R & D Towing, Inc., and Tri-County Towing LLC v. United Financial Casualty Company

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
R & D TOWING, INC., and April 7, 2026
TRI-COUNTY TOWING LLC, ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 25-ICA-259 (Cir. Ct. of Summers Cnty. Case No. CC-45-2020-C-5)

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioners R & D Towing, Inc. (“RDT”) and Tri-County Towing LLC (“Tri-
County”) appeal the May 27, 2025, order from the Circuit Court of Summers County,
which granted Respondent United Financial Casualty Company’s (“United”) motion for
summary judgment. United filed a response.1 Petitioners did not file a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

RDT was incorporated as a West Virginia corporation on July 17, 2013, and
engaged in the towing and recovery business. Ronald Cook was listed as RDT’s President
and only shareholder. According to the West Virginia Secretary of State’s records, RDT’s
corporate status was terminated on June 24, 2021. Tri-County was formed as a West
Virginia limited liability company on December 27, 2018. According to the West Virginia
Secretary of State’s records, Tri-County is not a successor to RDT.2

On April 7, 2015, RDT purchased a 2001 Peterbilt 378 (the “Peterbilt”) for
$185,000 and received the Peterbilt’s certificate of title from the West Virginia Division of

1
Petitioners are represented by Anthony M. Salvatore, Esq. United is represented
by Susan R. Snowden, Esq.
2
Our recitation of the facts relies extensively on the circuit court’s findings of
undisputed fact that petitioners do not challenge on appeal.

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Motor Vehicles on June 12, 2015. In June 2016, flash flooding damaged, among other
things, RDT’s offices and the Peterbilt.

RDT repaired the Peterbilt and returned it to service approximately three to four
days after the flood. Thereafter, on June 23, 2016, RDT submitted an insurance claim for
the cost of repairing the Peterbilt. At the time of this claim, KBK Insurance Group, Inc.
was RDT’s insurance provider. RDT received an insurance payout of approximately
$100,000 for its claim.

On September 20, 2017, United issued a Commercial Automobile Insurance Policy
(the “Policy”) to RDT with effective dates from September 30, 2017, to September 30,
2018. The Policy was obtained through Energy Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Energy
Insurance”). The Peterbilt was listed on the auto coverage schedule of the Policy for
$185,000, subject to a $1,000 deductible.

On the morning of February 26, 2018, Mr. Cook learned that the Peterbilt had been
vandalized while parked in RDT’s garage (the “Incident”). After arriving at the garage and
inspecting the damage, Mr. Cook contacted 911 Emergency Services, the West Virginia
State Police, and Energy Insurance. Law enforcement responded to the scene and observed
that the Peterbilt’s tires were sliced, its electronic controls were destroyed, and its engine
components and structural integrity had been compromised.

On February 26, 2018, Energy Insurance submitted a claim to United regarding the
Peterbilt’s damage from the Incident (the “Peterbilt Claim”). Upon United’s receipt of the
Peterbilt Claim, it was assigned to Claim Representative Elana Wells. On February 27,
2018, Ms. Wells contacted Mr. Cook at which time they discussed the Incident and
scheduling the Peterbilt for claim inspection.3

During the claim process, Mr. Cook came under investigation for insurance fraud
related to the Incident. Due to the investigation, Mr. Cook informed United on March 5,
2018, that he was withdrawing the Peterbilt Claim. United closed the claim on March 6,
2018. Following the investigation, a criminal complaint was filed against Mr. Cook in
Greenbrier County on March 30, 2018, alleging two counts of insurance fraud, one count
of fraudulent schemes, and one count of falsely reporting an emergency. Mr. Cook was
arrested and released on bond on April 2, 2018. On October 25, 2019, Mr. Cook’s criminal
charges were dismissed without prejudice.

