Gregory Dwayne Lewis III v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 368
Digitally signed by Elizabeth
Perry
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Date: 2022.07.25 11:41:41 -05'00' DIVISIONS III & IV
Adobe Acrobat version: No. CR-19-57
2022.001.20169

Opinion Delivered: September 11, 2019
GREGORY DWAYNE LEWIS III

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE MILLER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NOS. 46CR-17-737 & 46CR-17-738]

STATE OF ARKANSAS
HONORABLE BRENT HALTOM,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED

PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge

The appellant, Gregory Dwayne Lewis III, files this interlocutory appeal of a Miller

County Circuit Court order denying his motions to transfer two cases to the juvenile

division of the circuit court. On appeal, Lewis’s counsel has filed a motion to be relieved as

counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Rule 4-3(k) of the Rules

of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, explaining that an appeal of the

transfer decision would be without merit. The motion is accompanied by an

abstract, addendum, and brief concerning the proceedings related to the motion to transfer.

Counsel explained in the brief that the only adverse ruling pertinent to this interlocutory

appeal was the denial of the motion to transfer and contended that there was nothing in the

record that would arguably support an appeal. 1 We agree.

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He also addressed two other objections made at the juvenile-transfer hearing, but
neither were decided adversely to Lewis.
Procedurally, the State filed two separate charges against sixteen-year-old Lewis in

November 2017. In Miller County Circuit Court Case No. 46CR-17-737, Lewis was

charged as an adult with one count of aggravated assault and two counts of committing a

terroristic act in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-310(a)(1) (Repl. 2013)

(shooting at an occupied conveyance). In Miller County Circuit Court Case No. 46CR-

17-738, Lewis was also charged as an adult with seven counts of committing a terroristic act

in violation of section 5-13-310(a)(1) (shooting at an occupied conveyance), twenty-two

counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of second-degree battery.

Lewis filed motions to transfer these matters to juvenile court. The State responded,

arguing that Lewis was charged with very serious felonies; that the crimes were committed

in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, and willful manner; that they were crimes against

persons; and that Lewis directly participated in the crimes. 2 After a hearing, the circuit court

denied Lewis’s motions to transfer, and Lewis has appealed. Counsel has requested

permission to withdraw alleging that the appeal has no merit. In considering counsel’s

request, we will now consider the law pertinent to motions to transfer matters from the

criminal division of the circuit court to the juvenile division of the circuit court, as well as

the matters presented to the circuit court below.

Under Arkansas law, a prosecuting attorney has discretion to charge a juvenile sixteen

years of age or older in the criminal division of the circuit court if the juvenile has engaged

in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be a felony. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

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Lewis confessed to the crimes.

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318(c)(1) (Repl. 2015). However, a defendant charged in the criminal division may file a

motion to transfer to the juvenile division, and the court in which the criminal charges have

been filed must conduct a hearing to determine whether to transfer the case. Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-27-318(e).

Here, Lewis filed such a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the criminal division

of the circuit court over the charges and alleging that the juvenile division was the more

appropriate jurisdiction. The circuit court then conducted an evidentiary hearing as required

by statute. As the moving party, Lewis bore the burden of proving that the case should be

transferred. Z.T. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 282.

The circuit court in this case heard evidence that Lewis was only sixteen years old at

the time he was charged with the offenses and had no significant juvenile history. However,

Lewis was part of an allegedly violent street gang known as “Had Azz,” had participated in

and accepted responsibility for the commission of multiple violent felonies that occurred on

two separate occasions, and his actions had resulted in two people being shot. The court

was also presented with evidence that during the pendency of the charges and while Lewis

was released on bond, he was detained by the police for possessing a firearm. A search

conducted during that detention revealed live ammunition in his pocket. This resulted in

a revocation of his bond. Even Lewis’s own mother testified at the hearing that her son was

considered by some to be a leader and that he occasionally engaged in adult behavior.

At the juvenile-transfer hearing, the circuit court considered all the factors required

by statute:

(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society
requires prosecution in the criminal division of circuit court;

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(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner;

(3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight
being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;

(4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and
participation in the alleged offense;

(5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been
adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons
or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of
physical violence;

(6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration
of the juvenile’s home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire
to be treated as an adult;

(7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of the juvenile
division of circuit court that are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before the
expiration of the juvenile’s twenty-first birthday;

(8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission
of the alleged offense;

(9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile’s mental, physical,
educational, and social history; and

(10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the judge.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g). After assessing the credibility of the witnesses and

considering the weight to be given the evidence, the circuit court entered an order

addressing the statutory factors and denying Lewis’s motions to transfer.

