G.M.B. v. J.J.B.

Rel: May 15, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-0545
_________________________

G.M.B.

v.

J.J.B.

Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court
(CV-24-900136)

BOWDEN, Judge.

G.M.B. ("the husband") appeals from two orders of the Chilton

Circuit Court ("the circuit court"), the first denying the husband's motion

for the circuit-court judge to recuse himself and the second finding the
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husband in contempt for violating a temporary protection-from-abuse

order and awarding attorney's fees to J.J.B. ("the wife").

Procedural History

On July 8, 2024, the wife filed a petition for a protection-from-abuse

order against the husband, which commenced a protection-from-abuse

action ("the PFA action"). See Alabama Protection from Abuse Act ("the

PFA Act"), See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-1 et seq. In her petition, the wife

stated that the parties were married on October 19, 2019. She alleged

that the husband had made her fear that she would be seriously injured

and that he had engaged in reckless conduct that risked injury to her.

She also alleged specifically that, on February 8, 2024, the husband had

kicked in their bedroom door and had shaken and shoved her and that,

on July 3, 2024, the husband had pushed her. The wife also stated that

the husband was following her.

On July 9, 2024, the circuit court set the PFA action for a hearing

and entered an ex parte protective order ("the PFA order") barring the

husband from any contact with the wife until further order of the court.

On August 26, 2024, the husband filed a motion to set aside the PFA

order and to dismiss the PFA action. On September 5, 2024, the husband

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filed an amended motion to set aside the PFA order and to dismiss the

PFA action. In his amended motion, the husband argued that he had not

been served with a signed copy of the wife's petition and that the petition

had not been signed at all.

On September 6, 2024, the husband filed a motion to consolidate

the PFA action with an action initiated by the wife for a divorce from the

husband, which had been assigned case number DR-24-900093 ("the

divorce action")1. On September 6, 2024, the wife filed a response to the

husband's motions to set aside the PFA order and to dismiss the PFA

action. In her response, the wife asserted that the husband had been

aware of the petition and had multiple copies of it, that she needed the

PFA order to stay in place for her personal safety, and that she had

signed her petition when it was filed.

On September 10, 2024, the circuit court entered an order

consolidating the PFA action and the divorce action. On September 12,

2024, the circuit court entered an order that stated that the husband had

been served an unsigned copy of the petition for protection from abuse

1The husband appeals only from orders entered in the PFA action.

He does not appeal from any order entered in the divorce action.
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but that the petition had been subsequently signed. The circuit court also

left the PFA order in place, resetting the case for hearing on September

18, 2024.

The circuit court entered an order on September 19, 2024, that

stated that the parties had agreed to leave the PFA order in place. The

September 19, 2024, order also stated that counsel for the husband would

take possession of the husband's firearms within 10 days to facilitate

transferring possession of those items to the husband. On October 1,

2024, the husband filed four documents: a motion for pendente lite relief,

in which he stated that he had left the parties' marital residence when

they separated and had been unable to retrieve many of his personal

belongings and requested that he be permitted to return to the marital

residence to retrieve his belongings; a motion seeking to hold with wife

in contempt, in which he stated that the wife had not facilitated the

exchange of the husband's firearms as previously ordered by the court; a

motion to compel the issuance of several subpoenas; and a notice of

service reflecting that he had served a notice of deposition on the wife.

On October 2, 2024, the wife filed a response to the husband's

motion for contempt. In her response, the wife stated that she had

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delivered the husband's firearms to her attorney's office on October 1,

2024, and that the parties' attorneys would coordinate a time to exchange

the firearms. On October 8, 2024, the husband filed three documents: a

notice of service of discovery documents that indicated that he had served

an amended notice of deposition on the wife; a motion to compel the wife

to provide responses to interrogatories and requests for production of

documents; and a motion to schedule a hearing for his pending motions

for contempt, to compel issuance of subpoenas, for pendente lite relief,

and to compel discovery responses.

On October 17, 2024, the husband filed a notice of service of

discovery documents that indicated that he had served a second amended

notice of deposition on the wife. No response to the husband's motion to

compel discovery responses appears in the record; however, the husband

filed a reply to the wife's response to his motion to compel discovery

responses on October 18, 2024. In his reply, the husband stated that he

did not object to allowing the wife two additional weeks to respond to

discovery.

