“(b) Period for Review by Congress of Nuclear Agreements With Iran.—
“(1) Hearings.
Briefings.
In general.—
During the 30-calendar day period following transmittal by the President of an agreement pursuant to subsection (a), the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review such agreement.
“(2) Exception.—
The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) shall be 60 calendar days if an agreement, including all materials required to be transmitted to Congress pursuant to subsection (a)(1), is transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) between July 10, 2015, and September 7, 2015.
“(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional review period.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in paragraph (6), prior to and during the period for transmission of an agreement in subsection (a)(1) and during the period for congressional review provided in paragraph (1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a).
“(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both Houses of Congress, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a) for a period of 12 calendar days following the date of such passage.
“(5) Limitation on actions during congressional reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both Houses of Congress, and the President vetoes such joint resolution, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a) for a period of 10 calendar days following the date of the President’s veto.
“(6) Exception.—
The prohibitions under paragraphs (3) through (5) do not apply to any new deferral, waiver, or other suspension of statutory sanctions pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action if that deferral, waiver, or other suspension is made—
“(A) consistent with the law in effect on the date of the enactment of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015; and129 STAT. 204
“(B) Deadline.
not later than 45 calendar days before the transmission by the President of an agreement, assessment report, and certification under subsection (a).
“(7) Definition.—
In the House of Representatives, for purposes of this subsection, the terms ‘transmittal,’ ‘transmitted,’ and ‘transmission’ mean transmittal, transmitted, and transmission, respectively, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
“(c) Effect of Congressional Action With Respect to Nuclear Agreements With Iran.—
“(1) Sense of congress.—
It is the sense of Congress that—
“(A) the sanctions regime imposed on Iran by Congress is primarily responsible for bringing Iran to the table to negotiate on its nuclear program;
“(B) these negotiations are a critically important matter of national security and foreign policy for the United States and its closest allies;
“(C) this section does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;
“(D) this section provides for congressional review, including, as appropriate, for approval, disapproval, or no action on statutory sanctions relief under an agreement; and
“(E) even though the agreement may commence, because the sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.
“(2) In general.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, action involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement subject to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action—
“(A) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does favor the agreement;
“(B) may not be taken if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the agreement; or
“(C) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, following the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is not enacted any such joint resolution.
“(3) Definition.—
For the purposes of this subsection, the phrase ‘action involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United States’ shall include waiver, suspension, reduction, or other effort to provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to, Iran under any provision of law or any other effort to refrain from applying any such sanctions.
“(d) President.
Congressional Oversight of Iranian Compliance With Nuclear Agreements.—
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“(1) In general.—
The President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees and leadership fully and currently informed of all aspects of Iranian compliance with respect to an agreement subject to subsection (a).
“(2) Potentially significant breaches and compliance incidents.—
The President shall, within 10 calendar days of receiving credible and accurate information relating to a potentially significant breach or compliance incident by Iran with respect to an agreement subject to subsection (a), submit such information to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership.
“(3) Material breach report.—
Not later than 30 calendar days after submitting information about a potentially significant breach or compliance incident pursuant to paragraph (2), the President shall make a determination whether such potentially significant breach or compliance issue constitutes a material breach and, if there is such a material breach, whether Iran has cured such material breach, and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership such determination, accompanied by, as appropriate, a report on the action or failure to act by Iran that led to the material breach, actions necessary for Iran to cure the breach, and the status of Iran’s efforts to cure the breach.
“(4) Semi-annual report.—
Not later than 180 calendar days after entering into an agreement described in subsection (a), and not less frequently than once every 180 calendar days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report on Iran’s nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the agreement during the period covered by the report, including the following elements:
“(A) Any action or failure to act by Iran that breached the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of the agreement.
“(B) Any delay by Iran of more than one week in providing inspectors access to facilities, people, and documents in Iran as required by the agreement.
“(C) Any progress made by Iran to resolve concerns by the International Atomic Energy Agency about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.
