Philip C. Wilson v. State of Alaska

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

PHILIP CHAD WILSON,
Court of Appeals No. A-13880
Appellant, Trial Court No. 3AN-18-010894 CI

v.
OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

Appellee. No. 2811 — August 1, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.

Appearances: Justin N. Gillette, Assistant Public Defender,
and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.

Judge TERRELL, writing for the Court and concurring
separately.

In 1994, Philip Chad Wilson fatally shot Allen C. Boulch as part of a
planned robbery. Wilson, who was seventeen at the time of the offense, ultimately
pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 99 years, with discretionary
parole eligibility after serving 33 years.1 As a result, Wilson will be eligible to apply
for discretionary parole release when he is roughly fifty years old.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court decided a series of cases
clarifying that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing” and requiring special consideration of a juvenile offender’s youthfulness
before imposing a sentence of life without parole.2 In Fletcher v. State, we relied on this
line of cases and the Alaska Constitution to extend these protections to situations where
a court imposes a de facto sentence of life without parole.3
Wilson filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing that his
sentence was illegal in light of those cases. The superior court dismissed his application
for failing to state a prima facie case. Wilson now appeals.
On appeal, Wilson argues that he received a de facto life sentence for two
reasons. First, he argues Alaska’s discretionary parole system lacks key procedural
safeguards and is too speculative to qualify as a meaningful opportunity for release.
Further, without discretionary parole release, his sentence amounts to a de facto life
sentence. Second, and alternatively, he argues that even if he were granted discretionary
parole at the first available opportunity, the fact that he must serve at least 33 years
before becoming eligible for release amounts to a de facto life sentence.
We conclude that Wilson’s challenges to the Alaska Parole Board’s
procedures are premature because he has not yet gone through a parole hearing. And
we hold that 33 years of incarceration is not a de facto life sentence. As a result, we
affirm the superior court’s dismissal.

1
See former AS 33.16.100(d) (1994).
2
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569-70 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190, 209-10 (2016); Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2021).
3
See Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 307-08 (Alaska App. 2023).

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Background facts and proceedings
In 1994, Wilson and three other juveniles planned to rob and murder Allen
C. Boulch, another seventeen-year-old who knew Wilson.4 Under the pretext of going
target shooting, Wilson and the three others lured Boulch into Kincaid Park, then shot
Boulch in the back multiple times and divided the cash from his pockets among
themselves.5 For this conduct, Wilson pleaded guilty to a single count of first-degree
murder with open sentencing.6
At the sentencing hearing, the court found that Wilson was the instigator
of the planned robbery and killing, that he fired the first shots into Boulch’s back, and
that he did so “just for the fun of it.”
The court sentenced Wilson to 99 years and did not restrict his eligibility
for discretionary parole beyond the statutory minimum. Wilson is thus eligible for
discretionary parole after serving 33 years, when he is approximately fifty years old.7

Changes in law governing juvenile sentencing requirements
Following Wilson’s sentencing, the United States Supreme Court declared
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”8 In
Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution categorically bars a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide

4
Moore v. State, 1996 WL 499526, at *1 (Alaska App. Sept. 4, 1996) (unpublished).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See former AS 33.16.100(d) (1994).
8
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569-70 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190, 209-10 (2016); Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2021).

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offenses.9 The Court explained that while a state is “not required to guarantee eventual
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” the State must afford
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”10 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended the reasoning underlying
Graham to juveniles who have been convicted of homicide crimes, noting that nothing
about the characteristics of juveniles relied on in Graham was “crime-specific.”11
Drawing in part on these federal cases, we recently clarified in Fletcher v.
State that the Alaska Constitution requires sentencing courts “to affirmatively consider
the juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics and to provide an on-the-
record sentencing explanation that explicitly or implicitly finds that the juvenile
offender is one of the ‘rare’ juvenile offenders ‘whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption’” before imposing “a sentence of life without parole (or its functional
equivalent) on a juvenile offender tried as an adult.”12 We held that a sentence is
equivalent to life without parole if it “does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’”13 We further held

