Shelby Tarbox v. State of Alaska

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

SHELBY M. TARBOX,
Court of Appeals No. A-14509
Appellant, Trial Court No. 3AN-23-06497 CR

v.
OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

Appellee. No. 2815 — September 19, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Andrew Peterson, Judge.

Appearances: Darryl L. Thompson, Darryl L. Thompson, P.C.,
Anchorage, for the Appellant. Andalyn Pace, Assistant
Attorney General, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,
Judges.

Judge WOLLENBERG.

Alaska Statute 12.55.027 governs the award of credit against a term of
imprisonment for time spent in a court-ordered treatment program or on electronic
monitoring. As a general matter, subsections (a)-(c), (f), (i), and (l) set out the
substantive requirements and limitations on receiving credit for time spent in a
treatment program, and subsections (d), (g), and (i) set out the requirements and
restrictions on receiving credit for time spent on electronic monitoring.
In 2019, the Alaska Legislature amended AS 12.55.027(g) to prohibit a
court from granting credit against a term of imprisonment for time spent on electronic
monitoring for certain listed crimes, including felony crimes against a person.1 In that
same subsection, however, the legislature made clear that a person in this situation —
i.e., a person who served time on electronic monitoring for one of the precluded offenses
— is still eligible to receive credit against that sentence if “the defendant participated
in a residential treatment program under (c) and (f) of this section while under electronic
monitoring.”
In 2024, Shelby M. Tarbox pleaded guilty to second-degree assault, a
felony crime against a person.2 Prior to her sentencing, Tarbox spent more than nine
months on electronic monitoring, approximately one month of which was spent in a
residential treatment program. Tarbox requested credit against her sentence for the
entire period she was on electronic monitoring, arguing that under AS 12.55.027(g), she
was entitled to credit for the entire period because she spent a portion of that time in a
residential treatment program.
The superior court initially granted Tarbox’s request for credit against her
sentence for the entire period she was on electronic monitoring, but subsequently
vacated the credit after concluding that the legislative history of AS 12.55.027(g)
clearly demonstrated that Tarbox was only entitled to credit for the time she spent in a
residential treatment program. The question presented in this appeal is whether, under
AS 12.55.027(g), Tarbox was entitled to credit for the entire time period she was on

1
SLA 2019, ch. 11, § 6 (amending AS 12.55.027(g)).
2
AS 11.41.210(a)(2). Tarbox also pleaded guilty to misdemeanor driving under the
influence and received a sentence that ran entirely concurrently to her sentence on the
second-degree assault conviction.

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electronic monitoring because she participated in a residential treatment program for a
portion of that time, or whether she was only entitled to credit for the time she spent in
residential treatment.
For the reasons we explain in this opinion, we agree with the superior
court that Tarbox was not entitled to credit against her sentence for second-degree
assault for the time she spent on pretrial electronic monitoring outside of residential
treatment. We therefore affirm the superior court’s order.

Underlying facts and proceedings
In August 2023, Shelby M. Tarbox was charged with first-degree assault,
driving under the influence, and reckless driving.3 In September, the superior court
issued a bail order releasing Tarbox subject to electronic monitoring and house arrest.
The court also ordered Tarbox to attend residential treatment at Sundown M Ranch.
On September 25, 2023, Tarbox was placed on house arrest with
electronic monitoring. Starting on September 27, Tarbox was in residential treatment at
Sundown M Ranch. Tarbox remained in residential treatment until October 25, 2023.
Tarbox then returned to house arrest on electronic monitoring.
In March 2024, Tarbox pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to
second-degree assault and driving under the influence.4 Under the plea agreement,
Tarbox received a sentence of 5 years with 3 years suspended on the second-degree
assault conviction and an entirely concurrent sentence of 1 year on the driving under
the influence conviction (for a composite sentence of 5 years with 3 years suspended).
The State dismissed the reckless driving charge. Sentencing was scheduled for July
2024.

3
AS 11.41.200(a)(1), AS 28.35.030(a)(2), and AS 28.35.400, respectively.
4
AS 11.41.210(a)(2) and AS 28.35.030(a)(2), respectively.