Also on October 18, 2024, the husband filed a response to a motion

for a protective order. Based on the contents of that motion and the

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husband's assertions in his brief, that filing is in response to a motion for

a protective order that is not contained in the record on appeal. In his

response, the husband stated that he did not object to canceling and

rescheduling a deposition that was set for the following week. On October

24, 2024, the husband filed a motion to set aside an order that does not

appear in the record.

On October 28, 2024, the husband filed a renewed motion for a

hearing date, requesting that the circuit court set a hearing for the

following motions: the husband's motion for contempt; the husband's

motion to compel the issuance of several subpoenas; the husband's

motion for pendente lite relief; the husband's motion to compel discovery

responses; and the husband's October 24, 2024, motion to set aside an

order that is not in the record. On November 6, 2024, the husband filed

a notice of service of discovery documents that indicated that he had

served a third amended notice of deposition on the wife.

On November 11, 2024, the husband filed a motion for an

immediate status conference, in which he stated that he was also joining

the wife's motion for an immediate status conference. The wife's motion

does not appear in the record before us. On November 14, 2024, the

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circuit court entered an order setting the PFA action and the divorce

action for a hearing on December 19, 2024, to address the status of the

cases and all pending motions. On November 20, 2024, the husband filed

a notice of service of discovery documents indicating that he had served

a fourth amended notice of deposition on the wife. On December 4, 2024,

the husband filed a motion to compel the wife's deposition.

On December 5, 2024, the wife filed a motion to show cause, in

which she stated that the husband had continuously violated the PFA

order by making posts on social-media websites directed to or concerning

her. She asserted that the husband should be required to show cause as

to why he should not be found in contempt and have sanctions issued

against him. On December 6, 2024, the husband filed a response to the

wife's motion to show cause and moved to strike exhibits that the wife

had filed in support of that motion.

On December 19, 2024, the circuit court entered an order that

stated, in pertinent part:

"Case called this date on multiple motions. Parties present.
Parties' counsel of record present. [The husband's] counsel
asks to hold and continue all of their Motions except the
Motion to set aside Order on depositions. [The wife] presented
their Show Cause Motion and [the husband] gave their

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response. Court gave additional directive to the [the husband]
to have no contact with [the wife].

"ORDERED,

"1. All [of the husband's] Motions continued.

"2. Order set aside, insofar as [the husband's] being able to
attend the deposition of [the wife], if it should be held.

"3. Discovery in these cases is limited to the issue of the listed
items to be returned to [the husband].

"4. Sanction issue on the Contempt taken under advisement."

On January 24, 2025, the wife filed a motion for sanctions that referred

to the December 19, 2024, order of the circuit court. In her motion, the

wife asserted that the husband had continued to post comments directed

to her through an electronic picture-frame device. On January 26, 2025,

the circuit court entered an order setting all pending motions for a

hearing on January 29.

On January 28, 2025, the husband filed what he styled as a

renewed motion to continue the hearing, though no preceding motion to

continue appears in the record before us. Also on January 28, 2025, the

husband filed a motion for the recusal of the circuit-court judge, Sibley

G. Reynolds. In his motion, the husband argued that he had filed several

motions that had never been ruled on or had been ruled on in an untimely

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manner. The husband argued that, by contrast, Judge Reynolds had

promptly ruled on or scheduled hearings for motions that had been filed

by the wife. Although there is no order continuing the hearing set for

January 29, 2025, it appears that no hearing was conducted on that date.

On February 24, 2025, the husband filed a motion for an expedited

hearing on his motion for recusal. He filed a renewed motion for an

expedited hearing on his motion for recusal on February 26, 2025.

On March 9, 2025, the circuit court set the husband's motion for

recusal for a hearing on March 13, 2025. On March 10, 2025, the husband

filed a motion to reschedule that hearing, citing a conflict of counsel for

the husband. On March 11, 2025, the circuit court set the PFA action and

the divorce action for final disposition on April 16, 2025. The husband

filed a motion for clarification on March 18, 2025, requesting that the

circuit court specify whether his motion for recusal would be heard on

April 16, 2025. On March 26, 2025, the circuit court entered an order

setting all motions filed in the PFA action for a hearing on April 14, 2025.

