King, King & King Attorneys at Law, PC v. Lisa Drum (Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court: CV-19-900097).

Rel: December 20, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0085
_________________________

King, King & King Attorneys at Law, PC

v.

Lisa Drum

Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-19-900097)

EDWARDS, Judge.

King, King & King Attorneys at Law, PC ("King & King"), appeals

from a judgment entered by the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court")

in a quiet-title action commenced by Lisa Drum regarding an
CL-2024-0085

approximately 13.2-acre parcel of property ("the property") located in

Etowah County.1

In 1988, Corporate South Development, Inc., executed a warranty

deed conveying its interest in the property to Michael E. Jenkins and

"wife, Pam Jenkins," a/k/a Pamela Nichole Jenkins, as joint tenants with

right of survivorship. Based on a statement made by Pamela in a

quitclaim deed conveying her interest in the property to James Jenkins

III ("James III"), a deed that was recorded in the Etowah Probate Court

("the probate court") in March 1995 ("James III's deed"), Michael and

Pamela were divorced by a judgment entered in the trial court in

December 1992 in case number DR-92-692. Also, according to statements

made by Pamela in James III's deed, she and Michael had entered into a

trust agreement pursuant to which the property was to be conveyed to

1There is more than one legal description of the property in the

numerous deeds in the record, and no survey is included in the record
that purported to reconcile those legal descriptions. However, the parties
did not dispute that the property described in the deeds is the same
property in which each was claiming an interest.

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James III because he had purportedly paid certain indebtedness related

to the property. 2

Michael and purportedly "Pam" executed a warranty deed

conveying the property to Mitchell E. Kessler that was recorded in the

probate court on August 26, 1994 ("Kessler's deed"). A few days later,

Kessler executed a warranty deed conveying respective one-eighth

undivided interests in the property to Charles R. Trotter and Andrew H.

Roberts that was recorded in the probate court. Kessler eventually

discovered that the "Pam" who had executed his deed was not Pamela,

i.e., that Pamela's signature had been forged, and he commenced an

action against Michael and Pamela in the trial court; that action was

assigned case number CV-94-1019 ("the Kessler action"). 3 Neither

2It does not appear that a written trust agreement was executed,

and it is unclear from the record whether a resulting trust may have
existed.

3Based on a judgment entered in the Kessler action in September

1999, Kessler had negotiated with Michael for the purchase of the
property, and Michael had represented to Kessler that he owned the
property, although title to the property had been in Michael's name and
Pamela's name. Michael also did not inform Kessler that James III
claimed an interest in the property. The September 1999 judgment
stated that Michael had breached his warranties to Kessler, had
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Trotter nor Roberts was a party to that action. Although "[a] forged deed

is void, and completely ineffectual to pass title,' " Sheffield v. Andrews,

679 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Ala. 1996) (quoting Cumberland Cap. Corp. v.

Robinette, 57 Ala. App. 697, 331 So. 2d 709 (1976)), we have assumed,

simply for purposes of this opinion, that Kessler's deed might have

resulted in Michael's conveying his one-half undivided interest in the

property to Kessler, who subsequently conveyed part of that interest to

Trotter and Roberts. See Upchurch v. Upchurch, 386 So. 3d 1, 5 (Ala.

2023) (stating that "a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship may be

severed or destroyed by an act of one or more of the tenants that is

fraudulently procured the closing of the "transaction and payment of the
purchase price by Kessler," and had fraudulently "procured the
execut[ion] of the deed by someone other than [Pamela]," and that his
conduct was intentional. The September 1999 judgment stated that, as
a result of Michael's actions, Kessler had been caused to "lose the
purchase price of the property" and had "incurred expenses in defending
a lawsuit initiated by [Pamela] and [James III] regarding title to the
property." A judgment in the amount of $24,167 was entered in favor of
Kessler and against Michael. As noted above, Pamela was a named
defendant in the Kessler action, but it is unclear from the record what, if
any, adjudication was made as to her or her interest in the property. A
certificate of judgment was issued in the Kessler action on December 7,
1999, and Kessler filed a satisfaction of judgment in June 2005.
4
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inconsistent with the continuation of the joint tenancy," which results in

the parties holding the property as tenants in common).

