Chris N. Nelson v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a).
Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
CHRIS NEAL NELSON,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
,
Court of Appeals No. A-14267
Trial Court No. 3AN-15-04846 CI
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
No. 0500 — October 14, 2026
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, William F. Morse, Judge.
Appearances: Kelly R. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, and
Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting
Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Beach,
Judges.
Chris Neal Nelson was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree
sexual assault and kidnapping after he forced N.F. to drive to a remote location and then
sexually assaulted her.1 We affirmed Nelson’s convictions on direct appeal.2
1 AS 11.41.410 and AS 11.41.300(a)(1)(c), respectively.
2 Nelson v. State, 1994 WL 16196240, at *1 (Alaska App. Mar. 30, 1994)
(unpublished). We initially reversed Nelson’s convictions, finding substantial doubt as to

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At Nelson’s 1990 jury trial, N.F. testified that, on the night she was
abducted, a man she did not know came into the liquor store where she was working;
she later saw him outside by the dumpster as she was leaving her shift. The man
strangled her and forced her to give him a ride to a remote location, where he then
forced her to perform fellatio and forcibly penetrated her. N.F. testified that, while in
the car, the man revealed several biographical facts about himself, including that he was
twenty-four years old, he was on probation, his parents lived in Seward, and he had ten
siblings. N.F. inferred that he had recently moved to Seward because of his apparent
unfamiliarity with the area. All of these facts were true of Nelson.
N.F. — who testified to spending an hour in the car with her assailant —
gave a description of him to law enforcement that matched Nelson’s appearance, and
she positively identified Nelson in a photo lineup conducted the day after the sexual
assault and later in the courtroom. A police officer also testified that Nelson lived one
hundred yards from the liquor store where N.F. was working on the day of her
abduction. And a doctor who conducted a medical examination of N.F. on the night of
the sexual assault testified to his observations, including that N.F. had petechiae across
her neck and over her voice box which the doctor estimated were less than twelve hours
old.
An FBI agent also testified as a serology expert. The expert testified that
people were either “secretors” or “non-secretors.” He explained that secretors have “the
ability to secrete their ABO blood group substances in body fluids other than blood”
and that secretors constitute approximately eighty percent of the population. He testified
that the remaining twenty percent of the population are “non-secretors” who cannot
whether Nelson was tried by an impartial jury. Nelson v. State, 781 P.2d 994, 998 (Alaska
App. 1989). Nelson was subsequently retried and convicted. Nelson, 1994 WL 16196240,
at *1.

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secrete their ABO blood group substances in body fluids other than blood, including
semen.
Based on known samples taken from N.F. and Nelson, the serology expert
stated that N.F. was a secretor and Nelson was a non-secretor. The expert testified that
he analyzed samples taken from N.F.’s vaginal area, pants, and underwear, all of which
contained semen, and that all three samples were consistent with coming from N.F. and
a person who was a non-secretor.
Finally, at trial, the State offered testimony from an FBI hair identification
and analysis expert. This expert testified that a foreign pubic hair found in N.F.’s pubic
hair combings was “consistent” with Nelson’s hair. The expert also testified that two
pubic hairs found in Nelson’s underwear had the same characteristics as N.F.’s hair and
that, based on “the number of apparent [hair] transfers,” there was a “strong likelihood”
that Nelson and N.F. had come into contact.
In 2016, the United States Department of Justice sent a letter to Nelson’s
counsel and to the State explaining that an FBI review of cases involving microscopic
hair comparisons had determined that the hair identification and analysis expert had
provided testimony at Nelson’s trial that “exceeded the limits of science.” Based on this
letter, Nelson filed for post-conviction relief.3 Although this claim would otherwise
have been untimely, Nelson argued that the letter constituted “newly discovered
evidence” of innocence.4
The parties disputed the burden of proof applicable to Nelson’s newly
discovered evidence of innocence claim: Nelson argued that he had to prove by a
3 Nelson had a pre-existing post-conviction relief application raising a time
accounting claim. Nelson v. State, 2026 WL 103510, at *2 (Alaska App. Jan. 14, 2026)
(unpublished). Nelson amended his post-conviction relief application to add the newly
discovered evidence claim. The superior court bifurcated these two claims.
4 See AS 12.72.020(b)(2) (exempting post-conviction relief claims based on newly
discovered evidence from the statutory deadline if certain criteria are met).

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preponderance of the evidence that the outcome of a new trial would be an acquittal,
while the State argued that he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
outcome of a new trial would be an acquittal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
superior court concluded that, even applying the lower standard advocated by Nelson,
Nelson had failed to show that “without the FBI hair testimony . . . he would probably
be found not guilty” at a new trial given the totality of the evidence.
Since the superior court’s ruling, we have clarified that a defendant
bringing a newly discovered evidence of innocence claim, like Nelson, must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the outcome of a new trial would be an acquittal
(i.e., that it is “highly probable” that the outcome would be an acquittal).5 On appeal,
Nelson argues that the superior court abused its discretion in denying his claim that a
retrial without the FBI hair expert’s testimony would probably produce an acquittal.6
Nelson also asserts that we should remand his case to allow the superior court to
evaluate his claim under the correct (i.e., higher) burden of proof.
We decline to do so because, given the record before us, we conclude that
the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Nelson failed to meet even
the lower standard that, absent the hair comparison testimony, he would probably be
acquitted. Accordingly, Nelson necessarily failed to make the stronger showing that it
is highly probable that a retrial would result in an acquittal.7
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.
5 Marino v. State, 577 P.3d 992, 1023 (Alaska App. 2025).
6 See id. at 1014 (stating that a trial court’s ultimate determination of whether the facts
would “probably produce an acquittal” is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard).
7 Id. at 1013, 1024. We further note that Nelson’s attorney acknowledged before the
superior court that Nelson could not meet the higher standard if it did apply.