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Prior to sentencing, Tarbox filed an unopposed motion for sentencing
credit under AS 12.55.027. Tarbox noted that AS 12.55.027(d) authorizes a court to
grant credit against a sentence of imprisonment for time spent on electronic monitoring,
provided the electronic monitoring meets certain conditions.5 Under AS 12.55.027(g),
however, electronic monitoring credit is prohibited for certain crimes, including “a
felony crime against a person under AS 11.41.”6 Tarbox pleaded guilty to second-

5
In full, AS 12.55.027(d) provides:

(d) A court may grant credit against a sentence of
imprisonment for time spent under electronic monitoring if the
person has not committed a criminal offense while under
electronic monitoring and the court imposes restrictions on the
person’s freedom of movement and behavior while under the
electronic monitoring program, including requiring the person
to be confined to a residence except for a
(1) court appearance;
(2) meeting with counsel; or
(3) period during which the person is at a location
ordered by the court for the purposes of employment,
attending educational or vocational training, performing
community volunteer work, or attending a rehabilitative
activity or medical appointment.
6
AS 12.55.027(g)(1). In full, subsection (g) provides:

(g) Unless the defendant participated in a residential treatment
program under (c) and (f) of this section while under electronic
monitoring, a court may not grant credit against a sentence of
imprisonment under (d) of this section if the sentence is for
(1) a felony crime against a person under AS 11.41;
(2) a crime involving domestic violence as defined in
AS 18.66.990;
(3) an offense under AS 11.71 involving the delivery of
a controlled substance to a person under 19 years of age;
(4) burglary in the first degree under AS 11.46.300; or
(5) arson in the first degree under AS 11.46.400.

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degree assault, which is such a crime under AS 11.41.7
In her motion, Tarbox acknowledged that normally she would not be
entitled to credit against her second-degree assault sentence for the time she spent on
electronic monitoring because second-degree assault is a felony crime against a person.8
She argued, however, that the first clause of subsection (g) — “[u]nless the defendant
participated in a residential treatment program under (c) and (f) of this section while
under electronic monitoring” — meant that if she spent any time in a residential
treatment program, then the entire duration of her pretrial electronic monitoring became
eligible for credit against her sentence under AS 12.55.027(d).
Thus, Tarbox requested credit against her sentence of imprisonment for
the entire period she was on electronic monitoring from September 25, 2023 through
July 15, 2024 (nearly ten months), even though she only spent 28 days in a residential
treatment program. The superior court granted this unopposed motion for credit.
In August, the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) filed a motion to
intervene, arguing that the legislative history of AS 12.55.027(g) made clear that Tarbox
was only entitled to credit against her sentence for the time she spent in residential
treatment — not the entire period she was on electronic monitoring — and therefore the
court was required to vacate Tarbox’s illegal sentence. The superior court ultimately
agreed that the sentence was illegal and issued an order vacating the electronic

7
AS 11.41.210(a)(2).
8
This same restriction did not apply to Tarbox’s sentence for driving under the
influence, since driving under the influence is not one of the excluded crimes in
AS 12.55.027(g). As a practical matter, however, Tarbox’s sentence for driving under the
influence ran entirely concurrently to her sentence for second-degree assault. Therefore, if
she was not eligible for credit against her sentence for second-degree assault for the time
she spent on electronic monitoring outside of residential treatment, then she could not
receive any credit against her composite term of imprisonment except in relation to her
time in residential treatment.

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monitoring credit it had previously granted.9 The court also ordered a hearing to
determine how much time, if any, Tarbox spent in a qualifying treatment program.10
Tarbox subsequently filed an unopposed motion for credit for the 28 days
she had spent in the residential treatment program at Sundown M Ranch. The superior
court granted this motion, ordering that Tarbox be given credit against her composite
sentence of imprisonment for the time she spent in residential treatment from
September 27 to October 25, 2023.
Tarbox now appeals, arguing that the superior court misinterpreted
AS 12.55.027(g) in denying her credit against her sentence of imprisonment for the time
she spent on electronic monitoring before and after her time in residential treatment.11

9
Tarbox opposed DOC’s motion to intervene, arguing that DOC did not have
standing to intervene in her criminal case. Tarbox raises this argument again on appeal. We
need not reach this issue, however, because Tarbox’s sentence was illegal, and an illegal
sentence can be corrected at any time. Alaska R. Crim. P. 35(a). Thus, once Tarbox’s illegal
sentence was brought to the superior court’s attention, the court acted appropriately in
correcting the sentence under Alaska Criminal Rule 35(a). Regardless, even assuming we
were to decide this issue in Tarbox’s favor, she would not be entitled to the relief she is
seeking: an order granting her credit for all the time she was under electronic monitoring,
rather than an order limiting credit to her time in a residential treatment program.
10
See AS 12.55.027(b); see also AS 12.55.027(c) (listing factors “a court shall
consider” in “granting credit toward a sentence of imprisonment for time spent in a
treatment program”); AS 12.55.027(f) (listing requirements a treatment program must meet
to qualify under the section). The court also noted that if credit for time spent on electronic
monitoring had been part of the plea agreement, it would entertain a request by Tarbox to
withdraw her plea.
11
The parties do not dispute that Tarbox spent 28 days in a qualifying treatment
program and was entitled to credit against her sentence of imprisonment for that time.