9
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 82.
10
Id. at 75.
11
Miller, 567 U.S. at 473. The Supreme Court clarified in Jones v. Mississippi that
Miller did not require anything more than the existence of a discretionary sentencing
scheme under which such findings could be made. See Jones, 593 U.S. at 105. Because
Wilson was sentenced under a discretionary sentencing scheme where such findings could
be made, his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment under the federal constitution.
12
Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 308 (Alaska App. 2023) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S.
at 479-80).
13
Id. at 312 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).

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that requiring a juvenile offender to serve 45 years or more in prison before any type of
parole release qualifies as a de facto life sentence.14

Post-conviction relief proceedings and appeal
In 2018, Wilson filed a pro se post-conviction relief application, arguing
that his sentence was illegal in light of Miller. He was then appointed counsel, who filed
an amended application for post-conviction relief. The amended application alleged that
the sentence violated the United States and Alaska Constitutions because Wilson
received a de facto life sentence without an individualized sentencing hearing where
the court took into account the unique qualities differentiating children from adults. The
State filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a prima facie claim.
The superior court granted the motion to dismiss. The superior court ruled
that Wilson was not subject to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole because
he was subject to discretionary parole after 33 years. The superior court also ruled that
the sentencing judge properly considered Wilson’s youth and its attendant
characteristics as required by Miller.
Wilson now appeals, arguing that his sentence violated Fletcher because
he received a de facto life sentence without a proper consideration of his youth and
attendant circumstances.15 Wilson argues that his sentence is a de facto life sentence for

14
Id. at 319-20. Both holdings in Fletcher apply retroactively. State v. Fletcher, 555
P.3d 1046, 1047-51 (Alaska App. 2024) (affirming the superior court’s conclusion on
remand that our holding in Fletcher was retroactive and therefore that Fletcher had to be
resentenced).
15
Because we had not yet decided Fletcher, nor was there any other Alaska case
interpreting Article I, Section 12’s protections for juvenile offenders in light of Miller, the
superior court did not decide whether Wilson’s sentence complied with Fletcher or how
Article I, Section 12’s protections may have differed from the Eighth Amendment’s
protections. Despite this, we address and decide Wilson’s argument that his sentence
violated Fletcher on the merits for three reasons. First, Wilson explicitly argued that his
sentence violated the Alaska Constitution in his application for post-conviction relief.
Second, on appeal, both parties fully briefed Fletcher’s applicability. And third, the issue

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two reasons. First, he argues that Alaska’s discretionary parole procedures do not
provide a meaningful opportunity for release under Fletcher, meaning he will have to
serve a minimum of 66 years (i.e., until he is released on mandatory parole) before
being released. Second, and alternatively, he argues that his sentence is a de facto life
sentence under Fletcher because he will have to serve a minimum of 33 years before
being eligible for release on discretionary parole.
We address Wilson’s contentions in reverse order. First, we conclude that
requiring Wilson to serve 33 years before being eligible for discretionary parole is not
a de facto life sentence. Second, we conclude that Wilson has not yet shown a violation
of Fletcher because Wilson’s challenges to the discretionary parole system are
premature. We therefore affirm the superior court’s dismissal of Wilson’s application
for post-conviction relief.

Why we conclude that a sentence that requires 33 years’ incarceration is
not a de facto life without parole sentence
Under Fletcher, a juvenile offender cannot receive a de facto life sentence
unless, inter alia, the sentencing court “affirmatively consider[s] the juvenile offender’s
youth and its attendant characteristics.”16 Wilson argues that requiring him to serve 33
years before being eligible to apply for release amounts to a de facto life sentence. We
disagree.
In Fletcher, we determined that “a sentence that allows an opportunity for
release only after 45 years is a de facto life without parole sentence based primarily on

of whether a sentencing court complied with Fletcher is a pure question of law. See State
v. Blank, 90 P.3d 156, 162 (Alaska 2004) (addressing the merits of an issue that the lower
court did not rule upon because the issue raised a “pure question of law” and it was “more
expeditious” to reach it on appeal). We therefore address this argument on the merits rather
than remanding to the superior court for it to apply Fletcher in the first instance.
16
Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 308 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80).

