C.S.Q. v. Cullman County Department of Human Resources

Rel: June 12, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-1038
_________________________

A.Q.

v.

Cullman County Department of Human Resources
_________________________

CL-2025-1060
_________________________

C.S.Q.

v.

Cullman County Department of Human Resources

Appeals from Cullman Juvenile Court
(JU-24-344.02)
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

FRIDY, Judge.

A.Q. ("the mother") and C.S.Q. ("the father") appeal from a

judgment of the Cullman Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")

terminating their parental rights to their child, C.Q. ("the child"). For the

reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment.

Background

The Cullman County Department of Human Resources ("DHR")

filed in the juvenile court a petition seeking the termination of the

mother's and the father's parental rights on September 19, 2025, more

than sixteen months after it took custody of the child. The juvenile court

scheduled a trial on the petition for December 3, 2025. On December 2,

2025, the father filed a motion asking the juvenile court to order his

transport from the Cullman County detention facility so that he could

attend the December 3, 2025, trial. As grounds for his request, the father

argued that the termination of parental rights is "one of the most serious

matters a parent can face" and that his "right to be present at the trial

should not be compromised." There is no written order pertaining to the

father's motion to transport, but, at the outset of the trial, the juvenile

court noted for the record that it had denied that motion. The father was

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

not present for the trial; however, he was represented by counsel at the

trial.

Kindal Beach, a DHR investigation supervisor, testified at the trial

that DHR first became involved with the family when the child was born

in November 2022 because the mother tested positive for THC. Beach

said that DHR did not intervene then, however, because the mother

reported that she was using delta-8, a psychoactive cannabinoid; the

hospital staff did not have any concerns about the parents' behavior at

the hospital; and the child's drug screen was negative.

In April 2024, about sixteen months after the child was born, DHR

received a report from Hanceville law-enforcement officials that a female

was heard screaming in the parents' apartment complex. Once officials

were able to open the door to the parents' apartment, they saw that the

mother had red marks around her neck and throat. Beach testified that

the parents gave several explanations for the red marks, saying that they

were the result of a sexual encounter, that the mother made the marks

herself, and that the father made the marks while he was trying to calm

the mother during a "mental-health episode." Law-enforcement officials

arrested the father and charged him with domestic violence; DHR took

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

the child into its care pursuant to a safety plan. That evening, Beach said,

the person caring for the child under the safety plan noticed an abnormal

amount of bruising on the child and notified DHR. The child was returned

to DHR the next morning, Beach said, because his caretakers said that

he had cried all night and they could not handle him. After a shelter-care

hearing, the child was placed in foster care. Beach said that, when the

child first entered foster care, DHR workers were concerned because of

the mother's mental-health issues. The mother reported that she was

using marijuana to help her sleep and that she was not treating her

bipolar disorder.

Stephanie Tate, a DHR foster-care worker, testified that she

worked with the parents from April 2024 until July 2025 to try to reunify

them with the child, who was three years old at the time of the trial. She

said that DHR tried to assist the parents with sobriety, attempted to have

them participate in drug screens, located services that it believed could

benefit the parents, and provided psychological evaluations and

supervised visitation to the parents. While Tate was working with them,

the parents participated in the psychological evaluations but did not

avail themselves of the other services DHR offered. They did participate

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

in visitation, however, and Tate said that, after she had had a few

conversations with the parents, they began bringing appropriate foods

for the child. During the visits, Tate said, the parents struggled with the

child's temper. She said that she knew that they loved the child, but, she

said, when the child had a "meltdown," the father especially would start

using loud language and cuss. On one occasion in April 2025, Tate said,

the foster parent had to intervene to calm the child down because both

parents were frustrated.

Tate said that, toward the end of her time working with the parents,

her communication with them was limited. She said that the parents took

only two or three drug screens while she worked with them and that, in

April 2025, they refused the last drug screen she asked them to take. Of

the drug screens the parents took, Tate said, all of them were positive for

THC and methamphetamine "at higher levels," and the father also tested

positive for morphine, suboxone, and other drugs. Tate testified that, in

August 2025, she told the mother that the mother had failed a drug

screen and that the mother initially told her that it was because she used

hemp shampoo. The mother then told Tate that, on the night the child

was removed from her care, she and a neighbor had smoked marijuana

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

and that that was probably why she had had a positive drug screen. The

father was open with Tate about his drug use.

