Angel Smith v. Hot Springs Property Managment LLC

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 223
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-23-797

ANGEL SMITH Opinion Delivered April 16, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE UNION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 70CV-20-254]

HOT SPRINGS PROPERTY HONORABLE JIM F. ANDREWS, JR.,
MANAGEMENT LLC JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Angel Smith appeals the Union County Circuit Court order entering summary

judgment in favor of Hot Springs Property Management LLC (HSPM). On appeal, Smith

argues that the circuit court erred by finding that the caveat-lessee doctrine barred her

negligence claim against HSPM, which arose during a short-term rental of a house. She

alternatively argues that she is a third-party beneficiary to a contract in which HSPM agreed

to maintain and repair the house. We affirm.

On September 17, 2020, Smith filed a complaint for negligence against HSPM. She

explained that HSPM maintains, manages, and leases residential properties, and she and a

group of friends rented a house from HSPM in June 2019. She claimed that during the

night, she fell on irregular stairs in the house and fractured her tibia bone. She asserted that

HSPM owed her a duty as an invitee to use ordinary care to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition and that HSPM created a dangerous condition on the stairs by not

complying with the building codes and failing to warn her of the condition. She requested

damages for medical care and treatment, pain, suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment

of life, and loss of earnings.

On October 15, HSPM answered Smith’s complaint and filed a third-party complaint

against Debby and Steven Miller. In relevant part, it alleged that the Millers own the house

and that it had entered into a property-management agreement with them to rent, lease, and

manage the house.

On November 29, 2021, HSPM moved for summary judgment against Smith. It

argued that the caveat-lessee doctrine at Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-16-110 (Repl.

2015) barred Smith’s claim. HSPM pointed out that Smith’s friend, Jasmine Brown, entered

into an agreement with HSPM to lease the house for three days and that HSPM did not

agree with Brown to undertake an obligation to maintain or repair the premises. HSPM

attached its rental-management agreement with the Millers, Brown’s rental confirmation

with HSPM, and an affidavit of its owner. In the affidavit, the owner stated that Brown had

exclusive possession of the premises during her reservation.

On December 16, Smith responded. She argued that the transient-occupancy

exemption in Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-17-202(4) (Repl. 2015) of the Arkansas

Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007 applied because HSPM charged and collected sales

tax for the short-term rental. She thus claimed that she was a business invitee, not a tenant,

and she argued that the caveat-lessee doctrine did not bar her negligence claim.

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On January 27, 2022, HSPM filed a motion asking the court to reconsider the denial

of its summary-judgment motion. HSPM explained that the circuit court had conducted a

hearing on January 26 and that the court orally denied HSPM’s summary-judgment motion

because there remained questions of fact. However, HSPM argued that its motion presented

a question of law.

On April 26, 2023, Smith amended her complaint, and she alleged that the absence

of a handrail proximately caused her fall and that the absence was an open and obvious

danger.

On April 27, HSPM again filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its summary-

judgment motion, asserting the motion presented a question of law. HSPM noted that the

court still had not entered an order.

On May 18, Smith filed a response to HSPM’s motion for reconsideration. She

argued that even if the caveat-lessee doctrine applied, HSPM agreed to maintain services to

tenants in its contract with the Millers and that she is a third-party beneficiary to that

contract.

On June 30, the court held a hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the court

noted that a former circuit court judge had conducted a hearing on the summary-judgment

motion in January 2022 and had orally denied it but never entered a written order. The

parties stipulated that the court could consider the motion “anew.”

Thereafter, on September 8, the court entered an order granting summary judgment

in favor of HSPM. The court found that a landlord-tenant relationship existed and that the

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caveat-lessee doctrine barred Smith’s negligence claim. In making this finding, the court

found that Brown had exclusive possession of the property. The court also found that no

facts supported a claim that HSPM agreed with Brown to assume liability for alleged defects

in the property or by its conduct. The court further found that its decision on HSPM’s

summary-judgment motion rendered the claims against the Millers moot. This appeal

followed.

Our summary-judgment standard is well settled. Summary judgment may be granted

only when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated. Greenlee v. J.B. Hunt

Transp. Servs., Inc., 2009 Ark. 506, 342 S.W.3d 274. The burden of sustaining a motion for

summary judgment is always the responsibility of the moving party. McGrew v. Farm Bureau

Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 567, 268 S.W.3d 890 (2007).

Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary

judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of

a material issue of fact. Greenlee, 2009 Ark. 506, 342 S.W.3d 274. On appellate review, this

court determines if summary judgment was appropriate by deciding whether the evidentiary

items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact

unanswered. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom

the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our

review focuses not only on the pleadings but also on the affidavits and other documents filed

by the parties. Id. As to issues of law presented, our review is de novo. State v. Cassell, 2013

Ark. 221, 427 S.W.3d 663.