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the changing landscape of juvenile sentencing practices post-Miller.”17 We reached this
result by “look[ing] at ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’”18 This included “a review of objective indicia of consensus, as
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the
question.”19 A review of these “objective indicia” showed that no other state that had
adopted a post-Miller legislative enactment allowed for a sentence of 45 years before
parole eligibility.20 Likewise, no state supreme court that expanded the protections of
Miller under its state constitution had approved of a sentence where the first possibility
of release occurs after 45 years.21
Our review of Alaska case law and legislation was consistent with this
conclusion.22 Under Alaska case law, Fletcher’s overall sentence (135 years with
discretionary parole after 45 years) required the sentencing court to find that protection
of the public necessitated that “[Fletcher] must spend the rest of [her] life in prison
without any possibility of parole.”23 Likewise, the Alaska’s legislature created a
geriatric release program in 2016 that allows defendants convicted of most crimes to be
eligible for geriatric release after the age of sixty — the same age Fletcher would be
when she first became eligible for release.24 In sum, a review of practices across the

17
Id. at 319-20.
18
Id. at 320 (quoting Gray v. State, 267 P.3d 667, 671 (Alaska App. 2011)).
19
Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005)).
20
Id. at 320 & nn.215-17.
21
Id. at 320 n.218.
22
Id. at 321 (citing Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127, 133-34 (Alaska App. 1989));
SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 123; see also AS 33.16.090(a)(2).
23
Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 321 (quoting Thompson, 768 P.2d at 134).
24
Id. at 322 (citing SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 123).

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United States and in Alaska showed a “clear and consistent trend” that a sentence of 45
years was a de facto life sentence.25
By contrast, a review of the “objective indicia” across other jurisdictions
and Alaska law does not indicate that 33 years is a de facto life sentence. Multiple state
supreme courts and legislatures have approved juvenile sentences of 33 years or more
before parole eligibility.26 Likewise, under Alaska law, Wilson’s overall sentence did
not require a special finding that public safety required that he “spend the rest of his life
in prison.”27 To the contrary, the sentencing judge expressly stated that Wilson’s
sentence would give Wilson the opportunity to be released on parole.28 Wilson will also
first become eligible to apply for discretionary parole at the age of fifty — a full decade
before Alaska’s geriatric release program begins.29 As a result, we hold that Wilson’s

25
Id. at 320.
26
See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 261 A.3d 314, 320 (N.H. 2021) (upholding a discretionary
45-year-minimum sentence); State v. Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d 402, 410-11 (S.D. 2020)
(upholding discretionary sentence of 90 years, after consideration of Miller factors, with
eligibility for parole after 45 years); State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49, 66 (Tenn. 2022)
(concluding that defendant was entitled to have applied to him a previous parole statute,
which allowed for discretionary parole after serving up to 36 years); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-751(A)(2) (providing that a defendant sentenced to life may not be released until
completing 35 years of their sentence, depending on the age of the victim); 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 1102.1 (providing that a defendant who is at least 15 years old at the time of
commission serve at least 35 years of their sentence).
27
Thompson, 768 P.2d at 133-34.
28
Specifically, the sentencing court stated the following at the conclusion of its
sentencing remarks: “There is some question with such a sentence whether Mr. Wilson will
be released. . . . But in the event he is, the court leaves the conditions of that release up to
the parole board.”
29
SLA 2016, ch. 36, § 123.