Tate said that, after working with the parents for about fifteen

months, they had not shown any improvement toward resolving their

issues with drug use, unstable housing, and unstable employment and

could not maintain reliable transportation. Therefore, she said, DHR

believed that the child was at an increased risk of neglect and harm. After

April 2025, Tate said, she did not hear anything more from the parents.

She said that the parents' telephones "were on and off," that there was

no home address where DHR could send letters to them, and that the

parents did not communicate with DHR.

The mother testified that, when DHR had become involved with the

family, they were being evicted "due to poor choices and a lousy husband."

Tate said that, when she started working with the family, they were

homeless; they moved into a hotel in August 2024 and lived there until

December 2024, when they were evicted for nonpayment and once again

became homeless. After December 2024, Tate said, the mother and the

father lived with two individuals who DHR knew had a history of drug

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

use. She said that March 2025 was the last time that she had "decent

communication" with the parents.

Tate said that the mother, who had a history of mental illness, was

not caring for her mental-health needs and was not seeking any

psychiatric care or treatment. She said that the mother had told her that

she had attempted to obtain disability benefits for her mental-health

issues but had been denied. Tate said that she told the mother that if she

had been denied several times, she could perhaps obtain employment

that would allow her to have some stability and, toward that end,

suggested employment options within walking distance of the hotel

where the mother and the father lived. Because the mother and the

father had been evicted twice, Tate said, they had difficulty in securing

appropriate housing.

Tate said that the primary concerns DHR had with the parents

when she first began working with them were their instability, domestic-

violence and anger-management issues, and lack of protective capacity.

The parents took an anger-management course; however, Tate said, she

and a court-appointed special advocate each had completed the course in

six minutes by paying a fee and printing out a certificate. DHR asked the

7
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

parents to take an anger-management course through DHR, but, Tate

said, they told her they had completed an eight-hour course, and the

father told her that " '[he] moved the mouse. ' " Apparently, the program

shut off if the participant did not move the computer mouse, Tate said.

The father was honest about having anger problems, Tate said, but he

told her that the mother caused most of his anger. Tate said that the

father told her that he did not believe that he needed to treat his anger

issues and that his anger with the mother and with his former wife "were

simply their faults." She said that the father also became frustrated with

the child for little things like his inability to figure out a safety belt. Tate

said that, at the time of the trial, aside from the services that the parents

had not participated in, she did not know of any other services that DHR

could offer to the parents to help them with reunification efforts.

Tate testified that, when the child entered foster care, he was

behind developmentally, socially, and emotionally. For example, she said,

the child was not very mobile and was unable to communicate. The

parents had provided the child with "food pouches" instead of actual food,

Tate said, so he had difficulty swallowing at first. DHR placed the child

in early intervention and occupational therapy; he also participated in a

8
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

speech evaluation, and, in February 2025, he began play therapy. By the

December 5, 2025, trial, she said, the child had finished physical therapy

and occupational therapy, had learned how to eat, and had made progress

in his speech and his ability to play. Melissa Welch, the DHR social

worker who began working with the family in July 2025, when Tate

stopped working with them, testified that the child did not have any

emotional or physical limitations that would prevent him from being

adoptable.

Dr. Barry Wood, a clinical psychologist, performed psychological

evaluations on the mother and the father in January 2025. He said that

his evaluation of the father indicated that he was "subject to features" of

antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder,

which, he said, are resistant to treatment. He also noted that the father

admitted to having a history of substance abuse. Dr. Wood testified that

his immediate concern regarding the father was his use of cannabis and

that his long-term concern was the personality disorder. Those concerns,

he said, gave him pause about the father's ability to safely care for a

young child. Dr. Wood said that he recommended that the father comply

with mandates DHR imposed, which, he said, the father told him

9
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

included an evaluation by mental-health professionals, participating in

random drug screens, and maintaining adequate housing and

employment. Dr. Wood also recommended that the father complete, at

the least, an outpatient substance-abuse program. Tate said that the

father did not follow through with DHR on Dr. Wood's recommendations.