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On appeal, Smith argues that the circuit court erred by finding that the caveat-lessee

doctrine1 barred her negligence claim because a short-term rental does not create a landlord-

tenant relationship. In making this argument, Smith claims that Brown did not have

exclusive possession of the property because Brown was like a hotel guest or lodger and only

had a right to use the house. She cites out-of-state cases discussing the difference between

hotel guests and tenants.

However, this court addressed and rejected a similar argument in Franke v. Clinton

William Holland Revocable Trust UAD Aug. 9, 2010, 2021 Ark. App. 310, 633 S.W.3d 772.

Specifically, we held that landlord-tenant principles and thus the caveat-lessee doctrine

applied to a one-night rental of a warehouse for a party. Id. We rejected the appellant’s

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Arkansas has recognized the caveat-lessee doctrine for almost a century. Under that
rule, unless a landlord agrees with his tenant to repair leased premises, he cannot, in the
absence of statute, be compelled to do so or be held liable for repairs. Hurd v. Hurt, 2017
Ark. App. 228, at 4, 519 S.W.3d 710, 712 (citing Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark. 623, 932 S.W.2d
766 (1996)). The Arkansas legislature approved of the caveat-lessee doctrine by passing Act
928 of 2005, codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-16-110. Hadder v. Heritage Hill
Manor, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 303, 495 S.W.3d 628. The statute provides as follow:

No landlord or agent or employee of a landlord shall be liable to a tenant or a
tenant’s licensee or invitee for death, personal injury, or property damage proximately
caused by any defect or disrepair on the premises absent the landlord’s:

(1) Agreement supported by consideration or assumption by conduct of a duty to
undertake an obligation to maintain or repair the leased premises; and

(2) Failure to perform the agreement or assumed duty in a reasonable manner.

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-16-110.

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argument that the short-term nature of the agreement more closely resembled a one-night

license to occupy a hotel room rather than a long-term lease. Id. As to Smith’s argument on

exclusive possession, she points to nothing in Brown’s agreement with HSPM concerning

possession that differs from any other lease.

Smith also argues that the circuit court erred by finding that the transient-guest

exception in Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-17-202(4) did not preclude application of

the caveat-lessee doctrine. She points out that HSPM charged and collected sales tax on the

short-term rental, and she claims that the transient-guest exception demonstrates that the

legislature did not intend for landlord-tenant laws to apply to transient guests.

We disagree. Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-17-202 provides, “The following

arrangements are not governed by this chapter: . . . (4) Transient occupancy in a hotel, motel,

or other accommodation subject to any sales tax on lodging.” The caveat-lessee doctrine is a

common-law principle that has been codified at chapter 16, not chapter 17, and chapter 16

does not include this exception or an exception for short-term rentals. Thus, the circuit court

did not err in finding that the transient-guest exception did not apply here.

Smith further argues that the caveat-lessee doctrine should not apply to short-term

rentals for policy reasons. She argues that a short-term-rental lessor can evade his duties to

guests and that guests can never pursue damages for negligence. She points out that short-

term guests generally do not inspect the property before their stay and will leave before

repairs can be completed.

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However, public policy is for the General Assembly to establish, not the courts.

McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith, 2012 Ark. 452, 425 S.W.3d 671; see Propst, 326 Ark. 623,

932 S.W.2d 766 (before the codification of the caveat-lessee doctrine, the supreme court

stated that a reexamination of the caveat-lessee doctrine is for the legislature due to policy

considerations and possible effect of enlarging a landlord’s liability).

Smith’s final argument is that even if the caveat-lessee doctrine applies here, HSPM

agreed with the Millers to make repairs to maintain service to tenants in the rental-

management agreement, and she claims that she is a third-party beneficiary to that

agreement. She relies on paragraph (e) which states that the

[a]gent shall arrange and supervise routine maintenance, repair, and alterations of
said Premises and shall purchase supplies and pay all bills therefore, such cost will be
deducted from Owner’s revenue. Agent agrees to secure prior approval of Owner on
all expenditures in excess of One Hundred Dollars ($100) for any one item, except
monthly or reoccurring costs and/or emergency repairs in excess of the maximum, if
in the opinion of Agent such repairs are necessary to protect the property from
damage or to maintain services to tenants.

However, the circuit court did not issue a ruling on whether Smith was a third-party

beneficiary to HSPM’s contract with the Millers. It is well settled that the failure to obtain a

ruling from the circuit court is a procedural bar to our consideration of the issue on appeal.

Hurd, 2017 Ark. App. 228, 519 S.W.3d 710. It is incumbent on the appealing party to obtain

a ruling on an issue to preserve it for review. Id. Because Smith did not obtain a ruling, we

are precluded from addressing this argument on appeal.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree.

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Law Office of Phyllis B. Eddins, PLLC, by: Phyllis B. Eddins, for appellant.

Gill Ragon Owen, P.A., by: Jason A. Lee, for appellee.

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