3
During this conversation, Mr. Cook described the extent of the Peterbilt’s damage
to Ms. Wells. He explained that vandals had poured sugar into the engine and fuel tanks;
used a torch to cut the frame; smashed all the lights; and slashed all its tires. Mr. Cook
further reported that multiple tools and equipment were taken from the shop including but
not limited to generators and welding machines.

2
On December 3, 2019, petitioners’ counsel sent a letter to United, seeking the status
of the Peterbilt Claim. The claim had remained closed since Mr. Cook’s request in March
2018. On December 16, 2019, United unsuccessfully attempted to contact petitioners’
counsel concerning the Peterbilt Claim. On December 17, 2019, United received a
voicemail from said counsel who stated that Mr. Cook wished to reopen the Peterbilt Claim
because his criminal charges were dismissed. Thereafter, United reopened the claim and
assigned it to claim representative Pamela Mausser.

On December 20, 2019, Ms. Mausser sent counsel a letter requesting that he send
her documentation related to the Peterbilt Claim. Ms. Mausser attempted to reach counsel
about the claim on December 30, 2019, but he was not available. Thereafter, Ms. Mausser
sent counsel an email and upon counsel’s request, provided him with a certified copy of
the Policy. Ms. Mausser was unsuccessful in her later attempts to contact petitioners’
counsel regarding the Peterbilt Claim on January 2, 2020, and January 3, 2020. In response,
on January 3, 2020, Ms. Mausser sent a letter to counsel, stating that she had been trying
to reach him regarding the Peterbilt Claim as it was necessary in order to continue
processing the claim. Ms. Mausser also tried to contact counsel on January 7, 2020, but he
was not available. On January 8, 2020, counsel telephoned Ms. Mausser and confirmed
that his client wanted to move forward with the Peterbilt Claim.

Approximately thirty-seven days after the Peterbilt Claim was reopened, petitioners
sued United on January 24, 2020, alleging claims related to United’s handling of the
Peterbilt Claim. Petitioners’ counsel informed Ms. Mausser of this litigation through an
email dated February 4, 2020.

Ms. Mausser was likewise unsuccessful in her attempts to contact counsel regarding
the Peterbilt Claim on February 13, 2020, and February 14, 2020. On February 14, 2020,
Ms. Mausser left counsel a voicemail and sent him an email again expressing the need to
speak to counsel in order to process the claim.

On February 17, 2020, the Peterbilt Claim was reassigned to United claim
representative Guadalupe H. Soto. Mr. Soto attempted to contact petitioners’ counsel by
telephone on February 26, 2020, but was unsuccessful and counsel’s voicemail was not
accepting messages at that time. On February 26, 2020, Mr. Soto sent correspondence to
counsel requesting to speak with counsel about the claim. Mr. Soto also requested that
counsel provide photos of the Peterbilt’s damage, repair estimates for the alleged damages,
proof of payment for any repairs, and the current location of the Peterbilt.

On March 2, 2020, Mr. Soto and petitioners’ counsel exchanged emails and spoke
by phone concerning the Peterbilt Claim. Counsel informed Mr. Soto that the Peterbilt was
being stored in RDT’s garage, and that his client viewed the Peterbilt to be a total loss. At
that time, Mr. Soto and counsel discussed scheduling an inspection. Thereafter, United
requested further documentation from counsel, which was summarized in a letter dated

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March 19, 2020. United maintained that the requested information was necessary for both
the Peterbilt Claim adjustment and for United’s counsel in the underlying litigation.

On March 20, 2020, petitioners filed an amended complaint, which alleged that
United: (1) failed to honor the insurance contract with petitioners and pay the claim; (2)
failed to give any reason for a denial of this claim; (3) failed to promptly respond to
petitioners’ claim correspondence; (4) failed to advise petitioners of its right to appeal to
the West Virginia Offices of the Insurance Commissioner; (5) violated the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”) and related regulations;4 and (6) committed statutory
and common law bad faith.