As noted above, James III's deed from Pamela was recorded in the

probate court in March 1995. Based on an "Alabama Property Record

Card" ("the card") from the Etowah County Tax Assessor's office, James

III had the property assessed in his name in 1995, which resulted in the

property being double assessed. The original parcel-identification

number for the property was 03-07-26-0-000-008.000, which was used in

regard to Kessler and his successors in interest; the parcel-identification

number as to James III was 03-07-26-0-000-008.000-1, which apparently

is the format used by the Etowah County Tax Assessor to indicate a

double assessment as to part or all of a parcel. The notes section of the

card further states that the property was double assessed "with 31-03-

01-26-8.00 (Mitchell, Kessler & [illegible])"4 and "Court to Decide Verbal

Agreement & Whether Deed was Signed in Fraud." It is unclear whether

the "Court to Decide" reference was to the Kessler action or to other

pending or prospective litigation. See note 3, supra (referencing a

4The parcel-identification number is incorrect.

5
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"lawsuit" filed by Pamela and James III against Kessler). A handwritten

note on an "Abstract Search" states: "Court to Decide Verbal A" and

"#CV-98-1369 … Dismissed by Judge 3/30/2000." It is unclear whether

CV-98-1369 was the litigation involving Pamela and James III that is

referenced in the September 1999 judgment in the Kessler action, see

note 3, supra, or some other litigation.

Based on the foregoing, as of 1995, the property was assessed to

Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts under parcel identification number 03-07-

26-0-000-008.000 and was assessed to James III under parcel

identification number 03-07-26-0-000-008.000-1. On July 31, 1997, taxes

were assessed against the property in the amount $46.80 ($46.80 was the

full assessment on the property), and a tax bill for that amount was

issued to Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts; a separate tax bill for that

amount was issued to James III. On February 18, 1998, Robert H. King,

who was a lawyer with King & King, paid the 1997 tax bill, plus a

penalty, that had been issued to James III. Thereafter, Robert H. King,

James III, or someone from King & King or Robert H. King's estate

continued to pay subsequent tax assessments against the property, as

6
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those assessments were billed to James III, through the commencement

of the present action. Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts, however, failed to

pay the 1997 tax bill that had been issued to them.

Based on the failure of Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts to pay their

1997 tax bill, a tax sale was scheduled regarding parcel identification

number 03-07-26-0-000-008.000. It does not appear that James III

received actual notice of the scheduled tax sale. On May 19, 1998, Judy

Pitts, as Etowah County Revenue Commissioner, completed a tax sale of

the property to John Williams. Williams is the predecessor in interest to

Drum, and it is undisputed that tax assessments using parcel

identification number 03-07-26-0-000-008.000 were issued to and paid by

Williams or his respective successors in interest each year from 1998

through the commencement of the present action.

On May 27, 1998, Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts executed a

quitclaim deed conveying the property to Julie Lynn Jenkins ("Julie"), in

her capacity "as Custodian under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act" for

Chrissie Jenkins ("Chrissie"), Laura Jenkins ("Laura"), and James

7
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Jenkins IV ("James IV"), all of whom were described as minors; 5 to King

& King; and to Burns, Burn, Burns, & Morgan ("BBBM"). The

conveyance was described as being a one-half undivided interest to Julie,

as custodian, and a one-half undivided interest to King & King and

BBBM; the deed was recorded in the probate court on August 24, 1998

("the August 1998 deed"). Also on August 24, 1998, a quitclaim deed was

recorded in the probate court, pursuant to which BBBM purported to

convey to King & King a "one-half undivided one-half interest" in a 6.53-

acre tract that was part of the property. 6

An unsigned "Application for Redemption" in the records of the

Etowah County Tax Assessor's office states that "Kessler, Mitchell &

Andrew ha[d] made application to redeem" the property and that the

redemption price was $372.52 (the purchase price that had been paid by

5Pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 35-5A-22, the conveyance was
actually to Julie as custodian under the Alabama Uniform Transfers to
Minors Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 35-5A-1 et seq.

6It is unclear from the record whether Julie, as custodian, had
agreed to any subdivision of the property and whether BBBM had fully
conveyed its interest in the property, as opposed to merely its interest in
a 6.53-acre tract, to King & King.
8
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Williams, plus ad valorem taxes for 1998 and 1999, plus interest and

costs). The application indicated that it had to be executed and returned

with payment by May 31, 2000, but that was never done.

