A.D.J. v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources (Appeal from Mobile Juvenile Court: JU-21-1185.02).

Rel: November 1, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
________________________

CL-2024-0430
________________________

A.D.J.

v.

Mobile County Department of Human Resources

Appeal from Mobile Juvenile Court
(JU-21-1185.02)

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

A.D.J. ("the father") appeals from a judgment entered on April 24,

2024, by the Mobile Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court"), terminating his

parental rights to B.J. ("the child"). We affirm the judgment.

The Judgment

Upon finding in its judgment that the father had abandoned the

child, the juvenile court terminated the father's parental rights on the
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ground that he was unable or unwilling to discharge his parental

responsibilities to and for the child. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-319. The

judgment recounts that the child was born in 2012, during the marriage

of the father and L.F. ("the mother"). Later in 2012, the mother and the

father divorced; the divorce judgment failed to mention the child but, in

2013, the divorce judgment was amended to adjudicate the father's legal

paternity of the child. Despite the knowledge of his legal paternity, the

father never established a parental relationship with the child, having

seen the child only four times between 2012 and 2021. In August 2021,

the mother surrendered custody of the child to the Mobile County

Department of Human Resources ("DHR"), informing DHR that she could

no longer care for the child. The father saw the child only twice after the

child was placed into foster care -- on February 14, 2024, following genetic

testing that confirmed his paternity, and on April 17, 2024, the day of the

termination-of-parental-rights trial.

Despite finding that the father had abandoned the child, the

juvenile court found that DHR had used reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

the father but that the father had failed to avail himself of any services

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or to meaningfully participate in visitation, having talked to the child on

the telephone only four times after February 14, 2024. The juvenile court

also determined that there were no viable alternatives to the termination

of the father's parental rights. The child testified at trial and expressed

some interest in getting to know the father, but the child ultimately said

that he wanted to be adopted by his foster parent, which the juvenile

court concluded was in the child's best interests.

Issues

On appeal, the father raises several arguments that are premised

on the alleged error of the juvenile court in determining that he

abandoned the child. His remaining arguments are either disposed of by

our disposition of the abandonment issue or are undeveloped.

Standard of Review

A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear

and convincing evidence, which is " ' "[e]vidence that, when weighed

against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact

a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high

probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." ' " C.O. v. Jefferson

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Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)

(quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting

in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)).

" '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate
affirmance of a judgment based on a factual
finding in the context of a case in which the
ultimate standard for a factual decision by the
trial court is clear and convincing evidence is
evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to
clearly and convincingly ... establish the fact
sought to be proved.'

"KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish,] 47 So. 3d [749] at 761 [(Ala. Civ.
App. 2006)].

"... [F]or trial courts ruling on motions for a summary
judgment in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard of proof applies, 'the judge must view the
evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 254 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look
through a prism to determine whether there was substantial
evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding,
based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence, that
would 'produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm
conviction as to each element of the claim and a high
probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.' § 25-5-
81(c)[, Ala. Code 1975]."

Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not

reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact

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made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile

court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971

So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence,

this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of

correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

Discussion

For the purpose of terminating of parental rights, "abandonment"

refers to

"[a] voluntary and intentional relinquishment of the custody
of a child by a parent, or a withholding from the child, without
good cause or excuse, by the parent, of his or her presence,
care, love, protection, maintenance, or the opportunity for the
display of filial affection, or the failure to claim the rights of a
parent, or failure to perform the duties of a parent."

Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-301(1). As the father recognizes in his brief to

this court, "abandonment occurs when a parent intentionally forsakes

their parental responsibilities without justifiable cause." The father's

brief, p. 11; see also C.C. v. L.J., 176 So. 3d 208, 211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).

Whether a parent has abandoned a child is a question of fact for the

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juvenile court to determine based on its assessment of the competing

evidence, and a finding of abandonment will not be set aside if it is

supported by clear and convincing evidence. See A.D. v. R.P., 345 So. 3d

657, 668 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).