Dr. Wood said that the mother reported a history of depression and

anxiety as well as bipolar disorder and that she attempted to self-

medicate by smoking marijuana. He recommended that she stop

marijuana use and seek psychiatric help. He also said that, in addition

to her substance use and bipolar disorder, he could not rule out the

possibility that she suffered from a personality disorder. He diagnosed

her with cannabis-use disorder, bipolar disorder, and an unspecified

personality disorder. He said that he recommended that the mother

comply with DHR's mandates, including compliance with random drug

screens, completion of anger-management training and parenting

training, and participation in a substance-abuse evaluation and a

psychotropic-medication evaluation. He also recommended that the

mother be told that if she continued to have issues related to substance

10
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

abuse, such as a positive drug screen or other problems, she would be

required to complete a substance-abuse-treatment program.

Welch testified that, at the mother's most recent drug screen in

September 2025, the mother had tested positive for marijuana,

amphetamine, and methamphetamine; the levels for amphetamine and

methamphetamine were both relatively high, she said. Welch said that,

at an individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meeting, the mother explained

to DHR that she had smoked marijuana with a friend and that "they

must have laced the marijuana."

Welch testified that, after she began working with the parents, the

mother had initially refused to take a drug screen, but, when Welch asked

her again, she agreed to submit to the screen, which came back positive

for drug use. Welch also said that the parents had not offered any

financial or material assistance toward the child's care since he entered

foster care. According to Welch, the father had been incarcerated

awaiting the outcome of criminal charges against him, and he had not

been involved in services or visits with the child since she had been

involved with the case. She said that the child needed permanency and

11
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

stability and that, because of the amount of time the case had been open,

DHR was advocating for the termination of the parents' parental rights.

Welch testified that the mother was admitted to Bradford Health

Services ("Bradford") at the end of September 2025, the day after the last

ISP meeting, and completed a substance-abuse program there at the end

of October 2025. Tumika Noblett, a DHR employee, testified that, in

November 2025, the month before the trial, she had reached out to the

mother to obtain a records-release form from her so that DHR could

obtain her treatment records from Bradford. Welch said that, although

the mother had told her that she had put Noblett's name on the release

forms, neither she nor Noblett had received any documents from

Bradford as of the day of the trial. The mother testified that she had

talked with Bradford daily to try to get the paperwork that she needed to

complete to have her records released to DHR.

Noblett said that the mother had provided her with a new address

in Shelby County and had told her that she had applied to work as a

delivery driver for Amazon, an online retailer. Welch testified that the

mother told her that she was staying with her former husband in

Alabaster, but Welch stated that she had not been to that residence.

12
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

Later in November, Noblett said, the mother contacted her to tell her that

she had gotten the job with Amazon, so she would be unable to participate

in future ISP meetings and in color-code drug testing. The mother told

Noblett that if DHR needed drug screens, it could get them from Amazon.

The mother testified that, in the three months leading up to the

trial, she had voluntarily entered rehabilitation at Bradford, which was

also treating her for bipolar disorder. Three weeks before the trial, the

mother said, she began working ten to twelve hours a day, five or six days

a week, delivering packages for Amazon; however, she later testified that

she worked twenty to thirty-five hours a week because she was still in

training. Digital pay information indicated that the mother earned

$20.50 an hour. After the first of the year, the mother said, she would

work as a dispatcher for the delivery trucks. The mother said that, in the

three months leading to the trial, she had abstained from alcohol and

drugs, had taken a drug screen for Amazon that had produced a negative

result, and had recently quit smoking cigarettes. The day of the trial was

her sixty-first day of sobriety, she said. The mother also testified that she

had a meeting scheduled in January 2026 with a lawyer to commence

divorce proceedings against the father, who, she said, had been a

13
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

negative influence in her life. She said that "drugs and stupidity" caused

her to delay getting the help that she needed.

The mother said that, at the time of the trial, she lived with her

former husband and their nine-year-old child, whom they coparented.1

Her former husband testified that he was prepared to let the mother and

the child live with him for "an unlimited amount of time." The mother

said that she and her former husband divorced in June 2022, that, by

agreement, the former husband had "custodial guardianship" of their

child so that he could enroll her in school, and that they shared "joint

custody," although, she said, there was no court order involved and no

child support had been ordered. Her former mother-in-law, who had had

a stroke, also lived with the former husband. The mother said that she

had needed to move away from Cullman County because that was where

she would get high and where she had connections.