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Alaska Statute 12.55.027(g) prohibits credit for time spent on electronic
monitoring for certain crimes, including felony crimes against a person,
while allowing credit for time spent in a qualifying treatment program
Tarbox’s appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation. We review
questions of statutory interpretation de novo, applying our independent judgment.12
Under our sliding-scale approach to statutory interpretation, “the plainer the language
of the statute, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be.”13 “We give
statutory language a reasonable or common sense construction, consonant with the
objectives of the legislature.”14
Alaska Statute 12.55.027 sets out the circumstances under which a
defendant is entitled to credit against their sentence of imprisonment for time spent in
a court-ordered treatment program or on electronic monitoring.15 Subsection (g)
prohibits credit for time spent on electronic monitoring for certain offenses. In
particular, this provision states: “Unless the defendant participated in a residential
treatment program under (c) and (f) of this section while under electronic monitoring,
a court may not grant credit against a sentence of imprisonment under (d) of this section
if the sentence is for” certain offenses, including “a felony crime against a person under

12
Alaska Trappers Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 548 P.3d 332, 336 (Alaska 2024).
13
Bartley v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Teacher’s Ret. Bd., 110 P.3d 1254, 1258 (Alaska
2005) (quoting Alaskans For Efficient Gov’t Inc. v. Knowles, 91 P.3d 273, 275 (Alaska
2004)).
14
City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Nat. Gas Storage Alaska, LLC, 373 P.3d 473, 480
(Alaska 2016) (internal quotations marks omitted).
15
See Kelila v. State, 556 P.3d 284, 286-87 (Alaska App. 2024); see also Medina v.
State, 418 P.3d 861, 866 (Alaska App. 2018) (noting that AS 12.55.027 “sets out criteria
for determining whether a defendant’s time in treatment qualifies for jail credit”).

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AS 11.41.”16 At issue in this appeal is the meaning of the “unless” clause in this
provision.
Alaska Statute 12.55.027 was first enacted in 2007, and it has been subject
to a series of legislative amendments since then.17 Pertinent to the question of statutory
interpretation in this appeal, in 2015, the legislature amended AS 12.55.027 to authorize
credit for time spent on electronic monitoring under certain circumstances.18 The
following year, the legislature expanded eligibility for credit for time spent in a
treatment program, but imposed additional restrictions on credit for time spent on
electronic monitoring. In particular, the legislature enacted subsection (g), which
limited the amount of electronic monitoring credit a defendant could receive against a
term of imprisonment for certain crimes to 360 days.19 And in 2019, the legislature
amended AS 12.55.027(g) to its current form, prohibiting any credit for time spent on
electronic monitoring against a sentence imposed for the listed crimes, including a
felony crime against a person, “[u]nless the defendant participated in a residential
treatment program.”20
Tarbox acknowledges that she was convicted of a felony crime against a
person and that defendants typically are not entitled to credit against a sentence for such
a crime for time spent on electronic monitoring. She nonetheless contends that because
the “unless” clause applies to her — i.e., because she spent some time in a qualifying
residential treatment program, and she was on electronic monitoring during that time

16
AS 12.55.027(g)(1).
17
SLA 2007, ch. 24, § 20; Kelila, 556 P.3d at 287.
18
SLA 2015, ch. 20, § 2.
19
SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 71.
20
SLA 2019, ch. 11, § 6.