On April 7, 2025, the husband filed a motion to stay all rulings on

any motions other than his motion for recusal. On April 11, 2025, the wife

filed a response to the husband's motion for recusal.

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On April 14, 2025, the parties appeared before the circuit court for

a hearing. The parties indicated at that hearing that they had reached

an agreement to settle the divorce action. The terms of the settlement

addressed the return of the husband's personal property. The parties

agreed that the PFA action would remain pending and requested a

review hearing for that action later in the year. The parties agreed that

the wife's pending January 2025 motion for sanctions and the PFA order

itself would be dismissed at the upcoming review hearing if no further

issues between the parties occurred. The parties did not address any

other pending motions, particularly the husband's motion for recusal.

On April 14, 2025, the circuit court entered an order denying the

husband's motion for recusal. On that same date, the circuit court

entered an order that stated that the PFA action would remain active

while the parties settled the divorce action. The order stated, in pertinent

part: "Case being addressed in the [divorce action]. [The PFA action] to

remain pending while the [divorce action is] being settled. [The PFA

action] is set for review, with pending sanction motion remaining active.

Review is set for July 2, 2025, at 9:00 a.m."

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On July 2, 2025, the parties appeared before the circuit court for

the review hearing in the PFA action. Counsel for the wife called the

husband to testify, and counsel for the husband objected and argued that,

because the wife had not filed a new motion for sanctions or contempt,

presenting evidence of any new violation of the PFA order violated the

husband's due-process rights. That objection was overruled. Counsel for

the wife then asked the husband if he had reshared an old video of

himself and the wife on the social media website Facebook in May 2025,

and the husband denied having done so. The husband testified that the

circuit court had previously admonished him for making social-media

postings directed to the wife during the pendency of the PFA action. The

wife testified that she had received a screenshot of the husband's May

2025 post from her daughter and was concerned by it because the

husband had a history of making social-media posts directed to or about

her. She requested that the circuit court order the husband to pay her

attorney's fees in the amount of $5,000 for her efforts to enforce the PFA

order. She also requested that the circuit court leave the PFA order in

place.

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On July 9, 2025, the circuit court entered an order finding that the

husband had violated the PFA order. The order stated, in pertinent part:

"Upon testimony being taken from both parties, the
Court finds that [the husband], who is under a Protection
from Abuse Order of 'No Contact,' violated the same by
contact with [the wife] on social media, by publishing an old
photograph of the parties on vacation.

"The parties have previously been before this Court on
an allegation of contempt by violation of the PFA Order with
other publication on social media. The first allegation was
continued with admonishment by the Court to have no
contact.

"[The wife] is asking for monetary sanctions rather than
incarceration, therefore, IT IS ORDERED, that [the husband]
is taxed with attorney's fee in the sum of $5,000.00, to be paid
to [the wife] as reimbursement for fees paid to enforce this
PFA.

"The PFA remains in effect for 60 days, with the
continuing Order as No Contact."

(Capitalization in original). The husband timely appealed on July 11,

2025.

Analysis

I. Whether the circuit court erred in denying the husband's motion for

recusal

The husband argues that Judge Reynolds displayed a personal bias

in favor of counsel for the wife and that a reasonable person would have

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a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. The husband

asserts that Judge Reynolds ignored his motions but promptly responded

to motions filed by counsel for the wife. He also argues that the

procedural history of the case suggests that ex parte communications

took place between Judge Reynolds and counsel for the wife, although the

husband does not present any evidence indicating that such

communications actually occurred.

As an initial matter, a party may seek review of a denial of a motion

for recusal in two ways -- by a timely filed petition for the writ of

mandamus or by appeal, having properly preserved the issue below. See

Ex parte Crawford, 686 So. 2d 196, 198 (Ala. 1996).