On May 23, 2001, a tax-sale deed ("the tax deed") to Williams was

recorded in the probate court. US Bank Tr., N.A. v. Trimble, 296 So. 3d

867, 869 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) ("Generally speaking, a tax-sale purchaser

is entitled to demand a tax deed after the expiration of three years from

the date of the sale. Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-29."). The tax deed recited

the details of the May 1998 tax sale, referenced that Kessler, Trotter, and

Roberts had been the owners of the property, and stated that the "time

for redemption of said lands by said owner or other persons having an

interest therein has elapsed and said certificate of purchase has been

returned to the Revenue Commissioner."

As noted above, Williams is Drum's predecessor in interest to the

property. Drum apparently attempted to sell the property, and issues

regarding her title arose. On February 11, 2019, Drum filed in the trial

court a complaint against King & King; Julie, as custodian for Chrissie,

Laura, and James IV; Etowah County; and fictitiously named parties. In

9
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Drum's complaint, she alleged that she had color of title to the property

based on the tax deed to Williams and the subsequent deeds to his

successors in interest and that she had adversely possessed the property.

Drum also alleged that "members of the Jenkins family" had had title to

the property before the tax sale and that Jenkins and King & King

purportedly claimed an interest in the property, which, she admitted, had

been the subject of dual tax assessments.

On May 29, 2019, Drum filed a motion for a default judgment

against Julie, as custodian for Chrissie, Laura, and James IV, based on

Julie's failure to respond to the complaint after service of process. On

May 31, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting Drum's motion

for a default judgment. We note that the record does not disclose when

Chrissie, Laura, and James IV were born. However, based on the August

1998 deed, they were adults under Alabama law when Drum filed her

complaint, see Ala. Code 1975, § 26-1-1 (describing the age of majority as

19 years), although one or more of them might still have been a minor for

purposes of the law applicable to a custodianship. See Ala. Code 1975,

35-5A-2(11) (defining a "minor" as "[a]n individual who has not attained

10
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the age of 21 years"). See Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("[N]o judgment

by default shall be entered (A) against a minor … unless the minor … is

represented in the action by a general guardian or other representative

as provided in Rule 17(c)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] who has appeared therein.");

see also Rule 55(e) ("No judgment by default shall be entered against

minors … unless the claimant establishes the party's claim or right to

relief by evidence."). In any event, by the time of the trial in April 2022,

Chrissie, Laura, and James IV were no longer minors, even under the

law governing custodians, and any interest that they had in the property

already should have been conveyed to them by Julie. See Ala. Code 1975,

§ 35-5A-21.

On June 12, 2019, King & King filed an answer denying the

material allegations of Drum's complaint. According to King & King, the

tax sale to Williams was illegal or void because the taxes had been paid

on the property before the tax sale occurred and, thus, it asserted, the tax

deed should not have been issued to Williams. On June 13, 2019, King

& King filed an amended answer to Drum's complaint, adding a demand

for a jury trial.

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At Drum's request, the trial court voluntarily dismissed, without

prejudice, Etowah County as a defendant. Drum amended her complaint

to add Linda Barrett-Vaughn, in her capacity as revenue commissioner

of Etowah County, as a defendant. In her amended complaint, Drum

added compensatory-damages claims against Barrett-Vaughn based on

negligence, reckless misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. King &

King filed an answer to Drum's amended complaint, reasserting the

allegations in its previously filed answer, and, on October 25, 2019, King

& King filed another amended answer to Drum's complaint, a

counterclaim against Drum, and a crossclaim against Julie. Regarding

its counterclaim and crossclaim, King & King requested a judgment

declaring that it owned 6.53 acres of the property and enjoining Drum

and Julie from trespassing on those acres. Also, according to King &

King,

"[t]here had been years of litigation with respect to [the
property] between James Jenkins, III, and wife [Julie
Jenkins] as against another realtor company that was in fact
settled in December of 1997. That pursuant to said
settlement the owners of said Kessler firm executed a quit
claim deed of May 27, 1998[,] to [the property] pursuant to the
agreement of those parties to Julie Lynn Jenkins as custodian
under the uniform gift to minors act for Christy Jenkins, a
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minor; Laura Jenkins, a minor; James Jenkins, IV, a minor
and King, King and King Attorneys at law, P.C. (a
professional corporation) and Burns, Burns, Burns and
Morgan Attorneys."