In this case, the juvenile court received sufficient evidence from

which it reasonably could have been clearly convinced that, from the time

the child was born, the father had withheld from the child his presence,

care, love, protection, and the opportunity for the display of filial

affection. Although the father did pay child support for the child between

2016 and December 2023, by his own admission the father intentionally

avoided any interpersonal relationship with the child from 2012 to 2024,

having seen the child only a few times. The payment of child support

alone does not preclude a juvenile court from finding that a parent has

abandoned a child. See A.E. v. M.C., 100 So. 3d 587, 598 (Ala. Civ. App.

2012) ("Although 'maintenance,' i.e., support, is one of many factors to

consider in determining whether a parent has abandoned a child, it is

clear that failing to be present and act as a parent is equally

significant.").

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The father asserts, however, that he had "good cause or excuse" for

his absence from the child's life because, he says, he was uncertain as to

his paternity of the child until February 2024, when genetic testing that

was conducted as part of the termination-of-parental-rights proceeding

established that he was the biological father of the child. When the child

was born in 2012, the father was married to the mother, making him the

legal father of the child regardless of his biological paternity. See Ala.

Code 1975, § 26-17-204(a)(1), and Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala.

1989). The father nevertheless testified that he had doubted his

biological paternity of the child because he and the mother had been

separated during the period leading up to the child's birth and they had

divorced shortly thereafter, making no provision for the child in their

uncontested divorce judgment. The father testified that he had not

undergone any genetic testing to determine his parentage of the child in

the years following the entry of the divorce judgment. Without genetic

testing proving his biological link to the child, the father decided not to

forge a parental relationship with the child because, he said, he did not

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want to parent the child only to later find out that the child was not his

biological child.

On cross-examination, the father admitted that he had understood

that he was the legal father of the child since at least 2013. On May 6,

2013, in postdivorce proceedings, the divorce judgment was amended to

declare the father to be the legal father of the child. The father testified

that, during hearings in the postdivorce proceedings, the judge had

explained to him that, regardless of whether genetic testing showed that

he was not the biological father of the child, he was the legal father of the

child with a responsibility to support the child. The father acknowledged

that the amended divorce judgment required him to pay child support for

the benefit of the child, which, he said, he started paying in 2016.

The father claimed that he had requested genetic testing during the

postdivorce proceedings but that his request had been denied. The father

also asserted that he had repeatedly requested genetic testing every time

he had appeared in court after 2013, but the father did not provide any

documentary evidence of any such request. On November 17, 2023, the

father requested genetic testing as part of the termination-of-parental-

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rights proceeding. When asked why he had allowed 12 years to pass

before formally requesting genetic testing, the father simply responded:

"The time passed ...."

Because the 2013 amended divorce judgment clearly informed the

father that he was the legal father of the child, see Ala. Code 1975, § 26-

17-201(b)(3) (providing that a legal father-child relationship may be

established by adjudication), the juvenile court impliedly determined

that the father did not have a good excuse for failing to parent the child.

The juvenile court evidently concluded that the father's alleged

uncertainty as to his biological parentage of the child was not a sufficient

reason to excuse the father's behavior toward the child following the

declaration of his legal paternity. The father argues that the juvenile

court erred in that respect.

In his brief, the father states, in pertinent part:

"The critical factor is the delayed confirmation of [the
father's] paternity. Until the court-ordered [genetic] test
confirmed his paternity in February 2024, ... [the father]
lacked legal certainty about his role as the child's father.
Without this confirmation, it would have been inappropriate
for [the father] to assert parental rights or responsibilities,

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and his limited engagement was justifiable given the legal
ambiguity.

"This reasoning aligns with Alabama's ruling in Ex
parte J.W.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1085 (Ala. 2005), where the
[supreme] court recognized that delays in confirming
paternity must be considered when evaluating a parent's
actions. Similarly, other courts have found that delays in
confirming paternity can mitigate findings of abandonment.
For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In
re B.A.S., 880 A.2d 1003, 1011 (D.C. 2005), recognized that
delays in confirming paternity and logistical issues should be
considered when determining abandonment. The Nebraska
Supreme Court also ruled in In re Interest of Z.S., 761 N.W.2d
238, 244-45 (Neb. 2009), that a father's delay in asserting
parental rights could not be equated with abandonment when
paternity was uncertain."