The record is clear that that the matter before this court seeking

review of the denial of the recusal motion is an appeal and not a petition

for the writ of mandamus. It is also equally clear that there has not been

a final judgment in the PFA action. When a party files a petition for a

PFA order,

"[t]he court may enter such temporary ex parte protection
orders as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff or
children from abuse, or the immediate and present danger of
abuse to the plaintiff or children, upon good cause shown. The
court shall grant or deny a petition for a temporary ex parte
protection order filed under [the PFA Act] within three

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business days of the filing of the petition. Any granted
temporary ex parte protection order shall be effective until the
final hearing date."

Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-6(b) (emphasis added). Nothing in the record

indicates that a final hearing had taken place regarding the PFA order

allowing us to construe the circuit court's July 9, 2025, order as a final

order in the PFA action. The parties appeared before the circuit court to

discuss violations of the temporary PFA order, case-status updates, and

various motions; however, nothing in the record indicates that there was

a hearing at which both parties discussed the allegations contained in

the wife's original petition for protection from abuse. In fact, the record

indicates that the parties had agreed to dismiss the PFA action pursuant

to certain terms, which suggests that the PFA action was still ongoing.

When the wife raised a new alleged violation of the PFA order, the

parties did not then request that the PFA action be dismissed, and no

order, therefore, reflects that the PFA action was dismissed. The circuit

court ordered only that the temporary PFA order remain in place for an

additional 60 days; there has been no final order or hearing in the PFA

action. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-7(d)(2) ("Any final protection order is

of permanent duration unless otherwise specified or modified by a

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subsequent court order."). Therefore, we dismiss the husband's appeal of

the order denying his motion for recusal as an appeal from a case in which

there has not been a final judgment. McConico v. Carroll, 891 So. 2d 328,

330 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) ("[T]he judgment is not final and will not

support an appeal.").

An appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal, unless the

appeal is authorized by a statute or a rule of procedure. See Grall v.

Grall, [Ms. SC-2025-0346, Mar. 13, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2026).

Section 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes appeals from final

judgments. Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., authorizes appeals arising from

certain types of interlocutory orders. And Rule 70A(g)(1) and (2), Ala. R.

Civ. P., authorizes appellate review of an order holding a party in

contempt. Neither § 12-22-2 nor Rule 4(a)(1) nor Rule 70A(g) allows for a

direct appeal of an order denying a motion to recuse, which is an

interlocutory order. See Grall, ___ So. 3d at ___ (holding that order

denying motion to recuse neither "qualif[ies] as a final judgment that

would support an appeal" nor is "a type of interlocutory order from which

Rule 4(a)(1)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] authorizes a direct appeal"); see also Rule

70A(g) (noting that "the adjudication [of contempt] is reviewable by

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appeal"). Thus, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider a direct

appeal from an interlocutory order denying a motion to recuse.

The dissenters reason that we can nonetheless perform appellate

review of such an order because it was "subsumed in a final judgment

entered in a contempt proceeding." Alabama does allow for the review of

an interlocutory order in an appeal from a final judgment. But that

principle does not apply here for two reasons: (1) there was no "final

judgment" and (2) no order was entered in a separate "contempt

proceeding."

First, the "contempt proceeding" was not a contempt action

separate from the underlying PFA action. The wife filed her motion to

show cause and her motion for sanctions in the PFA action. The ensuing

contempt proceeding was therefore an interlocutory contempt

proceeding. Interlocutory contempt proceedings -- held to consider

interlocutory contempt claims -- are a part of the action in which they are

filed; they are not separate, independent proceedings from the

underlying action. Decker v. Decker, 984 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Ala. Civ. App.

2007) ("[T]he filing of each [interlocutory] contempt motion does not

initiate a separate and independent proceeding."). In fact, interlocutory

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contempt claims are so intertwined with the underlying actions in which

they are asserted that, when a trial court's order explicitly reserves

ruling on a contempt claim, the failure to rule on that claim renders the

order nonfinal. See Rule 70A(g)(3). Thus, the trial court did not enter a

"final judgment" in a contempt proceeding; it entered an order in the PFA

action adjudicating the wife's interlocutory contempt claims asserted in

the PFA action.