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sentence that requires he serve at least 33 years before becoming eligible for release is
not a de facto life sentence. 30

Why we conclude that Wilson’s challenge to whether Alaska’s parole
system will provide him with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release
is premature
Under Fletcher, a sentence that does not provide a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” is
unconstitutional when imposed on a juvenile offender convicted of homicide whose
crime reflects “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” rather than “irreparable
corruption.”31 Additionally, before imposing such a sentence on a juvenile, the
sentencing court must, inter alia, “affirmatively consider the juvenile offender’s youth
and its attendant characteristics.”32 For purposes of this appeal, we assume Wilson did
not receive a Fletcher-compliant sentencing hearing.33 In such situations, we recognized

30
Wilson also cites to two studies on the life expectancy of prisoners in support of his
argument that 33 years is a de facto life sentence. As we discussed in Fletcher, “[n]umerous
studies have indicated that incarcerated juveniles have a shorter life expectancy than
nonincarcerated juveniles of the same race and gender, with some studies showing an
average life expectancy of only fifty years for some juvenile prisoners.” Fletcher, 532 P.3d
at 313. But as Fletcher also noted, “many courts have eschewed the use of life expectancy
tables in this context, concluding that the determination of whether the principles of Miller
or Graham apply in a given case should not ‘turn on the niceties of epidemiology, genetic
analysis, or actuarial sciences in determining precise mortality dates.’” Id. at 314 (quoting
State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013)). We did not base our decision in Fletcher
on life expectancy studies, and we likewise decline to do so in this case.
31
Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 312 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012)).
32
Id. at 308 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80).
33
Although we need not decide the question of whether Wilson’s sentencing hearing
complied with Fletcher, we note that the sentencing court made, as the State describes,
multiple statements that “reflect [the court] was unaware of or did not accept the research
on juvenile brain development . . . on which Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery, Jones,
and Fletcher are based.”

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in Fletcher that such a deficiency could be cured by a parole release hearing where the
Parole Board considers the factors set out in Miller.34
Wilson argues that Alaska’s parole system does not qualify as a
“meaningful opportunity for release” under Fletcher because the Parole Board is not
mandated to consider the Fletcher factors, is not mandated to provide applicants with
counsel, and has released only a small percentage of applicants to discretionary parole
in recent years. And if discretionary parole does not qualify as a “meaningful
opportunity for release,” then Wilson will not be eligible for release until he has served
at least two-thirds of his sentence in prison — i.e., 66 years, when he would be eighty-
three years old.35 Pursuant to our holding in Fletcher, a sentence of that length is a
de facto life without parole sentence.
We conclude that Wilson’s challenges to the discretionary parole system
are premature. We discussed whether Alaska’s system of discretionary parole could
provide a meaningful opportunity for release in Fletcher. There, we noted that “while
there is nothing requiring the Alaska Parole Board to treat juvenile offenders differently,
there is also nothing preventing the parole board from applying the Miller factors and
de-emphasizing the seriousness of the offense in cases involving juvenile offenders.”36
This observation remains true. Likewise, while the Parole Board is not mandated by

34
Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 316-19.
35
Under Alaska law, inmates eligible for good-time credits are awarded good-time
credits equal to one-third of their sentence, are subject to losing those good-time credits as
a sanction for prison disciplinary infractions, and are released onto mandatory parole once
they have served their sentence less available good-time credits. See Roller v. State, 539
P.3d 518, 522 & n.16 (Alaska App. 2023) (describing the operation of AS 33.20.010-.040).
When Wilson committed his offense in 1994, inmates convicted of murder were eligible
for good-time credits. In 2019, the legislature amended AS 33.20.010(a) to add paragraph
(4), precluding award of good-time credits on sentences for first- and second-degree
murder. See FSSLA 2019, ch. 4, § 118.
36
Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 319.