In determining a motion to transfer, a circuit court shall order the case transferred to

another division of the circuit court only upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence

that the case should be transferred. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h)(2). Clear and convincing

evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to

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the allegation sought to be established. Z.T., supra. We will not reverse a circuit court’s

determination of whether to transfer a case unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Id. A

finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed. Id. Given the evidence presented to the circuit court below, we agree with

counsel that the transfer decision does not provide a basis for a meritorious appeal and affirm.

Based on the foregoing, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. In so doing, we

recognize our prior case law in which we have indicated that such requests should be denied

due to the interlocutory nature of the appeal. See R.J.W. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 382;

Nichols v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 12. However, in this case, it is clear from our record that

appellate counsel was appointed by our court solely for the limited purpose of perfecting

Lewis’s appeal. 3 Appellate counsel has now completed the limited task for which he was

appointed; therefore, we grant his motion to withdraw.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

KLAPPENBACH, SWITZER, and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

GLADWIN and VAUGHT, JJ., dissent.

3
On January 17, 2019, trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as the attorney on
appeal. In the motion, trial counsel stated that as a public defender, he could not be paid to
prosecute the appeal. Trial counsel noted that he had consulted with another licensed
attorney experienced in appellate work and that the other attorney was willing to accept
substitution as “counsel on this appeal.” Trial counsel also noted in his motion that Lewis
had no objection to his withdrawal as his “appointed counsel on appeal” or to the
appointment of the other attorney as his counsel “for purposes of the appeal.” Trial counsel
then requested that he be relieved as counsel and that the other attorney be appointed to
“complete the appeal.” We granted counsel’s motion on January 30, 2019.

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LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge, dissenting. I dissent from the decision of the

majority in this case because I do not believe that Anders and Rule 4-3(k) apply to

interlocutory juvenile-transfer appeals. Therefore, I would deny counsel’s motion to

withdraw and order counsel to file a merit brief.

Rule 4-3(k) traces its history back to 1963 when the United States Supreme Court

established that an accused has a constitutional right to appointed counsel on a first appeal

from a criminal conviction. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963). Later, the

Supreme Court held that appointed counsel on a first appeal from a criminal conviction

may seek to withdraw from a meritless appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

The Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987), explained the no-merit

procedure established in Anders was “a prophylactic framework” that is relevant when, and

only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel. However,

in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000), the Court stated: “We did not say that our

Anders procedure is the only prophylactic framework that could adequately vindicate this

right.” Instead, the Court described the Anders procedure as merely one method of satisfying

the requirements of the Constitution for indigent criminal appeals. Id. at 276. “States may—

and, we are confident, will—craft procedures that, in terms of policy, are superior to, or at

least as good as, that in Anders.” Id. at 276.

With these principles in mind, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted Rule 4-3(k) as

our Anders procedure. Rule 4-3(k)(1) provides:

(k) Withdrawal of Counsel.

(1) Any motion by counsel for a defendant in a criminal or a juvenile
delinquency case for permission to withdraw made after notice of appeal has been

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given shall be addressed to the Court, shall contain a statement of the reason for the
request and shall be served upon the defendant personally by first-class mail. A request
to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is wholly without merit shall be
accompanied by a brief including an abstract and Addendum. The brief shall contain
an argument section that consists of a list of all rulings adverse to the defendant made
by the circuit court on all objections, motions and requests made by either party with
an explanation as to why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal.
The abstract and Addendum of the brief shall contain, in addition to the other
material parts of the record, all rulings adverse to the defendant made by the circuit
court.

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(k)(1) (2019). This rule allows counsel for a defendant “in a criminal

or juvenile delinquency” appeal to seek permission to withdraw. Considering the Supreme

Court’s holdings in Douglas, Anders, and Finley, I believe this procedure to withdraw applies

to appointed counsel only on a first appeal from a criminal conviction or juvenile

adjudication—not interlocutory appeals in such cases. The Supreme Court has not extended

Anders to appeals beyond the first right of appeal of criminal convictions. In Finley, the Court

stated that Anders did not set down an independent constitutional command that all lawyers,

in all proceedings, must follow these particular procedures. 481 U.S. at 554–55. In that case,

the Court held that Anders does not apply to collateral postconviction proceedings. Id. at

555.