Second, the order adjudicating the wife's contempt claims is not a

"final judgment"; it is, in this case, an interlocutory order that is

appealable under Rule 70A(g). "A final judgment is one that resolves all

claims against all parties." Grall, ___ So. 3d at ___ n. 1 (citing Jakeman

v. Lawrence Grp. Mgmt. Co., 82 So. 3d 655, 659 (Ala. 2011)) (emphasis

added). The contempt order adjudicates the contempt claims, and Rule

70A(g)(1) and (2) authorize an appeal from the order adjudicating those

claims. See Rule 70A(g)(2), (noting that "the adjudication [of contempt] is

reviewable by appeal"). But simply because Rule 70A(g) authorizes an

appeal from an order adjudicating a contempt claim does not transform

that order into a final judgment in the underlying action, in the same

way that appellate review of an interlocutory order under Rule 4(a)(1)

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does not transform the interlocutory order into a "final judgment." To be

a final judgment, the order must "resolve[] all claims against all parties."

Grall, ___ So. 3d at ___ n. 1. Here, the contempt order adjudicated the

wife's contempt claims, but it did not adjudicate any other claims in the

PFA action. The contempt order is, therefore, not a "final judgment."

Alabama cases have held that interlocutory orders may be reviewed

upon the entry of a final judgment in the action. But that general

principle may not be applied here. There was no "final judgment," and

the contempt order was not entered in a separate "contempt proceeding."

The dissenters' reliance on Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n

v. Tucker, 192 Conn. 1, 469 A.2d 778 (1984), a Connecticut decision from

1984, is not compelling. Connecticut courts assess whether a contempt

claim is appealable using a two-part test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191

Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). N.D.R. Liuzzi, Inc. v. Lighthouse

Litho, LLC, 144 Conn. App. 613, 619, 75 A.3d 694, 698 (2013); Khan v.

Hillyer, 306 Conn. 205, 210, 49 A.3d 996, 999 (2012) ("In order to resolve

this appeal, we must determine whether the trial court's contempt order

satisfies either prong of Curcio."). If the contempt claim passes

the Curcio test, it is appealable and considered a "final appealable

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judgment." Id. Alabama has not adopted a test similar to the Curcio test

to determine if a contempt order is a final judgment and therefore

appealable. Instead, in Alabama, a party can appeal an interlocutory

contempt order because the Alabama Supreme Court promulgated Rule

70A(g), which permits an appeal from an "adjudication of contempt." An

interlocutory contempt order is therefore final as to the contempt claims

it adjudicates and appealable under Rule 70A(g), but it is not a "final

judgment" that necessarily renders other interlocutory orders in the

underlying action subject to appeal.

An order denying a motion to recuse is an interlocutory order that,

although not listed in Rule 4(a)(1), is subject to review by this court via a

petition for the writ of mandamus. Ex parte Crawford, 686 So. 2d at 198.

Creating an exception to allow appellate review of interlocutory orders

"subsumed" into an interlocutory contempt order, as the dissenters

propose, would provide an unnecessary and potentially unbounded

avenue for this court to exercise appellate review of interlocutory orders

not specified in Rule 4(a)(1).

II. Whether the husband's due-process rights were violated during the

July 2, 2025, hearing when the circuit court allowed new evidence

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indicated that the husband was in violation of the PFA order to be

presented

The husband argues that, because the wife did not file any pleading

ahead of the July 2, 2025, hearing alleging new violations of the PFA

order, the circuit court violated his due-process rights in allowing the wife

to present evidence of a new violation to seek a contempt finding and

corresponding sanctions. We agree.2

" ' "The issue whether to hold a party in contempt
is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and
a trial court's contempt determination will not be
reversed on appeal absent a showing that the trial
court acted outside its discretion or that its
judgment is not supported by the evidence." '

"J.S.S. v. D.P.S., 281 So. 3d [434] at 437-38 [(Ala. Civ. App.
2019)] (quoting Poh v. Poh, 64 So. 3d 49, 61 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010))."

2Although we dismiss the husband's appeal as to the denial of his

motion for recusal, his appeal of the circuit court's contempt order is
properly before us. See Gladden v. Gladden, 942 So. 2d 362, 369 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005) ("[A]n order adjudging a party guilty of contempt is a final,
separately appealable judgment."). See also Kimbrough v. Kimbrough,
963 So. 2d 662 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (affirming a contempt finding while
dismissing other issues on appeal for lack of a final judgment).
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Ex parte SE Prop. Holdings, LLC, 353 So. 3d 533, 537 (Ala. 2021). Rule

70A defines two types of contempt -- direct contempt and constructive

contempt.