The father's brief, p. 12. We reject this argument.

When a man is the legal father of a child, the law does not require

evidence of genetic testing to support an adjudication of paternity. In

those circumstances, evidence of genetic testing may be admitted to

disprove paternity but that evidence is not necessary to prove paternity.

See Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-631(1). As explained above, under Alabama

law, the father was the legal father of the child when the child was born

in 2012 based on his marriage to the mother. The 2013 amended divorce

judgment further erased any doubt as to the father's legal status as the

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child's father, despite the absence of evidence of genetic testing. Thus,

there was no "legal ambiguity" that prevented the father from asserting

his legal rights and accepting his legal responsibilities toward the child.

The father clearly understood that he was bound by the paternity

adjudication despite the absence of evidence of genetic testing because,

as he testified, he realized that, based on the 2013 amended divorce

judgment, he was obligated to pay child support for the benefit of the

child.

Ex parte J.W.B., 933 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 2005), the lone case cited by

the father to support his argument,1 bolsters the judgment of the juvenile

court. In J.W.B., an unwed father, who was considered a putative father

for adoption purposes, see A.D.S. v. S.J.L., 70 So. 3d 345, 350 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2010), asserted that he had good reason for failing to parent his

child because, among other things, he was not certain of his paternity

1The foreign-jurisdiction cases upon which the father relies could

not be located. The citations lead to Anderton v. WasteAway Services,
LLC, 880 A.2d 1003 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005), a workers' compensation case,
and Michigan Education Association v. Secretary of State, 761 N.W.2d
234, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008), a declaratory-judgment case.
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until genetic testing conducted several weeks after the birth of the child

excluded another man from being the child's father, and, in the

meantime, the maternal family had seized on that uncertainty to prevent

him from seeing the child. The Madison Probate Court rejected those

excuses, concluding that the weight of the evidence showed that the

putative father had not been prevented from seeing the child by the

maternal family and that, in fact, he had been disinterested in forming a

parental relationship with his child. The supreme court affirmed the

probate court's determination that the putative father had unjustifiably

failed to form a significant relationship with his child, thereby impliedly

consenting to his adoption. J.W.B. holds that a trial court may find that

a lack of definitive scientific proof of paternity is not a sufficient excuse

for a putative father to avoid his parental responsibilities to and for his

child. In this case, the juvenile court likewise found that the father was

not justified in refusing to form a significant parental relationship with

the child based on the lack of genetic testing confirming his paternity.

Furthermore, the father was the legal father of the child, not a

putative father, which makes his excuse even less credible. In In re

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Chance J., 279 Neb. 81, 776 N.W.2d 519 (2009), the Nebraska Supreme

Court affirmed a judgment terminating the parental rights of a legal

father based on facts remarkably similar to the facts in this case. In 2002,

Andrew J. was married to Miranda J. when she gave birth to Chance J.,

making Andrew the legal father of Chance; however, Andrew doubted his

biological paternity because he had been separated from Miranda before

the time of Chance's birth, Chance did not physically resemble him, and

Miranda had remarked that Chance may be another man's child. Based

on his uncertainty, Andrew refused to act as a father toward Chance. In

April 2008, after Nebraska authorities filed a petition to terminate his

parental rights, Andrew obtained genetic testing, the results of which

proved that Chance was his biological child and, at that point, he

expressed interest in acting as a father to Chance. A Nebraska juvenile

court concluded that Andrew had abandoned Chance and terminated his

parental rights.

On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the undisputed

facts showed that Andrew had intentionally refused to act as a parent

toward Chance since his birth.

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"Given these undisputed facts, the question before us is
whether Andrew had just cause or excuse to withhold his
presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and the
opportunity for the display of parental affection of Chance.
Andrew argues that he had just cause or excuse, because prior
to genetic testing, he believed that he was not Chance's
father."