King & King further alleged that Williams had acquired no legal title and

had conveyed no legal title to his purported successors in title. In

addition to requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, King & King also

requested that the trial court quiet title in the property with respect to

6.53 acres, naming King & King the owners as against the claims of

Drum and Julie. It does not appear that King & King attempted to serve

Julie with its crossclaim. 7 Drum filed an answer denying the material

allegations in King & King's counterclaim. Drum also filed a second

amended complaint, adding a claim for inverse condemnation against

Barrett-Vaughn, and a third amended complaint clarifying that her

claims against Barrett-Vaughn were asserted against her in her official

capacity.

7Two successors in interest to Williams executed a deed to Julie

purporting to convey a .42-acre parcel of property and an easement; the
.42-acre parcel has road frontage and is surrounded by the property on
three sides. That parcel, however, is excepted from the legal description
to the property in Drum's deed.
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Following a status conference, the trial court entered an order on

May 21, 2021, setting Drum's quiet-title claim for a trial to be held on

October 1, 2021, and stating that Drum "d[id] not rely on adverse

possession to support her claim." The May 2021 order further set various

deadlines and stated that "[a]ny claim that is subject to trial by jury will

be set by future order." Trial was reset, and Barrett-Vaughn retired as

revenue commissioner of Etowah County on October 1, 2021; her

successor in office was Becky Nordgren, who was substituted for Barrett-

Vaughn in the action. See Rule 25(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing for

automatic substitution when a public officer ceases to hold office).

A bench trial was held "on the issue of quiet title" on April 18, 2022.

At trial, Drum argued that she would establish her claim to the property

using Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-82. See Trimble, 296 So. 3d at 869 ("Our

supreme court has construed § 40-10-82 as establishing a 'short statute

of limitations' for tax-deed cases, pursuant to which, 'to bar redemption

under [Ala. Code 1975,] § 40-10-83, the tax purchaser must prove

continuous adverse possession for three years after he is entitled to

demand a tax deed.' Gulf Land Co. v. Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211, 1213

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(Ala. 1987)"). Drum's attorney articulated Drum's position at trial as

follows:

"What we're here about today, Judge, is just simply
clearing up does my client own the property? She has an
opportunity to sell it to her advantage but can't do it. … I
believe the law and the facts are all in her favor. We believe
the tax sale was valid. There's never been any redemption.

"We believe that even if the tax sale wasn't valid, which
you'll get to be the determiner of that, that the law still says
the fact that she took possession and improved it and lived on
it will defeat any future claims anyway."

Based on the May 2021 order, King & King objected to Drum's attempting

to prove that she might have adversely possessed the property, and King

& King insisted that it was entitled to a jury trial.

On May 6, 2022, the trial court entered an order quieting title to

the property in Drum. In the May 2022 order, the trial court stated that

Drum owned the property via the respective deeds from Williams and his

successors in title based on the tax sale held in May 1998. The May 2022

order further stated that, regarding

"[t]he lawsuit that was presented to this Court regarding the
conveyance of the property by Michael … and Pam[ela] … was
Etowah County case CV-1994-1019. The judgment that was
admitted … grants a judgment to Kessler and against Michael
… for 'false pretenses, false representations and actual
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fraud....' It states that Michael … procured the execution of
the deed by someone other than Pamela Jenkins. ...

"The judgment awarded to Kessler and against Michael
… was a money-damages award consisting of both
compensatory and punitive damages. That judgment does not
purport to reform or set aside any deed.

"While this is certainly evidence of fraud in the making
of the deed from Michael … and Pam[ela] … to Kessler, if that
deed has been reformed or set aside then this Court has not
been provided evidence of that.

"… [A]ny interest [King & King] may have must
necessarily flow from the deed in which Michael … and
Pam[ela] … were the grantors -- however, the interest that
flowed from that deed ended up with Kessler, Trotter, and
Roberts and then the tax sale.

"As of the May 19, 1998, tax sale, the property was
owned by Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts. Pam[ela] Jenkins
apparently had no interest to deed to James Jenkins, III, in
1995. Therefore Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts owned the
property as of May 19, 1998. The May 29, 1998, Quitclaim
Deed … from Kessler, Trotter, and Roberts to Julie Jenkins,
[King & King], and [BBBM] came after the tax sale and was
issued without authority given the result of the tax sale.

"Therefore, as a result of the tax sale John Williams
ultimately became the owner of the property."

The May 2022 order further stated that "Lisa Drum, and her

predecessors in title, have been in possession of the property for much

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longer than three years. Therefore, no redemption from the tax sale is

possible and no challenge to the tax sale is possible."