The mother testified that she believed that it was in the child's best

interest to be with her and the child's half sibling and to be surrounded

1The mother testified that her birthdate was April 25, 1999, and

that she was thirty-four years old. If that birthdate is correct, then, on
December 3, 2025, the day of the trial, the mother would have been
twenty-six years old.
14
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

by family. She said that she stays in a room in the former husband's

house that is away from the family so that she and the child can reconnect

and she can parent the child without her former husband's involvement.

She said that she could provide for the child, and, when asked whether

she had heard that the child had some "delay issues," the mother

responded by describing the day-care facility where the child would

attend, noting that the child's older half sibling had gone there and was

in an advanced class for math and engineering.

When the child was first taken into foster care, Beach said, the

mother provided DHR with her sister's name as a possible relative

placement. However, a DHR worker recognized the sister from a previous

report, and DHR determined that the sister was not an appropriate

placement for the child. The mother did not provide DHR with any other

names of relatives at that time, Beach said. Tate testified that, when she

worked with the family, she sought out family resources for the child,

and, although she believed that she had identified some that were

appropriate, they had declined to serve in January 2025. The child's

maternal grandmother had a history with DHR, Tate said, and the

mother advised her that the maternal grandmother used drugs. The

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

mother did not want the child placed with the maternal grandmother.

The mother also identified her former husband, J.C., as a possible

resource. When she contacted J.C., Tate said, he told her he was an

amputee and was unable to manage a toddler.

Tate said that the child's paternal grandmother was in poor health

and unable to care for the child and that she had a history with her own

children with DHR. The father's eighteen-year-old son was identified as

a relative resource, but he was denied because, Tate said, it was not

appropriate for an eighteen-year-old to take on caring for a two-year-old.

Additionally, Tate said, the father's eighteen-year-old son lived with his

own mother, who was the father's ex-wife, and she said that she did not

want the child in her home. The father's two siblings were appropriate,

Tate said, but one of the siblings reported that the father had threatened

to kill her in January 2025, and both siblings told DHR that they did not

feel safe bringing the child into their homes.

On cross-examination, Tate was asked whether the mother's

possible biological father, who lived in Kentucky, or her legal father had

been explored as possible relative resources. Tate said that she had not

seen any information regarding those two men. Welch testified that the

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

mother had told her that she did not know whether the man in Kentucky

actually was her biological father, so, the mother said, they were going to

have a DNA test performed and she would notify Welch of the results.

Welch said that she could not reach out to the mother's possible biological

father until DHR had verified that he was a relative. The line of

questioning ended without Welch confirming whether the man in

Kentucky was, in fact, the mother's biological father. Welch said that the

mother had not told her about her legal father. The mother testified that

her possible biological father and his wife were willing to take in the child

and had purchased bedroom furniture for him.

On December 5, 2025, the juvenile court entered a judgment finding

that the mother and the father had failed to comply with DHR's

recommendations and had been unable to make improvements to their

situation. It also found that the child was in need of permanency and

stability. It found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that

the mother and the father were unable or unwilling to discharge their

responsibilities to and for the child and that their conduct or conditions

were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Finally, the juvenile

court found that there were no relative resources available who were

17
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

appropriate for the child for either temporary or permanent placement.

Based on its findings, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights

of both the mother and the father and ordered that the child was freed

for adoption.

The mother and the father filed separate motions to alter, amend,

or vacate the judgment, which the juvenile court denied. They appealed

separately, and, on December 19, 2025, this court entered an order

consolidating the appeals.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a juvenile court's judgment terminating a parent's

parental rights, this court must determine whether the record contains

clear and convincing evidence to support the judgment. See J.H. v. Bibb

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 261 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).

Clear and convincing evidence is " '[e]vidence that, when weighed against

evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm

conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability

as to the correctness of the conclusion. ' " L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171,

179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (quoting § 6-11-20(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975). See

also Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 776 (Ala. 2008).

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

Our task in reviewing a judgment terminating parental rights is

not to reevaluate the evidence but rather "to specifically consider

whether the juvenile court could have reasonably reached the conclusion

that it did." Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1060 (Ala. 2022) (emphasis

omitted). When the juvenile court's findings are based upon ore tenus

evidence, we presume that those findings are correct unless they are

plainly and palpably wrong. See C.S.B. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 26

So. 3d 426, 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala.

