termination decision because the trial court had failed to consider placement with the child’s

grandmother as a less restrictive alternative to termination. In that case, the child and the

grandmother were bonded, and although the child had not been placed with the

grandmother, there had been repeated requests for placement by the parents and the

grandmother. In reversing the termination in Borah, we noted that DHS had failed to

communicate with the grandmother and that the trial court made no mention of the

grandmother’s request for placement and adoption in its best-interest findings. We stated

that “in light of the particular circumstances in this case, we reverse the termination of

parental rights and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Borah, 2020 Ark.

App. 491, at 21, 612 S.W.3d at 761.

We conclude that our decision in Borah does not compel reversal of the termination

decision here. In this case, MC1 and MC2 had been in their uncle’s placement during most

of these dependency-neglect proceedings, and in the termination order, the trial court

specifically addressed the children’s placement with Kyle and found that he had indicated

to DHS a preference to adopt the children (as opposed to a guardianship).

Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial court did

not clearly err in finding that termination of parental rights, rather than a guardianship, was

in the children’s best interest. In Anderson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2023

Ark. App. 18, 658 S.W.3d 470, we stated that when the parent demonstrates stability and a

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reasonable hope for reunification, then there is no harm in waiting a little longer before

terminating parental rights; but when that stability and a reasonable hope for reunification

are not present, there is no reason to further delay permanency through termination and

adoption. In Moore v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2024 Ark. App. 4, 682 S.W.3d

706, we held that because there was no reasonable expectation that the child would be able

to reunify with the parent, the trial court did not clearly err in choosing termination over a

guardianship.

This case began as a result of Angel’s mental-health issues and her written statements

that MC1 and MC2 had been sodomized, sacrificed, and cloned and that she should give

them up for adoption. Despite recommended inpatient treatment, Angel refused the

treatment, and there was no evidence that her mental-health issues had been addressed as of

the date of the termination hearing. The record also shows that, almost two years into this

dependency-neglect case, Angel had not established stable housing, employment, or

transportation, and she was not in compliance with the case plan. Angel frequently changed

addresses and was often out of contact with DHS. And despite Angel’s claim that she is

bonded with the children, the record shows that she had failed to regularly attend her

visitation with the children. There was no compelling reason for the trial court to choose a

guardianship rather than termination of parental rights and adoption because there was no

reasonable prospect that Angel would eventually reunify with MC1 or MC2 as demonstrated

by her failure to challenge the statutory grounds that support the termination. See Price v.

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 140.

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IV. Conclusion

On the record presented, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding

that termination of Angel’s parental rights was in MC1 and MC2’s best interest.

Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Angel’s parental rights to both children.

Affirmed.

ABRAMSON and THYER, JJ., agree.

Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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