Contemporaneously with the entry of the May 2022 order, the trial

court entered an order that stated: "This case will be set for further

hearing on motion of any party." King & King filed a notice of appeal to

the supreme court from the May 2022 order. The supreme court

transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 12-2-

7(6), and, on April 13, 2023, this court entered an order dismissing that

appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment.

After the entry of this court's order of dismissal, King & King filed

in the trial court a motion pursuant to Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing,

in part, that James III, and Chrissie, Laura, and James IV, "who

probably are adults now," should be made parties to the case. The trial

court held a hearing to consider that motion and other matters. On

September 20, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment denying all

remaining claims; it also denied all pending motions, which would

include King & King's Rule 19 motion.

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On October 15, 2023, King & King timely filed a postjudgment

motion; that motion was denied by operation of law. See Rule 59.1, Ala.

R. Civ. P. On January 18, 2024, King & King filed a notice of appeal to

the supreme court, which transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant

to § 12-2-7(6).

Because we find King & King's Rule 19 argument to be dispositive,

we pretermit discussion of its remaining arguments. We first note that

Drum's complaint was ambiguous regarding whether she was seeking to

quiet title to the property only as between her and certain persons or as

between her and all others who might claim an interest in the property.

On the one hand, her complaint stated that her quiet-title claim was filed

pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-540, which states:

"When any person is in peaceable possession of lands,
whether actual or constructive, claiming to own the same, in
his own right …, and his title thereto, or any part thereof, is
denied or disputed or any other person claims or is reputed to
own the same, any part thereof, or any interest therein or to
hold any lien or encumbrance thereon and no action is
pending to enforce or test the validity of such title, claim, or
encumbrance, such person …, so in possession, may
commence an action to settle the title to such lands and to
clear up all doubts or disputes concerning the same."

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An action pursuant to § 6-6-540 is an in personam action to determine

the parties' respective interests, if any, in lands. Thus, such an action

results in a judgment determining only "whether the defendant has any

right, title, or interest in, or encumbrance upon, such lands, or any part

thereof, what such right, title, interest, or encumbrance is and in or upon

what part of the lands the same exists." Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-543; see

also State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tarleton, 279 Ala. 555, 559, 188 So. 2d

516, 520 (1966) (discussing the predecessor statute to § 6-6-540 and

quoting Dake v. Inglis, 239 Ala. 241, 243, 194 So. 673, 674 (1940), for the

proposition that " '[t]he purpose of the proceeding is not to invest the court

with jurisdiction to sell or dispose of the title to the land, but merely to

determine and settle the same as between the complainant and the

defendants' " and stating that " 'the fact that there are others who might

assert claims to the property, who are not made parties, is not an obstacle

to proceeding to a final decree settling the title as between the parties to

the bill' " and that " '[t]he decree is only conclusive against such as are

made parties and their privies' ").

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Notwithstanding the foregoing, Drum's fictitiously named

defendants included "fictitious defendants a-z, representing all persons

claiming any present interest [in the property] and including any persons

claiming any future, contingent, reversionary, remainder, or other

interest therein, who may claim any interest in the above-described

property." Likewise, in Drum's request for relief, she stated:

"[Drum] files this petition against the named Defendants and
against the lands and against all parties or persons claiming
any present interest therein or including any persons
claiming any future, contingent, reversionary, remainder, or
other interest therein, or who may claim any interest in the
above-described property and seeks the following Court action
and relief:

"a. That this honorable Court would set a hearing at the
earliest possible time following service by publication, if
applicable; and,

"b. Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem if this Court deems
such to be due and necessary to protect the interests of the
Defendants, or until such time as the Defendants can be
located and Answer this claim themselves or through counsel
of their choice; and,

"c. An Order to establish the right and title of [Drum]
to the said lands and to clear up all doubts or disputes
concerning the same; and,

"d. [Drum] requests that the Defendants who are made
parties to this proceeding and notice hereof be given to them
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by publication, in accordance with the law, requiring the
Defendants to defend, plead or answer thereto within the time
required by law, or suffer default judgment against them, in
the event that service by normal means is not available; and,

"e. [Drum] requests that the court will make and enter
all Orders, Judgments, and Decrees that may be necessary or
proper in the premises, and upon a final hearing hereof,
[Drum] requests the Court will make and enter a decree that
[Drum] has the entire and undivided fee simple interest in
and to the said lands, with no restrictions thereon, except any
utility right of way easements; and,

"f. Such other, further, different or general relief as it
may be entitled to in the premises."