2007). We review a juvenile court's conclusions of law de novo. See J.W.

v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

Analysis

The mother first contends that the record does not contain clear and

convincing evidence that grounds for terminating her parental rights

existed or that her current conditions warranted the termination of her

parental rights. Instead, she argues, the evidence indicated that, at the

time of the trial, she had demonstrated "significant efforts" to adjust her

circumstances to resolve her substance-abuse problems and to be a

suitable custodian for the child. The father does not challenge the

juvenile court's finding that grounds existed for the termination of his

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

parental rights; therefore, our analysis regarding this issue pertains only

to the mother.

A juvenile court may terminate a parent's parental rights if the

party seeking the termination proves, by clear and convincing evidence,

that (1) one of the grounds for termination specified in § 12-15-319(a),

Ala. Code 1975, exists and (2) no viable alternative to terminating the

parent's parental rights exists. See J.C.L. v. J.B.L., 370 So. 3d 254, 262

(Ala. Civ. App. 2022). Under § 12-15-319(a), grounds for terminating

parental rights exist if clear and convincing evidence supports a finding

that the parents "are unable or unwilling to discharge their

responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or condition of

the parents renders them unable to properly care for the child and that

the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future."

The statute provides a list of thirteen nonexhaustive factors a court

should consider in determining whether grounds exist for terminating

parental rights. Among those factors are evidence of a parent's mental

illness or "excessive use of alcohol or controlled substances, of a duration

or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the needs of the child,"

§ 12-15-319(a)(2); that reasonable efforts by DHR to assist the parent

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

toward reunification with the child have failed, § 12-15-319(a)(7); that

the parent has failed to provide for the material needs of the child, § 12-

15-319(a)(9); and that a parent has demonstrated a lack of effort to adjust

his or her circumstances to meet the needs of the child, § 12-15-

319(a)(12). From a timing standpoint, "the existence of evidence of

current conditions or conduct relating to a parent's inability or

unwillingness to care for his or her children is implicit in the requirement

that termination of parental rights be based on clear and convincing

evidence." D.O. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 859 So. 2d 439, 444

(Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (emphasis omitted).

The evidence, as previously outlined, indicates that the mother has

a history of mental illness that she was failing to treat, a history of

substance abuse, and a history of an inability to maintain steady housing

and employment. She also failed to provide any material support for the

child while the child was in foster care. However, as the mother points

out, in the three months leading up to the trial, she finally took the steps

toward reunification that DHR had been asking her to take since the

child was first taken into custody at least a year and a half earlier. She

had been employed for three weeks, had made plans to divorce the father,

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

on whom she blamed a lot of her problems, and had moved in with her

former husband, who had custody of his and the mother's child. After the

last ISP meeting in September 2025, the mother sought treatment at

Bradford for her drug abuse, and, she said, she was also receiving

treatment for her mental illness through Bradford.

However, the evidence also indicated that she had abused illegal

drugs throughout the vast majority of the child's life; the mother used

drugs while she was pregnant with the child, and the results of her drug

screens while the child was in DHR's care indicated that she had

continued to take illegal drugs throughout the proceedings. She had been

sober only sixty-one days at the time of the trial, and that period included

the time that she was at Bradford. The juvenile court could have been

clearly convinced that, given the mother's history of drug use, sixty-one

days was not a sufficient time to ensure that the mother could remain

sober and successfully parent the child. Indeed, the juvenile court was

entitled to consider the mother's late attempts to cooperate with DHR "to

be merely unpersuasive, last-minute efforts intended only to forestall

termination rather than legitimate efforts by the mother to change her

circumstances." K.H. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 384 So. 3d

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

641, 655 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). See also A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't

of Hum. Res., 75 So. 3d 1206, 1213 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); K.J. v. Pike

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 275 So. 3d 1135, 1145 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).

Based on the totality of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the juvenile

court's determination that grounds existed for the termination of the

mother's parental rights was plainly and palpably wrong.