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statute or regulation to provide Wilson with counsel, there is nothing in the statutes or
regulations governing parole hearings that prevents the Parole Board from appointing
counsel in these types of cases.37 Similarly, while the Board is not required to hear from
witnesses or to allow Wilson to cross-examine any witnesses against him, there is
nothing preventing the Board from doing so.38 Likewise, Wilson’s statistics showing
that the Board has granted parole to a minority of applicants in recent years does not
prevent the Board from granting parole to any given applicant.
In short, the Parole Board is legally capable of providing a Fletcher-
compliant hearing under its current statutes and regulations. Determining whether the
Parole Board has actually provided a Fletcher-compliant hearing for Wilson will
require that he actually go through a hearing. Until he does so, Wilson’s challenges to
the Parole Board are premature. We therefore decline to decide them now.39

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Wilson’s
application for post-conviction relief.

37
One regulation, 22 AAC 20.150(h), states that “an applicant is not entitled to legal
representation” at discretionary parole application hearings. (Emphasis added.) But 22
AAC 20.150(n) provides that “[a]n attorney may represent the applicant at the hearing,”
though it disclaims any responsibility of the Parole Board or Department of Corrections to
arrange or pay for such representation.
38
22 AAC 20.100(b) (“[T]he board will not permit the appearance of witnesses at
discretionary parole hearings,” except that “[t]he board may make a rare exception due to
exigent circumstances.”).
39
See Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299, 302 (Alaska 2009) (noting “courts should not
resolve abstract questions or issue advisory opinions”).

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Judge TERRELL, concurring.

I write separately to outline what, in my view, a Fletcher-compliant parole
hearing would entail.
First, the Parole Board must affirmatively consider the core holdings of
Roper, Miller, Montgomery, and Fletcher. This means that, when evaluating Wilson’s
conduct as a juvenile, the Board must affirmatively consider and make findings as to
the degree to which the following factors may have affected his criminal conduct:
(1) that “children have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking”; (2) that
“children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’
including from their family and peers” and “have limited ‘contro[l] over their own
environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-
producing settings”; and (3) that “a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an
adult’s” and “his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”1 As part of this analysis, the Board must determine whether
Wilson is among “[t]hose prisoners who have shown an inability to reform” — who
“will continue to serve life sentences” — or is among those who can show that they are
“capable of change,” whom “release will be afforded to.”2 If parole is denied, the Parole
Board must make findings explaining why Wilson has insufficiently rehabilitated
himself.3

1
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (omission and alterations in original)
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)); Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286,
311 (Alaska App. 2023).
2
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016).
3
By this, I do not mean that the Parole Board must release Wilson unless it makes
such findings. The Parole Board may validly deny parole for any number of reasons.

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Second, Wilson must be allowed “to present witnesses and documentary
evidence” (absent exceptional circumstances) and “to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless [the Board or] the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation).”4 The Due Process Clause of the Alaska
Constitution already provides inmates involved in prison disciplinary proceedings with
these rights.5 And a juvenile offender sentenced to a de facto life sentence has at least
as much of an interest in discretionary parole as an inmate does in disciplinary hearings.
Third, Wilson must be appointed counsel if he is indigent. I agree with the
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue, which held that “the parole
process takes on a constitutional dimension” for juvenile offenders “where the
meaningful opportunity for release through parole is necessary in order to conform the
juvenile homicide offender’s mandatory life sentence to the requirements of [our state
constitution].”6 The constitutional right to such representation for offenders who are
entitled to a Fletcher-compliant parole hearing must prevail over any statute or
regulation denying the appointment of counsel in a discretionary parole hearing.
Fourth, Wilson’s application must be fully considered when it is first
raised. Postponing the decision on discretionary parole until some later date would be
legally problematic for many offenders convicted of homicides committed when they
were juveniles and who did not receive a Fletcher-compliant sentencing hearing
because this may extend their sentence to a length that could make it a de facto sentence

Rather, the point of requiring such findings is to ensure that the Parole Board considers
everything it needs to consider in order to make the parole hearing Fletcher-compliant.
4
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
5
McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1236 (Alaska 1975).
6
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 27 N.E.3d 349, 357 (Mass. 2015).

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of life without parole. I assume that the Parole Board will give full consideration to the
applications of such offenders, when they first apply for discretionary parole.

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