"Direct contempts are those committed in the 'presence' of the
judge, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct
are under the eye of the court, and are actually observed by
the court. If some of the essential elements are not personally
observed by the judge it is [a constructive or] an indirect
contempt."

Charles Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 361 So. 2d 1033, 1036

(Ala. 1978).

Constructive contempt is divided into two categories -- criminal

contempt and civil contempt, which are defined in Rule 70A(a)(2).

"A proceeding based on constructive contempt, whether
criminal or civil, shall be subject to the rules of civil procedure.
The proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition
seeking a finding of contempt (the petition may be in the form
of a counterclaim or cross-claim authorized under Rule 13).
The petition shall provide the alleged contemnor with notice
of the essential facts constituting the alleged contemptuous
conduct."

Rule 70A(c)(1) (emphasis added). The Alabama Supreme Court has

stated that providing such "notice of the essential facts constituting the

alleged contemptuous conduct" is paramount for due-process

considerations in a constructive-contempt proceeding:

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"'Where an individual is charged with indirect or
constructive contempt, due process requires
that he be given notice of the charges and a
reasonable opportunity to meet them, the right to
call witnesses and confront his accuser, and the
right to give testimony relevant either to complete
exculpation or to extenuation of the offense and
evidence in mitigation of the penalty to be
imposed. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499,
92 L. Ed. 682 (1948); International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 136 v. Davis
Constructors & Engineers, Inc., 334 So. 2d 892
(Ala. 1976).'

"State v. Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1067, 1073 (Ala. 1989) (emphasis
added). It is for this reason that a contempt petition should be
treated in an analogous way to a pleading."

Hyundai Constr. Equip. Ams., Inc. v. Southern Lift Trucks, LLC, 392 So.

3d 716, 726 (Ala. 2023) (footnote omitted).

In this case, the PFA order in place restricted the husband from

contact with the wife. The husband testified that he understood this to

include contact via social media. The evidence of the new violation of the

PFA order that the wife raised at the July 2025 review hearing occurred

in May 2025 -- over a month before that hearing. Despite having over a

month to assert these new facts in a contempt motion, the wife waited

until the hearing had begun to call the husband to testify about the May

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2025 violation without any prior indication that this would happen.3

Because these circumstances indicate that the husband should have

been, but was not, given sufficient notice of the wife's new allegations

before the circuit court held him in contempt and issued sanctions, we

hold that the husband was not afforded due process and that the circuit

court's contempt order is due to be reversed. See Hyundai Constr. Equip.

Ams., Inc., 392 So.3d at 728-29 (reversing a contempt order when the

party seeking contempt finding presented new evidence of violations of a

court order 30 minutes before hearing).

Because we reverse the circuit court's order finding the husband in

contempt for violating the PFA order, we also reverse the sanction

awarding attorney's fees to the wife. We pretermit any discussion of the

husband's arguments that the finding of contempt was not supported by

3The April 14, 2025, order, which is quoted earlier in this opinion,

also does not provide notice as required by Ala. R. Civ. P. 70A(c)(2) ("Upon
the filing of a contempt petition, the clerk shall issue process in
accordance with these rules .... In any case, the person against whom the
petition is directed shall be notified (1) of the time and place for the
hearing on the petition and (2) that failure to appear at the hearing may
result in the issuance of a writ of arrest pursuant to Rule 70A(d), to
compel the presence of the alleged contemnor.").
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adequate evidence and whether the alleged conduct constituted a

violation of the PFA order based on the plain language of the order.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the husband's appeal of the

circuit court's April 14, 2025, order denying the husband's motion for

recusal. We reverse the circuit court's July 9, 2025, order insofar as it

found the husband in contempt for violating the temporary PFA order

and ordering him to pay attorney's fees.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; JULY 9, 2025, ORDER

REVERSED; AND CAUSE REMANDED.

Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion,

which Edwards, J., joins.

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MOORE, Presiding Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the main opinion except insofar as it dismisses the

appeal from the order denying the motion to recuse.