The mother also contends that clear and convincing evidence does

not support the juvenile court's conclusion that the second prong

necessary to terminate her parental rights was met, that is, whether

clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's

determination that no viable alternative to termination existed and that

termination would serve the best interests of the child.2 The mother more

2In
its responsive brief, DHR contends that this issue was not
preserved for appellate review. In its judgment, the juvenile court made
limited factual findings, including that there were no viable alternatives
to the termination of the parents' parental rights and that DHR had
explored relative resources but had not found any that were appropriate.
The mother filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate in which she set
forth a number of factual assertions. Although she never explicitly
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, she ended her motion with the
statement that the judgment "should be reconsidered." Although this
case presents a close question as to whether the issue was preserved, see
New Props., L.L.C. v. Stewart, 905 So. 2d 797, 801-02 (Ala. 2004), we
conclude that it was.
23
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

specifically argues that, because DHR allegedly failed to present evidence

regarding whether an adoptive resource had been identified for the child

or whether the child was adoptable, the juvenile court erred in

terminating her parental rights. She contends that permanency through

adoption is an "essential element of DHR's case that must be proved"

before the juvenile court could properly terminate her parental rights.

The mother's brief at 27.

When DHR seeks to terminate a parent's parental rights, the

juvenile court must consider "whether the termination the government

seeks furthers a compelling governmental interest." M.P. v. DeKalb Cnty.

Dep't of Hum. Res., 394 So. 3d 1080, 1086 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). "Such

compelling interests may include, for example, protecting children from

abuse and neglect and establishing stable and permanent home

environments for at-risk children." Id. Assuming the existence of a

compelling governmental interest, the question a court must answer next

is whether terminating the parent's parental rights is necessary to

advance that compelling interest, or, put another way, a court "must

consider whether the government seeks to advance its interest in a

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manner that infringes the parent's parental rights in the narrowest

manner possible." Id.

Here, the child's placement in foster care has protected him from

abuse and neglect at the hands of his parents, so the question that arises

is whether termination is necessary to support a different governmental

interest, such as establishing a stable and permanent home environment

for the child. Termination could be the narrowest way possible to advance

that interest if, by terminating the parents' parental rights, the state

could provide the child with a stable and permanent home environment

through adoption. However, if the evidence provides no basis for believing

that the child will not simply remain in foster care regardless of the

termination of the parents' parental rights, there would be no basis on

which to conclude that the government, by that termination, has

advanced a compelling interest. That appears to be the case here.

This case is similar to D.M. v. Dale County Department of Human

Resources, 413 So. 3d 750, 755-56 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), in which this

court reversed judgments terminating the parents' parental rights after

determining that the Dale County Department of Human Resources ("the

Dale County DHR") had not demonstrated that the termination would

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

lead to the permanency and stability that it was intended to achieve. In

D.M., the children at issue had special needs -- one child had asthma and

autism that affected his behavior and speech and the other child had been

diagnosed with anxiety -- which, we said, impeded their adoption

prospects. D.M., 413 So. 3d at 754. Additionally, the children's foster

mother testified that the children should be kept together because one of

them thrived when he was with his sibling. Id. In terminating the

parents' parental rights, the juvenile court in that case found, among

other things, that "it would be in the best interests of the children to

terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father so that the

children could be freed for adoption." Id.

In analyzing whether termination of the parents' parental rights

were in the children's best interests, we quoted from our opinion in J.A.

v. S.L., 406 So. 3d 129 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), in which we wrote that, to

properly terminate a parent's parental rights, " ' at a minimum ' " the

juvenile court was to " ' f ocus on whether termination of the legal

relationship between the child and the parent will protect the welfare of

the child and promote the stability and permanency of the child.' " D.M.,

413 So. 3d at 755 (quoting J.A., 406 So. 3d at 140). We pointed out that

26
CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

the foster parents had not testified that they intended to adopt the

children and that the Dale County DHR had not presented evidence

indicating that it had identified any other adoptive resource or that the

children would likely be adopted. Id. Under those circumstances, we held,

"the juvenile court could not have reasonably determined that adoption

was a likely outcome for the children or that their permanency interests

would be advanced by termination of the mother's and the father's

parental rights." Id. at 756.

In this case, the juvenile court did not make a specific finding that

termination of the parents' parental rights would be in the best interests

of the child. It also made no specific finding that the child was adoptable.

In terminating the parents' parental rights, the juvenile court granted

DHR the authority to proceed with permanent plans and placement for

the child. However, our review of the record indicates that DHR failed to

present any evidence, including any ISPs, establishing a permanency

plan for the child. The child's foster parents did not testify, and no one

from DHR indicated that the foster parents intended to adopt the child

or that any other adoptive resource had been identified for the child.