Drum's request for relief is more consistent with an in rem quiet-title

action pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-560 et seq., which includes

provisions for naming unknown parties as defendants, see Ala. Code

1975, § 6-6-561, notice by publication for unknown parties, see Ala. Code

1975, § 6-6-564, and,

"should it appear that any of the defendants are infants or
persons of unsound mind or should the identity of some, or all,
of said defendants be unknown, the ... appoint[ment of] a
guardian ad litem to represent and defend the interest of such
infant, incompetent or unknown parties in the proceeding."

Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-562.

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We note the foregoing because, regardless of the fact that Drum

purported to proceed with her claim pursuant to § 40-10-82, she was

either seeking a judgment as to the interests of particular persons in the

property or as to all persons in the property. To adjudicate the interests

of such persons to the property, those persons must be named as

defendants and provided appropriate service of process, whether

personally or by publication, as the circumstances might warrant. As

this court stated in Darby v. Presley, 327 So. 3d 242, 245 (Ala. Civ. App.

2020), this court must consider whether the failure to join certain parties

pursuant to Rule 19, particularly persons whose interests are at issue in

a quiet-title action, "constitutes a defect requiring reversal of the

judgment," whether raised by the parties in the trial court or on appeal

or raised by an appellate court ex mero motu.

Rule 19(a) states that

"[a] person who is subject to jurisdiction of the court shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of
the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest
or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
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substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If
the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that
the person be made a party."

We have also stated that

" '[t]he general rule in a court of equity is that all persons
having a material interest, legal or equitable, in the subject
matter of a suit, must be made parties, either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The rule proceeds on the principle that no man's
rights should be controverted in a court of justice unless he
has full opportunity to appear and vindicate them; and
further, that complete justice may be done and future
litigation avoided, the performance of the decree being safe,
because of the presence in court of all parties who have an
interest in its subject matter.' "

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Bradshaw, 124 So. 3d 162, 166 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2013) (quoting Rollan v. Posey, 271 Ala. 640, 645, 126 So. 2d 464,

468-69 (1961)).

In the present case, the trial court did not purport to simply

adjudicate the rights of Drum to the property as against the interests of

King & King. Instead, the trial court purported to adjudicate whether

James III had any interest in the property, despite the fact that neither

he, nor his successors in interest, if any, had been made parties to the

case. Likewise, the trial court purported to adjudicate the interests of

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Chrissie, Laura, and James IV in the property, without them having been

made parties to the case and without them having legal representation,

to the extent that they may have been minors, when the default judgment

was entered against Julie, as custodian. See discussion, supra; see also

Ala. Code 1975, § 35-5A-12(b) ("A transfer made pursuant to [Ala. Code

1975, §] 35-5A-10[,] is irrevocable, and conveys to the minor indefeasibly

vested title to the custodial property, but the custodian has the rights,

powers, duties, and authority provided in this chapter, and neither the

minor nor the minor's legal representative has any right, power, duty, or

authority with respect to the custodial property except as provided in this

chapter.").

We see no need for an extended discussion regarding the

applicability of Rule 19 under the circumstances. Drum attempted to

have the trial court determine that she was the sole owner of the property

to the exclusion of not only King & King, but also nonparties who

purportedly were or might be tenants in common with King & King, i.e.,

James III, Chrissie, Laura, James IV, and perhaps others who may have

an interest in the property or a part of the property, see note 6, supra,

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CL-2024-0085

but without providing those persons full opportunity to appear and

vindicate their respective rights, if any. Even if the judgment had been

limited to solely adversely adjudicating the interest of King & King, the

issue would remain whether Drum was the sole owner of the property or

whether she had obligations, as a cotenant, to James III, Chrissie, Laura,

James IV, and perhaps others who may have an interest in the property

or a part of the property. Under the circumstances, we reverse the

judgment and remand the cause for the trial court to join as parties in

the action James III, Chrissie, Laura, James IV, and any other person

whose interest Drum desires to have adjudicated regarding the property

or who are otherwise needed for a just adjudication and to conduct other

proceedings consistent with this opinion, including, if joinder of an

interested person or persons cannot take place, determining whether the

action can properly proceed in the absence of such person or persons. See

Rule 19(b).

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

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