An order denying a motion to recuse may be brought up for

appellate review either by a petition for the writ of mandamus or by an

appeal from a final judgment. See Ex parte Crawford, 686 So. 2d 196,

198 (Ala. 1996). In Salvagio v. State, 274 So. 3d 310 (Ala. Crim. App.

2018), and T.K.W. v. State Department of Human Resources ex rel. J.B.,

119 So. 3d 1187, 1192 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), the intermediate appellate

courts of this state recognized that an interlocutory order denying a

motion to recuse is subsumed in a final judgment entered in a contempt

proceeding and that such an order may be reviewed on appeal from the

final contempt judgment. However, no reported Alabama case has

considered whether an appellate court may review an order denying a

motion to recuse in an appeal from an ancillary contempt judgment when

the underlying case remains pending.

Alabama law recognizes that an order finding a party in contempt

is a final, appealable judgment even though the contempt judgment does

not conclude the proceedings in the underlying case. See R.S.F. v. J.D.A.,

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[Ms. CL-2025-0284, Jan. 16, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026).

Because Alabama law considers such a contempt judgment to be a final

judgment, logically, any order denying a motion to recuse relating to the

contempt proceeding should be reviewable on appeal. In an appeal from

an adverse contempt judgment, the contemnor should be allowed to argue

that the trial judge should have recused himself or herself to avoid error

in presiding over the contempt proceedings.

In Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Tucker, 192 Conn. 1,

469 A.2d 778 (1984), Hartford Federal Savings and Loan Association

instituted foreclosure proceedings against Stanley V. Tucker, and the

trial court appointed a receiver to collect rents on the subject properties.

During the foreclosure proceedings, the trial court, after denying a

motion to recuse, found Tucker in contempt for continuing to collect rent

on the properties, despite the appointment of the receiver. Although the

foreclosure proceedings were not concluded by the contempt judgment,

Tucker appealed the contempt judgment and argued, among other

things, that the trial court had erred by denying his motion to recuse.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the interlocutory order

denying the motion to recuse was reviewable in the appeal from the

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contempt judgment. The court said: "Although denial of a motion to

disqualify is, in and of itself, an interlocutory order[,] ... denial of such a

motion is appealable in conjunction with the appeal of a final order such

as an order of contempt." 192 Conn. At 7-8, 469 A.2d at 782.

In this case, J.J.B. ("the wife") filed a contempt motion against

G.M.B. ("the husband") in a protection-from-abuse ("PFA") action that

she had commenced against the husband in the Chilton Circuit Court. A

contempt hearing was scheduled, and, two days after the scheduling

order was entered, the husband filed a motion requesting that Judge

Sibley Reynolds recuse himself. After the contempt hearing was

continued, the husband repeatedly requested to be heard on the motion

to recuse; the husband also filed a motion to stay the proceedings until

the recusal motion was adjudicated and, if necessary, subjected to

appellate review by a petition for the writ of mandamus. After the parties

agreed that the wife would dismiss the contempt motion if no further

issues arose between the parties, Judge Reynolds denied the motion to

recuse on April 14, 2025. Subsequently, at a scheduled review hearing,

Judge Reynolds, without properly notifying the husband, conducted a

contempt hearing relating to alleged contemptuous conduct committed

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by the husband in May 2025. Based on the evidence adduced at the

contempt hearing, on July 9, 2025, Judge Reynolds entered an order

finding the husband in contempt. The husband appealed.

On appeal, the husband argues, among other things, that his

motion to recuse should have been granted to protect his right to a fair

trial before an unbiased judge. In my opinion, this court has jurisdiction

to review the denial of the motion to recuse. The record indicates that

the husband filed the motion to recuse in anticipation of a hearing on the

wife's contempt motion. Once the parties conditionally settled the wife's

contempt claim, Judge Reynolds denied the motion to recuse. Following

the denial, Judge Reynolds presided over an impromptu contempt

hearing and entered an adverse judgment against the husband. The

motion to recuse was a part of the contempt proceedings, and the order

denying the motion to recuse was subsumed in the final judgment finding

the husband to be in contempt. Accordingly, our appellate jurisdiction

over the final contempt judgment should extend to the order denying the

motion to recuse.

Edwards, J., concurs.

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