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

T.W. v. Calhoun County Department of Human Resources, 391 So.

3d 306 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), involved the termination of parental rights

of the parents of one child who had been diagnosed with ADHD and

required medication for that disorder, as well as educational assistance,

and of a second child who had a speech impediment who required

biweekly therapy sessions. We found that, under the Department of

Human Resources regulations, the children qualified as special-needs

children, and the juvenile court in that case was required to consider

whether the children would likely achieve permanency through adoption.

Id. at 316 (citing Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-22-.06

(defining a special-needs child, for the purposes of subsidized adoption,

as, among other things, a child who is over five years of age; who is in a

group of two or more siblings seeking joint adoption; who has a physical

disability; or who is receiving ongoing medical treatment for an emotional

or behavioral issue)). We held that, under the circumstances, "it was

incumbent upon [the Calhoun County Department of Human Resources]

to present clear and convincing evidence of the viability of adoption so

that the juvenile court could make an informed evaluation and decision."

Id.

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

In this case, at the time of the trial, the child had not completed

speech therapy and was still attending play therapy; thus, he may have

qualified as a child with special needs under Department of Human

Resources regulation 660-5-22-.06(2)(a)2.(ii) (describing a special-needs

child as a child who "has a known emotional disturbance/behavioral issue

that requires on-going treatment and that has been documented by a

mental health professional"). At the very least, the evidence

demonstrates that the child has an ongoing need for services. Welch

testified that the child was adoptable; however, she offered no basis for

her belief despite the undisputed evidence regarding the child's speech

limitations and his continued involvement in play therapy. In short, her

unsupported statement is merely conclusory, which does not rise to the

level of clear and convincing evidence. See Reid v. Jefferson Cnty., 672

So. 2d 1285, 1290 (Ala. 1995) (holding that statement in an affidavit that

a bridge hampered ingress to and egress from party's property was

conclusory and did not constitute substantial evidence). The lack of

evidence demonstrating the viability of adoption for the child, coupled

with the lack of the identification of an adoptive resource or even a

permanency plan for the child, leads us to conclude that the juvenile court

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

did not have sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the child was

likely to achieve the permanency and stability that termination of the

mother's parental rights was intended to achieve, and, therefore, it could

not properly terminate those rights.

In his appellate brief, the father also challenged the juvenile court's

determination that there were no viable alternatives to the termination

of his parental rights, albeit on the general ground that DHR did not

perform due diligence in determining whether there existed a less

restrictive means than termination of his parental rights and his

contention that DHR workers were unaware whether certain relative

resources existed. In W.A. v. Calhoun County Department of Human

Resources, 211 So. 3d 849 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), a juvenile court

terminated both the mother's and the father's parental rights. This court

reversed the portion of the judgment terminating the father's parental

rights after determining that the Calhoun County Department of Human

Resources ("the Calhoun County DHR") had failed to make reasonable

efforts to reunite the father and the child. Regarding the judgment

terminating the mother's parental rights, we observed that the Calhoun

County DHR was not under a duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

the mother and the child, which was apparently the issue the mother

raised on appeal. Id. at 853. However, because we had reversed the

judgment terminating the father's parental rights, we also reversed the

judgment terminating the mother's parental rights, explaining that "the

father may prove to be a suitable custodian who could supervise

visitation of the mother and the child, which would be a viable alternative

to terminating the mother's parental rights." Id. Here, if the mother's

circumstances continue to improve and she can later demonstrate the

stability DHR requests of her, she, too, may one day be a suitable

custodian for the child who could supervise visitation with the father.

Accordingly, the judgment terminating the parental rights of the

mother and the father must be reversed. Because we are reversing the

judgment, we pretermit discussion of the remaining issues the parents

assert in their respective briefs.

Conclusion

The record lacks sufficient evidence from which the juvenile court

could determine that the termination of the parents' parental rights was

likely to achieve the permanent and stable home for the child that the

termination was intended to achieve or that the termination was in the

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CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060

child's best interests. Therefore, we reverse the judgment terminating

the parents' parental rights, and we remand the case to that court to take

further action consistent with this opinion.

CL-2025-1038 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

CL-2025-1060 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.

Bowden, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

32