279 Neb. at 90, 776 N.W.2d at 526. The Nebraska Supreme Court

rejected that argument, concluding that Andrew's "paternal uncertainty"

did not justify his abandonment of Chance, who was "born into wedlock."

279 Neb. at 91, 776 N.W.2d at 527. The court considered that Andrew

had made no effort to obtain genetic testing to confirm his suspicions that

he was not Chance's biological father until after termination proceedings

were commenced. The court held that Andrew could not avoid his

parental obligations to Chance "that easily." Id.

In this case, the father alleged that he had repeatedly requested

genetic testing to confirm his suspicion that the child was not his

biological child. Because no records were presented to support those

allegations, the juvenile court was not required to believe the father;

however, even if the father had made the requests as he testified, the

failure of the father to obtain the genetic testing until 2024 does not

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excuse his abandonment of the child. The child was born in wedlock, and

the 2013 paternity adjudication confirmed the father's legal relationship

to the child. Alabama law allows a trial court to reopen a paternity

adjudication "if there is scientific evidence presented by the defendant

that he is not the father." Ala. Code, 1975, § 26-17A-1(a). The father did

not obtain that evidence and seek to have the 2013 amended divorce

judgment set aside; therefore, he could not disregard the 2013 amended

divorce judgment and deny his paternity and the rights and

responsibilities arising therefrom. The father contends that his

subjective belief that the child might not have been his biological child

was sufficient to excuse his behavior toward the child, but a legal father

cannot avoid his parental duties so easily. Thus, the juvenile court

correctly determined that the father had no "good cause or excuse" to

withhold his emotional support from the child.

The father also asserts that, after genetic testing proved his

biological paternity of the child, he made reasonable efforts to establish

a relationship with the child, which, he says, were hampered by

"logistical barriers and [DHR]'s failure to provide sufficient support." The

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father's brief, p. 13. In effect, the father argues that the juvenile court

should not have concluded that he had abandoned the child because he

was willing to act as a parent toward the child. That argument is

meritless.

After the mother surrendered custody of the child to DHR in

August 2021, DHR placed the child with D.N. ("the foster parent"), a

friend of the mother's. The child bonded with the foster parent. On April

15, 2022, after DHR learned of the father's paternity, it conducted an

individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meeting, at which the father agreed

to submit to a psychological evaluation, to complete parenting classes,

and to attend supervised visits with the child. The father did not

accomplish any of those tasks, because, as he testified, he would not have

been able to care for the child anyway. The father did not maintain

contact with DHR after the April 2022 ISP meeting. Thereafter, DHR

instituted a permanency plan calling for the termination of the father's

parental rights and adoption by the foster parent.

Due to the lack of his efforts to cooperate with DHR and to satisfy

the goals of the ISP, the father did not see the child until the date of the

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genetic testing. After the genetic testing, the father spent five minutes

with the child eating ice cream at a local McDonald's fast-food restaurant.

The father also shared five telephone conversations with the child

leading up to the April 17, 2024, trial date. Throughout the day of the

trial, the father visited with the child. The child testified that, even after

those contacts, he did not really know the father. The father admitted

that he still had no significant parental relationship with the child when

he testified that he wanted to forestall termination of his parental rights

to "build a relationship with [the child] and get to know him." The child

expressed a willingness to get to know the father, but he maintained that

he wanted to be adopted by the foster parent.

In A.E. v. M.C., supra, a legal father had abandoned his child

following an adjudication of his paternity, allowing his child to be raised

by the mother and, after the mother died, by the mother's relatives.