RDT did not provide the requested information for several months. Instead, on
January 5, 2021, United’s litigation counsel sent petitioners’ counsel a letter, which
acknowledged United’s first receipt of information and stated, in part:

Thank you for providing the most recent information to United Financial
Casualty Company (“United Financial”) regarding the valuation of your
client’s truck in this matter. Please note that for the first time, based upon
you having provided the bill of sale, United Financial was provided with
a full description to include the specific make, model, body and more
detailed information with regard to the subject vehicle. Prior to that,
your client had not provided specific detailed information to his
insurance carrier, allowing it to accurately value the claim. I would again
call to your attention the fact that in your client’s prior claim, which was
made in this case, he withdrew the claim. At no time did United Financial
deny the claim.

(emphasis added).

Eventually, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations regarding the Peterbilt
Claim. The parties’ counsel exchanged a series of letters and emails between March 8,
2021, and March 18, 2021. Ultimately, the parties settled the Peterbilt Claim, and United
paid the Peterbilt’s listed Policy value of $185,000.

On January 4, 2024, United filed its motion for summary judgment wherein it
contended that Tri-County lacked standing to pursue the claims raised in the amended
complaint, and that RDT failed to establish that United acted in bad faith under the UTPA,
common law, or applicable regulations. United further asserted that RDT was not entitled

4
See generally W. Va. Code §§ 33-11-1 to -10 and W.Va. Code R. §§ 114-14-1 to
-10.

4
to Hayseeds damages.5 Petitioners filed a response opposing the motion and United filed a
reply. On May 27, 2025, the circuit court entered the order presently on appeal.

Relevant to this appeal, the circuit court found that petitioners’ UTPA claim for
unfair claim settlement practices is governed by West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9) (2002),
which states, in part:

No person shall commit or perform with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice any of the following:

(a) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to
coverages at issue; (b) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly
upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance
policies; (c) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the
prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies; (d) Refusing
to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all
available information; (e) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within
a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed; (f) Not
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear; (g) Compelling
insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance
policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
in actions brought by the insureds, when the insureds have made claims for
amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered; (h)
Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable
man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed
advertising material accompanying or made part of an application; (i)
Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured; (j) Making claims
payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a statement setting
forth the coverage under which payments are being made; (k) Making known
to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awards in
favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept
settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration; (l)
Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and
then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both
of which submissions contain substantially the same information; (m) Failing
to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably clear, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements

5 See Syl. Pts. 1 and 2, Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 177 W. Va.
323, 352 S.E.2d 73 (1986).
5
under other portions of the insurance policy coverage; (n) Failing to promptly
provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in
relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of
a compromise settlement[.]

The circuit court further noted that in order to prevail on a UTPA claim, an insured cannot
rely solely on an insurer’s isolated violation of West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9), but rather,
it must be demonstrated that an insurer violated the statute with such frequency as to
indicate a “general business practice” thereunder. See Syl. Pt. 3, Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 201 W. Va. 1, 491 S.E.2d 1 (1996) (citation modified) (“More than a single
isolated violation of West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9), must be shown in order to meet the
statutory requirement of an indication of a general business practice, which requirement
must be shown in order to maintain the statutory implied cause of action.”).

Applying those principles to the present case, the circuit court determined that
petitioners had produced no evidence to demonstrate that United violated the subject
statute. Particularly, the court found that there was no evidence to establish United’s
conduct was more than an isolated event and, thus, could not meet the statutory threshold
of a “general business practice.” The circuit court also found no merit in petitioners’
contention that they had a viable cause of action because United delayed the processing of
their claim. The court found this theory untenable based upon the undisputed facts of the
case. Particularly, the court explicitly found that petitioners’ own conduct delayed the
processing and settlement of the Peterbilt Claim. Here, the court highlighted United’s
several unsuccessful attempts to contact petitioners’ counsel and obtain pertinent claim
information. The court also noted the fact that petitioners did not provide United with
necessary claim information until on or about January 5, 2021, almost a full year after
petitioners filed their original complaint. Similarly, the court rejected petitioners’ parallel
argument that United was required to settle their claim within thirty days. Specifically, the
court found that no such requirement existed under the plain language of the UTPA and
relevant state regulations, petitioners offered no authority to support their contention, and
that petitioners’ subjective belief that the Peterbilt Claim took “too long” to process was
not a valid basis for relief. 6