“(D) Any procurement by Iran of materials in violation of the agreement or which could otherwise significantly advance Iran’s ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.
“(E) Any centrifuge research and development conducted by Iran that—
“(i) is not in compliance with the agreement; or
“(ii) may substantially reduce the breakout time of acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran, if deployed.
“(F) Any diversion by Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in Iran’s nuclear program in violation of the agreement.
“(G) Any covert nuclear activities undertaken by Iran, including any covert nuclear weapons-related or covert fissile material activities or research and development.
“(H) Assessment.
An assessment of whether any Iranian financial institutions are engaged in money laundering or terrorist 129 STAT. 206
finance activities, including names of specific financial institutions if applicable.
“(I) Iran’s advances in its ballistic missile program, including developments related to its long-range and inter-continental ballistic missile programs.
“(J) Assessment.
An assessment of—
“(i) whether Iran directly supported, financed, planned, or carried out an act of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;
“(ii) whether, and the extent to which, Iran supported acts of terrorism, including acts of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;
“(iii) all actions, including in international fora, being taken by the United States to stop, counter, and condemn acts by Iran to directly or indirectly carry out acts of terrorism against the United States and United States persons;
“(iv) the impact on the national security of the United States and the safety of United States citizens as a result of any Iranian actions reported under this paragraph; and
“(v) all of the sanctions relief provided to Iran, pursuant to the agreement, and a description of the relationship between each sanction waived, suspended, or deferred and Iran’s nuclear weapon’s program.
“(K) Assessment.
An assessment of whether violations of internationally recognized human rights in Iran have changed, increased, or decreased, as compared to the prior 180-day period.
“(5) Additional reports and information.—
“(A) Agency reports.—
Following submission of an agreement pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense shall, upon the request of any of those committees or leadership, promptly furnish to those committees or leadership their views as to whether the safeguards and other controls contained in the agreement with respect to Iran’s nuclear program provide an adequate framework to ensure that Iran’s activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.
“(B) President.
Provision of information on nuclear initiatives with iran.—
The President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees and leadership fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating to Iran’s nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement.
“(6) President.
Compliance certification.—
After the review period provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less than every 90 calendar days—
“(A) Determination.
determine whether the President is able to certify that—
129 STAT. 207
“(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements;
“(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has cured the material breach;
“(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and
“(iv) suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the agreement is—
“(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program; and
“(II) vital to the national security interests of the United States; and
“(B) if the President determines he is able to make the certification described in subparagraph (A), make such certification to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership.
“(7) Sense of congress.—
It is the sense of Congress that—
“(A) United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under an agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1);
“(B) issues not addressed by an agreement on the nuclear program of Iran, including fair and appropriate compensation for Americans who were terrorized and subjected to torture while held in captivity for 444 days after the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and their families, the freedom of Americans held in Iran, the human rights abuses of the Government of Iran against its own people, and the continued support of terrorism worldwide by the Government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure justice and the national security of the United States, and should be expeditiously addressed;
“(C) the President should determine the agreement in no way compromises the commitment of the United States to Israel’s security, nor its support for Israel’s right to exist; and
“(D) in order to responsibly implement any long-term agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity to review any agreement and, as necessary, take action to modify the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.
“(f) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.—
Subsection (e) is enacted by Congress—
“(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of legislation described in those sections, and supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and
“(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
“(g) Rules of Construction.—
Nothing in the section shall be construed as—
“(1) modifying, or having any other impact on, the President’s authority to negotiate, enter into, or implement appropriate executive agreements, other than the restrictions on implementation of the agreements specifically covered by this section;
“(2) allowing any new waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief from statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law, or allowing the President to refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement 129 STAT. 211
described in subsection (a) during the period for review provided in subsection (b);
“(3) revoking or terminating any statutory sanctions imposed on Iran; or
“(4) authorizing the use of military force against Iran.