When his child was six years old, the legal father filed a petition to gain

custody of the child, and the custodians of his child countered by filing a

dependency petition. The legal father exercised visitation with the child

while those petitions were pending. The Marshall Juvenile Court denied

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the dependency petition and awarded the father custody of his child. This

court reversed the judgment, concluding that the legal father had not

cured his abandonment of his child by filing a custody action and

exercising pendente lite visitation. This court explained that, because

the legal father had abandoned his child, his child had bonded with the

custodians, whom she viewed as her parental figures, and that removing

her from their custody would cause her psychological harm. This court

held: "We cannot conclude that, under these facts, the father's stated

willingness to appear in the child's life and serve in a parental role

diminished or erased his abandonment of her for the vast majority of her

life." 100 So. 3d at 598. A.E. was a dependency case, but it applied the

same definition of "abandonment" as applies in termination-of-parental-

rights cases. See § 12-15-301(1). The reasoning in A.E. supports the

juvenile court's determination in this case. The father could not negate

his abandonment of the child for over 12 years by attempting to form a

parental relationship with the child in the 2 months leading up to the

trial and asserting that he was ready to act as a concerned parent toward

the child. By that time, the child had been residing with the foster parent

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for over two years, had bonded with the foster parent, and had decided

that he wanted to be adopted by the foster parent. Under those

circumstances, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding

that the father had abandoned the child despite his contacts with the

child during 2024.

The father argues that DHR did not use reasonable efforts to

reunite him with the child and that the juvenile court did not fully

consider other viable alternatives to the termination of his parental

rights.

"Because we have determined that the juvenile court's
abandonment finding is supported by the evidence, we need
not consider the father's other arguments, including that [the
Department of Human Resources] failed to make reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate him and that [the Department of
Human Resources] did not establish that no viable alternative
to the termination of his parental rights existed. Once a
parent has abandoned a child, [the Department of Human
Resources] is not required to make reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate that parent. See [Ala. Code 1975,] § 12-15-
319(a)(1); L.L. v. J.W., 195 So. 3d 269, 273 (Ala. Civ. App.
2015) ('[I]n cases of abandonment, a juvenile court can
terminate parental rights even in the absence of proof that the
state has used reasonable effort to rehabilitate the parent and
reunite the family ....'). Furthermore, once a parent has been
found to have abandoned a child, the juvenile court is not
required to consider whether a viable alternative to the

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termination of his or her parental rights exists. See C.F. v.
State Dep't of Hum. Res., 218 So. 3d 1246, 1251 (Ala. Civ. App.
2016) (stating that, '[w]hen a [parent] abandons [his or her]
child and no longer maintains a significant parental
relationship with [his or] her child, [he or] she loses [the] right
to compel the state to exhaust viable alternatives before
terminating [his or] her parental rights'); see G.S. v. Cullman
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 253 So. 3d 383, 398 (Ala. Civ. App.
2017)."

K.F. v. Millwood, [Ms. CL-2023-0393, Feb. 23, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. Civ. App. 2024). The fact that the juvenile court made superfluous

findings regarding reasonable efforts and viable alternatives does not

require this court to review the evidence to sustain those findings. See

T.B. v. Lee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 216 So. 3d 1246, 1253 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2016).

Finally, the father raises an argument that the judgment

terminating his parental rights does not serve the child's best interests.

He does not, however, develop that argument; instead, he focuses on the

alleged absence of viable alternatives. See J.D. v. E.R., 266 So. 3d 1088,

1099 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018) ("We will not reverse the juvenile court's

judgments on an undeveloped and unsupported argument.").

Nevertheless, we conclude that the juvenile court received more than

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sufficient evidence indicating that the best interests of the child would be

served by the termination of the father's parental rights. The mother,

who had raised the child since his birth, was unable or unwilling to

parent the child and consented to the termination of her parental rights.

The child had been securely residing with the foster parent in a stable,

custodial arrangement since 2021. DHR had determined that the foster

parent was providing the child a suitable home and that the child would

be best served by remaining there. The juvenile court reasonably could

have been clearly convinced that the stability and permanency interests

of the child would be served by terminating the father's parental rights

to allow the child to be adopted by the foster parent. See C.S. v. Mobile

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 166 So. 3d 680, 686 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the judgment entered by the juvenile court

terminating the father's parental rights to the child is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

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