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— the plain language of AS 12.55.027(g) is clear that she is entitled to credit for all of
the time she spent on electronic monitoring.21
The State argues that the plain language is ambiguous because it could be
read more narrowly to mean that a person in Tarbox’s situation may be granted credit
against their sentence only for time spent on electronic monitoring while in a residential
treatment program. In other words, according to the State, the “unless” language is
meant to clarify that defendants in Tarbox’s situation may receive credit for time in
treatment, even though they are not otherwise eligible for credit for time spent on
electronic monitoring. The State further notes that the legislative history from 2019
resolves any ambiguity in AS 12.55.027(g) in favor of this interpretation.
We agree with the State that, although the plain text could be viewed as
ambiguous, the legislative history convincingly demonstrates that the legislative intent
in amending AS 12.55.027(g) was to ensure that defendants who were sentenced for
one of the listed crimes and participated in a treatment program while on electronic
monitoring were still eligible to receive credit against a sentence for an otherwise
excluded crime for any time spent in treatment. But, as to sentences for the crimes listed

21
Tarbox’s analysis relies on a highly generalized discussion of the 2007 legislative
history underlying the initial enactment of AS 12.55.027. SLA 2007, ch. 24, § 20
(amending AS 12.55 to add new section AS 12.55.027). We note that as initially enacted,
AS 12.55.027(d) provided, “A court may not grant credit against a sentence of
imprisonment for time spent in a private residence or under electronic monitoring.” Id.
Tarbox refers in passing to the fact that the “statute was subsequently amended in 2013,
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2019,” but does not explain how any of these amendments to
AS 12.55.027 support her proposed interpretation of AS 12.55.027(g). SLA 2013, ch. 43,
§ 19; SLA 2014, ch. 83, § 23; SLA 2015, ch. 20, §§ 1-3; SLA 2016, ch. 36, §§ 68-71;
FSSLA 2017, ch. 1, § 29; SLA 2019, ch. 11, §§ 6-7. Moreover, as we noted, subsection (g)
was not added by the legislature until 2016, and was not amended to include the “unless”
clause until 2019. Thus, legislative history from 2007 is inapposite to resolving the question
of statutory interpretation raised in this appeal. See SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 71 (amending
AS 12.55.027 to add subsection (g)); SLA 2019, ch. 11, § 6 (amending subsection (g)).

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in subsection (g), the legislature eliminated credit for time spent solely on electronic
monitoring.22
The 2019 bill containing this provision, House Bill 14, did not initially
include any proposed amendments to AS 12.55.027.23 In May 2019, the amendments to
AS 12.55.027(g) were introduced in the Senate Finance Committee as they were
ultimately enacted.24 In explaining the proposed changes to subsection (g) to the Senate
Finance Committee, Juli Lucky, staff to Committee Co-Chair Senator Natasha von
Imhof, explained that, under then-existing law, credit for time spent on electronic
monitoring for certain crimes was limited (to 360 days); she stated that the proposed
bill would “actually eliminate electronic monitoring credit for those serious crimes.”25
She further explained that there was “technical language” in the bill which was intended
to ensure that a person “in treatment . . . would still get credit regardless of whether they
are on electronic monitoring” during treatment.26 But Lucky clarified that “for those
serious crimes, there would be no electronic monitoring credit.”27
In short, Lucky informed the committee that the “unless” clause in
AS 12.55.027(g) was “technical language” that ensured an individual convicted of a
listed crime could receive credit against that sentence for time spent in treatment,

22
Kelila, 556 P.3d at 287 (citing SLA 2019, ch. 11, § 6).
23
H.B. 14, 31st Legislature, 1st Session, Version A (as introduced, Feb. 20, 2019).
24
S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 14, 31st Legislature, 1st Session, Work Draft H at 3-4 (as
introduced by the Senate Finance Committee, May 6, 2019); see also S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 14,
Version E (as introduced by the Senate Finance Committee, May 6, 2019).
25
Audio of Senate Finance Committee, S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 14, testimony of Juli Lucky,
at 9:04 a.m. - 9:05 a.m. (May 6, 2019).
26
Id. at 9:05 a.m. (testimony of Juli Lucky).
27
Id.

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regardless of whether they were on electronic monitoring. But such individuals would
not receive any credit against that sentence solely for electronic monitoring.28
During the same hearing, Senator Peter Micciche stated that “the one piece
that was missing” from House Bill 14 prior to this version “was the electronic
monitoring.”29 He confirmed that this amendment struck the “perfect mix” because the
legislature “want[s] people to go into treatment” and to allow people who were
convicted of a listed crime “to get credit just for the treatment,” but “not for the
electronic monitoring”: “It eliminates these serious crimes from electronic monitoring
credit.”30
The legislative intent to allow credit under AS 12.55.027(g) only for time
in treatment is further underscored by the discussion of the purpose of the new
subsection (k). This statutory subsection provides:
When a court grants credit toward a sentence of
imprisonment under this section, if a defendant spends time
in a treatment program while under electronic monitoring,
the court may grant credit for either the time spent in the
treatment program or for the time spent under electronic
monitoring, but not for both.[31]