The language of Rule 4-3(k) further supports my position. Interlocutory juvenile-

transfer appeals are not expressly included in Rule 4-3(k). Other language in Rule 4-3(k)(1)

suggests it applies only to the first right of appeal of criminal or juvenile-delinquency orders

and not interlocutory ones because the rule requires all rulings adverse to the defendant to

be listed and addressed in the no-merit brief. In contrast, Rule 4-8(a)(1) and Rule 6-9(i),

which allow for no-merit appeals from involuntary-commitment cases and DHS matters,

specifically provide that the no-merit briefs filed therein need only address those adverse

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rulings arising from the hearing from which the appeal is made. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-8(a)(1),

6-9(i). Thus, Rules 4-8 and 6-9 contemplate the potential interlocutory nature of appeals

arising thereunder. If our supreme court had intended for Rule 4-3(k) to apply to the appeal

of interlocutory orders in a criminal or juvenile context, it could have easily included

language similar to that in Rules 4-8 and 6-9. It did not.

One need look no further than the title of Rule 4-3(k) to discover that the purpose

of the rule does not contemplate the no-merit procedure in the context of an interlocutory

appeal of a juvenile-transfer order. Rule 4-3(k) is entitled “Withdrawal of counsel.” By its

terms, the relief being sought under the rule is the motion to be relieved. If our court were

to agree that there is no merit to an appeal of a juvenile-transfer order, given the

interlocutory nature of the appeal, counsel should not be relieved because the case is going

to continue.

This was our holding in R.J.W. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 382. There, this court was

faced with an interlocutory no-merit appeal of a juvenile-transfer case. We affirmed the

circuit court’s granting of the motion to transfer to the circuit court but refused to allow

counsel to withdraw due to the interlocutory nature of the appeal. In doing so, we noted

that because no trial or direct appeal (in the event of a conviction) had occurred, the case

had not concluded, and counsel should not be allowed to withdraw. R.J.W., 2017 Ark.

App. 382, at 6 (citing Nichols v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 12). Where is the logic in agreeing

with counsel that the appeal has no merit but then refusing to allow counsel to withdraw—

the stated purpose of Rule 4-3—because of the interlocutory nature of the proceeding? This

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nonsensical result is yet another reason why Rule 4-3(k) should not apply to interlocutory

appeals. I would overturn R.J.W.

Applying Rule 4-3(k) to interlocutory appeals in the criminal and juvenile-

delinquency context presents another problem. If the majority is correct and Rule 4-3(k)

applies to the interlocutory appeal of juvenile-transfer orders, then pursuant to the rule,

counsel is required to list and address all adverse rulings in the no-merit brief. In this case,

there was one adverse ruling that was not addressed in counsel’s no-merit brief. The record

reveals that while Lewis was out on bond on the charges in 46CR-17-737 and 46CR-17-

738, he was detained by the police for possessing a firearm, and a search revealed live

ammunition in his pocket. The State moved to revoke Lewis’s bond, and the circuit court

granted the motion. This is an adverse ruling; however, counsel did not abstract or address

it, thereby violating Rule 4-3(k)(1).

I acknowledge that the adverse ruling regarding the bond revocation is unrelated to

the denial of the juvenile-transfer motion and is an issue that cannot be raised by

interlocutory appeal. Thus, it makes sense that in an interlocutory appeal such as this, the

only adverse rulings that should be addressed are those related to the actual order on appeal.

The adverse rulings unrelated to the juvenile-transfer order would then be addressed on

direct appeal from the conviction. However, for this court to so hold would be to ignore

the plain language of Rule 4-3(k)(1) that requires a list of all rulings adverse to the defendant

along with an explanation as to why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for

reversal. The rule as worded includes adverse rulings unrelated to the juvenile-transfer order.

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This illogical result is yet another reason why Rule 4-3(k) should not apply to interlocutory

juvenile-transfer appeals.

For all these reasons, I would deny counsel’s motion to withdraw and order rebriefing

on the merits of the interlocutory order denying Lewis’s motion to transfer his case to

juvenile court. Accordingly, I dissent.

GLADWIN, J., joins.

Joseph C. Self, for appellant.

One brief only.

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