Ultimately, the circuit court determined that there was no factual basis to support
the allegations asserted by petitioners in their amended complaint. The court found that
United had not violated any statutory, regulatory, or common law provision with respect
to its handling of the Peterbilt Claim, and accordingly, entered summary judgment in favor
of United and this appeal followed.

6
The circuit court also found that Tri-County lacked standing with respect to the
underlying claims. Petitioners do not challenge that ruling in this appeal.
6
In West Virginia, it is well established that our standard of review in this matter is
de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit
court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”). In conducting a de novo review,
this Court applies the same standard for granting summary judgment that a circuit court
must apply, and that standard states, “a motion for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning
the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Id. at 190, 451 S.E.2d at 756,
syl. pt. 2 (citation modified). “Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the
evidence presented . . . the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.” Syl. Pt. 2, Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995). “[T]he party opposing
summary judgment must satisfy the burden of proof by offering more than a mere scintilla
of evidence and must produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in a
nonmoving party’s favor.” Id. at 60, 459 S.E.2d at 337 (citation modified).

As petitioners’ lone assignment of error on appeal, they offer the overarching
contention that the circuit court erred because it granted summary judgment in the face of
genuine issues of material fact. According to petitioners, these facts establish their common
law bad faith and UTPA claims. The Court finds petitioners’ argument unconvincing.
Rather, we conclude that petitioners have failed to articulate error for appellate review.

Here, the argument section of petitioners’ brief consists of about five pages, which
predominantly consists of several long block quotations, some of which are offered without
proper citation to the authority from which they are derived. Moreover, petitioners’
argument contains no analysis applying those authorities to the facts of this case or citation
to the record, as required. At best, petitioners present skeletal arguments, which lack any
reasonable specificity or meaningful explanation. See State v. Kaufman, 227 W. Va. 537,
555 n.39, 711 S.E.2d 607, 625 n.39 (2011) (citation modified) (“A skeletal argument, really
nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va.
294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996) (“Although we liberally construe briefs in
determining issues presented for review, issues which are not raised, and those mentioned
only in passing but are not supported with pertinent authority, are not considered on
appeal.”); W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) (“The argument must contain appropriate and
specific citations to the record on appeal, including citations that pinpoint when and how
the issues in the assignments of error were presented to the lower tribunal. The Intermediate
Court . . . may disregard errors that are not adequately supported by specific references to
the record on appeal.”).7 Furthermore, as our Supreme Court of Appeals has held:

7
The Court notes that it previously reminded petitioners’ counsel of the
requirements of Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure in a
different appeal. See R&D Towing, Inc. v. Plaza Ins. Co., No. 23-ICA-243, 2024 WL
3252731, at *4 n.2 (W. Va. Ct. App. July 1, 2024) (memorandum decision).
7
An appellant must carry the burden of showing error in the judgment of
which he complains. This Court will not reverse the judgment of a trial court
unless error affirmatively appears from the record. Error will not be
presumed, all presumptions being in favor of the correctness of the judgment.

Syl. Pt. 5, Morgan v. Price, 151 W. Va. 158, 150 S.E.2d 897 (1966).

In this appeal, petitioners’ cursory arguments fail to offer any indication of
reversible error in the circuit court’s judgment. Therefore, because petitioners have failed
to carry their burden of establishing error below, we decline to disturb the court’s decision
to grant summary judgment and affirm its May 27, 2025, order.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 7, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge S. Ryan White

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