28
This understanding was further emphasized in the Explanation of Changes prepared
for the Senate Finance Committee, which provided that AS 12.55.027(g) “prohibits credit
for [electronic monitoring (EM)] for those specified crimes but clarifies that credit can be
granted when the defendant is on EM while participating in residential treatment.”
Explanation of Changes for S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 14, prepared for the Senate Finance
Committee (May 6, 2019).
29
Audio of Senate Finance Committee, S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 14, statement of Senator Peter
Micciche, at 9:08 a.m. - 9:09 a.m. (May 6, 2019).
30
Id.
31
S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 14, 31st Legislature, 1st Session, Work Draft H at 4 (as introduced
by the Senate Finance Committee, May 6, 2019).

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Senator Lyman Hoffman asked about the intent of subsection (k).32 Lucky
clarified that the “intent of that section was to ensure that if a person was under both
electronic monitoring and treatment at the same time, that they could not get double
credit for that one calendar day.”33 She again noted that “electronic monitoring credit”
would no longer be available for certain crimes.34
Senator Micciche reminded the Senate Finance Committee that for the
“serious crimes” listed in subsection (g), defendants can “only get credit for the time
spent in treatment” and not for electronic monitoring, so subsection (k) would not
apply.35
This legislative history clearly resolves any ambiguity in the plain text:
the legislature considered the precise question raised by this appeal and intended that
defendants who were convicted of one of the crimes listed in subsection (g) be eligible
for credit against a sentence for that crime only for time spent in a qualifying treatment
program.
We note that adopting Tarbox’s construction would mean that an
individual who is convicted of one of the crimes listed in AS 12.55.027(g) would now
be eligible to receive more credit against that sentence for time spent on electronic
monitoring than under the previous version of subsection (g), which limited credit for
the listed crimes to 360 days.36 This outcome is inconsistent with the purpose of the

32
Audio of Senate Finance Committee, S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 14, statement of Senator
Lyman Hoffman, at 9:09 a.m. - 9:10 a.m. (May 6, 2019).
33
Id. at 9:10 a.m. (testimony of Juli Lucky).
34
Id. at 9:11 a.m. (testimony of Juli Lucky).
35
Id. at 9:11 a.m. - 9:12 a.m. (statement of Senator Peter Micciche).
36
See former AS 12.55.027(g) (pre-2019 version).

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2019 amendments to AS 12.55.027(g), which was to eliminate credit against a sentence
for any of the listed crimes for time spent solely on electronic monitoring.
For example, under Tarbox’s reading, an individual who was convicted of
a felony crime against a person who spent one month in a residential treatment program
and a total of two years on pretrial electronic monitoring could seek credit for the entire
two years on electronic monitoring — resulting in more credit for electronic monitoring
than the 360 days permitted under the previous version of AS 12.55.027(g). But the
legislature’s intent was to prohibit, not to expand, credit for electronic monitoring
against a sentence of imprisonment for the crimes listed under subsection (g), while
encouraging such individuals to participate in a qualifying treatment program by
allowing them to receive credit for such treatment.37 It would therefore defeat the
objectives of the legislature if we construed AS 12.55.027(g) to allow an individual
subject to subsection (g) who has participated in a qualifying treatment program to
claim unlimited credit against a sentence for a listed crime for time spent on electronic
monitoring.
Accordingly, we hold that under AS 12.55.027(g), an individual may
receive credit against their sentence of imprisonment for time spent in a qualifying
treatment program, as defined in AS 12.55.027(c) and (f), regardless of whether they
were on electronic monitoring during such treatment, but may not receive credit against
a sentence for one of the listed crimes for time spent solely on electronic monitoring.
We therefore reject Tarbox’s challenges to the superior court’s order denying her credit

37
Because we conclude that the legislative history resolves any ambiguity in the
statutory language, we reject Tarbox’s argument that we should apply the rule of lenity.
See Municipality of Anchorage v. Brooks, 397 P.3d 346, 349 (Alaska App. 2017)
(recognizing that the “rule of lenity or strict construction comes into play only when, after
employing normal methods of statutory construction, the legislature’s intent cannot be
ascertained or remains ambiguous” (quoting De Nardo v. State, 819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska
App. 1991))).

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against her second-degree assault sentence for time spent solely on pretrial electronic
monitoring.

Conclusion
The order of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

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