Ethan Ralph Bolton v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a).
Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
ETHAN RALPH BOLTON,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. A-14520
Trial Court No. 1KE-22-00247 CR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
No. 0499 — October 14, 2026
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District,
Ketchikan, Daniel Doty, Judge.
Appearances: Anna Jay, Attorney at Law, under contract with
the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public
Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Timothy
McGillicuddy, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal
Appeals, Anchorage, and Cori M. Mills, Acting Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Beach and Haines, Judges.
Ethan Ralph Bolton pleaded guilty, pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement,
to one count of first-degree assault for strangling and stabbing his then-girlfriend.1
Bolton inflicted life-threatening injuries, including cutting through his victim’s cheek,
causing permanent facial scarring.
1 AS 11.41.200(a)(1).

– 2 – 0499
As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Bolton would be
sentenced to 10 years to serve. The parties also agreed that Bolton would be sentenced
to suspended time ranging from 4 to 10 years and a term of probation ranging from 4 to
10 years. At sentencing, the superior court imposed a sentence of 20 years with 10 years
suspended (10 years to serve) and 6 years’ probation.
Bolton now appeals his sentence as excessive. But, as Bolton
acknowledges, we do not have jurisdiction to hear his excessive sentence claim because
Bolton received a sentence that was within the plea agreement’s agreed-upon range.2
We therefore refer his excessive sentence claim to the Alaska Supreme Court pursuant
to Alaska Appellate Rule 215(k).
Bolton also separately challenges the length of his probationary term. In
Maguire v. State, we held that we had jurisdiction to hear a defendant’s claim that his
term of probation was excessive because the claim did not involve the “term of
imprisonment” and therefore did not implicate the jurisdictional restrictions set out in
AS 12.55.120 and Appellate Rule 215(a)(1).3 Having reviewed the sentencing record in
the current case, we conclude that the 6-year probationary term — which was within
the plea agreement’s agreed-upon range — is not clearly mistaken given the aggravated
2 See AS 12.55.120(a); Alaska R. App. P. 215(a)(1); Stone v. State, 255 P.3d 979,
980, 982-83 (Alaska 2011) (explaining that AS 12.55.120(a) prohibits defendants from
appealing sentences as excessive to the Court of Appeals when they have been sentenced
in accordance with a plea agreement’s agreed-upon range but that Appellate Rule 215(a)(5)
allows defendants to raise an excessive sentence claim through a petition for review with
the Alaska Supreme Court).
3 Maguire v. State, 390 P.3d 1175, 1177-78 (Alaska App. 2017); see also Walters v.
State, 537 P.3d 339, 343 (Alaska App. 2023) (concluding that we have jurisdiction to
review a court’s restriction of a defendant’s discretionary parole).

– 3 – 0499
nature of Bolton’s assault, his criminal history, and his previous poor performance on
felony supervision.4
Lastly, Bolton challenges a probation condition (Special Condition No. 9),
which requires his residence to “be subject to the approval of the probation officer, and
if decided appropriate, limited to communities with an adult probation office.” Bolton
argues that the condition infringes on his constitutional rights and was not subject to
special scrutiny.5 Bolton argues that, if the condition were subject to special scrutiny, it
would fail.
But a review of the sentencing record indicates that the superior court was
aware of the potential constitutional implications of Special Condition No. 9. And the
superior court specifically rejected a more restrictive condition that would have required
Bolton to live in a community with an adult probation office in favor of the less
restrictive probation condition which left that decision to the discretion of the probation
officer. The superior court imposed this less restrictive condition as necessary, given
“the seriousness of the offense, the nature of the offense, [and] the need for
rehabilitation.” The court also emphasized that Bolton could seek judicial review if his
probation officer unreasonably refused to approve a proposed residence.6
We conclude the superior court acted within its discretion when it imposed
Special Condition No. 9, given the seriousness of the offense, Bolton’s criminal history,
4 McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974) (adopting the clearly
mistaken standard of review for sentence appeals).
5 Probation conditions infringing on constitutional rights must receive special
scrutiny. See, e.g., Peratrovich v. State, 903 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Alaska App. 1995) (vacating
probation condition barring residence on Prince of Wales Island because the superior court
had not considered and rejected lesser restrictions).
6 See, e.g., Rivers v. State, 2018 WL 1357352, at *2-3 (Alaska App. Mar. 14, 2018)
(unpublished) (upholding a similar condition where the superior court applied the proper
level of scrutiny, the condition was justified based on the circumstances, and the defendant
could seek judicial review if the probation officer unreasonably withheld permission).

– 4 – 0499
and the potential need for close supervision on probation.7 We also agree with the
superior court that the availability of judicial review helps safeguard the condition
against unreasonable or unconstitutional applications of its provisions.
Accordingly, we TRANSFER this case to the Alaska Supreme Court for
discretionary review of Bolton’s excessive sentence claim,8 but otherwise AFFIRM the
judgment of the superior court.
7 See Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 168 P.3d 890, 895 (Alaska App. 2007)
(“We review the court’s imposition of a probation condition for abuse of discretion.”).
8 Alaska R. App. P. 215(k).